This dissertation argues that the Alberta Progressive Conservative organization constructed a rural political monopoly that facilitated a general provincial political monopoly. It will argue that rural Alberta was vital for the rise of the Progressive Conservatives and accounted for much of its success over the subsequent twenty-five years. The argument also challenges the theories of ‘responsible party government’ that have traditionally explained the perpetuation of the quasi-party system and tradition of one-party dominance in Alberta. It argues that a more comparative approach, specifically the thesis of democratic quality, be integrated into this field of study. The employment of democratic quality biases and the consolidation of economic power in rural Alberta contributed heavily to Conservative political success between 1971 and 1996. Over this period, the Conservatives perpetuated a system of electoral malapportionment that overrepresented rural constituencies and underrepresented urban ridings. At the same time the Conservatives actively challenged independent rural/agrarian civil society organizations and any policy contrary to the party’s political interests. Alberta’s once considerable independent rural and agrarian lobby is today predominantly mediated by their position within or in relation to the Progressive Conservative Association. The decline of general farm organizations (GFOs) and agrarian civil society organizations, facilitated in part by government complicity and a changing agricultural economy, resulted in a ‘political monopoly’ in rural areas. During this period malapportionment underpinned a general political monopoly with rural overrepresentation shoring up collapses of urban support (i.e. Edmonton) in the 1980s and 1990s. This work will provide evidence of participation, competition and other democratic quality biases through a construction of this theoretical framework in terms of a broader comparative perspective based on the evaluation of ‘democratic quality’.

This dissertation argues that the Alberta Progressive Conservative organization constructed a rural political monopoly that facilitated a general provincial political monopoly. It will argue that rural Alberta was vital for the rise of the Progressive Conservatives and accounted for much of its success over the subsequent twenty-five years. The argument also challenges the theories of ‘responsible party government’ that have traditionally explained the perpetuation of the quasi-party system and tradition of one-party dominance in Alberta. It argues that a more comparative approach, specifically the thesis of democratic quality, be integrated into this field of study. The employment of democratic quality biases and the consolidation of economic power in rural Alberta contributed heavily to Conservative political success between 1971 and 1996. Over this period, the Conservatives perpetuated a system of electoral malapportionment that overrepresented rural constituencies and underrepresented urban ridings. At the same time the Conservatives actively challenged independent rural/agrarian civil society organizations and any policy contrary to the party’s political interests. Alberta’s once considerable independent rural and agrarian lobby is today predominantly mediated by their position within or in relation to the Progressive Conservative Association. The decline of general farm organizations (GFOs) and agrarian civil society organizations, facilitated in part by government complicity and a changing agricultural economy, resulted in a ‘political monopoly’ in rural areas. During this period malapportionment underpinned a general political monopoly with rural overrepresentation shoring up collapses of urban support (i.e. Edmonton) in the 1980s and 1990s. This work will provide evidence of participation, competition and other democratic quality biases through a construction of this theoretical framework in terms of a broader comparative perspective based on the evaluation of ‘democratic quality’.

This dissertation argues that the Alberta Progressive Conservative organization constructed a rural political monopoly that facilitated a general provincial political monopoly. It will argue that rural Alberta was vital for the rise of the Progressive Conservatives and accounted for much of its success over the subsequent twenty-five years. The argument also challenges the theories of ‘responsible party government’ that have traditionally explained the perpetuation of the quasi-party system and tradition of one-party dominance in Alberta. It argues that a more comparative approach, specifically the thesis of democratic quality, be integrated into this field of study. The employment of democratic quality biases and the consolidation of economic power in rural Alberta contributed heavily to Conservative political success between 1971 and 1996. Over this period, the Conservatives perpetuated a system of electoral malapportionment that overrepresented rural constituencies and underrepresented urban ridings. At the same time the Conservatives actively challenged independent rural/agrarian civil society organizations and any policy contrary to the party’s political interests. Alberta’s once considerable independent rural and agrarian lobby is today predominantly mediated by their position within or in relation to the Progressive Conservative Association. The decline of general farm organizations (GFOs) and agrarian civil society organizations, facilitated in part by government complicity and a changing agricultural economy, resulted in a ‘political monopoly’ in rural areas. During this period malapportionment underpinned a general political monopoly with rural overrepresentation shoring up collapses of urban support (i.e. Edmonton) in the 1980s and 1990s. This work will provide evidence of participation, competition and other democratic quality biases through a construction of this theoretical framework in terms of a broader comparative perspective based on the evaluation of ‘democratic quality’.

This dissertation argues that the Alberta Progressive Conservative organization constructed a rural political monopoly that facilitated a general provincial political monopoly. It will argue that rural Alberta was vital for the rise of the Progressive Conservatives and accounted for much of its success over the subsequent twenty-five years. The argument also challenges the theories of ‘responsible party government’ that have traditionally explained the perpetuation of the quasi-party system and tradition of one-party dominance in Alberta. It argues that a more comparative approach, specifically the thesis of democratic quality, be integrated into this field of study. The employment of democratic quality biases and the consolidation of economic power in rural Alberta contributed heavily to Conservative political success between 1971 and 1996. Over this period, the Conservatives perpetuated a system of electoral malapportionment that overrepresented rural constituencies and underrepresented urban ridings. At the same time the Conservatives actively challenged independent rural/agrarian civil society organizations and any policy contrary to the party’s political interests. Alberta’s once considerable independent rural and agrarian lobby is today predominantly mediated by their position within or in relation to the Progressive Conservative Association. The decline of general farm organizations (GFOs) and agrarian civil society organizations, facilitated in part by government complicity and a changing agricultural economy, resulted in a ‘political monopoly’ in rural areas. During this period malapportionment underpinned a general political monopoly with rural overrepresentation shoring up collapses of urban support (i.e. Edmonton) in the 1980s and 1990s. This work will provide evidence of participation, competition and other democratic quality biases through a construction of this theoretical framework in terms of a broader comparative perspective based on the evaluation of ‘democratic quality’.

Abstract ' The study described in this article consisted of a survey that was conducted among a sample of • South African political institutions and organisations, and that was aimed at investigating their views and perceptions with regard to the use of the Internet. The main research question posed by the current study was: What are the views of politically orientated institutions in South Africa on their use the Internet, and what are their perceptions on how the Internet could impact on democratic processes in the country? The aim of this exploratory research study was to obtain information that could cast light on the issue of how likely it was that the Internet would contribute to a deliberative democracy in South Africa. The survey revealed that the Internet was perceived to have a significant role to play with regard to political and democracy issues in South Africa. However, if certain problems (the lack of access, the lack of basic and computer literacy, and the lack of training) were not adequately addressed by means of an integrated government Internet strategy, the ability of the Internet to impact positively on democracy in South Africa would be very limited.

As the central institution of democracy, parliaments embody the will of the people in government, and carry all their expectations that democracy will be truly responsive to their needs and help solve the most pressing problems that confront them in their daily lives. With more countries preferring democracy over other systems of government, parliaments and other legislative assemblies have become increasingly pertinent. In broad terms, everybody agrees on what the functions of a parliament are. These bodies make laws, hold the executive branch accountable, and represent citizen interests. Achieving democratic governance, therefore, requires the existence of a strong, effective and efficient parliament or legislative body. The thesis highlights the specific challenges parliaments face in performing such crucial role, particularly fulfilling its oversight mandate. This becomes more daunting where parliaments and legislative bodies are not considered credible or trustworthy institutions, or do not enjoy the support from executives. Many parliaments and the likes are chronically under-staffed and ill-informed. More often than not, they are sorely under-resourced and vital research, legislative drafting, and other capacities are often in short supply. That is why parliaments in most emerging democracies look to the international community for support, as do civil society organisations. Support to ‘parliaments and parliamentarians’ is a relatively new, but rapidly growing area of cooperation provided by different donors and international organisations to representative institutions. The thesis attempts to do primarily three things: firstly, it offers a framework that links a set of specific democratic and aid effectiveness principles to the institutional means by which democratic and parliamentary institutions are supported. As part of this, it provides a compilation of practices whereby parliaments seek to put these principles into effect with international assistance, known as Parliamentary Development Assistance (PDA). In fact, a clear and consistent set of lessons and recommendations about how international development and parliamentary actors can improve their assistance has emerged over the past two decades [‘Lessons learned’ and ‘Good practices’]. Secondly, it explores whether this results into any distinct approach to parliamentary oversight. It examines whether the PDA demonstrated capacity to promote substantial changes to the parliamentary oversight mechanisms in order to address the challenges of corruption better. Thirdly, the thesis sheds light on the nexus between technical support and political environment – often expressed through political will - and, political economy analysis, ignored too long in the name of ‘neutral technical support’. The thesis reinforces that political behaviour and culture cannot be changed quickly. This requires long term engagements, and, calls for enduring commitment and collaboration. The thesis identifies distinct gaps in the literature of studies of the impact of parliamentary development assistance (PDA). It seeks to consider the work of international organisations, research institutions, and donors with the parliaments of different countries and developmental situations in terms of their capacity to make a difference to the strengthening of parliamentary development and oversight work. Donors - development partners and international actors will need to make a durable commitment to programmes based on robust local and political analysis, and reduce the number of short-term interventions, quick fixes, and small-scale projects.

The main aim of this thesis is to contribute to knowledge about the Portuguese parliament, the Assembleia da Republica. Although already over twenty years old, this is still in many ways an unknown institution. There is very little literature and much of what exists is dated. This dissertation seeks to fill a notable gap. Given the lack of previous studies, many objects could have been chosen for this thesis. However, considering the non-existence of basic information (for example, on the ruling framework and on scrutiny devices), this thesis has necessarily to adopt a broad perspective. It is concerned with the overall development of the Assembleia da Republica as a newly democratic institution. For this, a period of twelve years has been chosen: 1983 to 1995, which includes three different political situations, a coalition, a minority and an absolute majority government. The main reason for the choice of this period is again linked with the absence of studies on parliament: only a very small part of existing literature has been dedicated to the period subsequent to 1985; most of the studies have focused on the first decade of Portuguese democracy (after 1974). Besides this, other reasons justify the choice of those twelve years in particular. 1987 was the first time that an absolute majority held by one party was elected to parliament; for the first time in Portuguese democracy, there was political stability and a full legislature period (four years) was completed. Thus, it is normal to expect considerable changes in the Assembleia after 1987, that is in the V legislature. In 1991, the same absolute majority was elected to parliament for a further four years (VI legislature - 1991195). The repetition of two completed parliaments allows us to adequately understand the extent of the consequences of political stability for the development of a new institution. In order to fully assess the changes brought in by the absolute majorities, two previous legislatures were also included in the period studied here: the III (1983/85) and the IV (1985/87). This allows us to include in the analysis two different political situations: a coalition government (III) and a minority one (IV). Hence, the study of the Assembleia over this period of twelve years will provide a thorough understanding of the variables and processes involved in the development of a new democratic institution, once the troubled years of transition to democracy had been overcome. The analysis will be carried out basically through two dimensions: policy-making and legitimation. Finally, it should be noted that some of the material included in the dissertation is already in print, in publications that were published as the research developed.

The process of European integration has been going on for almost half a century. The last 15 years have seen an elected trans-national Parliament as part of that process. This thesis seeks to explore what impact the existence of an elected, full-time Parliament has had on the integration process. Chapter 1 begins by examining what is actually meant by European integration. It explores the various theoretical approaches, relating them to the intentions of governments and other actors. It finds that there is wide diversity of scholarly approaches and of actor"s objectives, as well as of the importance attributed to a Parliament. Nonetheless, elements of all the main approaches give certain insights into the process and it is possible to construct an overview (or "preliminary synthesis") taking aspects of all the integrative approaches, but which emphasizes in particular the importance of the basic constitutional settlements laid down in the treaties and the role of the institutions, governments and other actor's in using the possibilities thereby created to go further (in the right circumstances) and thereby to generate pressure for constitutional change. Chapter 2 examines what, exactly, was expected of the elected Parliament in academic literature and in political circles prior to and around the time of the first elections. Here, too, it is possible to find an enormous diversity of expectations. From this examination it is possible, bearing in mind the overview of integration theory developed in Chapter 1, to formulate hypothesis about how an elected Parliament might effect the integration process. The remaining chapters attempt to test the impact of the Parliament, at various levels, which overlap in time and content but remain distinct. Firstly, in Chapter 3, the Significance of establishing a new corps of full-time politicians, with back-up support and facilities, is assessed. Independently of the powers and formal role of the institution as such, is there any evidence of a new political network developing having an influence on political classes in Member States and other European institutions? Secondly, in Chapter 4, we examine what use the elected Parliament made of the existing, limited powers that it inherited from the nominated Parliament. Thirdly, Chapter 5 explores the attempts by Parliament to achieve institutional reform within the context of the treaties as they stood at the time of its election, notably by seeking to reach agreements with the other institutions. These three chapters are, in fact, overviews of material that deserves further exploration because, for reasons of time and space, the bulk of the thesis concentrates on exploring the role of the Parliament in securing changes to the treaties themselves - that is to find out what was Parliament's contribution to the processes leading to the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Thus, Chapter 6 describes how Parliament, after initial hesitation, turned to the path of treaty revision and prepared its own draft treaty on European Union at a time when such a path seemed to offer few prospects. Chapter 7 briefly describes the content of Parliament' s draft treaty and analyses the main objectives it sought to achieve. Chapter 8 looks at Parliament's strategy in building up support for a reform of the treaties and examines the run-up to the calling of the IGC that negotiated the SEA to assess Parliament's impact. Chapter 9 takes us through that IGC with a similar eye to Parliament's role and impact. Chapter 10 assesses how all the institutions, but especially the Parliament, were affected by the SEA and were able to exploit its provisions to achieve a higher level of integration. Chapter 11 examines how Parliament remained dissatisfied and made attempts to launch a new process of treaty reform. Chapter 12 takes us through the IGCs that produced the Maastricht Treaty, again with an eye to Parliament's role and impact. An attempt to bring all this together is made in the concluding Chapter 13 which takes up the synthesis of integration theories developed in Chapter 1 and the hypotheses developed at the end of Chapter 2 to see how the events explored in the intervening chapters (and the assessment made at the end of each chapter) have confirmed or invalidated them. The time-frame covered by this thesis was intended to be essentially the period from the first direct elections in 1979 until the third direct elections in 1989 i.e. the first two legislatures of the EP including the first two years of the application of the SEA. However, the immediate beginning in 1989 of the process leading to the Maastricht Treaty induced me to add the events of 1989 to 1993, but mainly as regards the treaty-making process rather than other institutional developments. Clearly, this thesis is an ambitious one in that it deals with a vast process involving a huge amount of material - hence its length. Its methodology is inevitably one that involves a large amount of piecing together and describing events of the basis of primary and secondary documentary sources, and a considerable degree of participant-observation and direct contact with key actors more than surveys or statistical analysis. Nonetheless, it is not a history thesis, but an attempt to provide an insight into one of the most complex and multi-faceted ongoing political processes of our time, namely that of European integration.

…the future is that; I think we have hit rock bottom and that the only way we can go now is not down but up. I have hope. I have told Malawians that we need to look into the future with hope and I know that we shall be fine. What I am implying here is that ultimately what is going to save democracy in Malawi is the willingness by Malawians to protect themselves and preserve the freedoms and rights which they have…, (President, Joyce Banda, 2011). The thesis of this study is that the Malawi Parliament ought to be the hub of vertical and horizontal accountability in legislation, representation and oversight roles. Salih, (2005, p.3) states that parliaments are caught between fulfilling the governance role and acting as part of government. Therefore, in order to effectively fulfil this objective, parliament must be supported, (Ma Ngok, in Siu-Kai, 2002). However, the study notes that the Malawi Parliament has a high executive influence; no policy making power with minimal legislative viscosity, (Norton, 2005, 1990; Polsby, 1975; Mezey, 1979 and Blondel, 1973). Consequently, it is argued with empirical data that since the 1994 multiparty election, parliament has not been effective in its vertical and horizontal accountability roles, (Lindberg, 2009). In the horizontal accountability, parliament plays an inter-governmental role of the executive oversight as well as that of checks and balance, (Stapenhurst and O’Brien, 2011, p. 3). In the vertical, parliament is held accountable through its elected members by its voters, stakeholders and the civil society, (Chirwa and Nijzink, 2012, p.6). It is argued that when voters (principals) delegate their decision-making power to parliament (agent), the principal must have mechanisms in place of holding the agent(s) accountable for their actions or lack of it and if necessary, impose sanctions or remove the agent from power, (Strom, 1999, pp. 7, 8). In every developed democracy, government policies and services are demand driven; sanctioned, monitored and evaluated by the legislature (Lupia and McCubbins, 1999, p. 4). Using empirical data, the study observed that although the Malawi Parliament has made significant reforms towards regaining its independence and autonomy from the executive, it still continues to be seen as a legitimatisation and sometimes rubberstamping institution, (Nyamongo, 2010; Chinsinga, 2007; Patel, 2007). The contributory factors were both intrinsic and extrinsic such as lack of institutional capacity as well as political will by the executive to support a greater parliamentary autonomy. Thus, the study recommends that the Malawi Parliament institutes a human resource development programme in order to improve the technical capacity of legislative support staff as well as MPs; increase funding and strengthen parliamentary committee system for higher scrutiny as well as a wider stakeholder consultation at every stage of the legislative process; The study also recommends that appointments of directors in auxiliary governance agencies such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Electoral Commission of Malawi, and the Human Rights Commission shift from the presidency to parliament. It is the assumption of this study that increasing parliamentary oversight potential promotes democracy and good governance, (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2007, p.13).

The principal purpose of this thesis is to explain the significance of moves towards industrial democracy in Britain since the Second World War. It attempts not only to outline a comprehensive 'conceptual map' of the literature on the subject, but also to define the limits of what industrial democracy - in its various forms - can achieve within the context of an advanced, neo-capitalist society. Part I contains a sustained critique of liberal pluralist approaches to industrial relations which leads, in Part II, to an analysis of power relations in industry focusing on the Gramscian concepts of 'hegemony' and 'contradictory consciousness'. It is shown that, although workers often express socially consensual attitudes in abstract terms, their behaviour reflects conflictual responses whenever their interests are threatened on the shop-floor. However, the 'non-observable' aspects of power (such as property relations, the legal framework and the division of labour) constrain the kinds of action workers may undertake through its 'observable' aspects (such as collective bargaining or consultation). In Part III, it is argued that managements try to use forms of industrial democracy to incorporate workers' behaviour - many of their organizations already having been incorporated - but that such attempts tend to fail because of structural tensions at the non-observable level. Since unions also use forms of industrial democracy to extend their own marginal power, the meaning of· the term is best seen as centring on the 'frontier of control' between the two sides of industry and analysable by level, area (or subject matter) and method of influence. The development of industrial democracy in these terms - with particular reference to job-restructuring, consultation, collective bargaining and worker directors - is examined for the period 1945-1980. It is found that both sides of industry use different forms of industrial democracy in an opportunistic way to pursue their own interests at the 'frontier of control'. Part IV, however, investigates the circumstances in which groups of workers have tried to 'break through' the institutional framework of the 'non-observable' aspects of power in order to establish an organization of industry which structurally favours their own interests. The role of union trustees on the boards of occupational pension funds is investigated, as are work-ins, social audits, co-operatives and workers' alternative corporate plans. The thesis concludes that democratic planning must be systematically introduced at all levels of industry if radical industrial democracy is to flourish.