Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern.

Thesis (doctoral)--Philipp-Universität zu Marburg.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern.

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, 1961. / "May 1961." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in microfiche.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the silence principle (i.e. the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination) and to determine its place within procedural and constitutional law. Should the silence principle be entirely abolished, sustained as a limited evidentiary rule or elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The central question to be argued is whether the silence principle has a rationally justifiable and valid procedural place within the accusatorial-adversarial Anglo-American system of criminal justice. The methodology employed in the main body of this thesis involves a critical and comparative examination of the silence principle and is founded on the following four legs : a) A historical analysis of the silence principle and its antecedents. Does the historical silence principle support the modern silence principle in description and scope? b) An analysis of the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege". Why is the accused's right to silence distinguished from the witness privilege? Is there a philosophical justification for the silence principle? c) A comparative study of the two major jurisdictions of the Anglo-American system of justice, namely : i) The American silence principle constituted as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and entrenched within the U.S. Constitution; ii) The English silence principle constituted until recently as a common law evidentiary rule contained within a body of ill-defined principles loosely referred to as the unwritten English Constitution. The common law rule has been statutorily formalized in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and will be greatly influenced by the new Human Rights Act 1998. iii) The South African interpretation of a silence principle is caught between the two extremes of an American absolute right and an English evidentiary rule. Silence in South Africa is a relative right subject to a balance of interest and reasonable limitation. Which of these definitions is better suited as a template for an ideal silence principle? vi d) A comparative international study of the procedural differences between an inquisitorial and an accusatorial system. How does a principle of silence function outside the accusatorial system? The conclusion of the thesis is that the most suitable role of a silence principle within the accusatorial system is one of a flexible compromise. While it does not deserve abolition neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. Silence is best suited to the role of a procedural evidentiary rule. A circumstantial item of evidence with its trial admissibility determined by the criteria of relevancy and prejudice. If the legal, political and cultural pressures upon a particular jurisdiction are such as to demand constitutional entrenchment then the second best alternative is to define the silence principle as a relative right susceptible to a properly applied balance of interest test. The worst alternative is to define the silence principle in absolute terms. Silence as an evidentiary rule or a relative right means that it will sometimes be necessary to emphasise the autonomous interests of the individual in remaining silent and at other times the societal interest in crime prevention. Which interest is to be preferred and to what extent will depend on the prevailing social pressures of the day. It shall be argued that the elevation of a silence principle into a constitutional right stifles a critical examination of the essentiale of silence by disguising its inherent irrationality and lack of a philosophical raison de etre. The interpretation of a silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United States is confusing, contradictory and riddled with innumerable exceptions. By contrast the English approach to silence is pragmatic and highly successful. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 gives a meaningful interpretation of silence which takes into account its logical flaws. The English statute is a successful compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal process and the need to combating crime in the most efficient manner possible. While the South African interpretation of silence is a workable compromise, South Africa may have been better served by defining its silence principle in terms of the pragmatic English statutory model which allows for the efficient but carefully controlled use of silence in the combating of crime. / Jurisprudence / LL.D. (Jurisprudence)

Thesis (LL.D.)--University of South Africa, 2001.

This research project is a report of cost findings and rearrest rates from a program evaluation of a pre-trial diversion program. In 1978 Cascade Research Center (CRC) contracted with Clark County, Washington, to determine the cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the Pre-Habilitation agency, which implements the Prosecuting Attorney's Pre-Trial Diversion Program.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the silence principle (i.e. the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination) and to determine its place within procedural and constitutional law. Should the silence principle be entirely abolished, sustained as a limited evidentiary rule or elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The central question to be argued is whether the silence principle has a rationally justifiable and valid procedural place within the accusatorial-adversarial Anglo-American system of criminal justice. The methodology employed in the main body of this thesis involves a critical and comparative examination of the silence principle and is founded on the following four legs : a) A historical analysis of the silence principle and its antecedents. Does the historical silence principle support the modern silence principle in description and scope? b) An analysis of the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege". Why is the accused's right to silence distinguished from the witness privilege? Is there a philosophical justification for the silence principle? c) A comparative study of the two major jurisdictions of the Anglo-American system of justice, namely : i) The American silence principle constituted as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and entrenched within the U.S. Constitution; ii) The English silence principle constituted until recently as a common law evidentiary rule contained within a body of ill-defined principles loosely referred to as the unwritten English Constitution. The common law rule has been statutorily formalized in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and will be greatly influenced by the new Human Rights Act 1998. iii) The South African interpretation of a silence principle is caught between the two extremes of an American absolute right and an English evidentiary rule. Silence in South Africa is a relative right subject to a balance of interest and reasonable limitation. Which of these definitions is better suited as a template for an ideal silence principle? vi d) A comparative international study of the procedural differences between an inquisitorial and an accusatorial system. How does a principle of silence function outside the accusatorial system? The conclusion of the thesis is that the most suitable role of a silence principle within the accusatorial system is one of a flexible compromise. While it does not deserve abolition neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. Silence is best suited to the role of a procedural evidentiary rule. A circumstantial item of evidence with its trial admissibility determined by the criteria of relevancy and prejudice. If the legal, political and cultural pressures upon a particular jurisdiction are such as to demand constitutional entrenchment then the second best alternative is to define the silence principle as a relative right susceptible to a properly applied balance of interest test. The worst alternative is to define the silence principle in absolute terms. Silence as an evidentiary rule or a relative right means that it will sometimes be necessary to emphasise the autonomous interests of the individual in remaining silent and at other times the societal interest in crime prevention. Which interest is to be preferred and to what extent will depend on the prevailing social pressures of the day. It shall be argued that the elevation of a silence principle into a constitutional right stifles a critical examination of the essentiale of silence by disguising its inherent irrationality and lack of a philosophical raison de etre. The interpretation of a silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United States is confusing, contradictory and riddled with innumerable exceptions. By contrast the English approach to silence is pragmatic and highly successful. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 gives a meaningful interpretation of silence which takes into account its logical flaws. The English statute is a successful compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal process and the need to combating crime in the most efficient manner possible. While the South African interpretation of silence is a workable compromise, South Africa may have been better served by defining its silence principle in terms of the pragmatic English statutory model which allows for the efficient but carefully controlled use of silence in the combating of crime. / Jurisprudence / LL.D. (Jurisprudence)

LL.D. / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 provides in Section 34 that everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before court, or where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. A fair civil trial that includes a fair judgment can only be achieved if the parties to the action receive fair treatment throughout all the stages of the proceedings. Obviously the concept "trial" cannot be given a narrow interpretation. There can hardly be mention of a "fair trial" if the processes that precede the trial since commencement of the litigation cannot also be construed as fair. In providing the procedures whereby a fair civil trial is facilitated, apart from providing effective mechanisms for the enforcement of substantive rights and obligations, the interrelated concepts of time, effectiveness and costs are pivotal. In an attempt to secure a fair civil trial, the preparation for trial stage plays a very important role. It is, however, a reality of the South African litigation milieu that hundreds of cases are postponed on a daily basis as a result of problems that are related to specific pretrial procedures. The indications that the pre-trial procedures per se need to be revised and where necessary, be reformed, are consequently rife. There is also no comprehensive procedural structure in place in South African law in terms of which the parties can co-operate in order to effectively facilitate pre-trial preparation. An aspect of the pre-trial procedure that often leads to delay and unnecessary escalation of costs is the excessive amount of party control (or lack thereof) during the preparation for trial stage. Pivotal to reform of the pre-trial procedures is thus the question whether it serves any purpose to leave this stage to the "mercy of the parties". It can hardly be argued that retaining the element of surprise as part of a strict adversary litigation character yields any real advantage. Legal reform is not a process that can be undertaken in vacuo and any attempts at reform in the preparation for trial stage must consequently bear the following considerations in mind: costs, delay, the degree of complexity of procedures, formulation, time limits and sanctions, the impact of the principle of fairness, the impact of party control and circumstances peculiar to a particular legal system. It is furthermore important that such reform should be undertaken in accordance with an expressly declared ethos. Where there is no clear congruence between the reform ethos and the needs of a specific legal system it will inevitably lead to reform which, although it may be new, might not necessarily address and improve existing problems. Legal reform, even if it is of limited scope, should always be a logical, purposive process. In this respect comparative study of Anglo- American systems are invaluable. It is of great importance that individual pre-rial procedures should be reformed in order to facilitate cost and time effective preparation for trial. Various problems exist in respect of discovery and attention should urgently be given to the lack of uniformity between the High Courts and the Magistrates Court, the non-compulsory nature of the procedure, the effectiveness of time limits and sanctions, the wording of the rule and the question whether the concept "document" should be elaborated upon. Provision should also be made in the South African Law of Civil Procedure for exchange of witness statements prior to trial. Exchange of expert evidence ought also to be reformed in order to address the problematic time aspect, the obligation to give notice, the contents of the summary, the discussion between experts and the lack of sanctions prior to the trial date. Reform of the pretrial conference should also be undertaken in order to emphasize its legitimate place as a stocktaking procedure prior to trial. It is furthermore necessary to address the problems regarding the pre-trial conference that relate to the lack of uniformity in the High Court and Magistrate's Court, the attitude of the legal profession, the stage at which the conference must be held, the question regarding who should preside at the conference and the lack of effective sanctions. Reform of the individual pre-trial procedures, whether piecemeal or as a comprehensive once-off reform, is, however, per se not sufficient to ensure a level of trial preparation that will eventually lead to a fair civil trial. The individual pre-trial procedures are separate though interrelated links that can only fulfill their purpose if the greater more holistic approach to civil procedure gives structured recognition to orderly, time and cost effective litigation. It is, therefore, essential that the individual pre-trial procedures should function within the framework of a case management system that can play a significant role in achieving the ideal of a constitutionally fair civil trial in that it establishes a coordinated and procedurally fair preparation for trial stage. The eventual success of such reform will, apart form the provision of effective individual pre-trial procedures and an effective case management model, also depend on the materialization of a sufficient budget to create an infrastructure of computers and trained personnel as well as a mentality shift on the part of lawyers in order to discard their old adversary cloak in exchange for more effective transparant litigation and eventually, a fair civil trial.

University of Macau / Faculty of Law