Security Sector Reform (SSR) is considered a significant feature in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts typically employed by states and international partners. Recently, the concept of SSR has played a significant role in the statebuilding process in Afghanistan after the Taliban regime; however, a disorganised and unplanned withdrawal poses severe threats to the security sector. This thesis explores the SSR efforts made by the western states after the end of the Taliban regime. The holistic approaches present in policy and strategy documents are quite challenging when it comes to SSR implementation in a post-conflict country ruled by an insurgent group for years. This thesis illustrates two competing approaches that show how SSR played a role in the post-conflict peacebuilding within Afghanistan and how peace spoilers and US/NATO withdrawal will impact the gains of twenty years in SSR. In order to better analyse the SSR process, a case study of the Afghan National Police is used. Moreover, this thesis offers some practical policy recommendations that can be useful for the concept of SSR in Afghanistan. This thesis does not offer a solution to the challenges of SSR in post-conflict countries like Afghanistan. Yet, it suggests that an uncoordinated withdrawal of external powers can negatively...

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants constitutes one of the most crucial activities in a post-conflict peacebuilding context with important effects upon the wider transitional process from war to peace. The efficient implementation of DDR programmes can reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. Moreover, a well-planned and flexible reintegration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally.1 Since the end of the Cold War, DDR initiatives have been undertaken in more than 25 war-to-peace transition contexts: Afghanistan, Aceh, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), El Salvador, Eritrea, East Timor, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Liberia, Mindanao, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan and Uganda. In 2007, over 1,129,000 combatants were taking part in DDR programmes in 20 countries at an estimated cost of US$ 2 billion; one estimate suggests that it worked out to be around US$1,686 per ex-combatant. Some 2/3 of former combatants were from African countries; 42% were members of the armed forces and 58% belonged to armed militias, guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups. Of this statistic, nearly 10% were child soldiers.

This working paper explores reinsertion and reintegration processes and how these connect (or are expected to connect) with donor-led strategies for post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development. DDR has long been recognised as essential for post-conflict stability, but in the 2000s, there has been emphasis on enhancing the linkages between short-term, time-bound DDR process and long-term reconstruction and development programmes and processes in post-conflict states. The importance of situating reintegration into the wider context of long-term development has been stressed by the UN, whose best practice guidelines emphasise that reintegration should: 'support a broader national strategic plan for reconciliation, reconstruction and development.' This does not suggest a restructuring of DDR activities, which aim to establish an environment conducive to long-term economic development rather than fostering long-term development, but a bridging of short- and long-term agendas.

Em dezembro de 2012, após treze anos, três mandatos de operações de paz e dois mandatos de missões políticas, a ONU se retirava do território do Timor-Leste de maneira bastante discreta. Fechava-se, naquele momento, um ciclo de participação da Organização na vida política e econômica daquele país, que se iniciara com os episódios de violência de 1999, quando milicianos pró-indonésia tentaram impedir o processo político de autodeterminação do povo timorense. Herdando um país com suas infraestruturas destruídas e mais de um quarto de sua população refugiada ou deslocada internamente, a ONU não apenas pacificou o território como também empreendeu ali um processo de Post-conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB), onde sua participação variou entre o exercício pleno de todos os poderes soberanos atinentes às funções de governo de qualquer Estado ao apoio de assessores altamente especializados em prol do governo independente do Timor-Leste. O balanço final dessa participação é positivo na medida que revela um país com estruturas governamentais consolidadas, formalmente democrático e com boas taxas de crescimento econômico. Por outro lado, o combate à pobreza, a consolidação da pacificação social, a necessidade de maior participação popular na política e a redução da dependência de sua economia em relação ao petróleo seguem sendo desafios não resolvidos e, em grande medida, externalidades provocadas pela própria ONU. / In December 2012, after thirteen years, three mandates of peace operations and two mandates of political missions, the UN withdrew from the territory of Timor-Leste in a rather discreet manner. At that moment, a cycle of the Organization's participation in the political and economic life of that country, which began with the 1999 episodes of violence, occurred when pro-Indonesian militiamen tried to impede the political process of self-determination of the Timorese people. Inheriting a country with its destroyed infrastructure and more than a quarter of its population refugee or internally displaced, the UN not only pacified the territory but also undertook a Post-conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB) process, where its participation ranged from full exercise of all sovereign powers pertaining to the government functions of any State to the support of highly specialized advisers for the independent government of Timor-Leste. The final balance of this participation is positive insofar as it reveals a country with consolidated government structures, formally democratic and good rates of economic growth. On the other hand, the fight against poverty, the consolidation of social pacification, the need for greater popular participation in politics and the reduction of dependence of its economy on oil remain unresolved challenges and, to a large extent, externalities caused by the UN itself.

Em dezembro de 2012, após treze anos, três mandatos de operações de paz e dois mandatos de missões políticas, a ONU se retirava do território do Timor-Leste de maneira bastante discreta. Fechava-se, naquele momento, um ciclo de participação da Organização na vida política e econômica daquele país, que se iniciara com os episódios de violência de 1999, quando milicianos pró-indonésia tentaram impedir o processo político de autodeterminação do povo timorense. Herdando um país com suas infraestruturas destruídas e mais de um quarto de sua população refugiada ou deslocada internamente, a ONU não apenas pacificou o território como também empreendeu ali um processo de Post-conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB), onde sua participação variou entre o exercício pleno de todos os poderes soberanos atinentes às funções de governo de qualquer Estado ao apoio de assessores altamente especializados em prol do governo independente do Timor-Leste. O balanço final dessa participação é positivo na medida que revela um país com estruturas governamentais consolidadas, formalmente democrático e com boas taxas de crescimento econômico. Por outro lado, o combate à pobreza, a consolidação da pacificação social, a necessidade de maior participação popular na política e a redução da dependência de sua economia em relação ao petróleo seguem sendo desafios não resolvidos e, em grande medida, externalidades provocadas pela própria ONU. / In December 2012, after thirteen years, three mandates of peace operations and two mandates of political missions, the UN withdrew from the territory of Timor-Leste in a rather discreet manner. At that moment, a cycle of the Organization's participation in the political and economic life of that country, which began with the 1999 episodes of violence, occurred when pro-Indonesian militiamen tried to impede the political process of self-determination of the Timorese people. Inheriting a country with its destroyed infrastructure and more than a quarter of its population refugee or internally displaced, the UN not only pacified the territory but also undertook a Post-conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB) process, where its participation ranged from full exercise of all sovereign powers pertaining to the government functions of any State to the support of highly specialized advisers for the independent government of Timor-Leste. The final balance of this participation is positive insofar as it reveals a country with consolidated government structures, formally democratic and good rates of economic growth. On the other hand, the fight against poverty, the consolidation of social pacification, the need for greater popular participation in politics and the reduction of dependence of its economy on oil remain unresolved challenges and, to a large extent, externalities caused by the UN itself.

Recent years have seen an increasing emphasis on local ownership in UN peacebuilding. Advocates of local ownership assert that it boosts the legitimacy and sustainability of UN peacebuilding by helping to preserve the principles of self- determination and non-imposition of externally-conceived solutions onto post-conflict countries in an activity that can contravene them. However, while the UN perceives local ownership as enabling it to act in accordance with these principles, it also perceives local ownership to imperil the achievement of its operational goals, thus bringing its normative and operational objectives into conflict. This thesis evaluates the UN’s discourse, understandings, and operationalizations of local ownership in peacebuilding. Drawing on examples from the UN peace operation in DR Congo, it shows that despite the UN’s regular invocation of local ownership discourse, it operationalizes ownership in restrictive and selective ways that are intended to protect the achievement of operational goals but that consequently limit self-determination and increase external imposition on the host country. This gap between the rhetoric and reality of ownership suggests that the UN uses local ownership primarily as a discursive tool for legitimation, one intended to reconcile the organization’s normative and operational imperatives. However, because its actions do not match its rhetoric, the UN’s attempts to generate legitimacy through discourse appear to fall flat, particularly in the eyes of local actors. Moreover, because of contradictions in the ways that the UN operationalizes local ownership, it not only deepens the curtailment of self-determination and the degree of external imposition, it also undercuts its ability to realize the very operational goals it is trying to protect. Ultimately, because it is a contradictory and contested concept, local ownership fails to eliminate or ‘fix’ the trade-offs the UN faces in peacebuilding, suggesting that the UN must instead accept them and incorporate them into its goals and expectations.

The literature on security sector actors in transitional societies emerging from war and/or authoritarianism has evolved by critiquing local perspectives recently. While the existing literature has extensively analysed transitional societies in Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe, the thesis adds a new geographical perspective by providing a case study of security sector change processes in the Republic of Georgia, 1985 - 2008. More specifically, the thesis examines the local processes and drivers of security sector change in Georgia, and their interrelationships with donor supported programmes including SSR. The thesis employs a political economy analysis to examine indigenous security sector actors and their characteristics. Based on the approach, the thesis particularly examines processes of change and reform of policing institutions. The paramilitary is identified and examined as a key focus for analysis. The research shows that political dynamics among a few political elites determined the course of security sector change in Georgia. Despite ample external assistance, domestic political dynamics remained the main driving factor in the SSR agenda-setting process. In the politically-driven security sector change efforts, the restoration and maintenance of regime security remained a priority under both the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili regimes. Overall, the security sector actors played significant role in the political developments. Consequently, the process of changing these actors was a largely domestically driven political process. The role of paramilitaries in relation to regime security and the security sector change agenda-setting process in Georgia requires the security sector research to treat paramilitary as a distinguished unit for consideration. / Akino Yutaka Eurasia Fund and the United Nations University Akino Memorial Research Fellowship.

This thesis develops a model that can be used to assess the ability of religious institutions to contribute to post-conflict state building. Highlighting the tendency in state building literature to stop short in discussing what seems to be inferred, but unnameable—religion—the research proposes a framework that identifies theoretical mechanisms through which religious institutions can contribute to post-conflict state building. Drawing from the theologies of Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam the thesis then reflects upon why they would, of their own accord, lend their considerable legitimacy and resources. The thesis diverges from traditional approaches such as rational choice theory that suggest religious institutions act to maximise membership or assets, and instead embraces a teleological view recognizing the importance of belief structures in understanding a religious institution's motivations. It embraces salvation as a hermeneutical key to outline a Roman Catholic theology of state building while drawing upon the concept of justice for Sunni Islam. The thesis concludes by incorporating the particularistic nuances of Bosnia and Herzegovina's unique historically and culturally influenced religious practices, structures and theologies to suggest the ability and willingness of the two religions' institutions to contribute to their country's state building.