At last, this study examines the welfare effects of export share requirement in a less developed country (LDC) with foreign investment, labour unemployment (or underemployment) and imperfect competition in its importable sector. In the quota case, introducing export share requirement always benefits a Harris-Todaro or Lewis' economy irrespective of free or restricted entry of local rivals. The policy unambiguously dampens the domestic price of imported goods, expands the importable sector, reduces labour unemployment (or underemployment) and improves national welfare. When free entry and exit of domestic players are allowed, the policy also induces emergence of local rivals. The LDC should always impose 100% export share requirement on foreign investment for attaining maximal welfare. / This dissertation consists of three independent essays on international trade policies. First of all, this dissertation provides a general equilibrium model on a small economy for examining the individual as well as the joint effects of pollution tax and equity share restrictions on the investment from multinational corporations (MNCs). The results show that free trade, free capital flow and the Pigouvian tax (i.e. at a rate equal to the marginal damage of pollution) is the first-best policy for the host country. Should imports be subject to irremovable tariff, the second-best policy is 100% foreign ownership of MNC subsidiaries, coupled with pollution tax higher than the Pigouvian rate. Allowing wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries and taxing pollution less than the Pigouvian rate is the second-best option for an economy adopting quantitative restriction policies. In particular, if quota is adopted by the host country, who retains all the trade restriction rent, the second best policy mix will be the Pigouvian tax and allowing full foreign ownership of MNC subsidiaries. / We then proceed to a game theoretic model to investigate how an industrialized country serves the market of a host country by transferring its technology to the host country's importable sector, and how the host country government reacts by means of export share requirement to optimize its national welfare. The interaction between the host country and the technology-exporting country has been modeled as a non-cooperative game. In the simultaneous-move framework, we have derived the existence of Nash equilibrium. The export of technology should earn a positive royalty, and the host country mandates some portion of importable good produced by foreign firms for export. The effects of raising tariff on importable good and importing more capital-intensive technology are also investigated. In addition, the sub-game perfect equilibria of two possible sequential-move frameworks have also been formulated. / Tai Chi-hung. / "December 1999." / Adviser: Eden S. H. Yu. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3296. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-99). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

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La tesis estudia como las firmas cumplen con la regulación de impuestos de contaminación en China y como las agencias ambientales de China imponen la regulación ambiental eficaz a firmas. Nuestro estudio proporciona pruebas claras que las firmas considerablemente underreport su contaminación y acciones de imposición por agencias ambientales son principalmente eficaces en la verificación de la contaminación relatada de las firmas e inducción de firmas a relatar su contaminación más exactamente. Además, mostramos que las agencias ambientales tienen la edad de las firmas en cuenta y la propiedad cuando ellos imponen los estándares de contaminación de las plantas y emprenden inspecciones. También mostramos que las plantas quiénes son localizados en el PBI más alto per cápita áreas y cuyas emisiones con mayor probabilidad inducirán daños de contaminación afrontan la regulación ambiental eficaz más estricta, que es estándares de contaminación más estrictos e inspecciones más frecuentes. / The thesis studies how firms comply with pollution taxation regulation in China and how China's environmental agencies impose effective environmental regulation on firms. Our study provides clear evidence that firms significantly underreport their pollution and enforcement actions by environmental agencies are mainly effective in verifying firms' reported pollution and inducing firms to report their pollution more accurately. Moreover, we show that environmental agencies take into account firms' age and ownership when they impose plants' pollution standards and undertake inspections. We also show that plants who are located in higher GDP per capita areas and whose emissions are more likely to induce pollution damages are facing stricter effective environmental regulation, which is stricter pollution standards and more frequent inspections.

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This thesis consists of four essays. The first essay looks at pollution taxation under capital mobility, and analyzes the role of pre-commitment by countries to their pollution tax rate. A polluting firm sells its product in two countries, and can locate and produce in a single country or in both countries. Due to the discrete-choice nature of the firm's location problem, the countries' welfare functions are discontinuous in their pollution tax rate. We show that when the countries cannot pre-commit to their pollution tax, the firm can still engender tax competition between them by strategically locating in both the countries. Moreover, pre-commitment pollution taxation may not be welfare improving for the countries, although it always makes the firm better off. / The second essay studies the effect of liberalization on corruption. Corruptible inspectors enforce an environmental regulation on firms, and are monitored by an honest regulator. Liberalization not only increases the variety of goods and the marginal utility of accepting a bribe, but also puts pressure on the regulator to curb corruption. The interaction of these two effects can cause corruption to initially increase with liberalization, and then decrease beyond a threshold. Moreover, equilibrium corruption is lower when the regulator is able to pre-commit to her monitoring frequency. / The third essay analyzes optimal labeling (information revelation) procedures for hidden attributes of credence goods. Consumers are heterogeneous in their preference for the hidden attribute, and producers can either self-label their products, or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third-party labeling requirements on either the "green" or the "brown" producers. When corrupt producers can affix spurious labels, the government needs to monitor them. A mandatory self-labeling policy is shown to generally dominate mandatory third-party labeling. / The fourth essay develops formulas for computing the economy-wide energy intensity decline rate by aggregating sectoral energy efficiency improvements, and sectoral shifts in economic activities. The formulas are used to (i) construct plausible scenarios for the global rate of energy intensity decline, and (ii) show the restraining role of the "electricity generation" sector on the energy intensity decline rate.

Les Gaz à Effet de Serre (GES) jouent un rôle crucial dans la régulation du climat. Le changement climatique, conséquence de l'accumulation de GES dans l'atmosphère, a de nombreux impacts tels que les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes (tempêtes, ouragans, cyclones, inondations, canicules, sécheresses), la disparition d'espèces animales et végétales, la prévalence croissante des maladies liées à la pollution atmosphérique (santé respiratoire par exemple). La pollution industrielle contribue au changement climatique. Par ailleurs, les firmes produisant un même bien sont en perpétuelle concurrence et leurs niveaux d'émission diffèrent selon leur technologie et leur pouvoir de marché. Compte tenu de ces effets néfastes croissants des agents économiques sur l'environnement, il est nécessaire que des politiques publiques soient mises en place pour réduire les émissions de GES.L'objectif de la thèse est triple. D'une part, elle vise à analyser la pollution dans des structures de marchés où tous les agents se comportent de manière stratégique (concurrence oligopolistique). D'autre part, elle vise à effectuer des exercices de statique comparative afin de mesurer les effets des variations de paramètres sur les équilibres stratégiques. Enfin, elle étudie différentes politiques publiques pour réguler les émissions liées à cette pollution. Notons ici que la thèse porte plus sur l'atténuation que sur l'adaptation au changement climatique.Le domaine exploré se situe au croisement de l'économie de l'environnement, et des jeux stratégiques de marché. / Greenhouse gases (GHG) play a crucial role in climate regulation. Climate change, due to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, has many consequences such as extremes weather events (storms, hurricanes, cyclones, floods, heat waves, droughts), extinction of animal and plant species, the increasing prevalence in diseases related to air pollution (e.g.,health respiratory). Industrial pollution contributes to climate change. Moreover, firms which produce the same good are in constant competition and their emission levels differ according to their technology and market power. Facing these deteriorating effects of the behaviour of economic agents on the environment, it is necessary to implement public policies to alleviate GHG emissions.The objective of this thesis is threefold. On the one hand, it aims to analyze pollution in market structures where all agents behave strategically (oligopolistic competition). On the other hand, it aims to carry out comparative static exercises in order to capture the effects of parameter variations on strategic equilibria. Finally, it studies different public policies to regulate emissions related to this pollution. It should be noted here that the thesis focuses more on mitigation than adaptation to climate change.The explored domain is at the junction of environmental economics, and strategic market games.