Throughout the present dissertation, we have intended to present and understand better a particular form of prejudice, namely, infra-humanization. Indeed, before being able to act upon prejudice reduction, we need to understand it. Infra-humanization is the tendency to perceive members of outgroups as less human than members of the ingroup. Infra-humanization is a process that has been largely studied in the last few years, however, a number of questions remained unclear. Specifically, we concentrated our work on the search of potential variables and conditions that could influence the process.

The present research examined how other people’s evaluations towards social groups will develop and how these evaluations will affect discriminatory behaviour outside of conscious effort. By living in a society people are exposed to other people’s preferences or beliefs and these culturally shared preferences or beliefs can become automatic over time. I call this construct implicit normative evaluations. In the first series of studies I developed and validated implicit normative evaluations measures. Study 2 demonstrated that implicit normative evaluations would develop by exposure to cultural norms. Study 3 showed that those who were exposed to an audience who laughed at offensive racist jokes were more likely to have negative implicit normative evaluation towards a target group and were more likely to engage in discriminatory behaviour than those who were exposed to an audience who did not laugh at the racist jokes. Finally in Study 4, I examined the consequences of implicit normative evaluations towards Black people and found that implicit normative evaluations played a role in the shooter bias. The implications of implicit normative evaluations in developing potential interventions for prejudice reduction will be discussed.

The present research examined how other people’s evaluations towards social groups will develop and how these evaluations will affect discriminatory behaviour outside of conscious effort. By living in a society people are exposed to other people’s preferences or beliefs and these culturally shared preferences or beliefs can become automatic over time. I call this construct implicit normative evaluations. In the first series of studies I developed and validated implicit normative evaluations measures. Study 2 demonstrated that implicit normative evaluations would develop by exposure to cultural norms. Study 3 showed that those who were exposed to an audience who laughed at offensive racist jokes were more likely to have negative implicit normative evaluation towards a target group and were more likely to engage in discriminatory behaviour than those who were exposed to an audience who did not laugh at the racist jokes. Finally in Study 4, I examined the consequences of implicit normative evaluations towards Black people and found that implicit normative evaluations played a role in the shooter bias. The implications of implicit normative evaluations in developing potential interventions for prejudice reduction will be discussed.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p.109-117). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Relationships between implicit measures of stereotyping (using subliminal semantic priming) and implicit measures of prejudice (using facial electromyography) were examined in both Black and White participants. Race of the participant showed a trend towards moderating the relationship between priming bias scores and EMG bias to face stimuli and the relationship between priming bias scores and EMG bias. There were nonsignificant relationships between priming bias scores and differences in application ratings for Black and White applicants. The issue of statistical power is discussed as a possible explanation for nonsignificance.

The Target Empowerment Model (TEM; Stone, Whitehead, Schmader, & Focella, 2011) advocates that targets can be strong sources of prejudice reduction if they implement a combination of strategies designed to reduce threat and encourage the perceiver to more actively process information about the target and his or her group. Solely using blatant strategies (those that require the perceiver to explicitly process the target's persuasive message) can create backlash against the target (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). In contrast, subtle strategies, (strategies that do not call attention to the perceiver's bias), such as asking self-affirming questions (Steele, 1988), can be more effective in creating a smooth interaction but might only provide the target with a brief respite from bias. Following the logic of the TEM, humor may allow stigmatized targets to subtly address their group membership, put perceivers at ease, and reduce the bias that may be directed against them. This research examines how a target of prejudice can successfully reduce bias directed against him when he uses humor to acknowledge his, potentially threatening, group membership. Using a getting-acquainted task, three experiments tested the hypothesis that using humor that acknowledges the target's stigmatized group membership would put perceivers at ease, thereby increasing liking for the target. Experiment 1 showed that following a getting-acquainted exercise, highly prejudiced perceivers reported significantly greater liking for an Arab American target whose humor also acknowledged stereotypes of his group, compared to a target who told a joke that did not include his ethnic background, and compared to a target who did not use humor at all. Experiment 2 conceptually replicated Experiment 1 and revealed that the effectiveness of the ethnicity-related joke was mediated by how much the joke put highly prejudiced perceivers at ease. Experiment 3 conceptually replicated Experiments 1 and 2 and provided evidence that, unlike disparagement humor, which denigrates the outgroup, humor that acknowledges the target's outgroup membership increases liking toward the target without increasing prejudice toward the group. Taken together, these studies show that using humor that acknowledges the target's stigmatized group membership puts perceivers at ease, thereby increasing liking for the outgroup target.

Recent polls (e.g., Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, 2006) have consistently found that atheists are the least liked group in America today, a type of prejudice that has barely been researched. This anti-atheist prejudice is surprising because atheists do not constitute a cohesive, recognizable, or powerful group. To the degree that people feel that religion provides a unique and necessary source of morality, they may dislike atheists primarily because of moral distrust towards them. This suggests a distinct origin for anti-atheist prejudice that sets it apart from ethnic, racial, and gender prejudice. We explored this broad hypothesis in a series of three experiments. First, we find that on an implicit level anti-atheist prejudice is driven by distrust rather than a feeling of generalized unpleasantness towards atheists. Second, we find that discrimination against atheists is limited to contexts requiring a high degree of trust. Finally, we find that anti-atheist prejudice is malleable. These findings are discussed in terms of prominent evolutionary theories of religion.

This is a study of the politics of identity in a working class setting in Galway on Ireland's west coast. It is based on twenty one months of fieldwork using ethnographic research techniques, and several years of library based research. Both of these aspects of research are integral to the analysis, which is centred around the argument that "racism‟ relies on discourse on "racism‟ for its ontological status (an issue which "anti-racism‟ must begin to engage with if it is to be more effective). Particularly since the 1950s when "racism‟ lost its scientific grounding, this study argues that academia has become just another player in this game of ideological construction (an issue which it must engage if it is to be more useful to "antiracism‟). Two equations sum up the contemporary dominant academic discourse on "racism‟: "racism = racialisation/ethnicisation + exclusion/denigration‟; and "racism = power (the power to exclude/denigrate) + prejudice (prejudice based on racialised/ethnicised identity)‟. According to these equations, the dominant discourse (made up of a complex combination of state and non-state discourse) on "ethnic‟ and "national‟ identity produced in Ballybane, Galway, and Ireland constructs three "racialised‟/"ethnicised‟ "communities‟ - the Traveller "community‟, the Immigrant "community‟ and the Settled Irish "community‟. Such identity construction involves "self-racialisation‟/"self-ethnicisation‟ as well as "racialisation‟/"ethnicisation‟ by the other. Indeed, Ireland is witnessing a growth in the field of "ethno-politics‟, where "community development‟ is now a political buzz word, state resources are often distributed according to "community‟ need and entitlement, and recognition of, and recourse for, "racist‟ victimhood via "anti-racism‟ often necessitates self-identity in "racialist‟/"ethnicist‟ terms. Once constructed in "racialist‟/"ethnicist‟ terms, the potential is, arguably, ever present for any of these "communities‟ to fall victim to "racism‟ as defined by dominant academic discourse on "racism‟. Indeed, in terms of such discourse the Traveller "community‟ and the Immigrant "community‟ in Ireland are victims of endemic popular and state "racism‟. A glitch appears in this picture, however, when one re-situates the evidence from academic discourse on "racism‟ to state discourse on "racism‟ (which essentially excludes any conceptualisation of "state racism‟) and popular discourse on "racism‟ (which, in line with traditional scientific "racist‟ doctrine sees "racism‟ as something white people intentionally do to black people). Therein is revealed the biggest problem facing "anti-racism‟ today – fighting a demon that eludes any clear understanding of its form let alone its causes.

Recent polls (e.g., Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, 2006) have consistently found that atheists are the least liked group in America today, a type of prejudice that has barely been researched. This anti-atheist prejudice is surprising because atheists do not constitute a cohesive, recognizable, or powerful group. To the degree that people feel that religion provides a unique and necessary source of morality, they may dislike atheists primarily because of moral distrust towards them. This suggests a distinct origin for anti-atheist prejudice that sets it apart from ethnic, racial, and gender prejudice. We explored this broad hypothesis in a series of three experiments. First, we find that on an implicit level anti-atheist prejudice is driven by distrust rather than a feeling of generalized unpleasantness towards atheists. Second, we find that discrimination against atheists is limited to contexts requiring a high degree of trust. Finally, we find that anti-atheist prejudice is malleable. These findings are discussed in terms of prominent evolutionary theories of religion.

Thesis (M.S.)--Georgia Southern University, 2005. / "A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Experimental Psychology." ETD. Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-63.)