Il s'agira de démontrer dans quelle mesure les réformes récentes relatives à l'action en réparation du dommage résultant de pratiques anticoncurrentielles influencent la stratégie de l'entreprise. Outre les stratégies destinées à contenir ce risque nouveau, cette dernière pourrait également tirer parti du contentieux privé afin d'améliorer ses performances sur le marché. / Following the recent reforms regarding anticompetitive practices private enforcement, my research aims at studying the influence of these new rules on companies' legal strategies. If companies will have to adapt their strategy to avoid legal exposure, they can also use those very same rules as a tool to improve their performance.

Leniency programmes and private enforcement of cartel law The available data suggests that there is an indisputable correlation between the declining attractivity of the leniency programme of the European Commission on the one hand, and the recent boom of private enforcement of cartel law on the other. It seems that in the past few years companies have become demotivated to submit leniency applications, which leads to a lower level of cartel detection and ultimately results in the weakening of both the public and private pillars of cartel law enforcement. This thesis focuses on areas that have not yet been sufficiently clarified by legislation and case-law and that are - when it comes to follow-on proceedings dealing with damages claims, held before national courts - associated with substantial risks for potential leniency applicants: (i) establishing of jurisdiction of national courts in the proceedings on claims for damages caused by anticompetitive conduct, (ii) protection of confidential information within the framework of hybrid settlements with the European Commission and in the proceedings before national courts, (iii) interpretation and application of presumptions of the existence and amount of harm caused by anticompetitive conduct and (iv) determination of the amount of harm caused by...

Denna uppsats undersöker tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Rådets förordning (EG) nr 1/2003 av den 16 december 2002 om tillämpning av konkurrensreglerna i artiklarna81 och 82 i fördraget (härefter ”Förordningen”). Enligt nämnda artikel får interimistiska åtgärder tillgripas för att motverka en överhängande risk för allvarlig och irreparabelskada på konkurrensen. I detta sammanhang anser Konkurrensverket att begreppetskada på konkurrensen behöver klargöras, och undrar om det kan likställas medbegreppet konkurrensskada. Därför har vi definierat begreppen i förhållande till varandra för att kunna dra slutsatser angående tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Förordningen. Vår utredning visar att konkurrensskada är ett snävt begrepp som syftar på en ren förmögenhetsskadasom drabbar individuella skadelidande på grund av en konkurrensrättsligöverträdelse. Begreppet utgår i allra högsta grad från ett individperspektiv ochkan, men behöver inte, sammanfalla med skadan som åsamkas konkurrensen, ekonomineller samhället. Skada på konkurrensen däremot, är ett allomfattande begrepp somåsyftar den allmänna skadan som åsamkas ekonomin i stort på grund av en överträdelseav konkurrensrätten. Trots att begreppet är allmänt hållet och öppet för fri tolkning av rättstillämparen, ställs specifika krav för förordnande av interimistiska åtgärder enligt artikel 8 i Förordningen, nämligen en prima facie konkurrensrättslig överträdelse som medför en risk för allvarlig och irreparabel skada på konkurrensen. Risken för att konkurrensenskadas måste preciseras på ett konkret och trovärdigt sätt och allvarlighetskravetinnebär till exempel att en konkurrent riskerar att försättas i konkurs. För attvara irreparabel får inte en skada kunna läkas av ett senare beslut av konkurrensmyndigheten. Skadan får inte heller endast vara av ekonomisk art. Slutsatsen är att det ställs höga krav för tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Förordningen,vilket kan förklara den nuvarande avsaknaden av praxis. Behovet för interimistiskaåtgärder anses dock vara stort, inte minst på grund av de långa handläggningstiderna i konkurrensmål. Därför anser vi att konkurrensmyndigheterna bör överväga att tillförordnainterimistiska åtgärder oftare, och att de kan förlita sig på den rättspraxis somfinns för att säkerställa att besluten kommer att motstå en överklagan.

This thesis deals with the competition law of the European Union, namely with the private consequences of cartel agreements (as defined in Article 101, paragraph 1, TFEU) and with their enforcement. It understands its subject widely and therefore it is not concerned only with private consequences and their enforcement but it also analyses the nature of prohibition and voidness of such agreements on the basis of a causal relationship between these legal concepts and respective consequences. Furthermore, it describes the private enforcement of EU competition law (which is legal instrument to enforce claims that emerge from private law consequences) not only from the perspective of its topic but also in terms of its relationship to the public enforcement. It also deals with the interaction between these enforcement systems. Chapter 2 of the thesis provides a basic introduction to the topic of cartel agreements governed by the EU law. It describes prohibition of these agreements under Article 101 paragraph 1 TFEU and deals with their voidness under paragraph 2 ibid. It concentrates on the later because of the considerable uncertainties about its nature in terms of interpretation of its legislation, absoluteness and possibility to severe void provisions from the rest. Chapter 3 covers the consequences of...

This thesis seeks to address the question: to what extent is the EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions sufficiently framed in its terms to achieve its underlying aims and objectives? It is argued that the Directive has one overriding goal: to make it easier for the victims of infringements of EU competition law - typically end-consumers - to claim compensation from the infringers. It is also argued that the authors of the Directive present a convincing case that one of the main reasons for the lack of victims claiming - let alone being awarded - compensation, prior to the adoption of the Directive, is weaknesses with the existing legal framework governing competition law damages actions at national level. The thesis examines four of the main areas covered by the Directive: disclosure of evidence; the effect of NCA decisions; limitation periods; and indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence. In each case, the relevant rules from the Directive are set out and an assessment is carried out. A crucial part of this assessment consists of seeking to ascertain the problems facing potential claimants prior to the adoption of the Directive and asking whether the Directive appears well-framed in terms of addressing those problems. As well as considering case law of the EU courts, the legal rules and jurisprudence of two leading Member States - the United Kingdom and Italy - are used as primary case studies in carrying out this assessment. The assessment of the measures considered in this thesis is a nuanced one. It is argued that the measures set out in Chapter II of the Directive on disclosure of evidence are generally well-framed and beneficial for claimants, crucially showing a keen understanding of the relationship between private and public enforcement. The assessment of Article 9, on the effect of NCA decisions is much less positive. It is argued that the measures are drafted in vague terms and compare unfavourably with existing rules and practices in the two case-study Member States. It is argued that while the measures set out in Article 10 on limitation periods do represent an improvement for claimants in certain respects, there are a number of key issues that they fail to address. Finally, the assessment of Articles 12 to 15 on indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence is positive in some respects, but it is argued that many of the measures do not adequately address the issues that they purport to tackle. It is also argued that these measures are unlikely to bear fruit, without certain issues which are not covered by the Directive, being addressed. Ultimately it is concluded that the Directive makes some important strides towards the realisation of its underlying aims and objectives, but that many of the measures examined are found to be too vague, too weak or too incomplete to fully address the key issues and that the Directive also fails to address some important issues at all.

The purpose of the thesis is to answer the question whether the new legal rules set forth by the Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union and its transposition into Act. No. 262/2017 Coll., on Damages in the Field of Competition, as amended, is able to provide for more effective private enforcement of competition law by all injured parties compared to present. The thesis is composed of eight chapters, except from the introduction and the conclusion, each of them analyzes the current regulation of private enforcement of competition law, evaluates it and proposes the possible solutions for securing the rights of injured parties. The second chapter describes the main differences and relationship between public and private enforcement of competition law. Since the competition law cases often includes the international element, the third chapter deals with the questions of international jurisdiction and applicable law and its importance for facilitating claims for damages by injured parties. The fourth chapter examines the scope of application of the above mentioned regulations. The fifth...

Private enforcement, which primarily represents individuals&rsquo / right to claim damage arisen from violations of competition law, supplements public enforcement and ensures indemnification of individual loss. However, private enforcement of competition law has fallen behind public law enforcement in laws presented in this study, other than those enforced in the USA. Realizing this fact, European Commission, has recently focused on the enhancement and facilitation of private enforcement in the Community competition law. The lagging behind of private enforcement mainly sources from the cultural and traditional differences in the understanding of liability law between Anglo Saxon Law and Continental Law. Anglo Saxon law tradition is inclined to leave the matter to individual action, whereas Continental Law is in more favor of strengthening regulatory mechanisms. More specific obstacles to the improvement of private enforcement are, yet not exhaustively, indefiniteness of legal basis of claims, involvement of complex economic analysis while stating the case, courts&rsquo / lack of technical knowledge, indefinite relationship between judiciary and competition authorities, problems in proving damage and causality, absence of facilitating procedural mechanisms such as class actions, treble damage and discovery rights. In the Community law context it is also highly probable to encounter peculiar problems arisen from co-existence of different national laws. Additionally, implementation of the Community competition law by national authorities may also lead to the weakening of the Single Market objective. Through this study, we will present probable solutions by depicting all these problems.

Notre étude cherche à démontrer pourquoi les agents économiques sont incités à enfreindre le droit de la concurrence. Le choix de l’infraction dépend de l’avantage retiré du manquement comparé au coût subi. La notion de « faute lucrative » illustre parfaitement l’espoir d’un lucre tiré du manquement à la loi. L’économie comportementale nous enseigne cependant que les déterminants de la conformité au droit sont autres que la recherche du profit. Selon cette discipline, l’incitation – c’est-à-dire la motivation principale de l’agent qui fait le choix d’enfreindre la loi – est détachée d’un calcul coût-avantage. L’agent économique est sujet à des « biais cognitifs » : le défaut d’information disponible ne lui permet pas de faire toujours le choix susceptible de maximiser son intérêt. Appliquée au droit de la concurrence, la théorie de l’agent rationnel, fût-elle critiquable, reste néanmoins la plus pertinente pour examiner la dissuasion car elle permet de comparer la règle de droit à un « prix » qui pèse sur le choix d’enfreindre la loi. L’influence des règles juridiques comme un ensemble de normes incitatives ou dissuasives qui influencent le comportement des agents sur le marché est moins pris en compte par l’économie comportementale qui se concentre davantage sur les biais cognitifs des agents.L'agent économique rationnel qui entend retirer un profit de son manquement peut spéculer sur les multiples failles propres au droit de la concurrence, lesquelles affaiblissent le risque juridique de l’infraction. Deux limites fondamentales affectent la dissuasion : d’une part, celles relatives à l’effectivité des règles de concurrence. La probabilité, pour le fautif, d’échapper à l’application du droit génère des infractions « rentables ». D’autre part, celles relatives à l’efficacité des règles de concurrence favorisent aussi la conservation des gains illicites retirés du manquement, car la sanction imposée par le déclenchement de l’action publique et/ou privée n’est pas adaptée à la dissuasion du comportement déviant.Ces limites concernent aussi bien l’application de l’action publique que l’application de l’action privée en réparation. La fonction dissuasive du « private enforcement » est limitée en l’absence de dommages-intérêts confiscatoires. De même, les vices congénitaux à la loi Hamon paralysent la portée dissuasive de l’action de groupe. S’agissant de l’action publique, le développement des ententes algorithmiques et la spécificité des marchés numériques compliquent le travail de détection des autorités de concurrence. Même en cas de détection, la sanction appliquée à l’agent économique semble sous-dissuasive car, comme le démontre notre étude empirique, l’amende et/ou les dommages-intérêts imposés sont souvent inférieurs aux gains retirés des infractions de concurrence.Par ailleurs, le faible risque pénal pesant sur les dirigeants responsables de pratiques illicites affaiblit la dissuasion, car ceux-ci forment aussi des calculs sur l’avantage qu’ils ont personnellement à tirer du manquement à la loi. Il ressort de nos travaux que la création d’un test de légitimité de l’emprisonnement permet de répondre à la question de savoir, pour chaque type d’infraction de concurrence, si la prison est ou non une peine légitime.En somme, l’étude propose la construction d’un régime dissuasif par étapes, visant à renforcer à la fois l’effectivité et l’efficacité des règles de concurrence. Considérant que l’agent économique opère des prédictions sur le droit applicable, il faut non seulement faire en sorte que le droit de la concurrence s’applique effectivement, c’est-à-dire que le contrevenant soit confronté aux coûts de sa violation, mais efficacement, ce qui signifie que le coût du manquement doit être supérieur à son éventuel bénéfice. / This study explores the reasons why economic agents are likely to break the rules of competition law. This paper demonstrates that main reasons are related to a cost-benefit calculation, also known as the concept of “lucrative infringement”. Our results are conflicting with the findings of behavioural economics, which reject the theory of cost-benefit calculations incentives and argues that economic agents are subject to “cognitive biases”. However, the theory of the rational agent, despite its limitations, remains the most relevant for assessing the competition law ability to deter anticompetitive practices because it compares the rule of law to a "price" that weighs on the choice to break the law. The influence of legal rules as a set of incentive or deterrent norms that influences agents' behaviour on the market is less considered by behavioural economics that focuses more on agents' cognitive biases.Economic agents are rational and look for a “lucrative infringement”. They speculate on the multiple loopholes of competition law, which weakens the legal risk of the infringement. In this regard, two fundamental limits affect deterrence: on the one hand, the low probability of getting caught which generates “lucrative faults,” and on the other hand, the retention of all unlawful gains derived from the infringement.These limits concern both the application of public and private enforcement. First, the dissuasive function of "private enforcement" is limited by the absence of confiscatory damages. Similarly, the restrictive standard of proof to admit a collective class action hinders its dissuasive nature. When it comes to enforcement, the development of algorithmic cartels and the specificity of digital markets reduce competition authorities’ ability to detect illegal practices. Even when they manage to detect such practices, the sanction applied to the economic agent seems under-dissuasive. As our empirical study shows, fines and/or compensatory damages imposed are often lower than the benefit derived from the infringement.In addition, deterrence is weakened by the absence of criminal punishments for business leaders who have coordinated anticompetitive practices. This study demonstrates that they also make calculations about the benefit they may derive from violating the law. Our study develops a “legitimacy test of imprisonment” to provide an answer to the question of when imprisonment is a legitimate penalty.This study builds a step-by-step deterrent legal regime to daunt anticompetitive practices. Deterrence requires a twofold analysis on the application of competition law and the adequacy of sanctions to deter anticompetitive conducts. It is necessary not only to make competition law effective, i.e. that no infringer can escape with the costs of its violation, but also – to achieve an adequate level of deterrence – that fines and/or compensatory damages exceed any potential gains that may be expected from the infringement.

1 Thesis Summary Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law Zuzana Šimeková 1. Starting points and goals of the thesis The main goal of my thesis is the application of the ever-evolving contemporary issues of private enforcement of the EU competition law, its developments in the legislative area and the decision- making practice of the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ECJ) to the pharmaceutical sector area. As regards the functioning of competition rules, the pharmaceutical sector found itself in the cross-hairs of the European Commission fairly recently. Its efforts resulted in the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report of 8 July 2009 (the Final Report). The primary subject-matter of my thesis is the assessment of the competition relationship dynamic between the originator and generic pharmaceutical companies, especially the degree by which the conduct by the originator pharmaceutical companies can delay market entry by the generic pharmaceutical companies and thereby negatively affect the consumers by (among other things) limiting availability of cheaper drugs. Despite the expectations of legal practitioners and academia, the European Commission did not rule in the Final Report whether the discovered conducts constitute violations of the EU competition law. The...

<p>Повредом права конкуренције Европске уније (ЕУ) наноси се, по правилу, штета великом броју лица. Тиме се угрожава остваривање не само општих или јавних интереса, већ се угрожавају и интереси и права појединаца. Међутим, у праву ЕУ је дуго времена након оснивања Европске економске заједнице (ЕЕЗ) основна пажња била посвећена заштити јавних интереса, чему је био подешен и механизам јавно-правне или административне заштите, као и висина и карактер санкција. Из тих разлога су све до последњих деценија и теоријска истраживања углавном била усмерена на анализу дејства јавно-правне примене прописа о конкуренцији на непосредне учеснике на тржишту. Имајући то у виду, предмет овог рада је усмерен на други аспект заштите која се остварује у поступку приватно-правне примене, у коме накнада штете представља грађанско правну санкцију због повреде ЕУ права конкуренције.<br />Тема је подједнако значајна у практичном и у теоријском смислу. У практичном смислу, јер се повредом правила о заштити конкуренције угрожава успостављање и несметано функционисање унутрашњег тржишта, као општег циља оснивања ЕЕЗ/ЕУ. Са аспекта интереса појединаца, њима се онемогућава да користе погодности таквог тржишта на коме би према правилима слободне конкуренције и закона понуде и тражње, остали само најуспешнији, са најбољом робом и услугама. Будући да се не могу спречити повреде конкуренције, у раду су анализиране превентивне и компензаторне мере заштите. У случају повреде јавних интереса, то се остварује високим казнама и заштитним мерама. У случају повреде индивидуалних интереса, оштећеним појединцима је признато право на потпуну накнаду настале штете.<br />У теоријском смислу, питање накнаде штете је у ЕУ крајем деведесетих година прошлог века анализирано и у контексту отклањања демократског дефицита у склопу &quot;конституционалазације и легитимизације&quot; ЕЗ/ЕУ, кад су у центар интересовања постављени интереси појединаца и заштита њихових субјективних права пред националним судовима држава чланица. Разумевање овог процеса подразумева налажење одговора на питање да ли Уговор о функционисању<br />Европске уније (УФЕУ), као врста вишестраног међународног уговора, ствара субјективна права на која се непосредно могу позивати појединци и тражити њихову заштиту пред националним судовима. У питању је дејство одредби чланова 101. и 102. УФЕУ, којима су забрањени рестриктивни споразуми и злоупотреба доминантног положаја учесника на тржишту. Питање је важно јер се забраном закључивања рестриктивних споразума и санкционисањем понашања на тржишту које се сматра злоупотребом доминантног положаја у значајној мери ограничава дејство општепризнатог начела аутономије воље привредних субјеката и начело предузетништва.<br />Како тзв. &quot;неведљива рука тржишта&quot; није у стању да омогући адекватну заштиту и јавноправних и приватноправних интереса, као и да није могуће спречити закључивање рестриктивних споразума, у раду се полази од тезе да држава има тзв. &quot;регулаторну одговорност&quot; да појединцима омоогући остваривање права на накнаду штете, као неотуђиво субјективно право. Признање оваквог субјективног права је образложено садржином и карактером посебних начела права ЕУ, као што је начело директног дејства и начело делотворне примене. Кандидат се залаже да се у складу са начелом делотворне примене у државама чланицама успостави механизам колективне заштите индивидуалних интереса путем репрезентативних тужби по opt-out моделу.<br />У раду су наведена питања анализирана у три дела, који су насловљени као: општа разматрања, садржина и природа права на накнаду штете и поступак остваривања права на накнаду</p> / <p>Povredom prava konkurencije Evropske unije (EU) nanosi se, po pravilu, šteta velikom broju lica. Time se ugrožava ostvarivanje ne samo opštih ili javnih interesa, već se ugrožavaju i interesi i prava pojedinaca. Međutim, u pravu EU je dugo vremena nakon osnivanja Evropske ekonomske zajednice (EEZ) osnovna pažnja bila posvećena zaštiti javnih interesa, čemu je bio podešen i mehanizam javno-pravne ili administrativne zaštite, kao i visina i karakter sankcija. Iz tih razloga su sve do poslednjih decenija i teorijska istraživanja uglavnom bila usmerena na analizu dejstva javno-pravne primene propisa o konkurenciji na neposredne učesnike na tržištu. Imajući to u vidu, predmet ovog rada je usmeren na drugi aspekt zaštite koja se ostvaruje u postupku privatno-pravne primene, u kome naknada štete predstavlja građansko pravnu sankciju zbog povrede EU prava konkurencije.<br />Tema je podjednako značajna u praktičnom i u teorijskom smislu. U praktičnom smislu, jer se povredom pravila o zaštiti konkurencije ugrožava uspostavljanje i nesmetano funkcionisanje unutrašnjeg tržišta, kao opšteg cilja osnivanja EEZ/EU. Sa aspekta interesa pojedinaca, njima se onemogućava da koriste pogodnosti takvog tržišta na kome bi prema pravilima slobodne konkurencije i zakona ponude i tražnje, ostali samo najuspešniji, sa najboljom robom i uslugama. Budući da se ne mogu sprečiti povrede konkurencije, u radu su analizirane preventivne i kompenzatorne mere zaštite. U slučaju povrede javnih interesa, to se ostvaruje visokim kaznama i zaštitnim merama. U slučaju povrede individualnih interesa, oštećenim pojedincima je priznato pravo na potpunu naknadu nastale štete.<br />U teorijskom smislu, pitanje naknade štete je u EU krajem devedesetih godina prošlog veka analizirano i u kontekstu otklanjanja demokratskog deficita u sklopu &quot;konstitucionalazacije i legitimizacije&quot; EZ/EU, kad su u centar interesovanja postavljeni interesi pojedinaca i zaštita njihovih subjektivnih prava pred nacionalnim sudovima država članica. Razumevanje ovog procesa podrazumeva nalaženje odgovora na pitanje da li Ugovor o funkcionisanju<br />Evropske unije (UFEU), kao vrsta višestranog međunarodnog ugovora, stvara subjektivna prava na koja se neposredno mogu pozivati pojedinci i tražiti njihovu zaštitu pred nacionalnim sudovima. U pitanju je dejstvo odredbi članova 101. i 102. UFEU, kojima su zabranjeni restriktivni sporazumi i zloupotreba dominantnog položaja učesnika na tržištu. Pitanje je važno jer se zabranom zaključivanja restriktivnih sporazuma i sankcionisanjem ponašanja na tržištu koje se smatra zloupotrebom dominantnog položaja u značajnoj meri ograničava dejstvo opštepriznatog načela autonomije volje privrednih subjekata i načelo preduzetništva.<br />Kako tzv. &quot;nevedljiva ruka tržišta&quot; nije u stanju da omogući adekvatnu zaštitu i javnopravnih i privatnopravnih interesa, kao i da nije moguće sprečiti zaključivanje restriktivnih sporazuma, u radu se polazi od teze da država ima tzv. &quot;regulatornu odgovornost&quot; da pojedincima omoogući ostvarivanje prava na naknadu štete, kao neotuđivo subjektivno pravo. Priznanje ovakvog subjektivnog prava je obrazloženo sadržinom i karakterom posebnih načela prava EU, kao što je načelo direktnog dejstva i načelo delotvorne primene. Kandidat se zalaže da se u skladu sa načelom delotvorne primene u državama članicama uspostavi mehanizam kolektivne zaštite individualnih interesa putem reprezentativnih tužbi po opt-out modelu.<br />U radu su navedena pitanja analizirana u tri dela, koji su naslovljeni kao: opšta razmatranja, sadržina i priroda prava na naknadu štete i postupak ostvarivanja prava na naknadu</p> / <p>Violation of the EU competition law makes damage to a large number of persons: direct competitors, customers and end-users of services. This endangers the implementation of not only public interests, but also the interests and subjective rights of individuals. However, long after the founding of the EEC, community law focused on the protection of public interests, to which the mechanism of public law or administrative enforcement, as well as the amount and character of the sanction, was adjusted. For these reasons, until the last decades, theoretical research mainly focused on analysing the effects of public law enforcement on the immediate participants in the market as well. Therefore, the subject of this paper is focused on another aspect, the so-called private enforcement, whose part is the right to compensation of damages as a civil law sanction for violation of the EU competition law.<br />The subject is equally important in practical and theoretical sense. Practical importance is reflected in the fact that by violating the rules on the protection of competition, damage is caused to a large number of participants on the market, thus jeopardizing the achievement of both general and individual goals. As a general economic objective in the EC/EU Treaties, proclaim the establishment of an internal market. On the other hand, individuals want to make full use of the benefits of such a market in which, according to the rules of free competition and rules of supply and demand, only the most successful, with the best goods and services, would remain. Practice, however, has shown that market participants often violate competition rules and thus the question is raised of how to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation in the best possible way. When it comes to public interests, this is achieved through high penalties and protective measures, which are decided by the European Commission and national regulatory bodies. In the event of a violation of individual interests, this can be achieved by recognition of the full compensation of damages.<br />The issue of compensation for damages in the EU was set in parallel with the elimination of the democratic deficit and in the context of the &quot;institutionalization and legitimization&quot; of the EC/EU in the late 1990s, when the interests of individuals and the protection of their subjective rights were placed before the national courts of the member states.<br />Understanding of this process implies finding the answer to the question of whether the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as a type of multilateral international treaty, creates subjective rights to which individuals can directly refer and request their protection before national courts.<br />These are the provisions of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU that regulate the issue of restrictive agreements and the dominant position of participants in the market by banning and automatically considering null and void the first ones, while the abuse of a dominant position is considered prohibited and punishable. The prohibition of the conclusion of restrictive agreements and the sanctioning of market behaviour which is considered to be the abuse of a dominant position is significantly limited to the generally accepted principle of autonomy of the will of business entities and the raight of establishement.<br />Since it is impossible to prevent the conclusion of restrictive (cartel) agreements, the solution was found in the recognition of the right to compensation as one of the inalienable subjective rights belonging to individuals. The recognition of this subjective right, due to the particular and dual nature of EU law, as supranational and national, is explained by the new principles of EU law, such as the principle of direct effect and the principle of effectiveness. The principle of effectiveness will also serve as a theoretical basis for establishing the principles of procedural autonomy, as a legal framework for judicial protection.<br />The author analyses the subject issues in three parts, which are addressed as: general considerations, content and nature of the right to compensation of damage and the procedure for enforcement the right to compensation. The paper starts from the thesis that the public law and private law enforcement of the EU competition law are complementary and that the compensation of damages should be implemented not only in individual lawsuits, but also by introducing collective redress mechanism for the protection of collective interests.</p>