Decentralisation, meaning the delegation of responsibilities from central to lower government levels is generally assumed to improve the delivery of local public services. The theoretical assumption is that local authorities are encouraged by decentralisation to behave in a more accountable and entrepreneurial fashion. At the same time, accountability and (public) entrepreneurship are distinct concepts and may even be considered to involve conflicting behaviours. Therefore, decentralisation outcomes may vary depending on which behavioural pattern predominates. Previous research has focused on using large data sets to examine the impact of decentralisation on outcomes such as economic growth, disparities, poverty reduction and government performance. But there is also a need to better understand how decentralisation, and specifically fiscal decentralisation, may promote accountability and public entrepreneurship in specific settings. To contribute to closing this gap, this dissertation examines both fiscal decentralisation policies and contemporaneous changes in political arrangements. It identifies the incentives these changes create for Mexican local authorities to behave in more accountable and entrepreneurial ways and which may lead to differences in government performance. The study focuses on rural municipalities where achieving the predicted decentralisation outcomes is highly challenging. A mixed methods research design was used with two phases. In the first stage, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and changes in government accountability and entrepreneurship was investigated through statistical analysis based on fixed effects estimation using a sample of 505 rural municipalities. For that purpose a longitudinal dataset was developed, comprising municipal level information between the years 1990 and 2009, including indices for accountability and public entrepreneurship. Phase two involves multiple case studies of individual municipalities that were selected based on performance. The empirical evidence suggests that decentralisation policy has tended to work against accountability but has increased entrepreneurial behaviour in rural municipalities, highlighting the potential tension between the two. The extent to which these effects occur seems to depend on the particular fiscal arrangement. In addition, political competition seems to reinforce accountability and has an impact in entrepreneurship in a different way to the effects expected theoretically, though the effects are not as strong as with fiscal decentralisation. This study advances the public entrepreneurship literature and expands the understanding of fiscal decentralisation. Additionally, it provides suggestions for which policy arrangements are likely to promote accountability and entrepreneurial actions by public authorities.

Por que mesmo entre os países com condições econômicas semelhantes o nível de desenvolvimento financeiro é tão diferente? Diversas variáveis políticas e institucionais já foram ressaltadas pela literatura, no entanto desconectadas uma das outras. Esse artigo visa contribuir para a questão fornecendo um modelo que analise as principais variáveis de forma concomitante, tornando endógena a interação entre elas. Para tanto, selecionamos uma amostra de países de renda média alta que compartilham de outras variáveis econômicas centrais e utilizamos o QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis), como método de análise. O estudo conclui que a estabilidade política é a única condição necessária, porém não suficiente. Entre aqueles países estáveis politicamente foi necessário mais um de dois atributos: um alto grau de proteção aos investidores minoritários ou, surpreendentemente, um regime político autocrático. / Why even among countries with similar economic conditions the financial development level is so different? Several political and institutional variables have already been highlighted in the literature, however disconnected from each other. This article aims to contribute to the issue by providing a model to analyze the main variables simultaneously, making endogenous the interaction between them. To achieve this, we selected a sample of middle-income countries who share other core economic variables and use the QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) as the analysis method. The study concludes that political stability is the only necessary condition, but still not sufficient. Those politically stable countries need another one of attributes: a high degree of protection to minority investors or, surprisingly, an autocratic political regime.

Por que mesmo entre os países com condições econômicas semelhantes o nível de desenvolvimento financeiro é tão diferente? Diversas variáveis políticas e institucionais já foram ressaltadas pela literatura, no entanto desconectadas uma das outras. Esse artigo visa contribuir para a questão fornecendo um modelo que analise as principais variáveis de forma concomitante, tornando endógena a interação entre elas. Para tanto, selecionamos uma amostra de países de renda média alta que compartilham de outras variáveis econômicas centrais e utilizamos o QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis), como método de análise. O estudo conclui que a estabilidade política é a única condição necessária, porém não suficiente. Entre aqueles países estáveis politicamente foi necessário mais um de dois atributos: um alto grau de proteção aos investidores minoritários ou, surpreendentemente, um regime político autocrático. / Why even among countries with similar economic conditions the financial development level is so different? Several political and institutional variables have already been highlighted in the literature, however disconnected from each other. This article aims to contribute to the issue by providing a model to analyze the main variables simultaneously, making endogenous the interaction between them. To achieve this, we selected a sample of middle-income countries who share other core economic variables and use the QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) as the analysis method. The study concludes that political stability is the only necessary condition, but still not sufficient. Those politically stable countries need another one of attributes: a high degree of protection to minority investors or, surprisingly, an autocratic political regime.