Proefschrift - Utrecht. / Summary in English.

Proefschrift - Utrecht. / Summary in English.

Diss.--Hamburg, 2002. / Bibliogr. p. 395-416.

The following thesis is concerned with the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind surrounding the nature of phenomenal consciousness (viz. subjective experience, or qualia). My primary aim is to adjudicate the ongoing dialectic between dualists and physicalists regarding the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness — physical or nonphysical — by examining the two major arguments most commonly deployed against physicalism: namely, the zombie argument (Chalmers), and the knowledge argument (Jackson). I conclude by showing that once physicalism has been shorn of the various doctrines that it need not and ought not accept — that is, once we are clear about what, precisely, the fundamental doctrine of physicalism actually is — it becomes clear that these arguments do not go through, and that the case for dualism has not been made. I also argue that the task of actually disarming these arguments (in the right way) is potentially critically instructive to contemporary physicalists, as this helps to nourish a clearer overall understanding of what physicalism (properly understood) is, and is not, committed to. In Chapter One I lay the groundwork for the aforementioned anti-physicalist arguments by explaining precisely what is meant by the phrase “phenomenal consciousness” and its various synonyms. I then briefly summarize the mind-body problem and articulate the so-called “explanatory gap” therein. Chapter Two looks at the zombie argument (as articulated by David Chalmers, 1996) and finds that the argument itself, as stated, actually has very little to do with defending dualism against physicalism, but rather is ultimately an argument for epiphenomenalism — which, I argue, is untenable. Chapter Three examines Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism (1982). Here I show why the argument itself fails to support property dualism, but also why the standard physicalist objections to it fail. I argue that Mary does indeed learn facts about the world upon her release, and that physicalists must face up to this squarely. I then suggest that physicalism (properly understood) is entirely compatible with this admission. Chapter Four examines a kind of rehabilitated version of the zombie argument in the context of a larger discussion about the relation between conceivability and possibility. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-18 13:18:41.928

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Universidad de Navarra, 1993. / Bibliogr. 311-326.

Inauguraldissertation--Theologische Fakultät--Heidelberg--Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, 2004.

There are three main themes in this thesis. Firstly, an analysis of the development of Thomas Chalmers' poor relief theories. Secondly, an evaluation of their impact on his contemporaries at home and abroad. Lastly, the establishment of their degree of success when put into practice in the early nineteenth century. Chalmers' ideas on poverty and pauperism are usually presented as having been formed relatively early on in his life and remaining fairly static throughout. Using the surviving correspondence, Chalmers' diaries and writings, this thesis traces the origin of his poor relief ideas in Enlightmement concepts and demonstrates the impact of the various stages of Chalmers' career upon them. In particular, Chalmers' conversion to evangelical Christianity, his experiences as a minister in a large parish in industrialising Glasgow, his life as a professor in St. Andrews and Edinburgh, and his involvement in the Disruption of the Church of Scotland are all considered as regards their contribution to his poor relief solution. At the same time, the popularity of his poor relief ideas among many of his contemporaries is explored and explained as the product in some cases of similar educational background, common social problems facing many industrialising areas in the period, and Chalmers' influence as a teacher and writer. The major practical experiment in poor relief and pastoral care embarked upon by Chalmers in St. John's parish in Glasgow is described at some length. The surviving evidence among the parish papers and correspondence concerning the work of the agency of deacons, elders and teachers is examined. The emerging picture is of a parish that for a time had dedicated pas tors and lay helpers working to improve its moral, spiritual and material welfare, but which was successful only in terms of its educational facilities. For the first time it is proven that the poor relief side of the St. John's experiment was a failure, both financially and practically. The other attempts and their failure to implement Chalmers' poor relief theories in the nineteenth century are also considered, using the surviving kirk session records, parish histories and correspondence. In conclusion, Chalmers is shown by the end of his life to have concentrated more on evangelisation than political economy, the conversion and education of the people as opposed to their immediate material improvement.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1962. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 169-174).

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