This thesis on The Role and Activities of the Prosecuting Attorney in Criminal Proceedings attempts to comprehensively analyse the role and activities of the prosecuting attorney within the Czech legal regulations of prosecuting attorneys whereas the prosecuting attorney is a completely irreplaceable party within criminal proceedings. His role in criminal proceedings is highly significant and he is able to affect criminal proceedings through his activities more than anyone else. This thesis is mainly focused on the comparison of the actual Public Prosecutions Act and the legislative intention of a new Public Prosecutions Act. The thesis finds the positives and negatives of the prepared act and shows them in conclusion. This thesis is composed of four chapters, some of them further subdivided into parts and subparts. Chapter One is introductory and describes the historical progression of public prosecution in the Czech state as well as in other states of Europe. The Chapter is subdivided into four parts where every part illustrates a different historical period. Part Two consists of four subparts. Chapter Two deals with the constitutional definition of a prosecuting attorney. Chapter Two is not subdivided into parts. Chapter Three is subdivided into five parts and provides an outline of the main...

Chargés de mettre en œuvre la loi pénale contre les personnes soupçonnées d’infractions, les procureurs bénéficient traditionnellement d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation qui est en général encadré par la loi et par des instructions hiérarchiques que les procureurs doivent suivre lorsqu’ils prennent leurs décisions. Avec une analyse fondée sur des observations et des entretiens dans les systèmes français et anglo-gallois, cette étude comparative vise à comprendre comment les systèmes de justice pénale étudiés s’efforcent de combiner les nécessités du contrôle des autorités de poursuites dans des sociétés démocratiques modernes avec la souplesse et la réactivité nécessaires à l’application de la loi résultant de la marge d’appréciation laissée aux procureurs. Il existe actuellement peu d’études empiriques et systématiques du processus de décision des autorités de poursuites. Cette thèse montre qu’aucun des systèmes observés ne parvient à un équilibre satisfaisant entre le degré de responsabilité et le pouvoir de décision des procureurs. En France, bien que le contrôle démocratique et hiérarchique des procureurs soit bien développé en théorie, il reste limité en pratique, en raison en raison de la primauté du principe d’individualisation dans la culture juridique et du statut professionnel des procureurs comme magistrats indépendants. En Angleterre et au Pays de Galles, les procureurs font partie d’une structure particulièrement bureaucratique et centralisée qui impose une stricte uniformité des décisions de poursuites aux dépens du pouvoir de décision et de l’autonomie des procureurs dont le rôle se limite à des tâches simples et répétitives en raison de la segmentation de la procédure de poursuites. Cette structure autoritaire de contrôle, conjuguée à un équilibre historique des pouvoirs en faveur de la police, semble empêcher les procureurs de prendre des décisions qui pourraient être mal vues par leur hiérarchie ou la police. Enfin, le manque de ressources et une recherche constante d’efficacité dans chacun des systèmes juridiques étudiés ont produit une bureaucratisation de la procédure pénale, certaines tâches étant déléguées à du personnel peu qualifié et les affaires mineures étant expédiées le plus rapidement possible selon un traitement standardisé. / Tasked with enforcing the criminal law against suspected offenders, public prosecutors have traditionally enjoyed broad discretion, which is usually structured by legal and policy guidelines defining rules prosecutors should follow when making their decisions. Basing its analysis upon direct observations and interviews in the two jurisdictions under study, this comparative thesis endeavours to understand how the French and Anglo-Welsh criminal justice systems attempt to combine the necessities of accountability for public prosecution services in modern democratic societies with the flexibility and reactivity needed in the application of the law provided by prosecutorial discretion. There have been few systematic, empirical accounts of the decision-making process of these national prosecution services.This thesis argues that neither system observed achieves a satisfactory balance between accountability and discretion for public prosecutors. In France, although democratic and hierarchical accountability channels are well developed in theory, oversight is weak due to the primacy of the concept of ‘adaptation’ in the legal culture and the strong professional ethos of procureurs as independent judicial officers. In England and Wales, public prosecutors are part of a highly bureaucratic and centralised structure which strictly enforces consistency in prosecutorial decisions at the expense of much discretion and autonomy for individual prosecutors whose responsibility is limited to narrow and repetitive tasks due to the segmentation of the prosecution process. This overbearing accountability structure, coupled with a historical balance of power in favour of the police, appears to prevent prosecutors from making decisions perceived as unpopular with their hierarchy or the police. Finally, pressure on resources and a drive for efficiency in both jurisdictions have resulted in the bureaucratisation of the criminal justice process with part of the prosecution workload being delegated to unqualified staff and minor cases being processed as quickly as possible into a one-size-fits-all system.

Magister Legum - LLM / Members of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) are required to be dedicated to the rule of law. Yet, recent and past decision-making has caused instability in the functioning of the NPA. The decision to prosecute or not to prosecute involves the exercise of discretion. The NPAs use of this discretion has been called into question on numerous occasions which has resulted in the erosion of its independence and credibility. There are constitutional and legislative provisions in place to guide prosecutors in the decision-making process which allows for a measure of accountability. However, the link between prosecutorial independence and accountability for decision-making is not clear when looking at recent and past decisions by the National Directors of Public Prosecutions. Therefore, an evaluation of the instability in the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions during the period of 1998-2018 will be discussed. The research discusses the unwarranted intrusion on prosecutorial decision-making. Furthermore, external interfering has resulted in the loss of public confidence in the functioning of the NPA. The administrative duties of prosecutors are guided by constitutional and legislative procedures. Hence, the research will identify whether these procedures are efficient for the effective administration of the NPA. Key to the already mentioned will be providing recommendations on how to create stability in an institution that has been surrounded by instability for the past 20 years.