Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau, 1913. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [6-7]).

This dissertation is a discussion of the challenge that cases of over-determination pose to Act-Consequentialism. Although there are many realistic examples of such cases – for example, pollution, overfishing, or the election of an inappropriate politician – I consider structurally purer examples, one of which I call “Case One.” Suppose that you and I independently shoot and kill a third person called “Victim.” Our bullets arrive at the same time and each shot would have killed Victim by itself. Finally, Victim would not have been killed, if neither of us had pulled the trigger. According to the Standard Version of Act-Consequentialism, an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better. Case One challenges the Standard Version because there does not seem to be such an alternative to my action: Victim would have died by your shot if I had not shot him, and similar remarks apply to your action. The dissertation is structured as follows. After Chapter One, which briefly introduces the main issues of the dissertation, I turn to Chapter Two – “Preliminaries” – where I outline the Standard Version and highlight the main characteristics of over-determination cases. These cases are divided into cases of redundant difference making and cases of redundant causation. Cases of redundant causation are subdivided further into cases of causal over-determination and pre-emption. I make an important stipulation in this chapter. I say that our actions in Case One and similar cases are “redundant negative difference makers.” In Chapter Three – “Replies” – I consider whether the proponent of Act-Consequentialism might question the intuition that you and I, respectively, act wrongly in Case One. The proponent might accept that we have this intuition but explain it away, or she might deny that we have the intuition and instead point to something else that is wrong in this kind of case. For example, she could suggest that although neither you nor I act wrongly individually, we act wrongly together. I argue that these replies are problematic.  For instance, explaining away this intuition might also force us to explain away intuitions that support the Standard Version. In Chapter Four – “Causal Consequences” – I discuss an alternative version of Act-Consequentialism that might seem to fare better. The Standard Version interprets the term “outcome of an action” as referring to the entire possible world that would obtain, if the action were performed. The version I have in mind, the “Causal Consequences Version of Act-Consequentialism,” understands “outcome of an action” as instead referring to the causal consequences of the action. It seems clear that you and I, respectively, cause the state of affairs that Victim dies in Case One. However, I show that the Causal Consequences Version has a number of unattractive implications. In Chapter Five – “the Non-Standard Version” – I suggest another alternative version of Act-Consequentialism. This version – the Non-Standard Version – implies that you and I act wrongly in Case One. Roughly, the Non-Standard Version says that an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better, or is a redundant negative difference maker. The Non-Standard Version is similar to a principle suggested by Derek Parfit. However, I shall argue that the Non-Standard Version is preferable to Parfit’s principle. In Chapter Six – “Further Cases” – I discuss a number of cases that challenge the Non-Standard Version. For example, what would the Non-Standard Version imply in a case very similar to Case One but where I would have killed another person, if I had not shot Victim? I argue that the Non-Standard Version handles this and other problematic cases, and that it is therefore a plausible alternative to the Standard Version.

Yes / The pre-emption procedure is an important part of the Radio Resource Management (RRM) when dealing with the emergency traffic. It allows resources to be allocated to higher priority connections by pre-empting lower priority connections. The provision of the pre-emption mechanism becomes much more important in the case of satellite systems such as the Inmarsat Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) system which aids in providing the communication during a catastrophe. This paper focuses on the preemption framework for a UMTS based satellite systems. Three algorithms have been proposed, Greedy, SubSetSum and Fuzzy pre-emption algorithm. Extensive simulations are carried out for the three algorithms and their performances are compared against each other. Simulation results show that the Fuzzy pre-emption algorithm performs better than the other two algorithms. / European Space Agency/Inmarsat

Data from three long-term field studies with loblolly pine (Pinus taeda L.) plantations were used to examine inequality (Gini coefficient) trends in diameter and the relationship between diameter relative growth rate (r) and initial size. Analysis with two spacing studies shows inequality increases with increasing density. For a given initial density, inequality initially decreases and then begins to increase as trees compete for resources. The slope of the linear relationship between r and relative size also increases with increasing density. The slope is initially negative and switches to positive as competition intensifies. The switch in the slope of the r/size relationship occurs when the crown projection area exceeds 1.05 or when the crown ratio falls below 0.75. These results are consistent with the resource pre-emptive or dominance/suppression theory of intra-specific competition. The r/size trends are not evident when calculations are based on class means as opposed to individual trees. The slope of the r/size relationship is a function of stand height, density, and to a lesser extent, site quality. Density reduction through mid-rotation thinning tends to decrease the slope coefficient. The r/size trends are used to develop a disaggregation model to distribute stand-level basal area growth over an initial tree list. This approach compares well with two other disaggregation models but tends to over predict growth on the largest trees. / Ph. D.

In recent years, there has been an exponential growth in the use of multimedia applications. A satellite system offers great potential for multimedia applications with its ability to broadcast and multicast a large amount of data over a very large area as compared to a terrestrial system. However, the limited transmission capacity along with the dynamically varying channel conditions impedes the delivery of good quality multimedia service in a satellite system which has resulted in research efforts for deriving efficient radio resource management techniques. This issue is addressed in this thesis, where the main emphasis is to design a CAC framework which maximizes the utilization of the scarce radio resources available in the satellite and at the same time increases the performance of the system for a UMTS based satellite system supporting unicast and multicast traffic. The design of the system architecture for a UMTS based satellite system is presented. Based on this architecture, a CAC framework is designed consisting of three different functionalities: the admission control procedure, the retune procedure and the pre-emption procedure. The joint use of these functionalities is proposed to allow the performance of the system to be maintained under congestion. Different algorithms are proposed for different functionalities; an adaptive admission control algorithm, a greedy retune algorithm and three pre-emption algorithms (Greedy, SubSetSum, and Fuzzy). A MATLAB simulation model is developed to study the performance of the proposed CAC framework. A GUI is created to provide the user with the flexibility to configure the system settings before starting a simulation. The configuration settings allow the system to be analysed under different conditions. The performance of the system is measured under different simulation settings such as enabling and disabling of the two functionalities of the CAC framework; retune procedure and the pre-emption procedure. The simulation results indicate the CAC framework as a whole with all the functionalities performs better than the other simulation settings.

Yes / Fifth generation (5G) cellular networks will be comprised of millions of connected devices like wearable devices, Androids, iPhones, tablets and the Internet of Things (IoT) with a plethora of applications generating requests to the network. The 5G cellular networks need to cope with such sky-rocketing tra c requests from these devices to avoid network congestion. As such, cloud radio access networks (C-RAN) has been considered as a paradigm shift for 5G in which requests from mobile devices are processed in the cloud with shared baseband processing. Despite call admission control (CAC) being one of radio resource management techniques to avoid the network congestion, it has recently been overlooked by the community. The CAC technique in 5G C-RAN has a direct impact on the quality of service (QoS) for individual connections and overall system e ciency. In this paper, a novel Fuzzy-Logic based CAC scheme with pre-emption in C-RAN is proposed. In this scheme, cloud bursting technique is proposed to be used during congestion, where some delay tolerant low-priority connections are pre-empted and outsourced to a public cloud with a penalty charge. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme has low blocking probability below 5%, high throughput, low energy consumption and up to 95% of return on revenue.

In recent years, there has been an exponential growth in the use of multimedia applications. A satellite system offers great potential for multimedia applications with its ability to broadcast and multicast a large amount of data over a very large area as compared to a terrestrial system. However, the limited transmission capacity along with the dynamically varying channel conditions impedes the delivery of good quality multimedia service in a satellite system which has resulted in research efforts for deriving efficient radio resource management techniques. This issue is addressed in this thesis, where the main emphasis is to design a CAC framework which maximizes the utilization of the scarce radio resources available in the satellite and at the same time increases the performance of the system for a UMTS based satellite system supporting unicast and multicast traffic. The design of the system architecture for a UMTS based satellite system is presented. Based on this architecture, a CAC framework is designed consisting of three different functionalities: the admission control procedure, the retune procedure and the pre-emption procedure. The joint use of these functionalities is proposed to allow the performance of the system to be maintained under congestion. Different algorithms are proposed for different functionalities; an adaptive admission control algorithm, a greedy retune algorithm and three pre-emption algorithms (Greedy, SubSetSum, and Fuzzy). A MATLAB simulation model is developed to study the performance of the proposed CAC framework. A GUI is created to provide the user with the flexibility to configure the system settings before starting a simulation. The configuration settings allow the system to be analysed under different conditions. The performance of the system is measured under different simulation settings such as enabling and disabling of the two functionalities of the CAC framework; retune procedure and the pre-emption procedure. The simulation results indicate the CAC framework as a whole with all the functionalities performs better than the other simulation settings.

<p>This dissertation offers an in-depth exploration of how temporality—and the imperative to control the unfolding of time in particular—is embedded in the practices, processes, and dynamics of contemporary world politics. While most International Relations scholarship remains conspicuously uninterested in questions relating to time, this study sees such temporal blindness as inhibiting the development of adequately nuanced and critically oriented understandings of key theoretical and practical issues in the global political realm. It thus attempts to demonstrate how time can be “brought in” to the study of world politics, and to highlight the analytical utility and critical potential of doing so. In this respect, Part I considers the importance of temporality to perhaps the most fundamental global political concept—state sovereignty—and then moves on to discuss how shifts in the contemporary political imagination have (re-)inscribed temporal contingency as a pressing problem that requires a political response. Part II then attempts to critically think through what is at stake in the resulting proliferation of anticipatory governance strategies premised upon controlling the unfolding of the future through pre-emptive intervention in the present. It is argued that by prioritizing imagination and conjecture in the context of political decision-making, such temporally-inflected strategies serve to radically reconfigure the way political power is organized and exercised, such that a paradigm of political authority best described as "exceptionalism” is enacted. This line of argument is developed through a comprehensive conceptual engagement with one particularly prominent manifestation of this ongoing “temporalization” of the political—namely, the “pre-emptive security” strategies that have emerged as central to the conduct of the global War on Terror. It is concluded that the adoption of anticipatory political rationalities is particularly problematic for the liberal democratic states that have most enthusiastically done so—both in the security realm and beyond.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The various constructions of rights of pre-emption encountered in South African case law all have some merit. This is confirmed by the multiplicity of types of preference contracts encountered in German law especially. The tendency of South African courts and writers to portray one approach as the only correct one to the exclusion of all other views, results in tension and confusion, all the more because of the failure to investigate the relevant policy considerations comprehensively. The confusion is compounded by what amounts to a breakdown of the system of precedents with judgments being based on incorrect interpretations of previous decisions and with scant regard for contrary decisions. No certainty exists regarding the construction of the contractual right of pre-emption in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, nor is it clear what figure or figures were received into South African law. The Germanic concept of tiered ownership that forms the historical basis for the Oryx remedy, does not form part of our law. This accounts for the difficulty that courts and writers have in explaining this remedy in terms of Romanist terminology, and the resort to the language of fiction. German law and English law, relied upon in South African case law, do not support a uniform construction of all rights of pre-emption as creating an enforceable duty to make an offer upon manifestation of a desire to sell. The almost unanimous support of US courts for a remedy by which the holder can ultimately obtain performance of the main contract upon conclusion of a contract with a third party, challenges the hypothesis suggested by German law that the default construction of preference contracts should be the bare preference contract which only creates a negative obligation. The very cryptic way in which rights of pre-emption are normally drafted, makes it difficult to even identify the main purpose of the parties. It is therefore not easy to classify preference contracts into the different types identified in this study as notional possibilities. A default regime is therefore highly desirable in the interest of legal certainty. The choice of a default regime should be made on the basis of recognised policy considerations, particularly on the basis of an equitable balancing of typical parties' interests and in view of communal interests balanced against the demand for legal certainty. The choice of default regime cannot be based merely on historical authority or precedent (which is in any event unclear in the present context) or unsubstantiated claims that one model is more logical or commercially useful than another. When rules are chosen as the default regime, these rules must, as far as possible, be reconciled with the existing conceptual structure of our law to prevent contradictions and inconsistencies. A policy analysis reveals that three default types of preference contract should be recognised, each with a clearly delineated field of application. Firstly, where the agreement allows the grantor to contract with a third party, the holder has the right to contract with the grantor at the terms agreed with the third party. Such a preference contract can therefore be regarded as an option conditional upon conclusion of a contract with a third party. Such contracts are rare in South Africa. In other cases, the default rule should be that the grantor must first give the holder an opportunity to contract before he contracts with a third party. The default construction of this latter type of preference contracts depends on whether the preference contract itself predetermines the main contract price. If so, the holder has a right or option to contract at that price upon any manifestation of a desire to conclude the relevant type of contract. However, where the preference contract does not predetermine the price, or refers to a price that the grantor would accept from third parties, any manifestation of a desire to sell should not be sufficient to trigger the holder's right. The grantor and society have an interest in having her freedom to negotiate with third parties to obtain the best possible price curtailed as little as possible. In such cases, the default rule should be that the holder is only entitled to conclusion of the main contract upon breach in the form of a contract with or offer to a third party. The default rule should also be that such preference contracts - which will be treated as ordinary preference contracts - only terminate upon the grantor actually contracting with and performing to a third party within a reasonable time after the holder declined the opportunity to match those terms, and provided the identity of the third party was disclosed to the holder on request. The holder therefore cannot lose his preferential right by a rejection of an outrageously high offer by the grantor. Options and preference contracts are closely related and overlapping concepts. The type of preference contract that grants a conditional right to contract can often be understood as a conditional option (or at least as a conditional option subject to a resolutive condition that the grantor does not want to contract anymore). The traditional distinction between options and rights of first refusal can only be maintained in respect of some types of preference contracts. These are negative or bare preference contracts which only give rise to remedies aimed at restoring the status quo ante the breach, as well as those preference contracts creating conditional rights to contract which courts refuse to treat as conditional options because their wording implies a duty to make or accept an offer, or because the requirement of certainty precludes them from being options. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die verskillende konstruksies van voorkoopsregte aanvaar III Suid-Afrikaanse beslissings het almal meriete. Dit word bevestig deur die verskillende tipes voorkoopskontrakte wat veral in die Duitse reg erken word. Die neiging van Suid- Afrikaanse howe en skrywers om een benadering as die enigste korrekte een te tipeer veroorsaak spanning en onsekerheid, des te meer weens die versuim om die relevante beleidsoorwegings deeglik te ondersoek. Boonop is die presedentestelsel telkens verontagsaam deur verkeerde interpretasies van vorige uitsprake en deurdat teenstrydige uitsprake bloot geïgnoreer is. Geen sekerheid bestaan oor die konstruksie van die kontraktuele voorkoopsreg in die Romeinse of Romeins-Hollandse Reg nie. Dit is ook nie duidelik watter figuur of figure in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geresipieer is nie. Die Germaanse konsep van gesplitste eiendomsreg wat die historiese basis van die Oryx-meganisme daarstel, vorm nie deel van ons reg nie. Dit verduidelik hoekom howe en skrywers sukkel om dié remedie te verduidelik aan die hand van Romanistiese verbintenisreg-terminologie, en die gevolglike gebruikmaking van fiksie-taal. Die Duitse en Engelse reg waarop gesteun is in Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak, steun nie 'n uniforme konstruksie van alle voorkoopsregte as behelsende 'n afdwingbare plig om 'n aanbod te maak by enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om te verkoop nie. Die byna eenparige steun van Noord-Amerikaanse howe vir 'n remedie waarmee die voorkoopsreghouer uiteindelik prestasie van die substantiewe kontrak kan kry by sluiting van 'n kontrak met 'n derde, is 'n teenvoeter vir die hipotese gesuggereer deur die Duitse reg dat die verstekkonstruksie van voorkeurkontrakte behoort te wees dat slegs 'n negatiewe verpligting geskep word. Die kriptiese wyse waarop voorkeurkontrakte normaalweg opgestel word, maak dit moeilik om selfs die hoofdoelstelling van die partye te identifiseer. Dit is daarom nie maklik om voorkeurkontrakte te klassifisieer in die verskillende tipes wat in hierdie studie geïdentifiseer is nie. 'n Verstekregime is daarom wenslik in die belang van regsekerheid. Die keuse van verstekregime behoort gemaak te word op die basis van erkende beleidsoorwegings, spesifiek op die basis van 'n billike balansering van tipiese partybelange en in die lig van gemeenskapsbelange gebalanseer teen die vereiste van regsekerheid. Die keuse van verstekregime kan nie gebaseer word bloot op historiese gesag en vorige beslissings nie (wat in elk geval in die huidige konteks onduidelik is). Dit kan ook nie gebaseer word op ongemotiveerde aansprake dat een model meer logies of kommersieël bruikbaar as 'n ander is nie. Wanneer verstekreëls gekies word moet dit, sover moontlik, versoen word met die bestaande begrippe-struktuur van ons reg om teenstrydighede in die sisteem te vermy. 'n Beleidsanalise laat blyk dat drie verstektipes voorkeurkontrakte erken behoort te word, elk met 'n duidelik afgebakende toepassingsveld. Eerstens, waar die ooreenkoms toelaat dat die voorkeurreggewer eers met 'n derde party kontrakteer, het die voorkeurreghouer 'n opsie om te kontrakteer op die terme ooreengekom met die derde. Die voorkeurkontrak kan daarom beskou word as 'n opsie onderhewig aan die voorwaarde van sluiting van 'n kontrak met 'n derde. Sulke kontrakte is raar in Suid- Afrika. In ander gevalle behoort die verstekreël te wees dat die voorkeurreggewer eers die houer 'n geleentheid moet gee om te kontrakteer voordat sy met 'n derde 'n kontrak aangaan. Die verstekkonstruksie van hierdie laasgenoemde tipe voorkeurkontrak hang daarvan af of die voorkeurkontrak self die substantiewe kontraksprys vasstel. Indien wel het die houer die reg of opsie om te kontrakteer teen daardie prys by enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om die spesifieke soort kontrak te sluit. Maar waar die voorkeurkontrak nie die prys vasstel nie, of verwys na 'n prys wat die gewer sou aanvaar van 'n derde, behoort enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om te kontrakteer nie genoeg te wees om die houer se reg afdwingbaar te maak nie. Die voorkeurreggewer en die gemeenskap het 'n belang daarby dat die gewer se vryheid om met derdes te onderhandel so min as moontlik beperk word sodat sy die beste moontlike prys kan kry. In sulke gevalle behoort die verstekreël te wees dat die houer slegs geregtig is op die voordeel van die substantiewe kontrak by kontrakbreuk in die vorm van 'n kontrak met of aanbod aan 'n derde. Die verstekreël behoort ook te wees dat sulke voorkeurkontrakte in beginsel slegs beëindig word wanneer die voorkeurreggewer inderdaad kontrakteer met en presteer aan 'n derde binne 'n redelike tyd nadat die voorkeurreghouer die geleentheid gegee is om daardie terme te ewenaar. Dit behoort ook vereis te word dat die identiteit van die derde aan die houer geopenbaar word op sy versoek. Die houer kan dus nie sy voorkeurreg verloor deur nie-aanvaarding van 'n belaglik hoë aanbod deur die voorkeurreggewer nie. Opsies en voorkeurkontrakte is oorvleulende konsepte. Die tipe voorkeurkontrak wat 'n voorwaardelike reg om te kontrakteer verleen kan dikwels verstaan word as 'n voorwaardelike opsie (of minstens as 'n voorwaardelike opsie onderhewig aan 'n ontbindende voorwaarde dat die gewer glad nie meer wil kontrakteer nie). Die tradisionele onderskeid tussen opsies en voorkeurregte kan slegs behou word tov sommige voorkeurkontrakte. Hulle is die "negatiewe" voorkeurkontrakte, wat slegs aanleiding gee tot remedies gemik op herstel van die status quo ante kontrakbreuk sowel as daarde voorkeurkontrakte wat voorwaardelike regte om te kontrakteer skep wat howe weier om as voorwaardelike opsies te behandelomdat hulle bewoording wys op 'n plig om 'n aanbod te maak of te aanvaar, of omdat die vereiste van sekerheid hulle verhoed om opsies te wees.

This thesis explores the nature of cyber-security at the beginning of the 21st century. In the current security paradigm, security strategies based on anticipatory governance have become essential in the management of the constantly changing cyber-security environment. Thus, this thesis aims to understand security strategies and governance introduced in the European region. The increased dependency on cyber-space is visible in all public-private sectors and governmental operations, as well as communications between groups and individuals. As a result, cyber-attacks on public and private entities are increasing. This requires a security framework that is flexible and establishes different types of security cooperation to manage the widespread cyber-risks. This is essential to the development of security strategies, governance forms, practices, and guidelines for enhancing resilience and preparedness towards cyber-risks. Therefore, I am examining cyber-security through the lenses of nodal governance and governmentality, which enables me to understand European cyber-security strategies and governance forms developed by the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. To analyse existing strategies and governance forms, I have used two critical security schools, the Copenhagen School and the Paris School, which cover different aspects of the security agenda. The thesis develops a substantive analytical framework through two case studies, namely cyber-security and cyber-terrorism. The findings in this thesis identifies problem areas, such as the complexity of the nodal system, the legislative lacuna, reliance on different governance forms, transparency and accountability, and types of anticipatory governance and regulatory practices.