The appointment of a judge, regardless of the process followed, is a political act. With the global expansion of judicial power, the topic of judicial appointments has become one of growing political importance. However, comparative research on judicial appointments reform has so far been limited. This dissertation proposes and tests a theory for understanding the timing and nature of reforms to judicial appointments systems, the Judicial Politics Trigger Theory, by looking at the final courts of appeal in Canada, Australia, and the United States. Examining these three courts from their respective origins to the present day, the dissertation situates contemporary interest in judicial appointments reform within the larger framework of each court's institutional history. Drawing upon in-depth interviews and archival research, it finds that changes to judicial appointments systems in these cases have tended to evolve incrementally over time. In addition, the dissertation highlights the importance that institutional rules can play in structuring the opportunities for and outcomes of reform, and confirms that there is a correlation between the perception of increased judicial empowerment and calls for judicial appointments reform. Consequently, as the judicial branches in various countries continue to gain political power, interest in and attempts to reform the judicial appointments processes of these courts are likely to continue, making research of such reform all the more essential. / La nomination d'un juge, quelle que soit la procédure suivie, est un acte politique. Avec l'expansion mondiale du pouvoir judiciaire, le sujet de la sélection des juges est devenu d'une importance politique plus forte. Cependant, la recherche comparative sur la réforme des processus de nominations judiciaires a été limitée jusqu'a present. Cette thèse propose et teste une théorie pour comprendre le calendrier et la nature des réformes des systèmes de sélection des juges, la théorie du «Judicial Politics Trigger», en examinant les tribunaux de dernière instance au Canada, en Australie et aux États-Unis. En faisant l'examen de ces trois tribunaux de leurs origines respectives à aujourd'hui, la thèse situe l'intérêt contemporain pour la réforme des systemes de sélection des juges dans le cadre plus large de l'histoire institutionnelle de chaque tribunal. S'appuyant sur des entretiens avec les élites politiques et des recherches dans les archives, la thèse etablit que les changements de processus de nominations judiciaires dans ces cas ont eu tendance à évoluer progressivement au fil du temps. En outre, la thèse met en évidence l'importance que les règles institutionnelles peuvent jouer dans la structuration des possibilités et des résultats de la réforme, et confirme qu'il existe une corrélation entre la perception de l'augmentation du pouvoir judiciaire et les appels à la réforme des systemes de selection des juges. Par conséquent, parce les branches judiciaires continuent de conquérir le pouvoir politique, l'intérêt et les tentatives de réformer les processus de sélection des juges de ces tribunaux sont susceptibles de se poursuivre, ce qui rend la recherche de telles réformes d'autant plus indispensable.

The purpose of this thesis is to understand how authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes can become responsive in the absence of free and fair elections, sometimes even more so than democracies. To address this issue, the thesis focuses on cases drawn from Southeast Asia. Many semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes in the region seem to be responsive, such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore, while democracies have often failed to respond in a similar manner. To account for these surprising results, the argument put forth in this thesis is that the presence of nominally democratic institutions - elections, legislatures and parties - can contribute greatly to the responsiveness of non-democratic regimes. Such institutions make important information about a population's preferences available, and responsiveness therefore becomes easier, while they can also improve a regime's capacity to implement responsive policies. To contribute to responsiveness in this way, elections need to be semi-competitive, legislatures have to allow for some representation, and parties must be institutionalized. Under these conditions, nominally democratic institutions favor responsiveness in non-democratic regimes. Meanwhile, the absence of some of these requirements in Southeast Asian democracies helps account for their low levels of responsiveness. Since responsiveness is deeply linked to the well-being of the populations living under different regimes, it seems crucial to understand how non-democratic regimes can become responsive, while democratic regimes can fail to become so. / Le but de ce mémoire est de comprendre comment des régimes autoritaires et semi-autoritaires peuvent en venir à répondre aux besoins de leur population en l'absence d'élections justes et libres, et parfois même mieux que certaines démocraties. Ce mémoire, pour répondre à cette question, se concentre sur des pays situés en Asie du Sud-est. Plusieurs régimes autoritaires et semi-autoritaires dans la région ont démontré une forte tendance à répondre aux besoins de leur population, comme le Vietnam, la Malaisie et Singapour, alors que les régimes démocratiques ont souvent échoué à remplir une telle fonction. Pour expliquer ces résultats surprenant, l'argument avancé est que la présence d'institutions nominalement démocratiques, telles que des élections, parlements et partis, a grandement aidé les régimes non-démocratiques à répondre aux demandes de leur population. De telles institutions communiquent de l'information sur les préférences de la population, ce qui aide les régimes à savoir comment répondre à ses demandes et besoins, alors qu'elles peuvent également améliorer la capacité des régimes à mettre en œuvre des politiques à cet effet. Cependant, pour avoir un tel impact, les élections doivent être semi-compétitives, les législatures doivent représenter certains secteurs de la société, et les partis doivent être institutionnalisés. Dans de telles conditions, des institutions nominalement démocratiques aident les régimes autoritaires et semi-autoritaires à répondre à leur population. L'absence de certaines de ces conditions au sein des régimes démocratiques en Asie du Sud-est explique pour sa part leur faible tendance à faire de même. Puisque la mesure dans laquelle les régimes répondent aux besoins de leur population est fortement liée au bien-être de cette dernière, il semble crucial de comprendre comment des régimes non-démocratiques peuvent répondre de cette façon, alors que certains régimes démocratiques n'y parviennent toujours pas.

This thesis explores the emerging political concept of Indigenous Food Sovereignty. In brief, the concept of Indigenous Food Sovereignty (IFS) makes the claim that Indigenous communities have the right to preserve and practice their cultural traditions surrounding the production of food. Communities should have access to enough land in order to practice their traditions to the point of self-sufficiency. This goal involves limiting the actions of Indigenous individuals through promoting traditional values within Indigenous communities. IFS also seeks to limit the actions of non-Indigenous persons and nations in order to protect space reserved for Indigenous traditions. I ask the following questions throughout my research into this subject. What kind of limitations on the freedoms of Indigenous individuals does the enforcement of tradition within communities entail? In what ways does "guaranteeing enough Indigenous land" require limitations on the actions of non-Indigenous people? Finally, are the values and demands that IFS promotes justifiable within an Indigenous worldview? A liberal worldview?From the traditional Indigenous worldview, I find that IFS is justifiable. This does not occur without tension though, for the concept additionally desires to employ certain modern practices in order to help communities survive. I find that liberalism can also agree with IFS in regard to the restrictions that are demanded on Indigenous individuals; this occurs through the adoption of a "cultural compromise" surrounding the issue of land inalienability. In this compromise, Indigenous communities are given the power of alienation over their lands so they may choose to alienate or not at their will. This is intended to please both sides because Indigenous people have the freedom to alienate if they want to, but they are not forced to do so.IFS's demands against external nations, however, create the most tension between the Indigenous and liberal worldviews. Liberals largely do not support the protection of Indigenous territory when it poses unfair limitations on liberal peoples. I thus question whether the above compromise will stand here. Yet, if agreement is not found between cultures, then this leaves us with an increased chance for real-world cultural conflict in the future. In this respect, I suggest that perhaps it is better for both sides to be flexible and accept the compromise being proposed. This would go a long way to avoiding conflict and would allow for the representation of a variety of individual views which exist across both Indigenous and liberal communities. / Cette thèse explore le concept émergent de «Indigenous Food Sovereignty» (IFS); Ce concept peut être traduit: «Souveraineté Alimentaire Autochtone». En bref, l'IFS affirme que les communautés autochtones ont le droit de préserver et pratiquer leurs traditions culturelles concernant la production d'aliments. Ces communautés doivent avoir accès à suffisamment de terrain dans le but de pratiquer leurs traditions jusqu'à l'autosuffisance. Cet objectif implique de limiter les libertés des membres des communautés afin de promouvoir les valeurs traditionnelles. De plus, ce concept cherche à encadrer les actions des nations non autochtones pour garantir l'espace nécessaire à la réalisation de ces pratiques traditionnelles. Je pose les questions ci-dessous pendant ma recherche: 1. Quelles sortes de limitations sur les libertés des autochtones faut-il pour appliquer le concept dans les communautés?, 2. Qu'elles sont les conséquences pour les non autochtones de l'attribution de terrain aux fins de l'IFS?, 3. Finalement, est-ce que les exigences que met en avant ce concept sont justifiables du point de vue autochtone? Du point de vue libéral?D'après la perspective autochtone, je trouve le concept justifiable. Mais, ceci n'arrive pas sans tension puisque le concept désire employer quelques pratiques modernes pour aider les communautés à survivre. Je crois aussi que la pensée libérale peut être en accord avec l'IFS à propos des restrictions pour les individus autochtones; ceci se produit grâce au «compromis culturel» concernant le point principal de l'inaliénabilité des territoires autochtones. Dans ce compromis, les communautés autochtones reçoivent le pouvoir de vendre ou non leurs territoires. Cela a pour but de plaire aux deux côtés puisque les autochtones ont le droit de vendre leurs territoires mais ne sont pas forcés de le faire.Toutefois, les exigences de l'IFS envers les nations étrangères créent le plus de tension entre la pensée libérale et la pensée indigène. Les penseurs libéraux, en général, ne supportent pas la protection des territoires autochtones quand cela implique des restrictions pour des peuples libéraux. Ainsi, je demande si le compromis ci-dessus peut supporter la pression dans ces conditions-ci. Cependant, l'importance d'une entente sur ce point est primordiale à de bonnes relations futures. À cet égard, je recommande que les libéraux et les autochtones acceptent ce compromis. Cette entente augmenterait les chances d'harmonie culturelle et permettrait la représentation à la fois des différentes positions qui existent à travers les communautés libérales et autochtones.

From Maître chez nous to Pour le Québec, from Jean Lesage to Jean Charest, the Quebec liberal party (QLP) has evolved through decades adapting itself vis-à-vis its opponents to better face them in partisan bull ring. The liberal electoral clientele might have also changed through time. Lemieux, in 1993, has analyzed the QLP as being one of the strongest party of the twentieth century while generating the parties that will compete against it from dissident fringes. How did the liberal supports have evolved between 1960 and 2012 while the party is still occupying an important place in the party system? This question is answered by the use of the marginal effects of binary logistic regressions and of two models of multivariate analysis. For this purpose, we use sociodemographic variables and one attitudinal variable (the support for sovereignty) from different academic datasets: 3 have been made by Maurice Pinard in the 60s and 70s, then 8 made by the Canadian Election Studies team and the 3 last done by Éric Bélanger and Richard Nadeau specifically on the Quebec elections. We find that the QLP strength is situated in three principal niches: Anglophones, allophones and religious people (no matter their religion). They systematically support the liberals since 1960. Moreover, we found a lifecycle effect: the more people are getting older, the more they vote liberal. We can find the same relation with people arriving to their retirement. The generational thesis does not survive to the multivariate analysis, but pre-baby-boomers seem to systematically support the liberals. The linguistic divide is stronger than expected because the effect stays significant even after the introduction of the sovereignty variable. These strengths also represent vulnerabilities that the party will have to face sooner or later. / De Maître chez nous à Pour Le Québec, de Jean Lesage à Jean Charest, le Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ) a évolué au fil des décennies s'adaptant vis-à-vis ses adversaires pour mieux leur faire face dans l'arène partisane. La clientèle électorale libérale risque d'avoir elle aussi changé au fil du temps. Lemieux, en 1993, analysait le PLQ comme un des deux grands partis du 20e siècle tout en ayant donné naissance aux partis qui lui firent compétition. De quelle façon les appuis électoraux du Parti libéral du Québec ont-ils évolué entre 1960 et 2012 alors que le PLQ occupe toujours une place prépondérante dans le système partisan québécois ? Cette question est répondue à l'aide des effets marginaux de régressions logistiques bivariées et de deux modèles d'analyses multivariées longitudinales des données sociodémographiques et de l'appui à la souveraineté du Québec provenant de bases de données académiques (3 sondages réalisés par Maurice Pinard, 8 par l'équipe des Études électorales canadiennes et 3 réalisés par Éric Bélanger et Richard Nadeau). On trouve que la force des libéraux se situe dans trois niches principales : les anglophones, les allophones et les gens pratiquants – peu importe leur religion. De plus, nous trouvons un effet de cycle de vie : les gens vieillissants (55 ans et plus) appuient plus les libéraux. Nous trouvons cette même relation pour les gens qui sont retraités. La thèse générationnelle ne survit pas à l'analyse multivariée, mais les pré-baby-boomers ont plus tendance à appuyer systématiquement les libéraux que les autres générations. De plus, le clivage de la langue est très puissant car l'effet reste statistiquement significatif même après l'introduction de la variable de souveraineté. Ces forces représentent aussi des vulnérabilités auxquelles le parti devra faire face bientôt.

<p> The work first outlines a theoretical framework referred to as the Theory of the Strong Executive, drawn from what comparatively little literature there is about the state governors, as well as certain primary sources. The Theory of the Strong Executive outlines two sets of expectations for state governors, one theoretical (descriptive labels of expected political behavior) and one institutional (certain institutional or constitutional features one might expect to see). </p><p> The veto power, basically a legislative power granted to the executive, is critical for gubernatorial behavior, and gubernatorial power, under both sets of expectations, and is rather under-studied relative to its near-universally acknowledged importance. Governor George E. Pataki of New York State was selected for in-depth study, for various reasons, in an attempt to plug the gaps in the literature. </p><p> Certain conclusions specifically relating to Governor Pataki were arrived at. Several things of a more general applicability and interest also were learned. Governor Pataki used the veto early and often, usually to express a policy disagreement with the State Legislature (rather than, say, because a bill was too costly or technically defective). Governor Pataki's use of the veto reflected both partisan conflicts and institutional conflicts with the State Legislature. Governor Pataki's divided government issues extended beyond divided government in the strictly partisan sense to reflect a complex relationship with the Republican-led State Senate that resembled divided government. Though veto overrides occurred under Governor Pataki, a trend of overrides never emerged, and the veto retained its considerable power. </p><p> New York's governors appear to veto more often than governors of most other states, and Governor Pataki appeared to be a comparatively aggressive vetoer even relative to other New York governors. The strong inference, therefore, is that there was something unique about Governor Pataki, and there is something unique about the New York governorship. Fully understanding the differences between governors, between states and within a single state, requires close-up study. </p><p> Further aggregate studies of the gubernatorial veto, therefore, should keep in mind that more particular factors may be more important than they appear to be.</p>

<p> Current social movement literature does not adequately analyze how a movement's strategies may change once a member or even leader of that movement assumes the country's highest office.&nbsp; Movements, especially those in which identity plays a key role, gain the tool of identity-based appeals once their leader takes office, that is, claiming that the new leader should act favorably to the movement because of their common characteristics.&nbsp; Analysis of the Bolivian indigenous movement shows that since indigenous leader Evo Morales has assumed the presidency, the movement has used this tactic toward various audiences in response to Morales' incomplete meeting of their policy demands.&nbsp; The movement first appealed directly to Morales, but has since shifted its focus to the public, attempting to increase agitation by emphasizing the contrast between Morales' discourse and actions.&nbsp;This case shows that contrary to assumptions made in the ethnic parties literature, an ethnic leader will not necessarily favor his base uniformly once he takes office.&nbsp; Rather, the movement continues, but now with a different type of "target"&mdash;one which had previously been an ally.&nbsp; The relationship between the Ecuadorian indigenous movement and president Rafael Correa also demonstrates how a movement targets appeals first at the president and then at the public.&nbsp; Analysis of the women's movements in Argentina and Chile, on the other hand, highlights two factors that can cause identity-based appeals to deviate from this pattern: a leader not embracing his or her shared identity with the social movement, and a leader facing policy constraints from other actors, respectively.</p>

In an attempt to understand why the military tends to commit a coup in reaction to the rise of leftist popular forces, and why the military officers in the post-coup period are inclined to implement politico-economic policies which most benefit the business elite at the expense of the economically underprivileged classes, this study proposed the Interactive Model. This model critically examines the explanatory effectiveness of the structuralist approach, such as the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model and Middle-Class Coup (or, Veto-Coup) hypothesis, in solving the above mentioned questions, but does not underrate its theoretical usefulness. In this study, which is primarily based on the voluntaristic approach focusing on the creative role of political actor, a synthetical framework of analysis is introduced. Regarding the officer corps as the prime political actor, the Interactive Model claims that the officers' political will, ideology, and commitment to their corporate interests play the most decisive role in bringing about radical political change like coup and the post-coup regime transformations. In the meantime, structural factors, such as political disorder, deteriorating class conflicts, and belief in economic rationality, are believed to indirectly influence the political actor. Four countries, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, and Thailand, were comparatively studied in this study. As coup-maker, officers are found to have violently reacted to the rise of the Left primarily because leftist forces posed a threat to their corporate interests. In the post-coup period, officers in power, as the state-manager, usually sided with the dominant economic powers, but tension often arises between the two. This study argues that these conflicting phenomena need to be understood with reference to the state-manager's ideology and political interest.

This project focuses on the effects of recent electoral reforms on voter participation. The project specifically examines three aspects of election administration, which are voter registration deadlines, early voting, and Election Day vote centers. The project builds from recent theoretical advances in the study of turnout to better understand the effects of the reforms and also suggests areas for future research. The project also analyzes aggregate and survey data using matching methods to test the effects of the reforms. The results suggest that registration deadlines and Election Day vote centers increase turnout, particularly for less politically engaged individuals, while early voting seems to negatively affect turnout.

One argument for political neutrality appeals to the value of autonomy. I consider three objections to this argument. First, it appears that this argument is self-defeating in drawing from a controversial conception of the good life. If we distinguish between theoretical and practical levels of political reasoning, however, the initial appearance of paradox disappears. Second, it is unclear whether autonomy plays an essential enough role in the good life to justify making it the goal of the state. Via, an expliction of Joseph Raz's work, I develop a sense in which it is plausible to say that autonomy is essential to the good life in some societies, and that the governments of such societies should pursue the conditions of autonomy. Third, it is unclear whether political neutrality is the best means of securing autonomy. I suggest a reason for believing that it is that draws on a connection between neutrality and the type of culture conducive to personal autonomy.

The level of popular support accorded to either a regime or an insurgent movement has long been considered a principal determinant of revolutionary outcomes. Rather than assume a priori that these support levels are somehow inextricably linked with the conditions which spawn revolutionary movements, we have tried to focus on the sequence of events by which the behavior of the two primary actors in insurgent conflicts (regime and guerrillas) is translated into support and how in turn this support produces an outcome. We have suggested that support decisions among the public at large are based on a number of different criteria, and have attempted to distill what we feel are the most important from the literature. In an attempt to balance completeness with parsimony, we have identified three dimensions which capture the "minimum requirements" that must be satisfied by an actor in the eyes of an individual in order for that person to accord support. These are inclusiveness (incorporation), contributions to material welfare (performance), and the provision of defense (protection/coercion). In evaluating our model, we examined six cases of insurgency in post-war Latin America, two cases each of insurgent failure (Venezuela & Peru), insurgent success (Cuba & Nicaragua), and two cases of ongoing insurgency (FMLN in El Salvador & Sendero Luminoso in Peru). Our analysis suggests that outcomes unfold from the interaction of the two actors across several dimensions. This implies that "success" for a single actor is predicated not only on that actor's "strengths", but also on the opponent's "weaknesses." This, in turn, suggests that outcomes will only occur at the point in time at which some "interlocking" of strengths and weaknesses of the two actors takes place. Additionally, our analysis of the two ongoing cases provides some preliminary indications that our model may also be applicable to situations in which "alternative outcomes" emerge, such as negotiated settlements, truces and chronic stalemate.