This doctoral dissertation deals with intergovernmental relations in Canada. It seeks to explain a pattern that the author has observed in the federal government's approach to its relations with the provincial and territorial governments. The pattern is characterized by a noticeable reluctance on the part of the federal government to assert its valid constitutional powers, even when the courts uphold the constitutionality of those powers. The dissertation hypothesizes that federal reticence stems from serious omissions in the constitution of Canada. Those omissions left Canada institutionally incomplete. They were a result of a major constitutional abeyance, in Michael Foley's terminology, having to do with the founders' ambivalent feelings about Canadian sovereignty and nationhood. Because of that abeyance and the particular constitutional exclusions that flowed from it, the federal government routinely backs away from a leadership role even when the issue in question appears to fall squarely within its jurisdiction. The author's theoretical framework, integrating historical institutionalism and the theory of constitutional abeyances, is tested by an analysis of the federal government stance on internal trade barriers, environmental policy, and the federal spending power. The theory was upheld in the first two cases but is not able, with the method and approach used in this dissertation, to satisfactorily explain the federal position on its spending power.

Scholars and policymakers generally regard democracy as a force for better governance; however, democracy is a many-splendored thing and it is not clear which elements of a democratic regime are critical in the governance equation. Moreover, we have only an imprecise understanding of the causal mechanisms in the democracy-governance relationship. Accordingly, the goals of this dissertation are to identify those elements of democracy that have a positive impact on the quality of government and to understand the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. I turn from the question "Does democracy improve the quality of government?" to "How does democracy improve the quality of government?" / Of all the various ways in which democracy might improve the quality of government (e.g., political participation, electoral competition, press freedom and political constraints created by checks and balances), I argue that political constraints on the executive's discretionary authority, activated by checks and balances, have the greatest impact on the quality of governance. Legislative constraints, particularly, have a strong effect on the quality of government by reducing the discretionary authority of the executive over the public bureaucracy. / The dissertation follows a mixed-method research strategy. In the first section, I begin with a theoretical chapter to develop the main argument and conduct cross-national statistical analyses to identify the component of democracy underlying variations in the quality of government, using time-series data and disaggregating democracy into specific components. The second part of the dissertation comprises three case studies: Mexico, Chile, and Argentina. Here, I process-trace the decisions these new democracies took to create professional and non-corrupt bureaucracies.

In this dissertation, I study the effects of electoral reform on party systems and electoral campaigns, based on the case of Japan following the change to a mixed-member electoral system. The dissertation project examines the issue from three different perspectives: two studies focus on the small party survival strategies under the new system, but from different points of view, and one focuses on the changes in incumbency advantage in plurality contests, following reform. / In Chapter 2, I reexamine accepted wisdom on the contamination effect: it is rational for small parties to nominate plurality candidates, because they help to mobilize more PR votes. I demonstrate that the mixed results of previous studies are due to inconsistencies between the specific question posed and the methodological tool used. I show that small parties in fact increased their PR vote-share where the party nominated candidates in plurality tier, but the impact was small at the national level. / In Chapter 3, I demonstrate an alternative purpose of nominations: blackmailing major parties to adopt policies more desirable to the small parties. I develop a formal model of the interactions between a small leftist party and the center-left major party based on chain-store paradox. The model shows that the small party can persuade the major party to select leftist rather than centrist candidates in a repeated game, regardless of the median voter preferences. The empirical data clearly supports the model. / In Chapter 4, I study the magnitude of incumbency advantage after electoral reform, which could help unpopular incumbents remain in power. I utilize the mechanisms of the double candidacy system for a natural experiment . The model shows that the parties/candidates with PR incumbency performed 2-3% better in the plurality vote-share in the districts than those without seats. This result suggests that the double candidacy system hurts the incumbents, counter to the conventional wisdom.

Over the past four decades, the majority of autocracies have held multi-party elections. This dissertation investigates the influence of these elections on policy and democratic development. I break up the analysis into four substantive chapters. First, I introduce a new dataset that disaggregates democracy into the two dimensions of participation and contestation to map the evolution of hybrid regimes from 1815--2004. I find that nearly all hybrid regimes prior to 1940 featured high contestation and low participation, but the opposite is true for modern regimes. I also show that experience with autocratic elections is a positive predictor of democratization and democratic stability. In the second chapter, I theorize that autocratic elections are used to gather information on citizen preferences and then adjust policy. I conduct the first cross-country empirical study of policy-setting based on autocratic election outcomes, finding that as a ruling party's vote support wanes, it increases its education and social welfare spending and decreases its military spending. In the third chapter, I introduce the first formal model of hybrid regime transitions. Class conflict over redistribution and the pressure of popular revolt frames an autocrat's choice between closed authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, and democracy. Among the empirical implications is that we should find electoral autocracies at middle values of economic inequality and regime strength. Finally, I argue that regime strength plays a critical mediating role between country-level variables and democratic transitions. Although this framework is tested on economic development, it also helps explain the patterns found for autocratic electoral history and democratic development.

The countries of post-Soviet Central Asia share remarkable similarities: they came into existence at the same time, have since undergone similar processes and challenges in establishing statehood, are culturally related to each other, share similar historical paths, and have nearly---if not totally---identical political institutions. Despite such similarities, however, the countries have developed distinct political regimes manifested, among others, in the consolidation of presidential power---the degree to which the presidents hold the monopoly on power and allow for political contestation and challenges to their authority from opponents. This study suggests that the differing ways the power was consolidated in Central Asia have led to divergent types of political regimes and are closely associated with the leadership styles adopted by the presidents in each country during the period immediately following independence. In Uzbekistan, the president's advocate style allowed him to eliminate political opposition early on and dominate the political landscape. In Kazakhstan, the president's pragmatic-advocate style resulted in a less repressive political order. In Kyrgyzstan, the president's opportunistic style allowed for more oppositional activity resulting in the most vibrant political scene in the region.

The importance of property rights to economic and political development is widely recognized. Yet it remains unclear why institutions for protecting property rights often fail to emerge. Many scholars focus on leaders' incentives and assume that if institutions are "supplied," then firms will automatically use them. By contrast, this study emphasizes that firms often circumvent or subvert newly created institutions. Consequently, theories of property rights formation should not focus exclusively on whether or not leaders create institutions. They must also explain the conditions under which firms actually use formal institutions for protection. / This study analyzes firms' strategies for protecting property rights in Russia and identifies conditions under which firms rely on state institutions. Observers of Russia frequently focus narrowly on high-profile property rights disputes and mistakenly conclude that the lawlessness of the 1990s persists. However, my original survey of Russian enterprises and in-depth interviews with firms, lawyers, and private security agencies reveal a remarkable shift in firms' strategies over time: Whereas Russian firms in the 1990s used illegal coercion---such as mafia rackets---to protect property, today they increasingly utilize law and formal institutions. / To examine this shift in firms' strategies, I develop an analytical framework based on evolutionary game theory. The framework draws attention to several key characteristics of institutional development: (1) The expected payoffs to firms' strategies for protecting property depend on the interplay of direct effects (i.e., exogenous factors that determine the benefits and costs of a given strategy) and interactive effects (i.e., the extent to which other firms in an economy use a given strategy). (2) Over time, more effective strategies become predominant, due to mechanisms such as natural selection or adaptive learning. (3) A tipping point exists, at which society begins to break from a vicious cycle to a virtuous cycle. Relatively small changes can therefore initiate self-reinforcing cycles with large effects. / Based on this analytical framework, the study investigates the sources of change in firms' strategies. Over the past decade, an incentive transformation has occurred. Firms now recognize that law is a more effective tool for protecting property than alternatives, such as private security agencies or informal connections with government officials. Three types of factors have shifted the benefits and constraints of illegal versus legal strategies in favor of law: (1) organizational changes within firms, such as the evolution of firm ownership structures; (2) changes in other institutional spheres, including the development of the tax administration and banking sector; and (3) changes from outside the domestic political and economic system, including the inflow of foreign investment. / Incentive structures also explain variation across firms' strategies for protecting property. The nature of threats and available resources shape the relative benefits and constraints of using illegal versus legal strategies. Analysis of these two factors predicts the types of firms most likely to use legal strategies: (1) medium-sized firms rather than small or large firms; (2) firms that produce physical products rather than services; (3) firms that operate in large-scale rather than exclusively local markets; and (4) firms that lack informal connections to government officials. / This study's conclusion explores pathways to the rule of law in transition and developing countries, with specific reference to Russia. Whether the rule of law will take root in Russia depends on the outcome of two conflicting tendencies: (1) increasing demand for law by firms; and (2) decreasing supply of law by predatory state officials.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Political Science, 2006. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0325. Adviser: Robert Huckfeldt. "Title from dissertation home page (viewed Feb. 8, 2007)."

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Political Science, 2006. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-03, Section: A, page: 1080. Adviser: Elinor Ostrom. "Title from dissertation home page (viewed March 16, 2007)."

How is two-party electoral competition influenced by third parties, even under normal political conditions? I argue that the mere threat of third party entry into the election induces anticipatory electoral strategies by the major parties. This effect, which is a normal aspect of the two-party system, is how third parties play a consistent role in U.S. elections. The ability for third parties to influence the major parties is moderated by electoral institutions. The ballot access requirement, in the form of a signature requirement, varies widely across House elections and is a significant predictor of third party electoral success. Consistent with conventional wisdom, I find that it has a negative effect on the likelihood of entry. Notably, the requirement also has a positive effect on third party vote shares, conditional on successful petitioning, due to a screening and quality effect. I explore the effects of third party threat in unidimensional and multidimensional settings. A formal model of elections predicts that the threat of entry induces major party divergence in a unidimensional ideological space. The major parties diverge in anticipation of potential third party entry. An empirical analysis of candidate positioning in the 1996 U.S. House elections finds support of this hypothesis. Data on major party campaign advertising in the 2000 to 2004 U.S. House elections are used to assess third party effects in a multidimensional framework. I show that third party threat influences the scope and content of campaign advertising. Major party candidates, particularly incumbents, discuss a broader range of issues when third party threat is higher. I use the case of environmental issues and the Green party to assess the influence of third parties on issue-specific content. I find that Green party threat leads to predictable differences between Democratic and Republican advertising on environmental issues. In sum, third parties play a consistent role in U.S. House elections by inducing anticipatory strategies by the major parties. This strategic framework for understanding third parties stresses two things. First, one should focus on the major parties in order to gauge the influence of third parties. Second, one should not conclude that third parties are irrelevant because of their minimal electoral success. Third party effects are in fact present even in elections where a third party does not enter. / Dissertation

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University OF MICHIGAN.