Le recours à l’appel d’offres n’est pas, et n’a jamais été, l’apanage des personnes publiques. Parce que la mise en concurrence de cocontractants potentiels permet d’obtenir le meilleur prix, les personnes privées le pratiquent volontairement pour la réalisation de nombreuses opérations contractuelles : construction immobilière, cession d’entreprise, vente d’immeuble, acquisition de produits et de prestations de service, etc. Familière des praticiens, cette figure du paysage précontractuel est négligée par la doctrine. L’objet de cette étude est de présenter une analyse juridique d’ensemble de l’appel d’offres privé. Celui-ci est susceptible de deux acceptions. Dans la ligne directe de son appellation, il désigne une invitation à soumettre des offres. Il s’agit d’un type de proposition de contracter à part entière, distinct des propositions de contracter traditionnelles que sont l’offre et l’invitation à entrer en pourparlers. À le concevoir ensuite comme une procédure de mise en concurrence de cocontractants potentiels pour la conclusion d’un contrat définitif, l’appel d’offres privé donne naissance à un avant-contrat entre son organisateur et ses participants que l’on ne peut ramener aux catégories d’avant-contrats que connaît le droit positif. La qualification d’avant-contrat imprime à l’appel d’offres privé son régime juridique. Ainsi, les parties s’obligent à organiser et à participer à la procédure de mise en concurrence selon les règles fixées par l’organisateur et de bonne foi. Les comportements consistant à fausser le jeu de la concurrence sont alors sanctionnés pour inexécution contractuelle. / Using private invitation to tender is not, and has never been, the prerogative of public entities. Because the implementation of competition calls between potentials co-contractors in order to achieve the best price, private entities practice it voluntarily to realise numerous contractual transactions : building construction, transfer of company, sale of real property, procurement of goods and service delivery, etc. Well-known by practitioners, this figure of the contractual landscape is neglected by the legal doctrine. The purpose of this study is to represent a global legal analysis of the private tender process. This one might be understood in two different ways. Literally, it designates an invitation to submit offers. It is a type of proposal to contract fully-fledged, which defers from the traditional ways of proposal to contract which are the offer and the invitation to treat. Conceived as a process introducing competition between potentials co-contractors to conclude a definitive contract, private invitation to tender give birth o a preliminary contract between its organiser and participants, which is distinct from the existing preliminary contracts. The qualification of preliminary contract print the private invitation to tender’s legal regime. Thus, parties undertook to organise and participate to the implementation of competition calls regarding the rules established by the organiser in good faith. The behaviours consisting in distorting competition are then subject to sanction on the ground of non-fulfillment of a contractul obligation.

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar o contrato preliminar, a partir das diversas funções que ele cumpre no processo de formação do negócio jurídico. Em especial, examina-se a figura do contrato preliminar que é menos completo do que o contrato definitivo, estabelecendo apenas os aspectos essenciais do negócio prometido e deixando em aberto outros pontos que devem ser preenchidos no intervalo entre os dois negócios. O contrato preliminar incompleto, como se lhe designa aqui, constitui uma etapa no processo de formação progressiva do contrato, atendendo a interesses dignos de tutela conforme o ordenamento jurídico. Para tanto, o trabalho está dividido em quatro capítulos, além da introdução e da conclusão. Na primeira parte, apresentam-se os principais interesses práticos que estão por trás da cisão do negócio em duas etapas (no contrato preliminar e no contrato definitivo). Vê-se que o contrato preliminar não é uma figura inútil, um desdobramento desnecessário do processo de formação do negócio. Na segunda parte, são delineados os contornos do contrato preliminar, mediante o exame de sua causa e de seu objeto, além das figuras que se lhe assemelham. Demonstra-se que, embora não se confunda com o negócio definitivo, o contrato preliminar já deve definir a causa do negócio prometido, que serve para identificá-lo. Na terceira parte, atenta-se para o chamado princípio da equiparação, que determina que, em regra, o contrato preliminar siga a mesma disciplina prevista para o negócio definitivo. Tal princípio deve ser, todavia, excepcionado, quando a própria cisão do processo de formação do negócio no preliminar e no definitivo serve para afastar alguma regra que valerá apenas para o segundo negócio. Nesse ponto, demonstra-se que o princípio da equiparação não se aplica integralmente no que se refere ao objeto do contrato definitivo, que não precisa estar previsto, exaustivamente, no contrato preliminar. Revela-se, aí, a admissibilidade da figura do contrato preliminar incompleto. Por fim, na última parte, examina-se a execução específica do preliminar, destacando-se, em particular, o cabimento desse remédio também para o chamado contrato preliminar incompleto, quando, então, caberá ao juiz integrá-lo mediante as regras de integração previstas no ordenamento jurídico. / The objective of this dissertation is to analyze preliminary contracts in the light of the various functions they perform in the formation of a legal transaction. In particular, the paper examines preliminary contracts which are less complete than the definitive contracts they precede and which set out merely the essential aspects of the promised transaction, leaving other points to be decided upon in the interval between the two contracts. Such contracts, referred to in this paper as incomplete preliminary contracts, constitute a distinct stage in the process of progressive formation of the legal transaction and address interests which are capable, in our legal system, of giving rise to a claim for judicial relief. This study is divided into four chapters (in addition to the introduction and conclusion). The first part sets out the principal practical interests behind the splitting of a legal transaction into two distinct parts (the preliminary contract and the definitive contract) and demonstrates that the preliminary contract is by no means an unnecessary and useless offshoot of the formation of a legal transaction. The second part sets out an overview of preliminary contracts in terms of their raison dêtre and their objects and draws a parallel with other similar legal instruments. This part seeks to show that despite being distinct from the definitive contract, the preliminary contract defines the raison dêtre of the promised transaction (i.e. the reason for contracting) and thus serves to define (classify) the contract. In the third part, attention is drawn to the so-called principle of equivalence (principio de equiparação) according to which a preliminary contract must, as a general rule, comply with the same legal rules applicable to the definitive agreement. An exception needs to be made, however, when the actual separation of the process of formation of the legal transaction into preliminary and definitive stages leads to a given rule being applicable solely to the definitive contract. The author demonstrates that, in such cases, the principle of equivalence does not apply in full to the objects of the definitive contract and said objects do not therefore need to be the subject of exhaustive provision in the preliminary contract. This therefore reveals that an incomplete preliminary contract is legally permissible. Finally, in the closing part of the paper, the issue of specific performance of the preliminary contract is examined. Particular emphasis is given to the applicability of this legal remedy to incomplete preliminary agreements and to the powers vested in the judge to complete (i.e. fill in the gaps) in the preliminary contract, in accordance with the applicable rules as to integration of contracts

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar o contrato preliminar, a partir das diversas funções que ele cumpre no processo de formação do negócio jurídico. Em especial, examina-se a figura do contrato preliminar que é menos completo do que o contrato definitivo, estabelecendo apenas os aspectos essenciais do negócio prometido e deixando em aberto outros pontos que devem ser preenchidos no intervalo entre os dois negócios. O contrato preliminar incompleto, como se lhe designa aqui, constitui uma etapa no processo de formação progressiva do contrato, atendendo a interesses dignos de tutela conforme o ordenamento jurídico. Para tanto, o trabalho está dividido em quatro capítulos, além da introdução e da conclusão. Na primeira parte, apresentam-se os principais interesses práticos que estão por trás da cisão do negócio em duas etapas (no contrato preliminar e no contrato definitivo). Vê-se que o contrato preliminar não é uma figura inútil, um desdobramento desnecessário do processo de formação do negócio. Na segunda parte, são delineados os contornos do contrato preliminar, mediante o exame de sua causa e de seu objeto, além das figuras que se lhe assemelham. Demonstra-se que, embora não se confunda com o negócio definitivo, o contrato preliminar já deve definir a causa do negócio prometido, que serve para identificá-lo. Na terceira parte, atenta-se para o chamado princípio da equiparação, que determina que, em regra, o contrato preliminar siga a mesma disciplina prevista para o negócio definitivo. Tal princípio deve ser, todavia, excepcionado, quando a própria cisão do processo de formação do negócio no preliminar e no definitivo serve para afastar alguma regra que valerá apenas para o segundo negócio. Nesse ponto, demonstra-se que o princípio da equiparação não se aplica integralmente no que se refere ao objeto do contrato definitivo, que não precisa estar previsto, exaustivamente, no contrato preliminar. Revela-se, aí, a admissibilidade da figura do contrato preliminar incompleto. Por fim, na última parte, examina-se a execução específica do preliminar, destacando-se, em particular, o cabimento desse remédio também para o chamado contrato preliminar incompleto, quando, então, caberá ao juiz integrá-lo mediante as regras de integração previstas no ordenamento jurídico. / The objective of this dissertation is to analyze preliminary contracts in the light of the various functions they perform in the formation of a legal transaction. In particular, the paper examines preliminary contracts which are less complete than the definitive contracts they precede and which set out merely the essential aspects of the promised transaction, leaving other points to be decided upon in the interval between the two contracts. Such contracts, referred to in this paper as incomplete preliminary contracts, constitute a distinct stage in the process of progressive formation of the legal transaction and address interests which are capable, in our legal system, of giving rise to a claim for judicial relief. This study is divided into four chapters (in addition to the introduction and conclusion). The first part sets out the principal practical interests behind the splitting of a legal transaction into two distinct parts (the preliminary contract and the definitive contract) and demonstrates that the preliminary contract is by no means an unnecessary and useless offshoot of the formation of a legal transaction. The second part sets out an overview of preliminary contracts in terms of their raison dêtre and their objects and draws a parallel with other similar legal instruments. This part seeks to show that despite being distinct from the definitive contract, the preliminary contract defines the raison dêtre of the promised transaction (i.e. the reason for contracting) and thus serves to define (classify) the contract. In the third part, attention is drawn to the so-called principle of equivalence (principio de equiparação) according to which a preliminary contract must, as a general rule, comply with the same legal rules applicable to the definitive agreement. An exception needs to be made, however, when the actual separation of the process of formation of the legal transaction into preliminary and definitive stages leads to a given rule being applicable solely to the definitive contract. The author demonstrates that, in such cases, the principle of equivalence does not apply in full to the objects of the definitive contract and said objects do not therefore need to be the subject of exhaustive provision in the preliminary contract. This therefore reveals that an incomplete preliminary contract is legally permissible. Finally, in the closing part of the paper, the issue of specific performance of the preliminary contract is examined. Particular emphasis is given to the applicability of this legal remedy to incomplete preliminary agreements and to the powers vested in the judge to complete (i.e. fill in the gaps) in the preliminary contract, in accordance with the applicable rules as to integration of contracts