[pt] Daniel Dennett, um dos mais controversos filósofos contemporâneos, propõe uma teoria materialista da consciência, segundo a qual a subjetividade humana pode ser reduzida a fenômenos físicos. Alguns filósofos consideram esta perspectiva uma impostura, um tipo de reducionismo nocivo e deturpador. A teoria de Dennett também atraiu críticas de filósofos materialistas como Paul Churchland e de adeptos da fenomenologia husserliana. Este trabalho visa investigar quão bem a teoria de Dennett se sai diante destas objeções. / [en] Daniel Dennett, one of the most controversial contemporary philosophers, advances a materialistic theory of consciousness, according to which human subjectivity can be totally reduced to physical phenomena. Some philosophers, such as David Chalmers and John Searle, consider this perspective an imposture, a harmful and distorting kind of reductionism. Dennett´s theory has also attracted criticism from materialistic philosophers such as Paul Churchland, and from enthusiasts of husserlian phenomenology. This work aims to investigate how well Dennett´s theory does when facing such objections.

A dissertação pretende permitir ao leitor simular a forma de pensar de Daniel Dennett, e perpassa toda sua filosofia, com ênfase em seu tratamento de o que são padrões, o algoritmo evolutivo, intuition pumps, consciência, e seu uso dos conceitos de illata, abstracta, semântica e sintaxe para compreender a natureza, a biologia e a mente humana. O trabalho reapresenta, sob nova luz, grande parte das ideias mais importantes de Dennett, e procura fazer a engenharia reversa de o que o levou a pensar de determinadas maneiras, guiando o leitor através de caminhos similares, procurando fomentar um aprendizado ativo de uma forma de pensar, acima e além de uma exposição dos resultados obtidos ao longo de décadas desse pensamento no próprio Dennett / This dissertation intends to provide the reader with an inner simulation of Daniel Dennetts form of reasoning, spreading over his whole philosophy, emphasizing his treatment of patterns, the evolutionary algorithm, consciousness, and his use of illata, abstracta, semantic, and synthax, to carve nature at its joints, especially biology and the human mind. It recasts, in a new light, great part of his most important ideas, and reverse engineers what made him think in particular ways, walking the reader through similar pathways, fostering an active learning of a thinking style, above and beyond a mere exposition of the results obtained by this thinking style over the years

A dissertação pretende permitir ao leitor simular a forma de pensar de Daniel Dennett, e perpassa toda sua filosofia, com ênfase em seu tratamento de o que são padrões, o algoritmo evolutivo, intuition pumps, consciência, e seu uso dos conceitos de illata, abstracta, semântica e sintaxe para compreender a natureza, a biologia e a mente humana. O trabalho reapresenta, sob nova luz, grande parte das ideias mais importantes de Dennett, e procura fazer a engenharia reversa de o que o levou a pensar de determinadas maneiras, guiando o leitor através de caminhos similares, procurando fomentar um aprendizado ativo de uma forma de pensar, acima e além de uma exposição dos resultados obtidos ao longo de décadas desse pensamento no próprio Dennett / This dissertation intends to provide the reader with an inner simulation of Daniel Dennetts form of reasoning, spreading over his whole philosophy, emphasizing his treatment of patterns, the evolutionary algorithm, consciousness, and his use of illata, abstracta, semantic, and synthax, to carve nature at its joints, especially biology and the human mind. It recasts, in a new light, great part of his most important ideas, and reverse engineers what made him think in particular ways, walking the reader through similar pathways, fostering an active learning of a thinking style, above and beyond a mere exposition of the results obtained by this thinking style over the years

[pt] O argumento dos zumbis surgiu em 1974 em um artigo de Robert Kirk, mas foi com o livro The Conscious Mind (1996), de David Chalmers, que ele ganha um papel de destaque dentro da filosofia da mente. Tal argumento, que tem várias versões diferentes, tem como principal objetivo uma refutação do materialismo. De maneira muito resumida, ele diz que se for possível pensar em um zumbi físico, ser que seria fisicamente idêntico a um ser humano, mas sem estados qualitativos conscientes, ou seja, sem qualia, então tais estados não podem ser físicos. Se tais estados fossem físicos teria que faltar algo a tal zumbi. Deste modo, a única coisa que precisaria ser feita para refutar o materialismo seria mostrar que tal ser é concebível. No entanto, várias críticas surgiram e seu principal crítico, Daniel Dennett, tem ganhado apoio em sua defesa de que tais zumbis são logicamente impossíveis, ou seja, são inconcebíveis. / [en] The zombie argument came to be in 1974, in a paper by Robert Kirk, but it was David Chalmers` book, The Conscious Mind (1996) that gave it a prominent place within philosophy of mind. This argument`s main objective, and that of its several different versions, is to refute materialism. In short, it says that, if it is possible to think of a physical zombie, a being physically identical to a human being, but lacking qualitative conscious states - that is, lacking qualia - then such states cannot be physical. If such states were physical, the zombie would have to lack something. This way, all that would be necessary to refute materialism would be to show that such a being is conceivable. However, several critiques arose and the main author of those, Daniel Dennett, has been gaining support in his defense of the view that zombies are logically impossible, that is, are unconceivable.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-11-17T11:27:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Arildo Luiz Marconatto_.pdf: 456462 bytes, checksum: ada4d37f03c42f006380ee1936b971c9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-17T11:27:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arildo Luiz Marconatto_.pdf: 456462 bytes, checksum: ada4d37f03c42f006380ee1936b971c9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-31 / SEDUC - Secretaria de Estado de Educação de Mato Grosso / Esta dissertação é uma síntese das principais teses defendidas pelo filósofo Daniel Clement Dennett ao longo de sua trajetória intelectual. A finalidade da dissertação é entender a relação entre as diversas teorias de Dennett e tentar interpretá-la como um todo coerente. Os conceitos que fundamentam a teoria do autor serão apresentados de forma sucinta e sequencial, buscando uma linha de ligação entre si. Ao final, argumenta-se que Dennett apresenta uma das mais importantes concepções teóricas para as ciências cognitivas contemporâneas, conectando o processo de surgimento e evolução da vida ao aparecimento da mente. / This paper is a summary of the main arguments put forward by the philosopher Daniel Dennett Clement over his intellectual trajectory. The purpose of the dissertation is to understand the relationship between the various theories of Dennett and try to interpret it as a coherent whole. The concepts underlying the author's theory will be presented in a succinct and sequentially, seeking a connecting line between them. Finally, it is argued that Dennett has one of the most important theoretical concepts for contemporary cognitive science, connecting the process of emergence and evolution of life to the appearance of mind .

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-04-28T18:50:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho.pdf: 2008728 bytes, checksum: 55f666836e537fcdf2341ba136ee8f80 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-28T18:50:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho.pdf: 2008728 bytes, checksum: 55f666836e537fcdf2341ba136ee8f80 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-01-31 / Nenhuma / Esta dissertação é um estudo analítico de duas concepções muito influentes sobre a consciência na filosofia contemporânea da mente. O foco principal desta pesquisa é duplo. Primeiro, ela pretende descrever da forma mais detalhada possível as abordagens de John Searle e de Daniel Dennet sobre a consciência. Além disso, pretende apresentar as críticas de Searle à abordagem funcionalista da Dannett. Ambas as abordagens serão descritas e avaliadas e as diferenças mais relevantes entre esses dois autores serão postas em contraste. Por não fornecer um conceito que inclua a característica qualitativa da consciência, será argumentado que o funcionalismo de Dennett não é capaz de explicar a consciência humana. Sua filosofia da mente também não resolve o problema das outras mentes, uma vez que o conceito de consciência exposto por Dennett não diferencia seres humanos conscientes de zumbis inconscientes. / This dissertation is an analytical study of two very influential conceptions of consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind. The main focus of this research is twofold. First, it intends to describe both John Searle's and Daniel Dennett approach on consciousness, and, second, to expose Searle's criticism to Dannett's functionalist approach. Both approaches will be described and evaluated, and the relevant differences between these two authors will be put in contrast. In not providing a concept that includes the qualitative characteristic of consciousness, it will be argued that Dennett's functionalism cannot explain human conscious experiences. His philosophy of mind also cannot solve the problem of other minds, since the concept of consciousness exposed by Dennett does not differentiate conscious human beings from unconscious zombies.

This essay intends to examine the atheists Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Michel Onfray's arguments against religion, based on the themes of religion, atheism and the perception.of their present worldview. In addition, the research aims to find out whether it is suitable to talk about a new atheism. And, if so, whether such newatheism correspond with the definition represented by the Christian critics. The essay intends to contribute to a very limited research on the so-called new atheism without applying pro-religious arguments. Previous research and theory highlight the problem of defining the terms atheism, religion and secularism a concern that is reflected by the five critics troughout their arguments. What really united the critics were the idea about religion taking too much place in society, and the opinion that atheistic morality is at least as good as religious morality. In addition, the authors agree that religion is not needed to maintain good morale, on the contrary, religion affect the morale negatively. They also assumed that religion restricts people and and that moderate religion more or less leads to, or is responsible for, fundamentalism. Also, the value of truth and contempt against relativism brought the authors together, although they were sometimes justified by very different arguments. Crucially, however, are the differences in their definitions of religion, both concerning their focus on substantive and functional definitions, the relationship between absolute, relative-, and private religion and their political focus. To regard these authors' arguments as a new atheism is thus hard to justify. The results conclude that both the Christian critics and the five critics of religion generalize their opponents view of atheism or religion, and also fail to define themselves in order to be able to unite as a group against the other.

O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista. / The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.

O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista. / The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the ideology of the cultural phenomenon, that is as political as it is controversial, the new atheism. By studying the ideas and values of four prominent new atheists, commonly referred to as the ‘four horsemen of the new atheism’, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett, this study aims to, in some ways challenge, and in others, nuance, the categorization of the movement. Its adherents have often been labeled as, for example: ‘secular fundamentalists’, ‘evangelical’ and ‘radical secularists’. None of these designations are inherently wrong. But I think there is a more fitting term available: ‘societal secular maximalist’. This term is a modified version of ‘religious maximalism’, coined by the historian of religion at the University of Chicago, Bruce Lincoln. I argue that the new atheist ideology is not fundamentalistic because it admits fallibility if another theory where to disprove it within its own scientific discourse. Considering this fact, it does not hold is central ideological feature, most commonly a Darwinist theory of evolution, as absolute. Due to this, and some other factors, I argue that the societal secular maximalist categorization is more fitting because the scientific and humanistic views of the ‘four horsemen’ lay claim to all aspects of human existence, private and public, emotional, and factual along with the morals, ethics and aesthetics of our societies.