The concept of ideology's theory-building potential has been under-exploited in studies of contemporary nationalism. This study offers a novel approach to 'neo-nationalism' by defining it as an ideology, embedding it in a theory of discourse, and extending this framework to a methodology based on text analysis. Qualitative deconstruction of texts using the tools of literary theory is one of the research methods used, complemented by evidence from elite interviews and a survey of primary sources. In order to illustrate how neo-nationalism is discursively constructed, the core of the ideology is distinguished from its periphery. Furthermore, parties are characterised as ideologues in contemporary society and placed within the postmodern framework of discourse theory. Case studies of the Scottish National Party and the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bavaria examine their interpretations of nationalist ideology through analysis of the rhetoric used in recent election campaigns. The parties are of particular interest because they attempt to reconcile core nationalist goals with contemporary political issues, such as that of integration within the European Union. The SNP is an example of a neo-nationalist party in that it pursues its core, immutable goal of prioritising the nation by promoting Scottish autonomy within a larger European framework. The CSU, on the other hand, is neo-nationalist in that its policies and rhetorical appeals revolve around a national nodal point articulated in terms of the Heimat. It has sought to defend Bavarian autonomy by profiling itself as the archetypal Bavarian party with an important role to play in both the German and European political arenas. The case studies demonstrate that a nationalist party's support for European integration may reinforce rather than undermine its core commitment to self-determination. Moreover, the ideological constructs developed by neo-nationalist parties can usefully be characterised in terms of discourse theory. Both the CSU and the SNP seek to 'de-contest' their interpretations of the nation and achieve conceptual hegemony by establishing their ideology as 'common sense'. Post-modem theory thus not only provides the epistemological grounding of the study, but also paves the way for a methodological approach designed to analyse neo-nationalism in its specificity.

In the 90´s, Europe used to be depicted as the most privileged political arena for regional nationalist political parties to access for “more” political power. In that sense, whereas formal channels of regional interest representation were taken for granted by those standing within federal political systems; informal channels of regional interest representation were highly valued by regional nationalists standing in decentralized or devolutionary constitutional settlements. In spite of nuanced institutional preferences, Europe was rationally inspired (Ostrom 2005) as it used to be perceived as an aggregation of formal-legal structures that could be used as a means to prescribe, proscribe and permit a certain behavior in exchange of a personal utility. Moreover, regional nationalists were policy “maximizers” who acted in isolation, away from the center, using their own limited political resources to maximize their policy gains by pursuing distinctive forms of political autonomy. However, by the end of the 90’s, both categories of regional nationalists plunged into European disillusion due to the limits of a sovereign logic prevailing in Europe.<p>However, in the 21st century, as soon as a new European policy cycle started to emerge and the economic crisis started to cripple, experienced regional nationalists realized that they could use the benefits of regional economic resources in face of the European Economic strategy to justify further concessions of policy competences that are still shared, either in theory or in practice, as well as to argue for new ones. The political plan would consist of using the reference of the European Economic targets to deliver policies, which would allow them to legitimize their nationalist aspirations, in both layers of governance, as well as to induce regional citizens into their political plan so they can finally reach the legal threshold to endorse a new state reform. Moreover, since they were rationally bounded, in the sense that they were lacking the policy expertise to perform these goals, they have learned to rely on a policy narrative (Shabahan et al 2011; Jones and Beth 2010; Radaelli 2010) embedded in a territorial economic argument to make sense of an advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), using informal channels of regional interest intermediation as “cognitive” structures (Scot 1995a) to articulate a policy strategy to be implemented in Europe and at the regional level of governance. <p>Therefore, and irrespectively of nuanced constitutional settlements, all experienced regional nationalists have returned to the center, using informal channels as an instrument of governance (Salamon 2002) to clarify the best policy options to be implemented in both layers of governance. In other words, regional nationalists have become “policy satisficers” (Simon 1954) who have learned to forgo immediate satisfaction in Europe to collect major gains of political power across multiple layers of governance. If the term “usage” can be defined as the act of using something to achieve certain political goals (Jacquot and Wolf 2003), in this research, we will apply the concept of “usage” to demonstrate that experienced regional nationalists in government have moved from a rational to a cognitive “usage” of the European institutions to perform renewed political preferences across multiple layers of governance. <p>Departing from an actor centered institutionalist approach (Mayntz and Sharp 1997), we will demonstrate that the N-VA in Flanders, since 2004, and the SNP in Scotland, since 2007, have become new pragmatic nationalists. In that sense, we will argue that, in a clear contrast with pragmatic nationalists of the 90’s who expected to legitimize their nationalist aspirations in Europe by the means of a rational “usage” of the European institutions; experienced regional nationalists have become new pragmatic nationalists as they have learned to rely on a cognitive “usage” of the European institutions to legitimize their nationalist aspirations, no longer in Europe, but through Europe. <p>We will then conclude that in the 21st century, and against traditional dogmas of the 90’s, the “usage” of Europe by regional nationalists is cognitively twisted, economically driven and collectively performed. It embraces all experienced regional nationalist political parties in government, irrespectively of their constitutional settlement or nationalist credo, as long as they possess the ability to anchor a political strategy embedded in “identity” without sticking to strict politics of nationalism. <p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished