Spelling suggestions: "subject:"[een] DAVID CHALMERS"" "subject:"[enn] DAVID CHALMERS""
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[pt] O ARGUMENTO DOS ZUMBIS NA FILOSOFIA DA MENTE: SÃO ZUMBIS FÍSICOS LOGICAMENTE POSSÍVEIS? / [en] THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: ARE PHYSICAL ZOMBIES LOGICALLY POSSIBLE?GUSTAVO LEAL TOLEDO 25 May 2005 (has links)
[pt] O argumento dos zumbis surgiu em 1974 em um artigo de
Robert Kirk,
mas foi com o livro The Conscious Mind (1996), de David
Chalmers, que ele
ganha um papel de destaque dentro da filosofia da mente.
Tal argumento, que tem
várias versões diferentes, tem como principal objetivo uma
refutação do
materialismo. De maneira muito resumida, ele diz que se
for possível pensar em
um zumbi físico, ser que seria fisicamente idêntico a um
ser humano, mas sem
estados qualitativos conscientes, ou seja, sem qualia,
então tais estados não
podem ser físicos. Se tais estados fossem físicos teria
que faltar algo a tal zumbi.
Deste modo, a única coisa que precisaria ser feita para
refutar o materialismo seria
mostrar que tal ser é concebível. No entanto, várias
críticas surgiram e seu
principal crítico, Daniel Dennett, tem ganhado apoio em
sua defesa de que tais
zumbis são logicamente impossíveis, ou seja, são
inconcebíveis. / [en] The zombie argument came to be in 1974, in a paper by
Robert Kirk, but it
was David Chalmers` book, The Conscious Mind (1996) that
gave it a prominent
place within philosophy of mind. This argument`s main
objective, and that of its
several different versions, is to refute materialism. In
short, it says that, if it is
possible to think of a physical zombie, a being physically
identical to a human
being, but lacking qualitative conscious states - that is,
lacking qualia - then such
states cannot be physical. If such states were physical,
the zombie would have to
lack something. This way, all that would be necessary to
refute materialism would
be to show that such a being is conceivable. However,
several critiques arose and
the main author of those, Daniel Dennett, has been gaining
support in his defense
of the view that zombies are logically impossible, that
is, are unconceivable.
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Invariance organisationnelle et conscience artificielleBrodeur, Julien 08 1900 (has links)
Ce mémoire se penche sur la possibilité de la conscience artificielle. Plus spécifiquement, je me demande s’il est possible qu’un robot, un ordinateur ou toute autre machine ait une conscience phénoménale, i.e. qu’il y ait un effet que cela fait que d’être ces systèmes. Après avoir brièvement caractérisé la conscience phénoménale, j’investiguerai quelques problèmes qui sont propres à la conscience, soit le problème difficile de la conscience ainsi que le problème des autres esprits, dans le but d’établir le cadre conceptuel qui nous permettra de réfléchir quant à la possibilité de la conscience artificielle. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je défendrai la thèse selon laquelle la conscience artificielle est possible en m’appuyant notamment sur le principe d’invariance organisationnelle défendu, entre autres, par David Chalmers, ainsi que sur la théorie computationnelle de l’esprit. Finalement, dans le troisième et dernier chapitre, j’évaluerai diverses objections contre la possibilité de la conscience artificielle que je tenterai tour à tour de réfuter dans le but maintenir ma thèse initiale aussi intacte que possible. / This thesis examines the possibility of artificial consciousness. More specifically, I consider the possibility for a robot, computer or any other machine to have phenomenal consciousness, i.e. that there is something it is like to be those systems. After having briefly characterized phenomenal consciousness, I will investigate some problems that are specific to consciousness, namely the hard problem of consciousness as well as the problem of other minds, in order to establish the conceptual framework that will allow us to reflect upon the possibility of artificial consciousness. In the second chapter, I will defend the thesis that artificial consciousness is possible by relying on the principle of organizational invariance which is defended by David Chalmers, among others, as well as on the computational theory of the mind. Finally, in the third and last chapter, I will assess various objections against the possibility of artificial consciousness which I will try to refute in turn in order to keep my initial thesis as intact as possible.
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