I argue against the claim that normative political theory is 'autonomous' with respect to moral philosophy. I take the simple view that political theory is a form of moral philosophy, and is differentiated by pragmatic rather than theoretically significant criteria. I defend this view by criticizing arguments for the autonomy thesis. In the first three chapters I introduce and analyse the autonomy thesis and provide a framework for understanding the various claims that are made in the literature. In Chapters 4 to 8 I proceed to criticize a series of arguments for the autonomy thesis. In Chapter 4 I explain why Kant's division of morality into ethics and right is not as useful as it may seem to those who wish to defend the autonomy thesis, and argues that Arthur Ripstein gives no reason to think that political philosophy is autonomous that can be endorsed independently of commitment to a Kantian normative theory. In Chapter 5 I examine the political liberal argument for the autonomy thesis, concluding that even if a freestanding political conception of justice can be regarded as autonomous, it does not follow that political philosophy can also. Chapters 6 to 8 tackle various political realist arguments for the autonomy thesis. In Chapter 6 I argue that political theory is not required to deal with empirical facts in any way that distinguishes it from moral philosophy, and any argument for its autonomy that is based on a prior claim about the purpose of political theorizing would be question-begging. In Chapters 7 and 8 I provide various arguments against the idea that there is a distinctively political form of normativity, and diagnose some of the mistaken assumptions about morality that I take to lie at the heart of the realist case. In Chapter 9 I conclude.

This thesis examines the relationship between political virtue and moral virtue in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. After critically engaging with Rousseau's compelling yet complex theory of human sociability, focusing more particularly on the seminal relationship between the two forms of self-love, the "natural" amour de soi and "social" amour-propre, it is observed that the culmination of Rousseau's moral theory in Emile sees him espouse a particular kind of moral excellence called vertu, defined as a striving to master one's passions, and a particular type of freedom named liberté morale, inherent in the act of obeying the inner law originating in man's conscience. After further exploring Rousseau's conception of vertu, and insisting upon the ambitiousness of his moral theory, the thesis argues that Rousseau's political theory differs from it in "taking men as they are", and starting from the assumption that men are driven by their passions. That the hegemony of amour-propre is pre-supposed by Rousseau's political project is demonstrated through a detailed comparison of the civic education described in his prescriptive political writings with the moral education advocated in Emile. Finally, it draws the implications of the discrepancies between Rousseau's moral and political versions of virtue for his political theory, identifying a strong tension between two ideals that have generally been regarded as wedded within it, those of republican liberty and moral freedom.

Many political philosophers believe that sometimes we ought to tolerate substantive injustice for the sake of the intrinsic importance of democracy. In this thesis, I argue that they are mistaken. The substantive justice of outcomes has primacy over the putative intrinsic procedural justice of democracy. This is a very strong form of instrumentalism: if we face a choice between a minor substantive injustice and massive political inequality, then we ought to accept the political inequality. The thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, I lay out the conceptual landscape for the discussion. I argue that assertions about justice are reducible to assertions about rights and that assertions about rights can be appropriately dealt with by the Hohfeldian analytic framework. Instrumentalists would gain from using this framework. The Primacy of Substance (POS) is true if people lack non-derivative individual or group democratic claim rights to do injustice. I defend my thesis by appealing to intuitions about injustices committed by gangs. I argue that gangs do not have rights to do injustice and this does not change merely because they choose to do the injustice democratically. Many philosophers accept this for severe injustices, but deny it for mild injustices. I argue that those positions are in error. People do not have democratic rights to do even mild substantive injustice. In the second part, I argue that popular intrinsic proceduralist arguments from equal respect and autonomy pose no threat to the POS. An appeal to equal respect in political philosophy, on one sense of respect, is equivalent to an appeal to the requirements of political morality. Interpreted in this way, in the absence of further argument, the appeal to equal respect begs the question against the POS. The POS is a theory about the requirements of political morality and so about the requirements of equal respect. Other arguments from equal respect rely on the appeal to contingent social beliefs which may be associated with political power. If this argument were sound, then there could be rights to do severe injustices such as rape and murder. Since people cannot have rights to do these things, contingent social beliefs cannot ground rights in the way suggested and so cannot ground democratic rights. Arguments from autonomy also do not threaten the POS. People's rights to act autonomously stop at the rights of others. This is true from the point of view of a variety of different theories of autonomy. Finally, one cannot, contra prominent arguments defend intrinsic proceduralism on the basis of what I call Truth Restricting Intrinsic Proceduralism (TRIP), which holds that people have democratic rights to decide on reasonably contentious matters of substantive justice. When we are responding to the fact that someone reasonably believes that a law ought to be enacted, we ought to pay attention to the content of that belief. Intrinsic proceduralism asks us to pay attention to the fact that they reasonably believe it. This is a mistake. Even if we accept that people have a right to impose their reasonable view, many voters in the real world are not reasonable, many people reasonably deny the reasonableness of others, and many people reasonably deny the proposition that people have a right to impose their reasonable view. Thus, even if we accept the premise, it does not imply that we ought to use democracy in the real world or in a large number of close possible worlds. Moreover, all of the most prominent arguments for TRIP have failed. Finally, proponents of TRIP have failed to recognise that it entails the democratic right to do severe substantive injustice. Since we ought to reject all theories which have this implication, we ought to reject TRIP. There is no remaining way to refute the POS.

The concept of human rights holds a distinctive significance in political practice, yet philosophers remain divided over the nature of these rights. The Orthodox View defines human rights as moral rights possessed by all individuals simply in virtue of their humanity. Proponents of this view claim that the contemporary idea of human rights is a continuation of the natural rights project of the eighteenth century and shares many of its basic philosophical assumptions. This thesis argues that the Orthodox View is no longer an appropriate characterisation of the concept of human rights we find in current domestic and international practice. It also rejects recent alternatives offered by supporters of the Political View, who define human rights by particular functions they serve, specifically their role(s) in acting as benchmarks for the legitimacy of states or triggers of international concern. I propose instead a new 'Political Justification View' of human rights, which states that human rights are demands which challenge unjustifiable political-institutional orders, which are the concern of all people, and which protect the equal standing of individuals in political decisions that affect the collective or individual good. This view better captures the diversity of practices that employ the term 'human rights', whilst also explaining its innovative power as a moral language that enables individuals to challenge the official institutional order under whose authority they live. Finally, I argue that within this broader view of human rights there are two distinct moral concepts which pertain to different parts of human rights practice: Domestic Human Rights and International Legitimacy Rights. Separating these two concepts is helpful in resolving long-standing debates about whether human rights are properly thought of as minimalist moral concerns of legitimacy or broader social goals to be achieved through political institutions.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-01T17:54:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2016-02-03. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2016-04-01T18:00:39Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000860172.pdf: 978547 bytes, checksum: 158bb0513c192fff77aa0d081ac345e6 (MD5) / A figura do Legislador na obra Do Contrato Social de Jean-Jacques Rousseau surge em meio a uma forma de legislação popular, sendo o povo o próprio Soberano e encarregado, por meio da vontade geral, de legislar para o próprio povo. Para tanto, este trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a definição que o autor dá ao Legislador, seus exemplos e a necessidade real para a existência deste Legislador. Posteriormente, analisaremos a utilidade para esta função recorrente na filosofia rousseauniana. / The figure of the Legislator in The Social Contract work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau comes amid a popular form of legislation, being the Sovereign own people and charge through the general will, to legislate for the people themselves. Therefore, this paper aims to examine the definition that the author gives to the legislator, his examples and the real need for the existence of this Legislator. Later, we will examine the usefulness for this recurring role in Rousseau's philosophy.

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Submitted by Maria de Lourdes Mariano (lmariano@ufscar.br) on 2017-01-13T17:18:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 RODRIGUES_Marcus_2016.pdf: 1835911 bytes, checksum: 64549d799bdfc8b9b67d8d60d8c2898c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria de Lourdes Mariano (lmariano@ufscar.br) on 2017-01-13T17:18:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 RODRIGUES_Marcus_2016.pdf: 1835911 bytes, checksum: 64549d799bdfc8b9b67d8d60d8c2898c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria de Lourdes Mariano (lmariano@ufscar.br) on 2017-01-13T17:18:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 RODRIGUES_Marcus_2016.pdf: 1835911 bytes, checksum: 64549d799bdfc8b9b67d8d60d8c2898c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-13T17:18:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RODRIGUES_Marcus_2016.pdf: 1835911 bytes, checksum: 64549d799bdfc8b9b67d8d60d8c2898c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-24 / Não recebi financiamento / The research now engendered has as a key objective to contribute to overcome the supposed obsolescence that was associated prematurely with the term “tolerance”, especially today. It performs a brief historical contextualization, as well as a biographical matrix, while considering authors who notably contribute to the semantic exploration of how tolerance has become synonymous with asymmetry, even though originally focused on mutual and equal consideration of human coexistence. This paper still investigates some philosophical aspects that underlie the understanding of the tolerant way of acting, based on its integration with rationality, elaborated bearing in mind ideas by Rouanet. Ideologies are presented as detractors of the tolerant way of acting when considering human relationships from the subject-object binomial, focusing on hierarchy. The communicative action of Habermas and Jasper’s Comprehensive present themselves as an alternative to the said binomial perspective. Weighted by Marcuse and Arendt, the limits and purposes of tolerating demonstrate the political importance of the discussion on the subject. Finally, it is intended to overcome the preconceptualization of this subject, since this is a naïve attitude, belonging to the ideological view aimed at domination. To achieve this, we used the initiatives taken up tolerance as a concept to be taught and therefore pedagogically located in school education. This was made possible by the philosophical foundations provided by Walzer and Freire, and also the intellectual efforts of practical proposals to teach to tolerate. / A pesquisa ora engendrada tem por objetivo maior contribuir para a superação da suposta obsolescência que apressadamente foi associada ao termo “tolerância”, sobretudo na atualidade. Realiza uma breve retomada histórica, de matriz biográfica e ao mesmo tempo considerando autores que notadamente contribuem para a exploração semântica de como a tolerância tornou-se sinônimo de assimetria mesmo sendo originalmente voltada para a consideração mútua e igualitária de convivência humana. São investigados ainda alguns aspectos filosóficos que fundamentam a compreensão do agir tolerante a partir de sua integração à racionalidade, elaborada a partir de Rouanet. As ideologias apresentam-se como detratoras do agir tolerante quando da consideração das relações humanas a partir do binômio sujeito-objeto incidindo em hierarquização. O agir comunicativo de Habermas e o Abrangente de Jaspers constituem-se como alternativa a perspectiva do referido binômio. Ponderados por Marcuse e Arendt, os limites e as finalidades de se tolerar evidenciam a importância política da discussão acerca do tema. Por fim, pretende-se a superação da pré-conceituação do tema, visto ser esta uma postura ingênua e pertencente ao parecer ideológico que visa à dominação. Para tanto, utilizaram-se as iniciativas de retomada da tolerância enquanto conceito a ser ensinado e, portanto, pedagogicamente situado na educação escolar. Isso foi tornado possível a partir dos fundamentos filosóficos de Walzer e Freire, e também dos esforços intelectuais das proposições práticas de se ensinar a tolerar.

Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T16:36:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vento_MarisaAlves_D.pdf: 3867247 bytes, checksum: 77416f80be30279f0a2a755a9792c709 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A pesquisa apresentada compreende a antropologia rousseauniana, abrangendo desde as investigações sobre o homem e a sua natureza originária até a idealização, no campo político, de uma sociedade fundada sobre a vontade legítima de cada cidadão que a compõe. O objetivo que se impôs alcançar está ancorado no pressuposto de que os princípios antropológicos estabelecidos por Rousseau no Segundo Discurso norteiam o seu pensamento político. Assim, busca-se demonstrar que uma das noções cruciais da sua filosofia política, a vontade geral, tem como fundamento o princípio antropológico do amor de si. Entretanto, para derivar a vontade geral do amor de si, interpretando-a como a vontade que o indivíduo tem pelo todo porque o considera como a si mesmo, é importante compreender como Rousseau justifica e relaciona a existência e a prevalência desse sentimento de preferência por si mesmo com a extrema exigência ética, expressa pela conformação da vontade particular do indivíduo à vontade geral do Estado. A compreensão desse componente primordial da natureza individual exige examinar, mais profundamente, a concepção de indivíduo e o papel específico que o princípio do amor de si desempenha na estruturação da identidade individual. Isto permitirá considerar a pertinência de, por um lado, apontar o amor de si como o vetor do desenvolvimento do indivíduo, e de outro, admitir a possibilidade de que ele constitua o liame social da ordem política legítima, uma vez que permite ao indivíduo buscar seu bem-estar sem se opor a outrem. Em decorrência da primazia desse princípio, a noção de interesse se mostra nuclear no pensamento de Rousseau, pois se apresenta como único objeto possível da vontade. Pretende-se mostrar como a temática do interesse, resultante dos desdobramentos das noções de amor de si e amor próprio, é retomada por Rousseau, que dá a ela uma nova direção e a requalifica segundo uma lógica própria, a lógica de imanência. Nessa perspectiva, a noção de interesse, vista por Rousseau como o bem do ser que deseja, passa a ser uma relação que ganha sua força no ser do indivíduo que, a partir da sua relação consigo mesmo, estabelece a relação com outro e com o mundo. Desse modo, acredita-se que a articulação entre as noções de indivíduo (movido pelo amor de si), interesse (de ser) e vontade geral possa dar conta da possível unidade de interesse do corpo político com o interesse particular de cada indivíduo, o que forma o corolário da vontade geral / Abstract: The present research comprises Rousseau's anthropology, ranging from investigations about man and his original nature to an idealization, in the political field, of a society founded on the legitimate will of every citizen who composes it. The goal proposed is based on the assumption that the anthropological principles established by Rousseau in his Second Discourse guided his political thought. Thus, we seek to demonstrate that the crucial notion to his politics, the notion of general will, is based on the anthropological principle of amour de soi. However, in order to derive the general will from this love by interpreting it as the will that the individual has towards the whole because he feels it as himself, it is important to understand how Rousseau justifies and relates the existence and prevalence of this feeling of preference for itself to the extreme ethical requirement expressed by the particular conformation of the will of the individual to the general will of the State. Understanding this primary componentof the nature of the individual requires a deep look into the concept of the individual and the specific role that the principle of amour de soi plays in the structuring of individual identity. This will permit to consider the relevance, on the one hand, of pointing the amour de soi as the vector of development of the individual, and on the other, of admitting the possibility that it constitutes the social bond of the legitimate political order. Because of the primacy of this principle, the notion of interest appears as the core of Rousseau's thought, because it presents itself as the only possible object of desire. I intended to show how the topic of interest follows the developments of the amour de soi and amour-propre notion's and how Rousseau covers this notion requalifying and redirecting it according to its own logic, the logic of immanence. In this perspective, the notion of interest, that Rousseau sees as the good of the being who desires, becomes a relationship which gains its strength in the being of the individual who, from his relationship with himself, establishes a relationship with others and with the world. In this way, by articulating the notions of individual, amour de soi (interest) and general will, I intended to account for the possible unity of interest of the body political with the private interest of every individual, which forms the corollary of general wil / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutora em Filosofia

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This study attempts to make a contribution to the critique of contemporary capitalism. This has been conceptualised through a Foucauldian critique of neo-liberalism, that is, Foucault’s concepts of power and governmentality have been used to criticise neo-liberalism. The study argues that neo-liberalism is a hegemonic and oppressive politico-economic social system. This has occurred in two ways; firstly, neo-liberalism came to dominate the global economy and, secondly, neo-liberalism has become the dominant politico-economic discourse. An attempt is made to expose the discourses and institutions that buttress the neo-liberal project by undertaking a Foucauldian critique. According to Foucault, knowledge shapes the social space through its ‘mechanisms’, discourses and institutions. In order to critique neo-liberalism, it is necessary to expose its power-knowledge base, which is what gives it legitimacy. By analysing and exposing neo-liberalism’s power-knowledge base, its oppression becomes clear through an observation of the material effects of neo-liberal ideology and policy. This study also evaluates to what extent Marxism is a viable alternative to neo-liberalism, in order to ascertain what Foucault adds to already existing critiques of capitalism, and neo-liberalism, in particular. It concludes by arguing that even though Marxism provides a useful framework in which to understand neo-liberal domination, its labour based social theory is somewhat outdated in our contemporary age of the information society. Therefore, it is Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge that is most pertinent in providing an effective critical theory of neo-liberalism in the age of the information society, as it focuses on the primacy of power-knowledge in matters of domination.