This study addresses the role of the possible or virtual in Shakespearean drama. It argues that the possible component constitutes an integral part of Shakespearean drama, and that they are as important as the actual events or component. To underscore its paramount importance, the study stresses two aspects of the possible in Shakespearean drama: its potentiality and its cognitive function. Potentiality highlights the power of the virtual in opening up different meanings and interpretations, suggesting alternative possibilities and creating new storylines out of the original ones. The cognitive function of the virtual or possible underlines its role in rendering the actual events and happenings more intelligible, probable and comprehensible. The study builds on the theoretical framework of possible worlds theory as well as Classical and Renaissance rhetoric; it argues that Shakespeare’s familiarity with and employment of these notions can be attributed to his rhetorical training, which formed an essential part of Elizabethan education. The study deals with the drama both as a fictional story and as theatre. On the level of theatre, it demonstrates that, despite its materiality, theatre must stimulate an imaginary virtual reality if the physical events and happenings onstage are to be fully meaningful. On the level of the fictional story, it shows that virtual or possible events form the beliefs and intentions of characters. They help to set the conflict on track and help the audience to access the characters’ inwardness. Although the possible is thought of as an ontological category, the study highlights its cognitive dimension, and argues that features of the possible even shape our image of the actual past. It addresses this question in relation to the representation of history in Shakespeare’s history plays. Finally, it deals with counterfactual statements in Shakespeare and uses a multidisciplinary approach to study their significance.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz claimed that this is the best of all possible worlds. This view has been widely criticized. Much of the criticism focuses on the fact that it is simply counter-intuitive because of the presence of evil. This paper is intended to be a defense of Leibniz's view against those who would suggest that the presence of evil implies that there could be a better world. After defining terms, the first section of this paper will examine Leibniz's arguments for this being the best of all possible worlds. The idea of "best" will also be examined. Leibniz's conception of best will be examined in Leibniz's writings, and an alternative view of best will be suggested to strengthen Leibniz's arguments. Then, the paper will tum to examine the problem of evil and the attack that it is on Leibniz's view. I will suggest that the problem of evil is not a problem for this belief because the world better accomplishes its purpose with evil than it would without evil.

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abstract: One activity for which philosophers are perhaps best known is having disputes with one another. Some non-philosophers, and increasingly many philosophers, believe that a number of these disputes are silly or misguided in some way. Call such silly or misguided disputes defective disputes. When is a dispute defective? What kinds of defective disputes are there? How are these different kinds of defective disputes different from one another? What does it mean to call a dispute 'merely verbal'? These questions come up for consideration in Part One of this manuscript. In Part Two I examine whether certain disputes in ontology and over the nature of possible worlds are defective in any of the ways described in Part One. I focus mainly on the question of whether these disputes are merely verbal disputes, though I examine whether they are defective in any other ways. I conclude that neither dispute is defective in any of the senses that I make clear in Part One. Moreover, I conclude that even some defective philosophical disputes can be worth consideration under certain circumstances. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2011

Possibilities divide into two kinds. Non-qualitative possibilities are distinguished by their connection to specific individuals. For example, the possibility that Napoleon is a novelist is non-qualitative, since it is a possibility for a specific individual, Napoleon. In contrast, the possibility that someone---anyone at all---is a novelist is a qualitative possibility, since it does not depend upon any specific individual. Haecceitism is a thesis about the relation between qualitative and non-qualitative possibilities. In one guise, it holds that some maximal possibilities---total ways the world could be---differ non-qualitatively without differing qualitatively. It would, for example, be only a haecceitistic difference that distinguishes actuality from a maximal possibility where Napoleon and Nefertiti swap all of their qualitative properties and relations. According to this alternative possibility, things are the very same qualitatively, but which individuals occupy which qualitative roles differs: Nefertiti would be a stout conqueror, while Napoleon would be a beautiful consort. This dissertation is an examination of the nature of haecceitism, the arguments in its favor, and the consequences that follow from it. In Chapter One, I distinguish various conceptions of haecceitism and related theses concerning maximal possibilities, possible worlds, the identity of indiscernibles, and non-qualitative properties. In Chapter Two, I develop and defend conceivability arguments for haecceitism in the face of various anti-haecceitist challenges. In Chapter Three, I consider the relation between haecceitism and the Humean approach to plenitude, which aims to characterize the space of possible worlds in terms of combinatorial principles. In Chapter Four, I examine the distinction between qualitative properties like redness and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and argue in favor of fundamental non-qualitative properties. In Chapter Five, I present a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory, which employs bare particulars to reconcile modal realism and haecceitism. In Chapter Six, I clarify and defend quidditism, the property-theoretic analogue of haecceitism. I conclude in Chapter Seven by defending the modal view of essence.

In this thesis I will test Yagisawa´s Extended Modal Theory of modality against two issues: the problem of accidental intrinsic properties and the problem of transworld identification. Both are part of the recurring criticism of theories supporting transworld individuals, such as the Extended Modal Theory. The first is based on Lewis criticism that argues that if a theory claims that individuals exist in more than one possible world, then transworld individuals do not possess intrinsic properties, only external ones. The second follows the rational of Quine, that argues that because anything can become anything by follow a chain of possible worlds, it becomes problematic in some cases to “discover” the modal stage of a transworld individual in another possible world. The discussion concludes that despite of the criticism above, Yagisawa provides convincing arguments to support transworld identity and EMR does a better job than the Counterpart theory in explaning modality.

La logique contemporaine a connu de nombreux développements au cours de la seconde moitié du siècle dernier. Le plus sensationnel est celui de la logique modale et de sa sémantique des mondes possibles (SMP) dû à Saul Kripke dans les années soixante. Ces dans ce cadre que David Lewis exposera sa sémantique des contrefactuels (SCF). Celle-ci constitue une véritable excroissance de l’architecture kripkéenne. Mais sur quoi finalement repose l’architecture kripkéenne elle-même ? Il semble bien que la réponse soit celle d’une ontologie raffinée ultimement basée sur la notion de mondes possible. Ce mémoire comporte quatre objectifs. Dans un premier temps, nous allons étudier ce qui distingue les contrefactuels des autres conditionnels et faire un survol historique de la littérature concernant les contrefactuels et leur application dans différent champs du savoir comme la philosophie des sciences et l’informatique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous ferons un exposé systématique de la théorie de Lewis telle qu’elle est exposée dans son ouvrage Counterfactuals. Finalement, nous allons explorer la fondation métaphysique des mondes possible de David Lewis dans son conception de Réalisme Modal. / Modern logic since the end of the Second World War has undergone many developments. Two of the most interesting of these are the Kripkian Possible World Semantics and Lewis’ system of Counterfactuals. The first was developed by Saul Kripke in the 1960s and the second was developed by David Lewis in the 1970s. In some senses we can say that Lewis’ system of counterfactuals or Counter Factual Semantics (CFS) is built on top of the architecture which Kripke created with his Possible Worlds Semantics (PWS). But, what is the Kripkian Possible World Semantics itself built on? The answer it seems is very finely tuned ontology founded on the notion of possible worlds. This paper will attempt to do the following. First, attempt to draw a distinction between on the one hand conditionals and the other counterfactuals and at the same time attempt to look at some of the historical literature surrounding counterfactuals and their application in various fields like the philosophy of science. Second, recapitulate Lewis’ system of counterfactual semantics as developed primarily in Lewis’ book Counterfactuals. Finally this paper will attempt to explore the metaphysical foundations of the possible worlds account argued for by David Lewis in his conception of Modal Realism.

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Madness has long been a popular theme for literature, featuring as a trope of horror, mystery, tragedy and comedy genres in varying degrees of amplitude. The topic has provided a significant access point for analysing historical, socio-political and cultural issues as it addresses controversial themes of alienation and criminality as well as philosophical theories of perception and consciousness. As a result, studies on the representation of madness in literature have been dominated by historical approaches that focus directly on social, political, philosophical and psychoanalytical interpretive models. Comparatively little has been done to analyse madness in literature from a narratological perspective. It is for this reason that I will conduct a narratological study on the impact of madness on narrative and fictional world structures. I am specifically interested in the way in which madness can be embedded across multiple levels of the narrative and the effect that this has on readers’ imaginative and interpretive processes. Close readings of Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club (1996) Bret Easton-Ellis’ American Psycho (1991) and John Banville’s The Book of Evidence (1989) will uncover some of the techniques that are used to embed madness into the textual and imaginative structures of a narrative, and will demonstrate how this works to deceive and challenge the reader. I will demonstrate the need for an expansion of terms within the narratological model that can cope specifically with the theme of madness.

Ted Sider writes that "many are impressed with the utility of possible worlds in linguistics and philosophy", and this is true, in particular, of those with an interest in modal logic. However, in the midst of the marvelous milieu brought on by the development of possible world semantics, some have stopped to ask just what it is that possible worlds are. They certainly seem useful, and we seem to understand how to use them and talk about them, but what precisely is it that we're talking about when we talk of possible worlds? In this thesis, I will attempt to outline the most significant and well-recognized view in this debate: that of David Lewis. Through my discussion of him, I will find occasion to discuss some alternative views that have arisen. After finishing my presentation of Lewis, I will discuss where people have begun to take this debate and address the question of whether progress can be made towards a substantive answer. In Chapter I, I begin by presenting the motivation of the question of possible worlds found in the study of modal logic. I then present the major approaches taken to answering the questions that were raised, leading into my discussion of David Lewis's famous and robust account. I present key features of Lewis's view and then move into his criticisms of the other major responses. This much should suffice as a relatively thorough treatment of the answers that have come before. In Chapter II, I discuss the current state of the debate. I begin by mentioning several problems that can be spotted in Lewis's views in particular. I then move to Menzel's account, which tries to answer the question of possible worlds from a new angle, jettisoning the direction taken by Lewis and his contemporaries. I explain why Menzel has taken this new approach, and then move into another new approach, this time given by Stephen Yablo. I discuss how these two approaches can help serve each other in helpful ways. But, at last, I present several hurdles these two views would have to overcome in order to play together nicely.