The research questions investigated are: 1. Are the expected post-issue fractional holdings of the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions signals of firm value? 2. Are the expected post-issue fractional holdings of the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions signals of underpricing? and 3. Are the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions monitors of IPO investments? The signaling theory developed by Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) (GH) and the monitoring theory for IPO investments have been used to develop the hypotheses for this dissertation. Four factors make my methodology unique. These factors are: 1. I apply and test the GH IPO signaling model over a unique data set collected from the IPO prospectuses, proxy statements and annual reports; 2. I disaggregate the expected post-issue holdings of the different groups of pre-issue blockholders and insiders and hypothesizes that these individual groups represents signals of firm value and underpricing; 3. I hypothesize that these groups, in aggregate and separately, monitor IPO investments over the long term; And 4. I develop signaling and monitoring hypotheses to make predictions at the two stages of the IPO. The results show that firm value is positively related to the level of underpricing, at a given variance of the firms cash flows; the level of underpricing is positively related to the holdings of the directors and officers as a group and the aggregate of the directors and officers, VCs and institutions, at given variances of the firm's cash flows; the firm value is not related to the level of underpricing, at a given level of capital outlay and holdings of either the aggregate blockholders, directors and officers, VCs or institutions. For the monitoring hypotheses, the results show that the long-run buy-and-hold-returns are positively related to the investment bank reputation and the gross spread. Also, the results do not support the theories that the holdings of the VCs, institutions and the aggregate holdings of the different groups, represent the level of monitoring. Therefore, these groups do not increase the value of IPO investments over the long-run.

Abstract not available

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2001. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-125). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2001. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-125). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, August 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1986.

In recent years, the number of Chinese companies going public has grown significantly. Some of these companies have listed their shares locally in Shanghai and Shenzhen, while others have chosen a stock exchange with better access to international capital (e.g., Hong Kong). This thesis examines 1) the determinants of the firms’ choice regarding initial public offering (IPO) locations and 2) whether IPO locations might affect their subsequent performance. Our study focuses solely on firms in the real estate sector in which pre-IPO attributes as well as the underlying asset value can be identified and measured. Our dataset includes 29 Chinese real estate firms that have issued shares in Shanghai or Shenzhen and 28 Chinese firms with IPOs in Hong Kong during the period of 1992-2008. To explain their IPO location choice, the self-selection or signaling theory suggests that firms with higher quality would signal this information by issuing shares in Hong Kong. Given the more stringent listing requirements and better informational disclosure schemes in the Hong Kong market, if a firm has low quality, such information is more likely and quickly to be discovered in Hong Kong than in Mainland China. Therefore, it is costly for such firms to imitate good firms’ IPO location choice. Once the firms have been listed, the corporate governance literature suggests that firms listed in Hong Kong would demonstrate a greater performance increase than those listed in Mainland China, because Hong Kong has a mature system of information disclosure, analyst coverage, and law enforcement. We found that firms listed in Hong Kong achieved higher Return on Asset (ROA) than those listed in Mainland China. We then construct four proxies for firms’ unobserved quality based on ex post abnormal stock or profit returns after IPOs. We obtained support for the signaling and self-selection effects: firms having higher quality, non-state ownership, and larger leverage ratio were more likely to conduct IPOs in Hong Kong instead of in Mainland China. Also consistent with the signaling theory, we found that firms listed in Mainland China were more likely to use IPO underpricing as a signal for firm quality than firms listed in Hong Kong were. / published_or_final_version / Real Estate and Construction / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

While the literature on underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock is various and expansive, very little research has been undertaken in countries where capital markets are less developed.  This thesis therefore attempts to address the shortage of such research in Egypt, which has been witnessing an important phase of transition towards a broader adoption of market-oriented policies through the revitalisation of its stockmarket since 1991.  The aim is to measure the short-run performance of IPOs in an effort to compare the maturity of the Egyptian capital market with that of other nations, both of developed countries and a peer group of developing countries.  This thesis also seeks to determine whether the underpricing phenomenon is due to the usual factors suggested by classical IPO theories or is related to some specific features of the Egyptian market transformation.  This thesis employs a sample of 59 Egyptian IPOs listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (ESE) during 1994-2005. This thesis suggests the winner’s curse model can be applied.  On average, Egyptian IPOs offer an initial return of about 10.16%, which is considered, to some extent, lower than the initial returns of many other developing countries.  Additionally, there is a general tendency for privatised IPOs (PIPOs) to be underpriced to a greater degree than private sector IPOs.  The industry of the firm and year of an IPO significantly affects the level of underpricing in Egypt.  Results are consistent with the political economy theory as the Egyptian government tried to build up investors’ confidence by underpricing PIPOs more than private-sector IPOs, underpricing regulated industries more than competitive industries and underpricing early IPOs more than late IPOs.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Western Australia, 2006.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print.