Ted Sider writes that "many are impressed with the utility of possible worlds in linguistics and philosophy", and this is true, in particular, of those with an interest in modal logic. However, in the midst of the marvelous milieu brought on by the development of possible world semantics, some have stopped to ask just what it is that possible worlds are. They certainly seem useful, and we seem to understand how to use them and talk about them, but what precisely is it that we're talking about when we talk of possible worlds? In this thesis, I will attempt to outline the most significant and well-recognized view in this debate: that of David Lewis. Through my discussion of him, I will find occasion to discuss some alternative views that have arisen. After finishing my presentation of Lewis, I will discuss where people have begun to take this debate and address the question of whether progress can be made towards a substantive answer. In Chapter I, I begin by presenting the motivation of the question of possible worlds found in the study of modal logic. I then present the major approaches taken to answering the questions that were raised, leading into my discussion of David Lewis's famous and robust account. I present key features of Lewis's view and then move into his criticisms of the other major responses. This much should suffice as a relatively thorough treatment of the answers that have come before. In Chapter II, I discuss the current state of the debate. I begin by mentioning several problems that can be spotted in Lewis's views in particular. I then move to Menzel's account, which tries to answer the question of possible worlds from a new angle, jettisoning the direction taken by Lewis and his contemporaries. I explain why Menzel has taken this new approach, and then move into another new approach, this time given by Stephen Yablo. I discuss how these two approaches can help serve each other in helpful ways. But, at last, I present several hurdles these two views would have to overcome in order to play together nicely.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, 1996. / Includes vita. "An annotated bibliography on the unchurched": (leaves 116-120). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 253-256).

abstract: Panpsychist double aspect theory, the most promising version of panpsychism, holds that the mental and the physical are mutually irreducible properties, or features, of ultimate matter, therefore they both are ontologically fundamental and ubiquitous. This version of panpsychism involves the following two notions: anti-reductivism and anti- emergentism. The former states that mental phenomena are not recordable in terms of physics. The latter implies that mental phenomena do not causally arise only from a certain macroscale physical condition, and the mental and the physical do not constitute an ontological hierarchy. From these notions, it follows that any macroscale mental phenomenon is the result of a combination of ultimate mental properties. Yet this idea creates the combination problem: how higher level mentality, e.g., human or animal consciousness, arises from lower level mentality, the ultimate mental "particles." Panpsychist double aspect theory purports to find the proper location of mind in the world without being vulnerable to typical mind-body problems. Nevertheless, since this version of panpsychism explains the ontological structure of higher level mentality as analogous to the atomic structure of a molecular physical entity, the combination problem arises. In Chapter 1, I explain the general conception of panpsychism. Chapter 2 shows the plausibility of panpsychist double aspect theory and how the combination problem arises from this version. I discuss the history and implications of the combination problem in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I introduce some alternative versions of panpsychism that do not raise the combination problem, and point out their implausibility. The intelligibility of mental combination is explained in Chapter 5. The moral of these chapters is that our epistemic intuition that mind is not composed of "smaller" minds fails to undermine the possibility that mind is structurally complex. In Chapter 6, I argue that C. Koch and G. Tononi's integrated information theory (IIT) is a form of panpsychism, and that the IIT can serve as a model for solving the combination problem. However, I am not committed to the IIT, and I point out theoretical weaknesses of the IIT besides the combination problem. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Philosophy 2013

Theories of Extended Mind have evolved in waves to reach the present state of disagreement with regard to whether or not external artefacts become part of the mind when used for memory purposes. A four-step approach has been used to address and resolve this disagreement. First, a new component for models of mind which provides a saliency function is provided. This saliency function corresponds to computational elements found necessary in large mainframe computer systems for handling rich data environments. Second, there is introduced a Computational Model of Memory containing the new component which models the operation of human memory. The Computational Model of Memory contains four interoperative elements including the new component, short-term memory, long-term memory, and a cross-reference associator. Third, the work of Marcin Milkowski is drawn upon to obtain a general method of assessing a computational model’s well-formedness, and the method is applied to prove the adequacy of the Computational Model of Memory. According to Milkowski’s schema, the model satisfies most criteria for a well-formed computational model, including in particular a separation between conceptual elements of the model, and constitutive elements of the model, which while explicitly related, are required to subsist at separate logical conceptual levels. Fourth, the Computational Model of Memory is applied to outstanding arguments in Extended Mind to clarify and resolve several of these arguments. The model serves to highlight where the nature of the disagreement depends upon a category error of reference, and further resolves a key disagreement by demonstrating that the mind may treat external artefacts as an alternative realizable constitutive element of short-term and long-term memory.

No description available.

This paper addresses strong artificial intelligence (AI) and, if it is possible,if consciousness could be replicated. Focus lies on Searle's article Minds,brains and programs and David J. Chalmers's theory that consciousness can be replicated because it is as an organizational invariant. The purpose is to evaluate Searle's argument against strong AI in light of Chalmers theory that simulation is replication in terms of consciousness. My thesis is that Chalmers can show that simulation can be replication but not that it is enough to prove strong AI possible. My conclusion is that Searle's arguments against strong AI in the said article does not hold but Chalmers also cannot prove that consciousness can be replicated. However, Chalmers can prove that simulation and replication in some cases can be the same. If it would be possible for some type of semantic content to emerge from syntax, the path for strong AI is open. / Denna uppsats behandlar stark artificiell intelligens (AI) och, om det är möjligt, huruvida medvetande skulle kunna replikeras. Som utgångspunkt används Searles artikel Minds, brains and programs samt David J. Chalmersteori om att medvetande kan replikeras då det är en organisatorisk invariant. Syftet är att utvärdera Searles argument mot stark AI i ljus av Chalmers teori om att simulering är replikering när det gäller medvetande. Min tes är att Chalmers kan visa att simulering kan vara replikering men att det inte räcker till för att bevisa att stark AI är möjlig. Vad jag kommit fram till är att Searles argument mot stark AI i den nämnda artikeln inte håller men Chalmers kan inte heller bevisa att medvetande kan replikeras. Däremot kan Chalmers bevisa att simulering och replikering i vissa fall kan vara samma sak. Om det visar sig möjligt att någon typ av semantiskt innehåll kan uppkomma ur syntax är vägen för stark AI öppen.

The aim of this study was to develop knowledge about the librarians role as a stakeholder to a current research information system (CRIS). These systems can be seen as a possibility to manage the vast amount of information that surrounds research projects and this investigation directed focus to the system Chalmers Research that was developed by a project group in the library of Chalmers University of Technology. The librarians of Chalmers were sent a survey and four of them were interviewed about their involvement in the work with Research. The study has had an abductive approach with stakeholder analysis as a theoretical framework. The result from the survey and interviews was analysed using qualitative analysis of content with the categories from stakeholder analysis. The findings were that librarians can make good use of the power to manage a CRIS and that it was a good use of their competence. They could see both what was of use for the organisation and the user as well as trying to further develop the administration of the system. The result also showed that there was a difference in the librarians' relation to the system dependent on their work tasks. Those administrating the system have more power and legitimacy relating to Chalmers Research, but all librarians might have reason to use the system in their work.

In this study, we have used a survey to investigate students in higher education and their self-efficacy abilities in Media and information literacy (MIL). We have investigated whether the students felt that the MIL-related education, offered by the libraries, helped them develop their abilities when they took part in it. The survey also asked if the students would like more such education. The results in this study revealed that the students at Chalmers had a high self-efficacy for critical thinking and information seeking both in their studies and in their social media habits. The result also revealed that despite their high self-efficacy the students still wished for more education in media and information literacy.

Disons que je me cogne l’orteil à l’instant. Selon le physicalisme, il est possible d’expliquer l’ensemble de ce qui se produit alors de façon purement physique. Ultimement, il s’agit de certaines interactions entre les particules de mon orteil et de celles du mur, qui mènent à des interactions dans mon système nerveux, qui mènent à d’autres interactions dans mon appareil vocal, de façon à ce qu’on entende « Aïe! ». Je crois qu’il manque quelque chose d’important à cette histoire, en l’occurrence l’effet que cela fait de se cogner l’orteil : ma douleur phénoménale à l’orteil. Plus généralement, l’ontologie de la physique n’est pas suffisante pour rendre compte de la conscience phénoménale. La question est de savoir par quoi la remplacer. Dans ce mémoire, j’explore la possibilité d’une ontologie qui ne serait pas physicaliste, mais qui serait quand même naturaliste, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reposerait quand même sur les sciences naturelles. Après tout, la science n’a pas à se limiter à l’ontologie de la physique actuelle. Pour mener à bien cette exploration, je comparerai les deux possibilités qui me semblent les plus plausibles, c’est-à-dire le naturalisme transcendantal de Colin McGinn et le dualisme naturaliste de David Chalmers. McGinn affirme qu’il existe une réponse naturaliste au problème corps-esprit, mais qu’elle n’est pas cognitivement accessible à l’humain, de la même façon que la solution au problème de la gravité n’est pas accessible à l’écureuil par exemple. Chalmers croit au contraire qu’il est bien possible de répondre au problème, à condition d’introduire la conscience phénoménale dans notre ontologie comme une nouvelle entité, comme Newton l’avait fait avec la gravité. J’expliquerai qu’un compromis est en réalité possible entre McGinn et Chalmers. La position de Chalmers est menacée par des paradoxes et des problèmes qui ne seront ultimement réglés qu’en concédant beaucoup de terrain à McGinn.

Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2017-10-18T21:15:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 AlbertoLeopoldoBatistaNeto_TESE.pdf: 2275116 bytes, checksum: 48fe93fd896aa79f9e40bd1b17f8d818 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-10-24T23:27:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 AlbertoLeopoldoBatistaNeto_TESE.pdf: 2275116 bytes, checksum: 48fe93fd896aa79f9e40bd1b17f8d818 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-24T23:27:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AlbertoLeopoldoBatistaNeto_TESE.pdf: 2275116 bytes, checksum: 48fe93fd896aa79f9e40bd1b17f8d818 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-27 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior (CAPES) / A teoria das tradi??es de pesquisa racional de Alasdair MacIntyre elabora uma perspectiva metafilos?fica em que ? poss?vel avaliar os m?ritos relativos de enquadramentos rivais da racionalidade, de uma maneira que se assemelha a algumas abordagens can?nicas na filosofia da ci?ncia, evadindo-se, por?m, tanto aos problemas relativos ? compreens?o do progresso te?rico, quanto ?s restri??es pr?prias das posi??es relativista e perspectivista, de modo a permitir, por um lado, uma percep??o dos condicionamentos que operam sobre uma investiga??o e, por outro, assumir uma postura filosoficamente realista, amparada numa concep??o da verdade como adequa??o da mente ? realidade. Aproxima-se da tradi??o aristot?lico-tomista e, em sua vers?o madura, encontra nessa tradi??o seu modelo e dela se considera continuadora. Compromete-se com uma concep??o de racionalidade especificamente adaptada, argumenta-se, para a pr?tica filos?fica, sendo importante tra?ar uma distin??o, ignorada por MacIntyre, entre uma racionalidade filos?fica e uma racionalidade cient?fica, esta dedicada ? constru??o de modelos explorat?rios adequados ? predi??o e controle de fen?menos e aquela ocupada com o julgamento sobre a natureza e a estrutura da realidade como tal. Considerando a origem hist?rica dessa divis?o de caminhos e abordando a maneira como alguns fil?sofos de orienta??o aristot?lico-tomista trataram a rela??o entre ci?ncia natural e filosofia da natureza, estabelece-se a primazia de uma perspectiva filos?fica que n?o assuma simplesmente o modelo da racionalidade cient?fica para uma mais completa fundamenta??o de uma teoria da pesquisa racional em moldes macintyreanos. Essa complementa??o da teoria das tradi??es de pesquisa racional de MacIntyre permite, por sua vez, elaborar uma cr?tica ? filosofia anal?tica que encontra na admiss?o da racionalidade cient?fica como modelo para a racionalidade filos?fica o elemento capaz de atribuir ao movimento a identidade unit?ria de uma tradi??o. Tal identidade deve ser entendida antes como pressuposto operacional que como ades?o a teses ou par?metros metodol?gicos bem definidos, e ilumina as cr?ticas esparsas de MacIntyre ?quela tradi??o, apontando para a exist?ncia, nela, de uma forma de emotivismo filos?fico generalizado. / Alasdair MacIntyre?s theory of the traditions of rational enquiry elaborates a metaphilosophical perspective from which one may evaluate the relative merits of rival frameworks of rationality in a way that resembles some canonical approaches in the philosophy of science, but in such a way as to avoid as much as possible the problems relating to the understanding of theoretic progress as the restrictions proper to relativist and perspectivist positions, so that it allows, on the one hand, a clear sight of the conditionings which operate on an investigation and, on the other, to assume a strictly realist posture anchored in a conception of truth as adequation of mind to reality. It approximates to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition and, in its mature version, finds in this tradition its own model and takes itself to be its heir. It is committed to a conception of rationality specifically adapted, it is argued, to philosophical practice, being an important task to draw a distinction, ignored by MacIntyre, between a philosophical and a scientific rationality, the latter dedicated to the building of exploratory models adequate to the prediction and control of phenomena and the former occupied in judging of the nature and structure of reality as such. By considering the historical origin of this parting of ways and approaching the manner in which some philosophers of an Aristotelian-Thomistic orientation dealt with the relation between natural science and the philosophy of nature, the primacy is established of a philosophical perspective that does not simply take scientific rationality as its model, in order to furnish a fuller grounding to a theory of rational enquiry in MacIntyrean moulds. This complementation of MacIntyre?s theory of the traditions of rational enquiry, in its turn, allows for an elaboration of a criticism of analytic philosophy which finds in the adoption of scientific rationality as a model to philosophical rationality the element apt to confer the movement the unitary identity of a tradition. Such an identity should not be understood as adhesion to determinate theses or methodological patterns but rather as an operational presupposition, and it sheds light on MacIntyre?s sparse criticisms of that tradition, pointing toward the existence, in it, of a kind of generalized philosophical emotivism.