Submitted by PPG Ci?ncias Criminais (ppgccrim@pucrs.br) on 2018-04-19T12:10:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 VITOR PACZEK - Vers?o Final depositada.pdf: 1297680 bytes, checksum: 16aea4759abc436839c33468a313ee68 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2018-05-07T18:40:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 VITOR PACZEK - Vers?o Final depositada.pdf: 1297680 bytes, checksum: 16aea4759abc436839c33468a313ee68 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-07T18:45:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 VITOR PACZEK - Vers?o Final depositada.pdf: 1297680 bytes, checksum: 16aea4759abc436839c33468a313ee68 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-01-04 / The research seeks to answer whether the precautionary principle has an argumentative power to be inserted in criminal law in a valid way, especially in crimes of abstract danger. For this, after emphasizing the meaning of the precautionary principle from environmental law, it is explained the transposition to the criminal field, especially in the scope of abstract danger, space of reference for criminal expansion. With the introduction of the notion of danger, abstract danger connects with precaution, where criminal law theorists propose a re-reading of danger through uncertainty. From this approach, two criticisms are elaborated, both inserted in the third chapter. One is by the epistemology of uncertainty, confronting the fundamental idea of the precaution given by environmental law theorists (uncertainty) with the notions of complexity, speed and antideterminism of thought, where it is concluded by the insufficiency of the concept of precaution. Even with this epistemological obstacle, another critical approach is faced by the perspective of criminal law, which orbits in two general argumentative axes: a preliminary and a principal judgment that is based on considerations of uncertainty properly. In the preliminary judgment, it is argued that the characteristics of the precautionary principle are incompatible with criminal law, namely the alleged reversal of the burden of proof, the attribute of reversibility of instrumental precautionary measures and, finally, the desire to protect generations future. Then the criticisms of the second general bloc (focused on scientific uncertainty) are threefold. The first is in the notion of presumption of danger; the second in the idea of delegating it to administrative accessority; and the third is directed to the thesis of identification of danger by evidence. With this framework it was possible to place our position, which considers the principle of precaution inadequate for criminal law and even harmful, because it has the power to legitimize a criminal law of the enemy by the rhetoric of the criminal law of risk, which is illegitimate; uncertainty must be accepted (because it is a contemporary feature), but caution is rejected, since it is better risk and uncertainty with criminal and procedural guarantees than with authoritarianism. / A pesquisa procura responder se o princ?pio da precau??o tem pot?ncia argumentativa para ser inserido no direito penal de forma v?lida, especialmente nos crimes de perigo abstrato. Para isso, depois de destacar o significado do princ?pio da precau??o desde o direito ambiental, explica-se a transposi??o para o campo penal, especialmente no ?mbito do perigo abstrato, espa?o de refer?ncia para a expans?o criminal. Com a introdu??o ? no??o de perigo, conecta-se o perigo abstrato com a precau??o, em que te?ricos do direito penal prop?e uma releitura da perigosidade pela incerteza. Dessa abordagem, elabora-se duas cr?ticas, ambas inseridas no terceiro cap?tulo. Uma pela epistemologia da incerteza, confrontando a ideia fundante da precau??o atribu?da pelos te?ricos do direito ambiental (incerteza) com as no??es de complexidade, velocidade e antideterminismo do pensamento, onde se conclui pela insufici?ncia do conceito da precau??o. Mesmo com esse obst?culo epistemol?gico, enfrenta-se a outra abordagem cr?tica pela ?tica do direito penal, que orbita em dois eixos argumentativos gerais: um ju?zo preliminar e outro principal que se baseia em consi a??es sobre a incerteza propriamente. No ju?zo preliminar, defende-se que as caracter?sticas do princ?pio da precau??o s?o incompat?veis com o direito penal, notadamente a pretensa invers?o do ?nus da prova, o atributo da reversibilidade das medidas instrumentais da precau??o e, por fim, o desejo de prote??o de gera??es futuras. Depois, as cr?ticas do segundo bloco geral (focadas na a incerteza cient?fica) s?o tr?s. A primeira est? na no??o de presun??o de perigosidade; a segunda na ideia de delega??o dela para a acessoriedade administrativa; e a terceira est? direcionada ? tese de identifica??o da perigosidade por ind?cios. Com este quadro foi poss?vel colocar a nossa posi??o, que considera o princ?pio da precau??o inadequado para o direito penal e at? mesmo prejudicial, porque tem pot?ncia para legitimar um direito penal do inimigo pela ret?rica do direito penal do risco, o que ? ileg?timo; deve-se aceitar a incerteza (porque caracter?stica contempor?nea), mas rejeitando-se a precau??o, pois ? melhor risco e incerteza com garantias penais e processuais do que com autoritarismo.

Submitted by PPG Ci?ncias Criminais (ppgccrim@pucrs.br) on 2018-09-03T14:09:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 VITOR PACZEK - Vers?o Final depositada.pdf: 1297680 bytes, checksum: 16aea4759abc436839c33468a313ee68 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Sheila Dias (sheila.dias@pucrs.br) on 2018-09-05T17:28:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 VITOR PACZEK - Vers?o Final depositada.pdf: 1297680 bytes, checksum: 16aea4759abc436839c33468a313ee68 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-05T17:41:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 VITOR PACZEK - Vers?o Final depositada.pdf: 1297680 bytes, checksum: 16aea4759abc436839c33468a313ee68 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-01-04 / The research seeks to answer whether the precautionary principle has an argumentative power to be inserted in criminal law in a valid way, especially in crimes of abstract danger. For this, after emphasizing the meaning of the precautionary principle from environmental law, it is explained the transposition to the criminal field, especially in the scope of abstract danger, space of reference for criminal expansion. With the introduction of the notion of danger, abstract danger connects with precaution, where criminal law theorists propose a re-reading of danger through uncertainty. From this approach, two criticisms are elaborated, both inserted in the third chapter. One is by the epistemology of uncertainty, confronting the fundamental idea of the precaution given by environmental law theorists (uncertainty) with the notions of complexity, speed and antideterminism of thought, where it is concluded by the insufficiency of the concept of precaution. Even with this epistemological obstacle, another critical approach is faced by the perspective of criminal law, which orbits in two general argumentative axes: a preliminary and a principal judgment that is based on considerations of uncertainty properly. In the preliminary judgment, it is argued that the characteristics of the precautionary principle are incompatible with criminal law, namely the alleged reversal of the burden of proof, the attribute of reversibility of instrumental precautionary measures and, finally, the desire to protect generations future. Then the criticisms of the second general bloc (focused on scientific uncertainty) are threefold. The first is in the notion of presumption of danger; the second in the idea of delegating it to administrative accessority; and the third is directed to the thesis of identification of danger by evidence. With this framework it was possible to place our position, which considers the principle of precaution inadequate for criminal law and even harmful, because it has the power to legitimize a criminal law of the enemy by the rhetoric of the criminal law of risk, which is illegitimate; uncertainty must be accepted (because it is a contemporary feature), but caution is rejected, since it is better risk and uncertainty with criminal and procedural guarantees than with authoritarianism. / A pesquisa procura responder se o princ?pio da precau??o tem pot?ncia argumentativa para ser inserido no direito penal de forma v?lida, especialmente nos crimes de perigo abstrato. Para isso, depois de destacar o significado do princ?pio da precau??o desde o direito ambiental, explica-se a transposi??o para o campo penal, especialmente no ?mbito do perigo abstrato, espa?o de refer?ncia para a expans?o criminal. Com a introdu??o ? no??o de perigo, conecta-se o perigo abstrato com a precau??o, em que te?ricos do direito penal prop?e uma releitura da perigosidade pela incerteza. Dessa abordagem, elabora-se duas cr?ticas, ambas inseridas no terceiro cap?tulo. Uma pela epistemologia da incerteza, confrontando a ideia fundante da precau??o atribu?da pelos te?ricos do direito ambiental (incerteza) com as no??es de complexidade, velocidade e antideterminismo do pensamento, onde se conclui pela insufici?ncia do conceito da precau??o. Mesmo com esse obst?culo epistemol?gico, enfrenta-se a outra abordagem cr?tica pela ?tica do direito penal, que orbita em dois eixos argumentativos gerais: um ju?zo preliminar e outro principal que se baseia em consi a??es sobre a incerteza propriamente. No ju?zo preliminar, defende-se que as caracter?sticas do princ?pio da precau??o s?o incompat?veis com o direito penal, notadamente a pretensa invers?o do ?nus da prova, o atributo da reversibilidade das medidas instrumentais da precau??o e, por fim, o desejo de prote??o de gera??es futuras. Depois, as cr?ticas do segundo bloco geral (focadas na a incerteza cient?fica) s?o tr?s. A primeira est? na no??o de presun??o de perigosidade; a segunda na ideia de delega??o dela para a acessoriedade administrativa; e a terceira est? direcionada ? tese de identifica??o da perigosidade por ind?cios. Com este quadro foi poss?vel colocar a nossa posi??o, que considera o princ?pio da precau??o inadequado para o direito penal e at? mesmo prejudicial, porque tem pot?ncia para legitimar um direito penal do inimigo pela ret?rica do direito penal do risco, o que ? ileg?timo; deve-se aceitar a incerteza (porque caracter?stica contempor?nea), mas rejeitando-se a precau??o, pois ? melhor risco e incerteza com garantias penais e processuais do que com autoritarismo.