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Within the Philosophy of Mind two features of our mental life have been acknowledged as the most perplexing - consciousness, the phenomenal "what it is likeness" of our mental states, and intentionality, the aboutness or directedness of our mental states. As such, it has become commonplace to develop theories about these phenomena which seek to explain them naturalistically, that is, without resort to magic or miracles. Traditionally this has been done by analyzing consciousness and intentionality apart from one another. However, in more recent years the tide has turned. In contemporary theories these phenomena are typically analyzed in terms of the other. This results in two competing views: Representationalism, which seeks to ground consciousness in intentionality, and Phenomenalism, which seeks to ground intentionality in consciousness. David Chalmers has proposed an alternative view to these which takes consciousness and intentionality as essentially interdependent, neither more fundamental than the other. This thesis explores the motivations for Representationalism and Phenomenalism, outlines their extraneous commitments, and analyzes their merits - as well as assessing whether Chalmers' view is a defensible middle ground. This involves an analysis of the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, and the nature of mental content. I argue that the view which Chalmers advocates is the best supported. Yet, I argue, it could benefit by adopting a thoroughgoing externalism of mental content.

[pt] O argumento dos zumbis surgiu em 1974 em um artigo de Robert Kirk, mas foi com o livro The Conscious Mind (1996), de David Chalmers, que ele ganha um papel de destaque dentro da filosofia da mente. Tal argumento, que tem várias versões diferentes, tem como principal objetivo uma refutação do materialismo. De maneira muito resumida, ele diz que se for possível pensar em um zumbi físico, ser que seria fisicamente idêntico a um ser humano, mas sem estados qualitativos conscientes, ou seja, sem qualia, então tais estados não podem ser físicos. Se tais estados fossem físicos teria que faltar algo a tal zumbi. Deste modo, a única coisa que precisaria ser feita para refutar o materialismo seria mostrar que tal ser é concebível. No entanto, várias críticas surgiram e seu principal crítico, Daniel Dennett, tem ganhado apoio em sua defesa de que tais zumbis são logicamente impossíveis, ou seja, são inconcebíveis. / [en] The zombie argument came to be in 1974, in a paper by Robert Kirk, but it was David Chalmers` book, The Conscious Mind (1996) that gave it a prominent place within philosophy of mind. This argument`s main objective, and that of its several different versions, is to refute materialism. In short, it says that, if it is possible to think of a physical zombie, a being physically identical to a human being, but lacking qualitative conscious states - that is, lacking qualia - then such states cannot be physical. If such states were physical, the zombie would have to lack something. This way, all that would be necessary to refute materialism would be to show that such a being is conceivable. However, several critiques arose and the main author of those, Daniel Dennett, has been gaining support in his defense of the view that zombies are logically impossible, that is, are unconceivable.

Inom ett väldigt forskningsintensivt område, strategiskt arbete, identifierades ett hålrum inom den tillgängliga litteraturen som berörde strategiska satsningar inom ideella organisationer utan direkt ekonomiskt intresse. Den här uppsatsen har därför haft till syfte att fylla det här tomrum och det har gjorts genom en kvalitativ fallstudie vid Chalmers Tekniska Högskola där två ideella studentorgansiationer, Chalmers Studentkår och Maskinteknologsektionen, har undersökts. Undersökningen har genomförts genom flera intervjuer med aktiva medlemmar samt före detta aktiva medlemmar för att på så vis skapa en bred, generell, bild av organisationerna och hur de arbetar med strategiska frågor. Resultatet av undersökningen var att stort fokus bör ligga i att analysera organisationerna och skapa en tydlig vision för att ha en entydig väg framåt i arbetet samtidigt som den interpersonala aspekten är otroligt viktigt med både engagemang, motivation och incitament samt kontinuitet och överlämningar mellan åren i organisationer som är väldigt person intensiva föratt säkerställa ett lågt kunskapstapp. / Within a highly research-intensive area, namely strategic work, a gap was identified in the available literature that focused on strategic ventures in nonprofit organizations without direct financial interest. This essay has therefore been designed to fill this gap and it has been done through a qualitative case study at Chalmers University of Technology, where two non-profit student union organizations, Chalmers Student Union and the Mechanical Engineering Division have been investigated. The thesis work has been conducted through several interviews with active members as well as former active members in order to create a broad, general picture of the organizations and the strategic work carried out. The result of the thesis work was that the focus should be on analyzing the organizations and creating a well-defined strategy creating a way forward in the day to day work efforts. At the same time, the interpersonal aspect is incredibly important with both commitment, motivation and incentives as well as continuity and handover between years in organizations which are very personally intensive to ensure a minimized knowledge loss in the shift.

This essay examines and analyzes the debate between David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett about the nature of consciousness and how to proceed to explain its existence. They are two of the biggest names of philosophy of mind today and have been on opposite sides of the debate since the nineties. Chalmers has long advocated a modern dualistic view of consciousness while Dennett's theories move in a more physicalist and functionalist direction. Today, Chalmers calls himself a realist as a clear opposite to Dennett's illusionism. The essay begins with a short summary of the history of modern philosophy of mind and a presentation of Chalmers and Dennett. Then it goes into some of their most noted older theories and arguments and move on to two of the most famous thought experiments of philosophy of mind before going into their most recent theories and work. It concludes with summary of their development and with an analysis of the sustainability and significance of their theories for the development of the debate today together with some personal reflections.

The reemergence of artificial intelligence during the last 30 years has introduced severalforms of weak AI to our everyday lives, be it in our smartphones or how the weather ispredicted. Modern approaches to AI, using methods like neural networks and machinelearning, also feel confident about creating strong AI, intelligence that is human-like orsuperior to humans. In this thesis, I discover the philosophical premises of artificialintelligence, how the research program views the mind and what implications this has for theform of intelligence that is being constructed. Furthermore, I derive at several criteria thatneed to be met to qualify a system as intelligent. To cover this rather wide field, the works ofHubert Dreyfus, an early commentator on AI, and David Chalmers, one of the most widelyread philosophers of mind, are interrogated about their views on human intelligence and howsuch a theory relates to the possibility of intelligent machines.Key

This user study was carried out at the library at Chalmers University of Technology in Gothenburg in the spring of 1999. Chalmers wanted to investigate how much their employees use electronic journals. To facilitate decision-making and be cost effective, the library needed to know about their customers' opinions. The main purpose was to investigate the usage of electronic journals, how the library's choice of these journals affects the frequency of use and what the attitudes towards them are. A questionnaire was sent out to 2 400 employees; 477 replies were received. The result shows that 55% of the respondents use electronic journals at least once a month. The major advantages of electronic journals are, according to the study, the easy access and the option to work from one's own desk. The major disadvantage is the difficulty in scanning them. Two thirds of the respondents are willing to let go of the print journal at the library in favour of the electronic one, but only one fifth are willing to give up their departmental subscriptions. For a majority, conditions such as user friendliness and archiving must be fulfilled before electronic journals can be fully accepted. / Uppsatsnivå: D

The purpose of this essay is to examine what happens with library e-resources after implementing the discovery tool Summon. Summon provides a Google-like experience and uses multiple facet options when users need to narrow their discovery. Observations of change in the libraries e-resources with regards to database searches, click-throughs in linkresolvers and full text downloads are examined through looking at earlier reports and statistics from libraries in America and England. This provides a way to compare with Chalmers University of Technology’s Library. This essay presents results that suggest that usage drop in database searches while full text downloads and click-throughs increase when Summon is implemented. Also discussed in the essay is the importance for libraries to continuous evaluate the use of their resources to keep up with their users needs and demands. / Program: Bibliotekarie

One common element of Kripke’s and Chalmers’ reactions to physicalist theories of mind is their reliance upon the intuition that concepts about conscious experiences are essentially identified by the “immediate phenomenal quality” of the conscious experience, how the experience feels from the subjective point of view. I examine how Kripke’s and Chalmers’ critiques require that concepts about conscious experiences be identified by their subjective feel and then move on to provide some ways in which this intuition about concepts of conscious experience could be wrong. Specifically, the intuition is not consistent with our intuitions about unusual cases reported by pain researchers and does not take such cases to be genuine cases of pain. These inconsistencies weaken the intuition, making it problematic for any critique of identity theory or physicalism to rely heavily upon it.