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Contemporary Hobbesian contractarianism began in the wake of John Rawls' revitalization of contractarianism in A Theory of Justice and the subsequent body of critical literature which has grown up around it. Philosophers have been impressed with Rawls' powerful application of a contractarian framework to traditional issues in moral and political philosophy but dismayed at the extensive normative precommitments of his particular contractarian theory. They have thus sought an equally powerful contractarian approach unwed to strong normative precommitments. Of all extant contractarian theories, Thomas Hobbes' theory in Leviathan uniquely constitutes such an approach. Like all contractarians, Hobbes specifies a hypothetical choice problem consisting of a choice environment, a choice problem, and a method of resolution. But Hobbes' choice environment purports to make virtually no substantive normative precommitments. The strength of Hobbesian contractarianism is that it seeks to generate substantive normative conclusions from premises established in a normatively minimalistic theoretical framework, and thus promises not to beg any fundamental normative questions. This dissertation considers in detail three comprehensive and game-theoretically sophisticated books which are central to the current corpus of contemporary Hobbesian contractarianism. These are Jean Hampton's Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Gregory Kavka's Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, and David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. We explain the common denominators and points of divergence among these theories while undertaking an extensive critical investigation of each. Two fundamental themes emerge from these investigations. First, Hobbesian contractarianism tends to run afoul of collective action problems at various levels of its overall argument. Collective actions problems arise when the requirements of individual and collective rationality diverge. Second, the normative minimalism which is heralded as the primary virtue of Hobbesian contractarianism is also revealed as one of its fundamental problems. By minimalizing its normative precommitments, Hobbesian contractarianism undermines its ultimate goal of generating powerful normative conclusions.

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Chor-yung Cheung. / Bibliography: leaves 97-101 / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986

Despite the fact that reputation is a feature of Plato’s work and context, scholars have scarcely addressed the place of reputation in Plato’s thought. Herein I ask: ‘what is reputation (doxa) for Plato?’ and provide an answer by turning to the political orders (politeiai) described in the Republic, Laws, and Menexenus. In Chapter 1 I demonstrate the horizontal relationships of mutual dependence between rulers and ruled in the politeia of the Republic. It is in the epistemic configuration of the ruled where the economy of reputation is sourced and distributed. I argue that, first, the text explicitly engages with and seeks to correct the common opinions about justice and its relationship to political power and, second, that the philosopher must care about how philosophy appears to the city at large. I end with a consideration of how the Republic attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of philosophy. The images of the cave, the ship, and the bride show how and why philosophy’s bad reputation is contingent rather than necessary. In Chapter 2 I establish the role of reputation in the circumstances described and enacted in the founding of Magnesia, the politeia of the Laws. Through its exhortation to the incoming Dorian colonists to pursue a reputation for virtue, the law code exercises normative force over the disposition of human nature to excessive self-love and also transforms the colonists into Magnesian citizens. The legislator, voiced by the Athenian Stranger who is the principal interlocutor in the dialogue, urges each individual to appear as they are, and reinvents the undesirable features of Dorian constitutions. If this politeia is to come about, its founder and interlocutor in the dialogue, Cleinias the Cnossian, must become a Magnesian; the Athenian must succeed in exhorting the ambivalent Cleinias to seek a good reputation among the future Magnesians. In Chapter 3 I turn to how Magnesia is maintained. This politeia suffers from, and has to cope with, the pathologies of agonism. It does so via the operation of the social mechanisms of praise and blame that the law code sets forth and the citizens act out. The institutional practices such as the daily athletic contests encourage Magnesians to become similar in judgment and, therefore, to correctly distribute political honors and offices. I go on to argue that the city’s foreign policy aims at peace and at deterring aggressors. Such a policy is conducive to a more stable interpolis environment, which, in turn, maintains Magnesia. In Chapter 4 I argue that the vision of the politeia found in the Menexenus is best understood as an intergenerational multitude. Reputation is key to reconstituting order in these intergenerational relationships. In a dialogue that contains a funeral oration written by Aspasia and delivered by Socrates to the young Menexenus, reputation is a defining characteristic of the politeia with the multitude being the source of reputational judgments. Reputation also operates remedially at a critical juncture in the life of the city. I show the explanatory power of these claims by considering Aspasia’s role in the dialogue. I propose the Socrates-Aspasia fusion, a device that is symbolic of the correct understanding of what constitutes a good reputation in a politeia: men and women, citizens and non-citizens, locals and foreigners. As a device, the fusion functions to block a reputation from accruing to the orator. This brings into focus the dialogue’s explicit argumentative target: the Athenian orator-general Pericles. According to Plato, reputation is a permanent source of instability for politeiai; yet, not only can this disruption be mitigated, but reputation also acts as a boon to political affairs. Reputation is a liminal space between the subjective and objective and as such is under the sway of the multitude. Therefore, reputation is both an explanatory and political concept. With an eye to future research, I conclude with a critical discussion of the findings of the dissertation.

Within and across all societies, some people live longer and healthier lives than others. Although many of us intuitively think of health as a very important good, general theories of justice have hitherto paid little attention to its distribution. This is a thesis about what we owe to one another, as a matter of justice, in view of our unequal levels of health. The first part of the thesis addresses the problem of social justice in health. I argue that the basic institutional framework of society must be arranged so as to ensure an egalitarian distribution of the 'social bases of health,' that is, the socioeconomic conditions that shape our opportunities for a healthy life. Inequalities in health, including those caused by differences in individual lifestyles, are only fair when people have been given fair opportunities. This egalitarian approach to the social bases of health must be complemented by a sufficientarian concern for meeting all basic health needs, regardless of whether these originate in unfair social arrangements. The second part of the thesis takes up the problem of global justice in health. Although I argue against the idea that domestic principles of justice can be simply replicated on a global scale, I emphasise the fact that there are a number of international institutions and practices that shape people's opportunities for health. One of these is the state system - the division of the world into sovereign states - which I argue grounds the idea of the human right to health. I also examine two more specific examples of global practices that contribute to global inequalities in health, namely global trade in tobacco and the global labour market for healthcare workers. Both of these, I suggest, must be restricted in light of their impact on health levels worldwide.

No description available.

This thesis calls into question a currently orthodox view of Ludwig Wittgenstein's post-Tractarian philosophy. This view is that the social and political implications of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations are conservative and relativist. That is, Wittgenstein's concepts such as 'forms of life', 'language-games' and 'rule-following' defend and promote: a rule-determined and context-determined rationality; or an incomparable community-determined human understanding; or a neutralist, nonrevisionary, private or uncritical social and political philosophy. / In order to challenge and correct this conventional understanding the thesis sets up as 'objects of comparison' a variety of very different examples of the use of Wittgenstein in social and political philosophy. These uses are neither relativist nor conservative and they situate understanding and critical reflection in the practices of comparison and dialogue. The examples of this 'comparative-dialogical' Wittgensteinian approach are found in the works of three contemporary philosophers: Thomas L. Kuhn, Quentin Skinner and Charles Taylor. / This study employs the technique of a survey rather than undertaking a uniquely textual analysis because it is less convincing to suggest that Wittgenstein's concepts might be used in these unfamiliar ways than to show that they have been put to these unfamiliar uses. Therefore I turn not to a Wittgensteinian ideal but to examples of the 'comparative-dialogical' uses of Wittgenstein. In so doing I am following Wittgenstein's insight in section 208 of the Philosophical Investigations: "I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. And when I do this, I do not communicate less to him than I know myself." Thus it will be in a survey of various uses and applications of Wittgenstein's concepts and techniques that I will show that I and others understand them.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

Rousseau's work often seems contradictory, but the author himself insists that his works comprise a consistent system based on the principle that man is naturally good. In order that individuals might live up to this natural goodness in society, Rousseau advocates a division of labour between general and particular aspects of reason. This division is exemplified in the different roles that Rousseau assigns to the sovereign and the government in the political sphere, and men and women in the domestic sphere. The difficulties faced by man in the absence of these divisions of labour are illustrated in Rousseau's autobiographical writings. When his various works are examined in light of the principle of man's natural goodness, the apparent contradictions between democratic and authoritarian aspects of his thought and between the roles his ascribes to men and women are resolved.