Zugl.: Köln, Universiẗat, Diss., 1994. / Zugl.: Köln, Univ., Diss., 1994.

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2004.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2007.

Zugl.: München, Universiẗat der Bundeswehr, Diss., 1994. / Literaturverz. S. 281 - 304.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2004--Bremen.

Chapter 1: Intrafamily Bargaining and Love Popular culture and common wisdom testify that the way partners in a relationship feel for one another very much depends on how they treat each other. This paper posits the hypothesis that altruism or love in a relationship is endogenous to the actions of the partners and studies how this influences allocations and efficiency in a bargaining model of household decision-making. The main results are that agents treat their partner in a kinder way than without endogenously evolving love, this leads to more equitable allocations in household decision making and greater intertemporal efficiency. There are two mechanisms at work: agents treat their partner nicely to avoid retribution by a less loving partner in the future; and they treat the partner nicely so that the kind reciprocal behavior raises their own love towards the partner, which lets them enjoy higher utility. As to love, two interpretations emerge: love is a commitment device by which couples can implement Pareto superior allocations; and love is an investment good in the sense that costly nice behavior towards the partner today may ensure higher levels of trust and efficiency in the future. Chapter 2: Perception of Technology and Technological Progress under Extractive Institutions This paper explores the impact of different perceptions of the nature of technology - whether it may grow in an arithmetic or geometric fashion - on the choices of an elite that lives on extracting resources from the productive populace. We show that slow potential growth destroys the credibility of inclusive institutions that the elite may consider in order to foster growth whereas these can and will be implemented if populace and elite believe in fast growth. Belief in the potential of technological growth leads to growth-friendly policies under both extractive and inclusive institutions and, as history progresses, the true nature of technology reveals itself and this belief spreads. Chapter 3: A critical literature review of the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and the communication of Unprotected Information Assets This paper reviews the literature centred on the question of what kind of settings facilitate the transmission of unverifiable pieces of information that re- side with an agent whose incentives are not well aligned with an agent for whom this piece of information is useful. The question is framed within the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and its answers make extensive use of the modelling device of Cheap Talk. The main findings are that communication leads to costly distortions and the efforts to decrease bias and information loss may trigger major revisions to the structure of incentive systems and the allocation of decision-rights. The paper argues that the literature has so far failed to properly examine the question of property rights of information and is therefore focused on niche applications.

Property rights are an important subject of economic theory and as a product of institutional qualities an essential determinant of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The purpose of this study is to examine how middle income countries with, on average, weak property rights can attract investments from abroad, given their (formal) institutions, and if differences in institutional qualities have an effect on FDI inflows. Using a panel approach to observe a sample of 20 countries over ten years, we find that there is mixed evidence supporting this theory. Whilst the theoretical background suggests that institutional qualities do affect a country’s ability to attract or deter investments, we cannot conclude a significant effect in our results. Furthermore, the study concludes that certain products of institutional qualities (democracy, corruption) can lead to mixed effects on the net inflows of FDI, but that an important determinant is the market-size of the country.

This thesis analyses how intellectual property (IP) laws are used in the home console game industry and in particular how these laws are used to capture the returns on investment, which may indirectly provide a stimulus to innovation. The relationshipis evaluated in three selected markets: The United States (US), the European Union (EU) and People's Republic of China (PRC). The first two of these are selected as representative of developed markets whilst the latter as an instance of an emerging market. This thesis analyses and illustrates ways in which three major types of intellectual property rights - patents, copyright and trademarks - operate in this sector of industry. This thesis evaluates this relationship via a unique approach, adopting both a legal and economic analysis. The thesis starts with a detailed market analysis of this industry to identify key factors that affect individual firms' abilities to capture returns on investment. This is followed by section II (comprising Chapters II to IV) which goes on to examine the effects of each type of IPR on these factors in the developed markets of the US and Europe. The analysis in section III shifts the focus from these developed markets to the emerging market in the PRC. It identifies the unique attributes and problems of the Chinese market and demonstrates how contemporary local IP laws can be used to tackle these problems. It is the view of this thesis that IP laws theoretically can be used to maximise a firm's return on investment while not distorting competition; hence, the thesis suggests that IPRs may indirectly create incentives to innovate.

Traditional medicine, the use of plants, animals, and minerals for human health needs must be brought toa new scientific level of sustainable development in order to accommodate future global health care needs.

A partir da segunda metade da década de noventa, após a fase de reestruturação e modernização da produção agrícola, as questões econômicas pertinentes aos conflitos de terra no Brasil ganharam maior grau de complexidade em virtude de significativas mudanças institucionais e das incertezas sobre os direitos de propriedade; geradas com o aumento das disputas entre proprietários de terras, posseiros, organizações de movimentos sociais, indígenas, quilombolas, ambientalistas e organismos governamentais. Dentro desse contexto sócio-econômico, a presente pesquisa objetivou investigar um tipo específico de conflito fundiário referente ao processo de invasões (ocupações) de terras em propriedades rurais, realizadas por organizações de movimentos sociais. A literatura empírica sobre a relação econômica entre direitos de propriedade e investimento apresenta uma diversidade de resultados e apontamentos que motivaram a investigação do problema no caso das disputas de terra no Estado do Paraná. O atual conflito paranaense tem como importante característica as disputas judiciais entre produtores rurais e movimentos sociais, no qual, os proprietários rurais questionam a legalidade das invasões quanto ao seu caráter reivindicatório pela reforma agrária, e pleiteiam o cumprimento imediato dos mandados de reintegração de posse quando da invasão de terra. Por parte dos movimentos, as invasões de terras tornaram-se o principal mecanismo de \"pressão\" sobre o Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA), para a execução dos processos de desapropriação e assentamentos. Tendo como marco institucional a Medida Provisória nº2027-38/2000 (conhecida como lei \"anti-invasão\"), mais o relatório de propriedades invadidas da Federação de Agricultura do Estado do Paraná (FAEP), foi desenvolvida uma pesquisa empírica junto aos produtores rurais nas principais áreas de conflitos de terras; compreendendo as invasões ocorridas entre 2000 e 2006. Com base na fundamentação da Nova Economia Institucional e na análise dos resultados da literatura empírica sobre direitos de propriedade de terra e investimentos privados, a presente pesquisa analisou a relação entre o a variável \"tempo de invasão\" (proxy para a insegurança do direito de propriedade) e \"nível de produtividade da terra\" (proxy para o investimento), comparando diferentes grupos de produtores e sua produtividade antes e depois da invasão. Como resultado da análise descritiva dos dados primários, a presente pesquisa estabeleceu um conjunto de observações sobre: (i) as propriedades invadidas; (ii) as invasões de terra; (iii) os processos judiciais; e (iv) os efeitos das invasões sobre os investimentos na produção. Como principais resultados, a pesquisa apontou para as seguintes considerações: o tempo de invasão da terra afetou, especialmente, os investimentos das propriedades pecuaristas e invadidas acima de 120 dias (longo prazo de invasão). No caso das propriedades com tempo inferior a 60 dias de invasão (curto prazo), o resultado mais freqüente foi a manutenção dos investimentos na produção; contudo, em casos que ocorreram mais de uma invasão na mesma propriedade, houve queda da produtividade mesmo com um tempo curto de invasão. Para o grupo dos proprietários com tempo de invasão de 60 a 120 dias (médio prazo), os resultados sobre os investimentos foram variados. / From the second half of the nineties after the phase of restructuring and modernization of agricultural production, the economic issues relevant to conflicts of land in Brazil won greater degree of complexity because of significant institutional changes and uncertainties about the property rights generated with the increase of disputes between owners of land, squatters, social movements organizations, indigenous, Afro-Brazilian (\"quilombolas\"), environmentalists and government. In this socio-economic context this research objectives investigate a specific conflict type pertaining to the process of land invasions (occupation) of land properties held by organizations of social movements. The empirical literature about economic relationship between property rights and investment presents a variety of results and notes that led to the investigation of the problem in the case of disputes of land in the state of Paraná. The current Paraná\'s conflict has important feature as the legal disputes between farmers and movements in which the landowners questioned the legality of the claim invasion for agrarian reform and compliance with the immediate mandate of reinstatement of possession when invasion of land. For part of the movement the invasions of land have become the main mechanism of \"pressure\" on the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (NICAR) to the implementation of procedures for the expropriation and settlements. With New Institutional Economics framework and analyze of the Provisional Measure 2027-38 of 2000 (known as \"anti-invasion\" law), plus the report of properties raided the Agricultural Federation of the state of Paraná (AFSP) a survey was developed to empirically with farmers the main areas of conflict of land; including invasions occurred between 2000 and 2006. Based on the reasoning of the New Institutional Economics and the analysis of the results of the empirical literature on the land property rights and private investments, this research examined the relationship between the variable \"time of invasion\" (proxy for the uncertainty of property) and \"level of productivity of the land\" (proxy for investment), comparing different groups of producers and their productivity before and after the invasion. As a result of the descriptive analysis of the primary data, this research has established a set of comments on: (i) the properties invaded; (ii) the invasions of land; (iii) legal proceedings; and (iv) the effects of the invasion on investment in production. The main results, the research pointed to the following considerations: the time of invasion of the land affected, in particular, investment properties and pastoralists invaded over 120 days (longterm invasion). In the case of properties with time less than 60 days of invasion (short-term), the result was more frequent maintenance of investment in production. However, in cases that occurred over an invasion on the same property, the result of productivity was negative even with a short time of invasion. For the group of owners with time of invasion of 60 to 120 days (medium term), the results of the investments have been varied.