Since its foundation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has developed its relationship with non-state allies throughout the Middle East and beyond, often using them to engage in proxy warfare with its enemies. This topic has seen increasing attention by academics and policy-makers. Using the proxy groups as case studies and classical comparison, this thesis analyzes what drives Iran to deploy these proxies to wage war on its enemies, and under which circumstances Iran does not engage in proxy warfare, as well as the factors that make Iran develop lasting and deep relationships with its proxies and under which circumstances these relationships stay superficial. Three main hypotheses are tested: first the identity-based hypothesis, that Iran feels compelled to help fellow Shias and the Palestinians in their struggles against local oppressors, the West and Israel, being driven by a responsibility to protect them born out of Shia religion and Khomeinist revolutionary ideology, together forming the Axis of resistance. Second the power-based hypothesis, that Iran is primarily driven by realist concerns to defend and secure itself and its sphere of influence, making proxies Iran’s pawns. Lastly a factionalism-based hypothesis, an alternative explanation is competition between the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Foreign Ministry as causing the IRGC to engage with proxies to pursue their foreign policy. By testing these three hypotheses in several case studies spanning four decades and geographically the Middle East and beyond, this thesis presents a comprehensive approach to the reasons behind Iranian proxy warfare as well as a contribution to a more identity and ideology focused approach to the study of proxy wars.

In recent years, the IRI has managed to increase its influence in the Middle East. The strategic use of proxy warfare has played a central role as surrounding countries have become destabilised. However, following the positivist logic of structural IR theories, the materially inferior IRI should not be a stronger player in the region’s conflicts than the US and its Arab allies. The Iranian success in proxy warfare, therefore, provides a paradox for the explanatory framework of reductionist IR theories which rely on rational and positivist epistemologies. I argue that this is because these perspectives do not endorse an adequate comprehension of the mutual embedded relations which have served the IRI a strategic advantage in proxy warfare. In a challenge to the parsimonious reductionism of structural IR and security studies, I adopt Feklyunina’s constructivist framework for analysing soft power as a relational identity. Thereby, I switch the focus from a top-down analysis of the IRI to a focus including Iraqi insurgencies’ acceptance or rejection of the IRI’s national identity and foreign policy goals. I argue that identity matter in proxy relations. Hence, I estimate the IRI’s strength in proxy warfare based on potential Iraqi insurgencies’ compatible identities. I employ a longitudinal historical research design tracing the development of collective identities within Iraq. The study finds that the Iraqi Shi’ites share important common facets of their identity with the IRI and have subsequently been willing to fight as proxies against American and Sunni forces in Iraq. However, identity and legitimacy structures in the Middle East are complex, multifaceted, constantly changing, and dependent on context. Iraqi Shi’ites still preserve some reservations and antipathy towards the Iranian regime due to a nationalist sense of community.

Nowadays, the theory of proxy warfare receives more and more attention. However, it is not an entirely new phenomenon. Recent conflicts in Syria and Yemen got proxy warfare to the forefront of academic and public interest. This thesis aims to describe the existing proxy relationships in the area of the Middle East and analyze those relations from the perspectives of an actor's motivation to forge such a relationship and management of the proxy. The principal-agent (p-a) analysis is the approach that allows us to do that. We apply this approach to three case studies. In the first case study, we analyze the principal-agent relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. In this relationship, we can observe a high alignment of interests, and therefore it should be a textbook example of the p-a relationship. In the second case study, we focus on the relationship between Israel and Hamas. However, it may seem like there is no possibility these two actors will cooperate in any sense. We described that if "declared interests" (ideology) are put aside, both principal and agent can find a common pragmatic interest enabling them to establish the p-a relationship. The third case study analyzes Hamas as a hybrid actor, suggesting that one agent (Hamas) can be in the principal- agent relationship with two hostile...