Thesis (MA)-- Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Comparative studies investigating predictors of political participation in new democracies are rare. This study addresses an identified gap in the literature on predictors of political participation in new democracies in order to build on the rich body of literature concerned with political participation and democratic consolidation which already exists, but also to contribute towards understanding the role of citizens and their decisions pertaining to political participation in new democracies. In order to address the identified gap, this cross-national comparative study uses World Values Survey (2006) data for Chile, Poland, South Africa, and South Korea as part of a cross-sectional secondary analysis aimed at ascertaining what predictors of political participation can be identified for these new democracies. Drawing primarily from studies by Shin (1999) and Dalton (2008) which used the Civic Voluntarism Model by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) as theoretical framework, predictors of political participation considered in this study include: personal resources (level of education and self-reported social class), political engagement and motivation (political interest and leftright political ideology), group membership and networks, as well as demographic attributes (age, gender and size of town). Forms of political participation investigated include: voting as conventional form of participation; and boycotts, petitions and demonstrations as forms of political protest behaviour. The relationships between the possible predictors of participation and forms of political participation were determined by multiple regression analysis. The main findings by this study are that political interest is an important predictor of voting and political protest behaviour; age is a strong predictor of voting; and group membership has a greater impact on political protest behaviour than on voting. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Vergelykende studies wat ondersoek instel na voorspellende faktore van deelname aan politieke aktiwiteite in jong demokrasieë, is skaars. Deur indikatore van politieke deelname in nuwe demokrasieë na te vors, spreek hierdie studie dus die geïdentifiseerde gaping in die literatuur aan en brei dit uit op die korpus tekste aangaande politieke deelname en demokratiese konsolidasie. Verder bevorder dit ook ’n beter begrip van landsburgers en hul besluite rakende politieke deelname in jong demokrasieë. Ten einde die aangeduide literatuurgaping te oorbrug, steun hierdie verglykende studie op data van die “World Values Survey” (2006) vir Chili, Pole, Suid-Afrika en Suid-Korea. Dit vorm deel van ’n sekondêre analise om individuele eienskappe as voorspellers van deelname aan politieke aktiwiteite in nuwe demokrasieë, te identifiseer. Studies deur Shin (1999) en Dalton (2008), wat gebruik maak van Verba, Schlozman en Brady (1995) se “Civic Voluntarism Model”, dien as primêre teoretiese begronding. Daaruit word afgelei dat moontlike voorspellers van deelname aan politieke aktiwiteite gelys kan word as: persoonlike hulpbronne (vlak van opvoeding en self-geidentifiseerde sosiale klas); politieke betrokkenheid en motivering (belangstelling in politiek en politieke ideologie); groeplidmaatskap en –netwerke asook demografiese eienskappe (ouderdom, geslag en grootte van dorp). Die vorme van politieke aktiwiteite waaraan daar aandag gegee word, is eerstens stemgedrag tydens nasionale verkiesings as konvensionele vorm van politieke deelname en tweedens biokotte, petisies en demonstrasies as vorme van politieke protesgedrag. Die hoof bevindinge van hierdie studie is dat politieke belangstelling ‘n belangrike voorspeller is vir stemgedrag en politieke protesgedrag; ouderdom is ‘n sterk voorspeller vir deelname aan verkiesings en groeplidmaatskap het ‘n groter invloed op politieke protesgedrag as op die keuse om te stem. / Mandela Rhodes Foundation

The intention of campaign finance regulations was to reduce the influence of special interest groups while increasing citizen contributions. Critics have suggested an unintentional consequence of this policy of increasing bias in campaign contributions in favor of incumbents. These claims of intentional and unintentional consequences, however, have rarely been tested. My dissertation examines the intentional and unintentional consequences of campaign finance regulations in the American states. This study adopts a theoretical framework emphasizing the different effects of regulations on two distinctive types of contributors. A particularistic contributor, whose motivation is influencing policy, is likely to be affected by contribution limits. A universalistic contributor, motivated by helping his or her favorite candidates, is not likely to respond to regulations. Furthermore, the disparity of contributions is not expected to be affected by contribution limits. Two specific hypotheses reflecting the theoretical consideration are tested: 1) Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions and increase the disparity between the numbers as well as the amounts of contributions, and 2) Contribution limits do not affect the number, the amount, or the disparities of universalistic contributions. Individual contribution records on gubernatorial elections are collected from 1990 to 2000 in 42 states. After aggregating individual contribution records by state and candidate, two analyses are conducted at the state and candidate level. The results indicate that campaign finance regulations work without the unintentional consequence of providing a financial advantage to incumbents at both the state and candidate levels. Contribution limits increase the number of total contributors, reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions, and increase the number of universalistic contributors. In addition, further analyses show a dynamic effect of contribution limits on corporations, labor unions, individuals, parties, and ideology PACs. Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of corporate contributions, but only reduce the amount of labor union contributions. On the other hand, strict contribution limits encourage individual contributions, but discourage party and ideological PAC contributions. The intentional consequence of campaign finance regulations does not result in the unintentional consequence of increasing bias in favor of incumbents. These findings suggest that current regulations that limit campaign contributions should remain in place.