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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

A defense of P.F. Strawson's theory of self /

Gray, Paul Dennis January 1971 (has links)
No description available.
2

God is not an object : Wittgensteinian account of belief in God

Rabinowitz, Robert Martin January 1999 (has links)
No description available.
3

ARGUMENTOS TRANSCENDENTAIS E NATURALISMO: AS DUAS ESTRATÉGIAS ANTICÉTICAS DE STRAWSON / TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND NATURALISM: THE TWO ANTISKEPTICAL STRATEGIES OF STRAWSON

Gelain, Itamar Luís 15 August 2008 (has links)
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This dissertation has for objective to present and analyze the two anti-skeptical strategies of Strawson, called transcendental arguments and naturalism. Therefore, at a first moment, we will begin by distinguishing and characterizing the two types of transcendental arguments - the refutative (elenctic) and the deductive - which appear, respectively, in the two works Individuals and The bounds of sense. At a second moment, only the refutative transcendental argument itself will be analyzed, which is contained in the first work mentioned, and which is used by Strawson to justify the belief of the continuous existence of the objects, the objective of the skeptical question. And, at last, on one hand, will be discussed the critics of Stroud against this anti-skeptical strategy, to know, the transcendental arguments are not enough to face the skepticism, what makes Strawson to abandon the transcendental arguments as anti-skeptical; and on the other hand, naturalism is presented as the new anti-skeptical strategy of Strawson, which would be supported by Hume and Wittgenstein, as well as the new role of the transcendental arguments, taken now as conceptual connectors within the conceptual scheme. / Esta dissertação tem por objetivo apresentar e analisar as duas estratégias anticéticas de Strawson, denominadas de argumentos transcendentais e naturalismo. Em virtude disto, parte-se, num primeiro momento, da distinção e caracterização dos dois tipos de argumentos transcendentais o refutativo (elêntico) e o dedutivo que figuram respectivamente nas obras Indivíduos e Os Limites do Sentido. Num segundo momento, analisa-se tão somente o argumento transcendental refutativo (elêntico) contido na primeira obra citada, o qual é empregado por Strawson para justificar a crença na existência contínua dos objetos, alvo do questionamento cético. E, por fim, se discute, por um lado, as críticas que Stroud endereça a essa estratégia anticética, a saber, os argumentos transcendentais não são suficientes para fazer frente ao ceticismo, o que implica num abandono dos argumentos transcendentais como anticéticos por parte de Strawson. E, por outro lado, apresenta-se o naturalismo como a nova estratégia anticética strawsoniana, a qual estaria apoiada em Hume e Wittgenstein, bem como o novo papel dos argumentos transcendentais, entendidos agora como conectores conceituais no interior do esquema conceitual.
4

Morality in the Meat Machine

Mccormack, Jessica L. 07 June 2013 (has links)
This thesis examines the excusing and exempting conditions in Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility. More specifically, it notes some concerns for Strawsonian accounts with regards to exempting individuals on the basis of psychological abnormalities, namely that the excusing/exempting distinction is unclear, and more importantly that treating a person's brain as an entity distinct from the person suggests a dualistic picture of the self that is not consistent with neuroscientific accounts of the brain. If we redraw the distinction to be between external/internal features, and focus on brain processes as the responsible entities for any given action, we can avoid these worries and have a more empirically accurate account of responsibility. / Master of Arts
5

EXPERIÊNCIA E ESQUEMA CONCEITUAL EM STRAWSON / EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEME OF STRAWSON

Nunes, Cristina de Moraes 26 August 2011 (has links)
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / In The Bounds of Sense, Strawson presents what he considers a major Kantian contribution to the analytic philosophy. This contribution corresponds to Kant‟s attempt to establish the general possible limits to the experience and therefore also to limit our use of concepts. According to the principle of significance, the limits of experience are limits to the significant use of concepts. In Individuals, Strawson develops the metaphysical project and takes into account many of the positive aspects found in Kant‟s theory, as it is the case of the empiricist principle of significance. In this metaphysical project, Strawson is interested in clarifying our thinking about the world this is made possible by the use of a single conceptual scheme. In the conceptual scheme the concepts are interconnected and these are the concepts that allow us to access things in the world. In his ontology a necessary condition for maintaining the conceptual scheme is the undisputed acceptance of the continued existence of some objects, Thus, Strawson is faced with the skeptic who doubts the continued existence of material bodies. The transcendental argument used in Individuals to show that skeptical doubt is incoherent he received criticism such as Barry Stroud. For Stroud the transcendental argument implies certain verificationism to assert the continued existence of particulars, but to accept the verificationism is to refute directly the skeptic, so that the transcendental argument becomes insufficient to refute skepticism. In Skepticism and Naturalism, Strawson accepts Stroud‟s criticism and he found in naturalism a way not to refute the skeptic, but just leave it aside, as it is natural to believe in the existence of material bodies and people. By embracing naturalism, Strawson gets closer of the realistic. He believes we can know things directly as they really are. This is possible because our sense perception is always permeated by concepts, so that, our sensitive knowledge is always conceptual. The concepts are learned in their practice of using, by observing the behavior of other users. Wherefore, when Strawson approaches Wittgenstein he gives a step ahead of Kant and he states that the concepts limit what we can know. Therefore, the basic features for a consistent conception of experience are agency and society and the limits to our knowledge are always set by the language. / Em The Bounds of Sense, Strawson apresenta o que considera como a grande contribuição kantiana para a filosofia analítica. Essa contribuição corresponde à tentativa de Kant em estabelecer os limites gerais possíveis para a experiência e, consequentemente, limitar também o uso que fazemos dos conceitos. De acordo com o princípio da significatividade, os limites da experiência são os limites para o uso significativo dos conceitos. Nos Individuals, Strawson desenvolve o projeto metafísico e leva em consideração muitos dos aspectos positivos encontrados na teoria de Kant, como é o caso do princípio empirista da significatividade. Neste projeto metafísico, Strawson tem o interesse de elucidar o nosso pensamento sobre o mundo, o que se torna possível pelo uso de um esquema conceitual único. No esquema conceitual, os conceitos encontram-se interligados entre si e são esses conceitos que nos possibilitam ter acesso às coisas no mundo. Na sua ontologia, uma condição necessária para a manutenção do esquema conceitual é a aceitação incontestável da existência contínua de alguns objetos. Com isso, Strawson depara-se com o cético que põe em dúvida a existência contínua dos corpos materiais. O argumento transcendental utilizado nos Individuals, para mostrar que a dúvida cética é incoerente, recebeu críticas tais como a de Barry Stroud. Para Stroud, o argumento transcendental implica certo verificacionismo para afirmar a existência contínua dos particulares, mas aceitar o verificacionismo já é refutar diretamente o cético, de modo que o argumento transcendental torna-se insuficiente para refutar o ceticismo. Em Ceticismo e Naturalismo, Strawson aceita a crítica de Stroud e encontra, no naturalismo, uma maneira de não refutar o cético, mas simplesmente deixá-lo de lado, já que é natural crer na existência dos corpos materiais e das pessoas. Ao adotar o naturalismo, Strawson aproxima-se ainda mais dos realistas. Ele considera que podemos conhecer as coisas diretamente como elas realmente são. Isso torna-se possível porque a nossa percepção sensível é sempre permeada por conceitos, de modo que o nosso conhecimento sensível é sempre conceitual. Os conceitos são apreendidos na sua prática de uso, através da observação do comportamento dos demais usuários. Desse modo, ao se aproximar de Wittgenstein, Strawson dá um passo a frente de Kant e afirma que os conceitos limitam aquilo que podemos conhecer. Assim, os traços fundamentais para uma concepção coerente de experiência são agência e sociedade, sendo que os limites para o nosso conhecimento são sempre estabelecidos pela linguagem.
6

Strawson and Wittgenstein : the no-ownership argument.

Reigel, Thomas J. January 1970 (has links)
No description available.
7

Freedom and Forfeiture: Responding to Galen Strawson's Basic Argument

Kelsey, Eli Benjamin 21 August 2008 (has links)
Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is an attempt to prove that no agent can meet the demands for true moral responsibility. The Basic Argument proceeds on the assumption that, in order for an agent to be truly morally responsible for her actions, she must be truly responsible for her reasons for performing those actions, which Strawson contends is impossible since it requires an infinite regress of truly responsible decisions to have the reasons one has. In my thesis, I take issue with the Basic Argument. I argue that, contrary to Strawson’s claims, the Basic Argument is not persuasive to those who reject that one’s reasons cause one’s actions. For those who are willing to overlook this shortcoming, I then argue that it is possible for an agent to evade the threat of infinite regress, particularly in situations where two simultaneous choices (at least partially) explain each other.
8

Strawson and Wittgenstein : the no-ownership argument.

Reigel, Thomas J. January 1970 (has links)
No description available.
9

Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics

Clugston, Byron January 2009 (has links)
Master of Philosophy / Following P.F. Strawson's reading of Kant, the majority of the literature on transcendental arguments seeks to divorce such arguments from their original Kantian context. This thesis is concerned with Mark Sacks's recent defence of transcendental arguments, which takes a different approach. A critique is given of Sacks's work and extensions and modifications of his approach are recommended. It is proposed that certain difficulties encountered by Kant's transcendentally-ideal approach can be overcome with Hegelian solutions.
10

Transcendental-Phenomenological Proof and Descriptive Metaphysics

Clugston, Byron January 2009 (has links)
Master of Philosophy / Following P.F. Strawson's reading of Kant, the majority of the literature on transcendental arguments seeks to divorce such arguments from their original Kantian context. This thesis is concerned with Mark Sacks's recent defence of transcendental arguments, which takes a different approach. A critique is given of Sacks's work and extensions and modifications of his approach are recommended. It is proposed that certain difficulties encountered by Kant's transcendentally-ideal approach can be overcome with Hegelian solutions.

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