Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Europe and Eurasia) )--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Johnson, Thomas H. ; Tsypkin, Mikhail. "March 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 23, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Russia, Soviet Union, Intelligence, Foreign Policy, Maslow, Hierarchy of Needs, NATO, CSTO, SCO, Central Asia, U.S.-Russia Relations, NATO-Russia Relations, International Relations, Political Science, Foreign Policy, Legitimacy, Domestic Security, External Security, Prestige, Strong States, State Identity, Needs, State Behavior Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-114). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, June 1997. / Thesis advisors, Mikhail Tsypkin. Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-132). Also available online.

This thesis consists of two objectives which divide it into two parts. Thus, part one explores the cyclicity of protest mobilisation in post-Soviet Kazakhstan in the 1992–2009 period and part two investigates the relationship between protest mobilisation and democratisation in the 1990s, a decade marked by early progress in democratisation followed by an abrupt reversal to authoritarianism. Acknowledging the existence of numerous competing explanations of protest cyclicity, the first part of this study utilises four major social movement perspectives – relative deprivation (RD), resource mobilisation (RMT), political opportunity structures (POS) and collective action frames (CAF) – to explain variances in protest mobilisation in Kazakhstan over time and four issue areas. Adopting a small-N case study and process-tracing technique, the thesis’s first research question enquires into which of these four theoretical perspectives has the best fit when seeking to explain protest cyclicity over time. It is hypothesised that the ‘waxing and waning’ of protest activity can best be attributed to the difficulties surrounding the identification and construction of resonant CAFs. However, the study’s findings lead to a rejection of the first hypothesis by deemphasising the role of CAFs in predicting protest cyclicity, and instead support the theoretical predictions of the POS perspective, suggesting the prevalence of structural factors such as the regime’s capacity for repression and shifts in elite alignments. The second research question revolves around variations in protest mobilisation across four issue areas and explores the reasons why socioeconomic grievances mobilised more people to protest than environmental, political and interethnic ones. According to the second hypothesis, people more readily protest around socioeconomic rather than political and other types of grievances due to the lower costs of participation in socioeconomic protests. While the regime’s propensity for repressing political protests could explain the prevalence of socioeconomic protests in the 2000s, the POS perspective’s key explanatory variable failed to account for the prevalence of socioeconomic protests in the early 1990s, resulting in the rejection of the second hypothesis. The second part of the thesis attempts to answer the third research question: How does protest mobilisation account for the stalled transition to democracy in Kazakhstan in the 1990s? Based on the theoretical assumption that instances of extensive protest mobilisation foster democratic transitions, the study’s third research hypothesis posits that transition to democracy in Kazakhstan stalled in the mid-1990s due to the failure of social movement organisations to effectively mobilise the masses for various acts of protest. This assumption receives strong empirical support, suggesting that protest mobilisation is an important facilitative factor in the democratisation process. The thesis is the first to attempt to employ classical social movement theories in the context of post-communist Central Asian societies. Additionally, the study aims to contribute to the large pool of democratisation literature which, until recently (following the colour revolutions), seemed to underplay the role of popular protest mobilisation in advancing transitions to democracy. Finally, the research is based on the author’s primary elite-interview data and content analysis of five weekly independent newspapers.

La thèse de doctorat en science politique s’attache à comprendre le rôle des partis politiques parlementaires d’opposition en Russie entre 2005 et 2010. Elle se fonde sur l’étude des branches régionales du Parti communiste de la Fédération de Russie (KPRF), du Parti libéral-démocrate de Russie (LDPR) et de Russie juste à Tomsk, en Sibérie occidentale. Toute la problématique de ces trois partis d’opposition est liée à ce paradoxe :dans les années 2000, il existe en Russie des partis qui se positionnent comme étant d’opposition - dans un système partisan dominé par Russie unie - tout en se montrant loyaux envers le régime politique et ses principaux dirigeants.<p>Les données, recueillies au cours de huit mois et demi de recherche de terrain en Russie, sont essentiellement qualitatives. Une approche organisationnelle et fonctionnelle de l’étude des partis est utilisée afin de comprendre le rôle de ces trois formations dans le système politique russe. <p>La thèse s’attache à tester trois hypothèses :les partis parlementaires d’opposition remplissent certaines fonctions dans le système politique qui leur assurent le soutien d’électeurs et d’adhérents ;les organisations partisanes du LDPR, du KPRF et de Russie juste sont centralisées de manière à limiter la marge de manœuvre des branches locales et permettre un contrôle étroit de l’appareil central ;ces trois partis transforment au sein des institutions parlementaires le soutien des électeurs en soutien pour le régime.<p>Tout d’abord, il apparaît que le KPRF, le LDPR et Russie juste remplissent d’autres fonctions dans le système politique que celle de légitimation/stabilisation (Lavau, 1969). Ces fonctions sont multiples. Les activités électorales indiquent que ces trois partis servent, d’une part, de plateforme d’accès aux organes du pouvoir pour les entrepreneurs, d’autre part, la fonction d’expression est assurée en ce que les partis expriment des problèmes, proposent une alternative, et disqualifient certaines pratiques. Pendant les élections, et au sein du parlement régional, les partis assurent dans une certaine mesure la fonction d’organisation de l’opposition. Enfin, le KPRF, le LDPR et Russie juste remplissent, de différentes façons, la fonction d’assistance à la société.<p>Ensuite, la thèse a vérifié que les trois partis ont une structure interne centralisée à Moscou, tout en mettant en évidence l’interdépendance qui existe entre le siège fédéral et les branches régionales dans chaque parti. Une marge de manœuvre, différente selon les trois formations, existe donc au niveau des branches locales.<p>Enfin, l’exemple de Tomsk montre qu’une loyauté formelle envers le régime et une opposition réelle sont possibles. Cela implique des ambiguïtés, notamment concernant l’activité des députés de ces partis au sein des parlements locaux./The PhD thesis starts with this paradox: in the 2000s, the Russian party system is dominated by United Russia called the party of power. Nevertheless, this system also allows the existence of parties that claim to be the opposition, while being loyal to the political regime and its leaders. How do these parties resolve this paradox? <p>The doctoral dissertation in political science seeks to understand the role of parliamentary opposition parties in Russia between 2005 and 2010. It is based on the study of regional branches of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Just Russia (SR) in Tomsk, Western Siberia. The qualitative data were collected during eight and a half months of field research in Russia. An organizational and functional approach to the study of political parties is used to understand their role in the Russian political system.<p>The thesis tests three hypotheses: first, the opposition parliamentary parties perform certain functions in the political system that gives them the support of voters and members. Second, the party organizations of the LDPR, the KPRF and Just Russia are centralized to limit the flexibility of local branches and allow tight control of the central apparatus. Third, we examine if these parties transform the support of voters into support for the regime in the parliamentary institutions at the local level.<p>The results show three elements. First, it shows that the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia perform several functions in the political system. On the one hand, they are platforms for businessmen to access to the organs of power; on the other hand, they express problems, offer an alternative, and disqualify some practices. During elections, and within the regional parliament, parliamentary opposition parties perform to a certain extent the function of organizing opposition. Moreover, the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia support citizens in various ways. <p>Then, the dissertation verifies that the three parties have a centralized internal structure. But it also highlights the interdependence between federal headquarters and regional branches within each party. <p>Finally, the case of Tomsk shows that formal loyalty to the regime, and a real opposition at the same time, is possible as far as the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia are concerned. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished