In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization.

In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX provide A philosophic examination of friendship. While these Books initially appear to be non sequiturs in the inquiry, a closer examination of the questions raised by the preceding Books and consideration of the discussion of friendship's position between two accounts of pleasure in Books VII and X indicate friendship's central role in the Ethics. In friendship, Aristotle finds a uniquely human capacity that helps readers understand the good is distinct from pleasure by leading them to think seriously about what they can hold in common with their friends throughout their lives without changing who they are. What emerges from Aristotle's account of friendship is a nuanced portrait of human nature that recognizes the authoritative place of the intellect in human beings and how its ability to think about an end and hold its thinking in relation to that end depends upon whether it orders or is ordered by pleasures and pains. Aristotle lays the groundwork for this conclusion throughout the Ethics by gradually disclosing pleasures and pains are not caused solely by things we feel through the senses, but by reasoned arguments and ideas as well. Through this insight, we can begin to understand how Aristotle's Ethics is a work of political philosophy; to fully appreciate the significance of his approach, however, we must contrast his work with that of Thomas Hobbes, his harshest Modern critic. Unlike Aristotle, Hobbes is nearly silent on friendship in his political philosophy, and examining his political works especially Leviathan reveals the absence of friendship is part of his deliberate attempt to advance a politics founded on the moral teaching that pleasure is the good. Aristotle's political philosophy, by way of contrast, aims to preserve the good, and through friendship, he not only disentangles the good from pleasure, but shows a level of human community more suitable for preserving the good than political regimes because these communities have more natural bonds than any regime can hope to create between its citizens.

Political thinkers of the Renaissance, foremost among them Niccolò Machiavelli and Desiderius Erasmus, authored works commonly referred to as “mirrors of princes.” These writings described how princes should rule, and also often recommended a certain arrangement or relationship between the intellectual class and the political powers. François Rabelais’s five books of Pantagruel also depict and recommend a new relationship between these elements of society. For Rabelais, the tenets of a philosophy that he calls Pantagruelism set the terms between philosophers and rulers. Pantagruelism, defined in Rabelais’s Quart Livre as “gaiety of spirit confected in contempt for fortuitous things,” suggest a measured attitude toward politics. Rabelais’s prince, Pantagruel, accordingly rejects the tendencies of ancient thinkers such as Diogenes the Cynic who viewed politics as futile. Yet Pantagruel also rejects the anti-theoretical disposition of modern thinkers such as Machiavelli who placed too much confidence in politics. I demonstrate how Rabelais warns against the philosophers’ entrance into public service, and how he simultaneously promotes a less selfish philosophy than that of Diogenes. I argue that Pantagruel’s correction of his friend Panurge through the consultations of experts regarding the latter’s marriage problem shows that fortune will always trouble human life and politics. I also argue that Pantagruel’s rule over the kingdom of Utopia exemplifies a Socratic form of rule—reluctant rule—which relies on a trust that necessity (embodied in the Tiers Livre in the Pantagruelion plant) and not fortune (embodied in the Tiers Livre in Panurge’s future wife) governs the world, including the political world.

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Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Are violent and non-violent mass atrocities morally different? According to the United Nations, they are. But why? The answer to this question is important as it in part determines our obligations to people living in other countries. This thesis seeks to determine if violent and non-violent mass atrocities are morally different and, if not, whether the latter should be included under the United Nations’ doctrine of the responsibility to protect. In order to do this, the thesis first examines the conditions under which sovereignty exists in order to understand when intervention can occur. It also analyzes just war theory to discern when military intervention to halt nonviolent mass atrocities is justified. Having established these two concepts, the thesis then presents three arguments for why non-violent mass atrocities are morally indistinguishable from violent ones and should also be included under the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. A discussion of the feasibility of implementing this extension and the long-term effects of these types of interventions follows. Finally, the thesis contains three case studies in order to apply the arguments presented earlier. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Is daar ‘n morele verskil tussen gewelddadige en nie-gewelddadige gruweldade? Volgens die Verenigde Nasies is daar so ‘n verskil, maar hoekom? Die antwoord tot hierdie vraag is deels belangrik omdat dit ons verantwoordelikhede tot mense in ander lande bepaal. In hierdie tesis word daar gepoog om te bepaal of daar so ‘n verskil tussen gewelddadige en nie-gewelddadige gruweldade is, en, indien nie, of nie-gewelddadige gruweldade ook moet tel onder die Verenige Nasies se verantwoordelikheid om te beskerm. Die tesis poog eerstens om die kondisies vir soewereiniteit te bepaal ten einde te probeer verstaan wanneer ‘n intervensie moreel regverdigbaar is. Dit analiseer ook die teorie van geregverdigde oorlogvoering ten einde te bepaal wanneer militêre inmenging om nie-gewelddadige gruweldade stop te sit geregverdig is. Na hierdie twee konsepte ondersoek is word daar drie argumente verskaf om aan te toon dat nie-gewelddadige gruweldade nie moreel onderskeibaar is van gewelddadige gruweldade nie, en dus dat nie-gewelddadige gruweldade onder die verantwoordelikheid om te beskerm behoort te tel. Dit word gevolg deur ‘n bespreking van die praktiese haalbaarheid van die implementering van so ‘n uitbreiding van die verantwoordelikheid om te beskerm, asook ‘n bespreking van die langtermyn effekte van hierdie tipes intervensies. Die tesis eindig met drie gevallestudies ten einde die argumente wat reeds gemaak is toe te pas.

This dissertation seeks a concept of freedom that is compatible with Michel Foucault’s descriptions of power and its role in the constitution of the subject. Discovering the concept of freedom that properly opposes the Foucauldian concept of domination reveals the possibilities and limitations of the usefulness of Foucault’s account of power for social criticism. The first step in this endeavor is therefore to distinguish between Foucault's own use of the terms 'power' and 'domination' – the conflation of which is a source of criticism of his social theory. With this distinction in hand, I argue that Foucault’s genealogical period with its diagnosis of subjection is wholly compatible with, and indeed inseparable from, his ethical period with its emphasis on self-transformation. Read as two sides of a coin, these periods of Foucault’s work establish the terms in which we must understand the ethico-political struggle in which we constantly find ourselves as subjects of self-transformation embedded in identity-constituting relations of power. I then explore Foucault’s criticism of the modern concept of autonomy, which he believes to be inherited from the Enlightenment and, more specifically, Kant. In spite of these criticisms, Foucault does not dispense with the concept of freedom as autonomy altogether, but instead must embrace a concept of social freedom, similar to that which is found in contemporary recognition theory. Therefore, we should characterize Foucault’s normative stance as that of a coupling of a general concept of social freedom with what I call a "metaethico-political openness principle" committing us to acts of resistance that would attempt to push the boundaries of recognition so that we may affirm previously unimagined ways of life.

The aim of the present study is to demonstrate the nature of the relation of Russell's political philosophy to the other areas of his work, both popular and professional. The nature of the relation can be demonstrated, however, only if two premises are accepted: (1) that Russell has a political philosophy, and (2) that his political theory is related to the other branches of his philosophy. [...]

May the state, from a liberal point of view, operate laws and institutions that impede the mobile lifestyle of nomadic Roma and Travellers, or should the state take steps to accommodate their nomadic way of life? This is the essence of the problem of Roma and Traveller itinerancy and the question that is at the heart of this three-partite dissertation. The first part of the dissertation looks at public policy in France and the United Kingdom and describes the six public policy problems that constitute the problem of Roma and Traveller itinerancy. These problems concern the education of children, the French travel permits system, the legal conditions for voter registration and for GP registration, the housing benefits system, and the public provision of halting sites. The second part looks at liberal political theory. It suggests that contemporary liberalism divides into two strands that take different views on the entitlements of cultural and religious minorities, and it provides a detailed outline of the prime articulations of each approach, namely the multiculturalist liberalism of Kymlicka and the classic neutrality liberalism of Barry. The third part investigates what the two said liberalisms imply for the six policy problems from part 1. These analyses suggest that the two liberalisms have slightly diverging implications for the halting sites problem, the housing benefits problem and the problem of GP registration. They suggest furthermore that the two accounts converge on the question of voter registration and agree that the voter registration system must accommodate nomads, and may not make the possession of a fixed residence an absolute condition for voter registration. And the analyses suggest finally that the two liberalisms also converge over the education question and the travel permits question, but here support polices that are potentially inimical to Roma and Traveller itinerancy. The broader implications of these findings are that liberalism is potentially, but not necessarily and not intrinsically, inimical to Roma and Traveller nomadism, and that the disagreement between classic neutrality liberalism and multiculturalist liberalism is weak insofar as public policy is concerned.

The purpose of this thesis is to reflect on the importance that deception has had on the efficient functioning of societies and the development of individuals. I attempt to do so by adopting an historical perspective, analysing the development of the notion of lawful deception during the Middle Ages and, mainly, the Early Modern Age through theological and political discourses. The scope of my investigation is pan-European. I examine sources from the major Western territories, but I pay special attention to those produced in the Spanish-Habsburg Empire, which was a major political and cultural entity during this period. My claim is that between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, the West witnessed the formation of what I call an "Ethics of Deception:" a trend of thought that, without challenging the Augustinian prohibition of lying, recognised deception as intrinsic to nature and mankind, thereby justifying its use from moral and political perspectives. I explain how this intellectual process was conducted, fostered by new social realities, and helped by the flourishing of casuistry, tacitism and neostoicism. Furthermore, I argue that the acceptance of deception contributed to the creation of a new view of the world, language and human interaction. A view that is in the very basis of some of the most characteristic features of Baroque art and that opened the door to some of the most transcendental cultural changes of the period, such as the creation of politics governed by reason rather than faith, the secularisation of social behaviour, and the emergence of the notions of individualism, privacy and freedom of thought. For these reasons, I claim that deception played an important role in the shaping of Modernity.

Demanding Taxation, disciplining, and even at times requiring the sacrifice of life, the State is undoubtedly one of the most influential and important structures within a subject's existence. Nonetheless, despite these great demands, very few subjects actually choose or construct the State they inhabit. On the contrary subjects rather find themselves born into these great structures which transcend their existence. Consequently understanding how subjects come to learn about, and relate to, these great structures they are thrown into is vital for both an understanding of politics and the human condition generally. In this thesis I will explore an alternative approach to investigating the subject and State relationship: The ‘Subjective approach'. Inspired by the thought of Danish Philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, the aim of this approach will be to explore the encounters that the subject has with the State, what perception of the State is given to subjects in these encounters, and how the relationship between subject and State grows out of such encounters. The aim of this thesis is therefore to provide prolegomena to such an approach. I shall aim to outline why such an approach should be considered for investigating subject and State relations, and explore how one may begin articulating such an approach.