Esta dissertação de mestrado aborda a controvérsia em torno de qual é o nível biológico no qual a seleção natural atua, com ênfase na proposta de Richard Dawkins do gene egoísta e nas questões que surgem em torno da mesma. Examina-se um panorama de questões de filosofia da biologia abordadas a partir do problema dos níveis nos quais a seleção natural atua. Esperamos que ao avaliar o impacto da teoria do gene egoísta na problemática evolutiva, consigamos compreender sua importância. O objetivo deste trabalho é filosófico, delineando as questões e clarificando alguns termos do debate, sem se propor a tomar partido por uma ou outra posição. O primeiro capítulo apresenta as origens históricas do debate, partindo do ponto de vista original de Charles Darwin no qual o indivíduo era a entidade efetivamente selecionada. Em seguida, buscamos entender como novas questões empíricas, em especial a busca de explicações biológicas para o altruísmo, conduziram a propostas de seleção de grupo. No segundo capítulo delineamos como o desenvolvimento da genética possibilitou que um novo nível de seleção fosse proposto: o gene, e acompanhamos a exposição de Dawkins sobre o ponto de vista do gene egoísta, em especial a partir de seus dois livros mais relevantes sobre o tema: O gene egoísta e O fenótipo estendido. O terceiro capítulo examina diversas aproximações filosóficas no contexto de resposta à pergunta: o que é uma unidade de seleção?. Nosso estudo é consistente com a tese de que as forças seletivas atuam simultaneamente em diversos níveis. / This Masters thesis studies the controversy over what is the biological level in which natural selection takes place. Emphasis is given to Richard Dawkins proposal of the selfish gene and to the issues that arise therefrom, which include many questions in the philosophy of biology. We hope that by assessing the impact that the theory of the selfish gene has had on the problems of evolution, one may understand its importance. The aim of this study is philosophical, raising questions and clarifying the terms of the debate, without taking side on one or another position. The first chapter presents the historical origins of the debate, starting with the original view of Charles Darwin that the individual is the entity that is effectively selected. We then set out to understand how new empirical problems, specifically the search for biological explanations for altruism, led to proposals of group selection. In the second chapter, we depict how the development of genetics allowed that a new level of selection be proposed: the gene. We analyze Dawkins exposition of the point of view of the selfish gene, especially in the two most important books on the subject: The selfish gene and The extended phenotype. The third chapter examines several philosophical approaches to the question what is a unit of selection?. Our study is consistent with the thesis that selective forces act simultaneously in different levels.

Esta dissertação de mestrado aborda a controvérsia em torno de qual é o nível biológico no qual a seleção natural atua, com ênfase na proposta de Richard Dawkins do gene egoísta e nas questões que surgem em torno da mesma. Examina-se um panorama de questões de filosofia da biologia abordadas a partir do problema dos níveis nos quais a seleção natural atua. Esperamos que ao avaliar o impacto da teoria do gene egoísta na problemática evolutiva, consigamos compreender sua importância. O objetivo deste trabalho é filosófico, delineando as questões e clarificando alguns termos do debate, sem se propor a tomar partido por uma ou outra posição. O primeiro capítulo apresenta as origens históricas do debate, partindo do ponto de vista original de Charles Darwin no qual o indivíduo era a entidade efetivamente selecionada. Em seguida, buscamos entender como novas questões empíricas, em especial a busca de explicações biológicas para o altruísmo, conduziram a propostas de seleção de grupo. No segundo capítulo delineamos como o desenvolvimento da genética possibilitou que um novo nível de seleção fosse proposto: o gene, e acompanhamos a exposição de Dawkins sobre o ponto de vista do gene egoísta, em especial a partir de seus dois livros mais relevantes sobre o tema: O gene egoísta e O fenótipo estendido. O terceiro capítulo examina diversas aproximações filosóficas no contexto de resposta à pergunta: o que é uma unidade de seleção?. Nosso estudo é consistente com a tese de que as forças seletivas atuam simultaneamente em diversos níveis. / This Masters thesis studies the controversy over what is the biological level in which natural selection takes place. Emphasis is given to Richard Dawkins proposal of the selfish gene and to the issues that arise therefrom, which include many questions in the philosophy of biology. We hope that by assessing the impact that the theory of the selfish gene has had on the problems of evolution, one may understand its importance. The aim of this study is philosophical, raising questions and clarifying the terms of the debate, without taking side on one or another position. The first chapter presents the historical origins of the debate, starting with the original view of Charles Darwin that the individual is the entity that is effectively selected. We then set out to understand how new empirical problems, specifically the search for biological explanations for altruism, led to proposals of group selection. In the second chapter, we depict how the development of genetics allowed that a new level of selection be proposed: the gene. We analyze Dawkins exposition of the point of view of the selfish gene, especially in the two most important books on the subject: The selfish gene and The extended phenotype. The third chapter examines several philosophical approaches to the question what is a unit of selection?. Our study is consistent with the thesis that selective forces act simultaneously in different levels.

Le concept de gène est central en biologie. Certains ont avancé (Ruse (1971, 1976)) que la génétique classique pouvait être réduite à la génétique moléculaire. Dans le même ordre d'idée, Richard Dawkins, dans The Extended Phenotype, offre une double définition de son concept de gène qui présuppose qu'il soit possible d'opérer cette réduction. Nous comptons montrer que la génétique moléculaire et la génétique des populations ont chacune leurs problématiques propres en reconstituant l'histoire de la génétique depuis Darwin. Ensuite, nous expliciterons la position de Dawkins et soulignerons les contradictions auxquelles il parvient en raison de cette réduction infondée. À la suite de quoi, nous nous attarderons aux nouvelles découvertes moléculaires qui montrent qu'il n'est pas possible d'opérer la réduction d'un des concepts à l'autre. Nous terminerons en soulignant que la thèse génocentriste de Dawkins n'est pas mise en péril par l'abandon de la réduction, mais qu'il est nécessaire de tempérer ces prétentions. La conclusion globale de ce mémoire est qu'il est possible d'admettre le concept de Dawkins, mais pas la manière dont il l'utilise. Le concept est bon, il n'est tout simplement pas dans le bon cadre théorique. / The concept of gene is of great importance in biology. Some philosophers asserted (Ruse (1971, 1976)) that classical genetics can be reduce to molecular genetics. Similarly, in The Extended Phenotype, the definition of the gene Richard Dawkins is giving presupposes such a reduction. By reconstituting the history of genetics since Darwin, we will show that population genetics and molecular genetics are interested in problems of their own. Then, we will explain Dawkins' position and stress contradictions which follow from that illegitimate reduction. Afterward, we'll show that new molecular researches refute the possibility of reducing the concept of population genetics to a concept of molecular genetics. One of our conclusion is that the gene's eye view has not to be dropped out. It is only necessary to temper these claims. The most important conclusion of this memoire is that the concept Dawkins is using is legitimate, but not the way he is using it. The concept does not fit in Dawkins' conceptual framework.

The compatibility between the Christian faith and various scientific advances has been up for discussion time and again to the degree that the debate is hard to miss. According to most, the most daunting subject of the discussion might be the compatibility with Darwin’s theory of evolution. In an attempt to get a perspective on this issue, this paper discusses compatibility by analysing the argumentation on the subject by two evolutionary biologists: Richard Dawkins and Joan Roughgarden. The arguments of the two authors are then tested regarding validity and applicability, leading to the conclusion that although both make valid claims regarding the subject of evolution, Dawkins’ reasoning of incompatibility can only be applied to a strictly limited group of Christians, whereas Roughgarden’s arguments for compatibility between the theory of evolution the Bible appears to be both tenable and applicable to Christianity at large. The conclusion is thus drawn that a certain compatibility appears to exist.

This essay intends to examine the atheists Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Michel Onfray's arguments against religion, based on the themes of religion, atheism and the perception.of their present worldview. In addition, the research aims to find out whether it is suitable to talk about a new atheism. And, if so, whether such newatheism correspond with the definition represented by the Christian critics. The essay intends to contribute to a very limited research on the so-called new atheism without applying pro-religious arguments. Previous research and theory highlight the problem of defining the terms atheism, religion and secularism a concern that is reflected by the five critics troughout their arguments. What really united the critics were the idea about religion taking too much place in society, and the opinion that atheistic morality is at least as good as religious morality. In addition, the authors agree that religion is not needed to maintain good morale, on the contrary, religion affect the morale negatively. They also assumed that religion restricts people and and that moderate religion more or less leads to, or is responsible for, fundamentalism. Also, the value of truth and contempt against relativism brought the authors together, although they were sometimes justified by very different arguments. Crucially, however, are the differences in their definitions of religion, both concerning their focus on substantive and functional definitions, the relationship between absolute, relative-, and private religion and their political focus. To regard these authors' arguments as a new atheism is thus hard to justify. The results conclude that both the Christian critics and the five critics of religion generalize their opponents view of atheism or religion, and also fail to define themselves in order to be able to unite as a group against the other.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Clarissa de Franco.pdf: 3281883 bytes, checksum: 9bdef4d359b91f69b35ab1ca66383f0c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-09 / Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo / The object of study is the main Richard Dawkins ideas of atheism and this reception on the brasilian atheists. Dawkins is one of the leading publishers and militant atheist movement today, and despite his public facet - released worldwide on websites and in books of recognized success - there are debates of the author , pertaining to academic spaces and restricted to scientists, who do not always have congruent to its exhibitions and public defenders . Internally the walls of science, Richard Dawkins can not find full verification and corroboration of some central points of his theory that seem to support its public arguments of atheism, such as the theory and the concept of memetic and selection gene, ideas presented to the lay public one of his most famous books, The Selfish Gene (2001a [1976]) and maintained publicly with the status of consolidated science. We assume that the figures of scientist and militant atheist from Dawkins mingle in front of the public imagination, which tends to lead his followers to understand atheism as a more legitimate and true way that religious, being interpreted that as a way to free choice and the latter undergoes a indoctrination. We believe, however, that atheism can be understood as subject to natural cognitive mechanisms, as religion. We take into account the political scene today is favorable to atheists, since we observed a phenomenon we call "moral atheists revenge", a reversal of official protection and legitimacy of the state, which has long been welcoming and protecting the speech religious and today happened to be synchronized with atheistics claims, being religious in an outdated and uncomfortable place in the democratic debate. These hypotheses was investigated by means of confrontation between the scientific and public speeches of Richard Dawkins and through a mixed questionnaire (with open and closed questions ) that investigated 1022 atheists, noting whether and to what extent atheism sample follows trends thinking of Richard Dawkins. We observed patterns of response, three groups: Super Atheists, Moderates Atheists and Discrete Atheists. Approximately 30% of the sample declare themselves as followers of the author, and all, nearly 80% have knowledge about any point of the theory of Dawkins / O objeto de estudo consiste nas principais ideias ateístas de Richard Dawkins e na recepção destas por parte dos ateus inseridos na cultura brasileira. Dawkins é um dos principais divulgadores e militantes do movimento ateísta da atualidade, e a despeito de sua faceta pública divulgada em sites mundiais e em livros de reconhecido sucesso existem debates do autor, concernentes aos espaços acadêmicos e restritos a cientistas, que nem sempre se apresentam congruentes às suas exposições e defesas públicas. Internamente aos muros da ciência, Richard Dawkins não encontra plena verificação e corroboração de alguns pontos centrais de sua teoria que parecem embasar sua argumentação pública do ateísmo, tais como a teoria da memética e o conceito de seleção de gene, ideias apresentadas ao público leigo em um de seus mais célebres livros, O gene egoísta (2001a [1976]) e mantidas publicamente com o status de ciência consolidada. Consideramos que as figuras de cientista e militante ateu em Dawkins fundem-se diante do imaginário público, o que tende a levar seus seguidores a compreenderem o ateísmo como um caminho mais legítimo e verdadeiro que o religioso, sendo aquele interpretado como um caminho de livre escolha e este último submetido a uma doutrinação. Acreditamos, no entanto, que o ateísmo pode ser compreendido como submetido a mecanismos cognitivos naturais, como a religião. Levamos em conta que o cenário político hoje é favorável aos ateus, uma vez que observamos um fenômeno que chamamos de vingança moral dos ateus , uma inversão da proteção oficial e da legitimidade do Estado, que durante muito tempo esteve acolhendo e protegendo o discurso religioso e hoje passou a se afinizar com reivindicações ateístas, ficando o religioso em um lugar ultrapassado e incômodo no debate democrático. Estas hipóteses foram investigadas por meio da confrontação entre os discursos científico e público de Richard Dawkins e através de um questionário misto (com questões fechadas e abertas) que investigou 1022 ateus, observando se, e em que intensidade, o ateísmo da amostra segue as tendências do pensamento de Richard Dawkins. Pudemos observar nos padrões de resposta, três grupos: Super Ateus, Ateus Moderados e Ateus Discretos. Aproximadamente 30% da amostra declara-se fã do autor, e ao todo, perto de 80% tem conhecimento sobre algum ponto da teoria de Dawkins

This study has its background in the debate about religion and the existence of God, which has been an ongoing issue throughout the Western cultural tradition. Today´s information society has been an impact on the increasing interest for this subject. The essay’s main task is to accomplish a rhetorical analysis of two books, Illusionen om Gud (2008) by atheist Richard Dawkins and Guds dödgrävare (2010) by Christian John Lennox, in order to investigate the authors’ use of rhetorical strategies to influence their audience. The texts are studied using a qualitative approach with the theoretical basis of some well-defined rhetorical variables: ethical, logical and pathetic means of persuasion, propaganda, and the important factor that a message always is presented in a certain context in which the recipients both have their own values and subjects to general truths and common frames of reference. The analysis is intended to convey the rhetorical essence of each author, and uses this image to discuss aims and methods in the communication. Both authors demonstrate varying propagandistic strategies and base their arguments from common context and widely recognized frames of reference. Lennox almost exclusively uses methodological logo arguments, while Dawkins often uses the pathetic persuasion founds.

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the ideology of the cultural phenomenon, that is as political as it is controversial, the new atheism. By studying the ideas and values of four prominent new atheists, commonly referred to as the ‘four horsemen of the new atheism’, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett, this study aims to, in some ways challenge, and in others, nuance, the categorization of the movement. Its adherents have often been labeled as, for example: ‘secular fundamentalists’, ‘evangelical’ and ‘radical secularists’. None of these designations are inherently wrong. But I think there is a more fitting term available: ‘societal secular maximalist’. This term is a modified version of ‘religious maximalism’, coined by the historian of religion at the University of Chicago, Bruce Lincoln. I argue that the new atheist ideology is not fundamentalistic because it admits fallibility if another theory where to disprove it within its own scientific discourse. Considering this fact, it does not hold is central ideological feature, most commonly a Darwinist theory of evolution, as absolute. Due to this, and some other factors, I argue that the societal secular maximalist categorization is more fitting because the scientific and humanistic views of the ‘four horsemen’ lay claim to all aspects of human existence, private and public, emotional, and factual along with the morals, ethics and aesthetics of our societies.

This diploma work analyzes the contemporary rise of the number of atheists in the United States of America, basing this presupposition on numerous nation-wide surveys, primarily conducted by Gallup Poll and Pew Research Center. It goes into depth on the definition of atheism and strictly delineates the meaning of this word and the use of its alternatives in the work. Given the fact that the thesis is written by a Czech author, it also provides necessary background covering the differences between Czech atheism and American atheism. Since the work is purposely not one of literary analysis but rather of socio-political and cultural nature, reasons for this decision are given in a separate subchapter analyzing Flannery O'Connor's novel Wise Blood. History of atheism in America is touched upon in the beginning of Chapter 3, but since the fundamental focus of this work is on the contemporary state of affairs, the roots of modern atheism in America are sought after mainly in the twentieth century. In particular, the greatest causes of the weakening of church's power and the rise of secularism (or atheism, for that matter) are given as following: Madalyn Murray O'Hair's fights against church's influence in public schools and against its public funding; the argument about the non-scientific nature of belief...