Submitted by Fernando Luz Brancoli (fbrancoli@gmail.com) on 2016-05-12T14:07:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Fernando Brancoli.pdf: 1557179 bytes, checksum: 03f67eab386fbe2e2dc3e2fc4047a61e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Felipe Augusto Arakaki (arakaki@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-05-16T12:39:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 brancoli_fl_dr_mar.pdf: 1557179 bytes, checksum: 03f67eab386fbe2e2dc3e2fc4047a61e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-16T12:39:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 brancoli_fl_dr_mar.pdf: 1557179 bytes, checksum: 03f67eab386fbe2e2dc3e2fc4047a61e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-16 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O argumento central da pesquisa fundamenta-se na capacidade das Companhias de Segurança Privadas (CSP) influenciarem cenários de conflito contemporâneos, no caso específico para a Guerra do Afeganistão, entre os anos de 2001 e 2011, e da Líbia (2011-2012). Sugerimos que as CSP possuem uma disposição ainda pouco estudada para conformar pontos nevrálgicos relacionados com a segurança internacional, dentre eles o caso analisado, nos teatros de operações do Oriente Médio e do norte da África. O objetivo da pesquisa é demonstrar qual o impacto dessas Companhias, ressaltando como a instrumentalização dos discursos feitas por essas empresas encontram eco explicativo parcial no princípio de Securitização, abordado pela chamada Escola de Copenhague. Pela própria natureza do campo de estudo, nos pautamos principalmente em fontes primárias, como entrevistas realizadas nos dois países entre 2012 e 2015. Empregamos ainda documentos oficiais, tanto do governo norte-americano quanto de especialistas das CSP, além da bibliografia especializada. Sugerimos ainda que tais Companhias, combinando características locais e internacionais, acabam por resiginficar capitais e possibilidades, formando atores distintos, chamados aqui de Companhias Antropofágicas de Segurança (CAS). As CAS possuem uma capacidade ainda não analisada na literatura tradicional para definir, por exemplo, distribuição de tropas, escolha do inimigo e emprego de novos armamentos, mobilizando justamente o discurso de emergência e a necessidade de ferramentas não estabelecidas no marco legal. / The central argument of the research is that Private Security Companies (PSCs) are able to chaperon contemporary conflict scenarios, in this case, the Afghan war, between 2001 and 2011, and Libya (2011-2012). We suggest that the CSP have a provision, not well researched, to impact hotspots related to international security, including the case analyzed in the theaters of operations in the Middle East and North Africa. The objective of the research is to demonstrate the impact these companies, highlighting how the instrumentalization of the speeches made by them are partial explained by the concept of securitization, covered by the so-called Copenhagen School. The research is based in primary sources, such as interviews in both countries between 2012 and 2015. We also used official documents, both the US government and experts of the CSP, as well as academic literature. We suggest that such companies, combining local and international features, promoted a resignification of capitals and possibilities, forming innovative actors, called here Security Anthropophagic Companies (CAS). CAS have a capacity not yet analyzed in traditional literature to define, for example, distribution of troops, choose the enemy and use of new weapons, just mobilizing emergency speech and the need for tools not established in the legal framework.

La Communauté Economique des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest est une organisation internationale qui s’est très tôt impliquée dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité. Elle a entrepris des interventions militaires dans certains Etats ouest-africains, comme le Libéria, la Sierra Léone, la Guinée Bissau, dans les années 1990. A partir de 1999, la CEDEAO a procédé à une réorientation stratégique en matière de sécurité. Celle-ci s’est manifestée par l’adoption d’un nouveau mécanisme de sécurité visant à placer l’individu au cœur des préoccupations sécuritaires. Le nouvel objectif de la CEDEAO est de réaliser la sécurité humaine au profit des citoyens ouest-africains. Il se trouve que la réalisation de la sécurité humaine nécessite des moyens économiques et financiers, or les Etats ouest-africains sont parmi les plus pauvres du monde. Aussi, depuis l’adoption du nouveau mécanisme de sécurité, la CEDEAO rencontre de plus en plus de difficultés à concrétiser les nobles recommandations et principes contenus dans son ordonnancement juridique, dans un contexte marqué par l’accroissement des menaces militaires contemporaines et des menaces non militaires.Après plus de 30 ans d’expériences dans le processus d’intégration, n’est t-il pas désormais évident que la réussite de l’organisation dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité est intimement liée au progrès accompli dans l’intégration économique ? La faiblesse des perspectives économiques des Etats de la CEDEAO n’appelle-t-elle pas à modifier la stratégie d’intégration de la CEDEAO ? L’adoption du fédéralisme à l’échelle ouest-africaine ne peut-elle pas constituer une voie salvatrice pour la CEDEAO ? / The Economic Community of West Africa is an international organization that was involved very early in the peacekeeping and security. It undertook military intervention in some West African states, like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. In 1999, ECOWAS has made a strategic shift in security. This was manifested by the adoption of a new security mechanism to place the human at the heart of security concerns. The new objective of ECOWAS is to achieve human security for the citizens of West Africa. It turns out that the realization of human security requires economic and financial means, or the West African states are among the poorest in the world. Also, since the adoption of the new security mechanism, ECOWAS meeting more and more difficult to achieve the noble principles and recommendations contained in its legal system, in a context of increased of contemporary military and non military threats. After over 30 years of experience in the integration process, is there not now clear that the success of the organization in peacekeeping and security is closely linked to progress in the economic integration? The weak economic outlook states of ECOWAS calls does not change the strategy of integration of ECOWAS? The adoptions of federalism across West Africa cannot it be a way of salvation for ECOWAS?