Thesis (Ph.D.)--Mississippi State University. Department of Finance and Economics. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

The thesis investigates the link between internal and external funds in financing new investment when asymmetric information is important. In both chapter, the entrepreneur has private information about the value of a project and, if the quality of the project is high, she tries to signal this to outside investors. The first chapter explores the tradeoff between using internal funds and raising external funds by issuing shares or bonds to finance a project. The entrepreneur can delay the project to accumulate internal funds over time from existing operations. This allows an entrepreneur with a high quality project to reduce her reliance on expensive underpriced bond or share issues. However, accumulating funds is also costly because of discounting and the risk that the project disappears. The more valuable the good project, the less the entrepreneur will delay the project, risking its loss, and so the more she relies on external financing. When external financing is sought, the entrepreneur decides to issue bonds or shares. The greater the value of the good project, the more underpriced shares are relative to bonds. Thus an entrepreneur with a highly valuable good project chooses equity and one with a less valuable project chooses debt. Combining the two results shows that for a highly valuable good project, debt is used, and for a less valuable project, internal funds are used. External equity gets squeezed out. Aggregate data for the U.S. confirm that corporate bond issues are a more important source of funds than new share issued. Furthermore, most small firms rely on internal funds and debt, rather than external equity to finance their projects. The second chapter provides a new theory for the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). As in the first chapter, underpricing is used as a signal of quality. However, the entrepreneur is risk averse and only underprices when she cannot sell enough primary (new) shares to raise sufficient proceeds from the IPO to cover the cost of the project without diluting her position below that needed to signal a high project value. Underpricing allows the entrepreneur to maintain a high stake in the firm and still make a credible signal of quality. This allows more primary shares to be sold resulting in a net increase in proceeds. The model predicts that underpricing should be greatest among firms that don't sell secondary shares (shares held by insiders) at the IPO and that there should be a positive relationship between the firm's capital requirement and the initial return among this group of firms only. A switching regression framework is used. The probit model is first estimated where the probability of no secondary shares is explained by proxies for a firm's capital requirements. The initial return is then regressed on the same proxies, conditioning on whether the firm sells secondary shares or not and accounting for possible correlation between errors in the selection and regression equations. Strong support is found for the positive relationship between initial return and capital requirements for only firms without secondary share sales, as predicted.

This thesis consists of empirical studies on various aspects of international corporate finance, a series of long-run event studies examining the abnormal stock return performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), and stock analyst recommendations. The first two of these, presented in Chapters 2 and 3, investigate the key issues relating to Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). The next, in Chapter 4, examines the performance of new American Depositary Receipt issues from emerging markets and its determinants. The final study, presented in Chapter 5, assesses the value of stock analysts? recommendations in emerging markets. It is essentially a series of empirical studies adopting a tried and tested methodology, involving benchmarks, for measuring returns over time in emerging markets, a subject that has not been sufficiently investigated. The long-run event study approach is designed to identify anomalies in these markets, which may be much more pronounced than in developed markets. This thesis makes substantive contributions to the existing knowledge on measuring, documenting and determining various issues in international corporate finance, and provides methodological improvements over previous studies. Chapter 2 presents an examination of the stock return performance of the IPO stocks listed on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in Hong Kong, finding that the return performance is sensitive to the benchmark employed. Two main factors contributing to the underperformance of GEM stocks are the ?technology boom? and ?IPO effects?. Moreover, the results of cross-sectional analyses suggest that the Hong Kong GEM is a unique market; since at least 70 percent of the IPO stocks listed on the GEM are technology stocks, the ?technology? factor outweighs previous hypotheses advocated by previous researchers to explain the poor performance of newly listed stocks. Chapter 3 extends this analysis by turning attention to the post-issue stock price performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in Asian markets, using a comparative assessment of the stock performance of Asian IPOs motivated by the ongoing discovery of biases in event studies involving long horizon returns. Various methods were used to remove such biases, while examining the robustness of the long run performance of the IPOs. The results of this examination show that the existence of long run underperformance for the Asian IPOs depends on the methodology used. The study also assesses the ?Market Timing? theory with regard to Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), adding to the growing literature that suggests that Asian firms time their issuance of equity securities. Chapter 4 presents a comparative study of the post-issue stock performance and operating performance of the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of American Depositary Receipts (ADR) in emerging markets. The results of this study suggest that ADR IPOs are underpriced, though not to the same extent as regular IPOs. In the aftermarket, ADR IPOs underperform the Emerging Market Index. However, after controlling for differences in size and industry, underperformance of ADR IPOs compared with both home market IPOs and US IPOs could not be demonstrated. The analysis of stock and operating performance yields consistent results; aside from the ?window dressing? effect, this also demonstrates that stock price performance is a reflection of operating performance over the long run. Chapter 5 presents the first study to examine post-recommendation abnormal returns in emerging markets, based on the Emerging Market Index adjusted model and the Controlling Firm approach, demonstrating that stock prices react significantly to recommendation revisions, both on the revision day and subsequently. In this cross-sectional analysis, it appears that the Market-to-Book ratio is the primary indicator for Buy and Strong Buy recommendations. This indicates that stock analysts in emerging markets prefer high growth stocks with their attractive characteristics.

Zugl.: Leipzig, Universiẗat, Diss., 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [502]-534) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in electronic version.

No description available.

The thesis investigates the link between internal and external funds in financing new investment when asymmetric information is important. In both chapter, the entrepreneur has private information about the value of a project and, if the quality of the project is high, she tries to signal this to outside investors. The first chapter explores the tradeoff between using internal funds and raising external funds by issuing shares or bonds to finance a project. The entrepreneur can delay the project to accumulate internal funds over time from existing operations. This allows an entrepreneur with a high quality project to reduce her reliance on expensive underpriced bond or share issues. However, accumulating funds is also costly because of discounting and the risk that the project disappears. The more valuable the good project, the less the entrepreneur will delay the project, risking its loss, and so the more she relies on external financing. When external financing is sought, the entrepreneur decides to issue bonds or shares. The greater the value of the good project, the more underpriced shares are relative to bonds. Thus an entrepreneur with a highly valuable good project chooses equity and one with a less valuable project chooses debt. Combining the two results shows that for a highly valuable good project, debt is used, and for a less valuable project, internal funds are used. External equity gets squeezed out. Aggregate data for the U.S. confirm that corporate bond issues are a more important source of funds than new share issued. Furthermore, most small firms rely on internal funds and debt, rather than external equity to finance their projects. The second chapter provides a new theory for the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). As in the first chapter, underpricing is used as a signal of quality. However, the entrepreneur is risk averse and only underprices when she cannot sell enough primary (new) shares to raise sufficient proceeds from the IPO to cover the cost of the project without diluting her position below that needed to signal a high project value. Underpricing allows the entrepreneur to maintain a high stake in the firm and still make a credible signal of quality. This allows more primary shares to be sold resulting in a net increase in proceeds. The model predicts that underpricing should be greatest among firms that don't sell secondary shares (shares held by insiders) at the IPO and that there should be a positive relationship between the firm's capital requirement and the initial return among this group of firms only. A switching regression framework is used. The probit model is first estimated where the probability of no secondary shares is explained by proxies for a firm's capital requirements. The initial return is then regressed on the same proxies, conditioning on whether the firm sells secondary shares or not and accounting for possible correlation between errors in the selection and regression equations. Strong support is found for the positive relationship between initial return and capital requirements for only firms without secondary share sales, as predicted. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Prior literature suggests two competing theories regarding the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in their portfolio companies. The VC monitoring hypothesis argues that VCs effectively resolve the managerial agency problem through close monitoring and restraining managers' earnings management behavior. The VC moral hazard hypothesis argues that VCs aggravate the private benefits agency problem by exerting influence over managers to artificially inflate exit stock price through earnings management. Using a sample of IPO firms between 1987 and 2002, after controlling for the magnitude of accruals manipulation (AM), I compare the magnitude of real activities manipulation (RM) between venture-backed and non-venture-backed companies. I find that relative to non-venture-backed companies, venture-backed companies show significantly less RM in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust after controlling for the VC selection endogeneity. The finding supports the VC monitoring hypothesis that VCs restrain managers' RM behavior. Furthermore, I document that venture-backed companies exhibit a significant difference from non-venture-backed companies only in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The difference between the two groups in either the IPO year or the second post-IPO fiscal year is not significant, or at best, is weak. This finding is consistent with the argument that VCs tighten their control during the lockup expiration period when insiders such as managers or founders have strong incentives to inflate earnings. By the end of the second post-IPO fiscal year when VCs exit the portfolio companies, their impact on portfolio companies' RM decreases dramatically which makes the difference between the two groups less significant. In addition, using a sample of venture-backed IPOs from 1987 to 2002, I find that companies backed by high-reputation VCs show significantly less RM than those backed by low-reputation VCs in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust to alternative VC reputation proxies. This finding is consistent with the argument that high-reputation VCs have more incentives to preserve reputation and better ability to monitor managers than low-reputation VCs.

In March 2003, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) released new corporate governance guidelines, which included debatable “best practice” recommendations such as the adoption of an independent board and separation of the roles of chairperson and CEO. Given the premise that strong corporate governance enhances shareholder value and, by extension, increases initial public offering (IPO) issuers’ appeal to investors, this thesis assesses the level of conformity by a sample of Australian firms, which made an IPO between 1994 and 1999, with the best practice recommendations. We also examine the relationship between firm outcomes (including IPO underpricing, post-IPO long-run performance, and the likelihood of a SEO) and board governance quality, captured by board composition, board leadership, board size and share ownership of directors. These outcomes are addressed as they are important dimensions of firm performance that may be reasonably assumed to be associated with the quality of corporate governance, and these tests can provide an insight into the preference of investors who arguably are best placed to assess the appropriateness of the recommendations promoted by the ASX. Further, we analyse changes in IPO firms’ board structures from the time of listing to five years later to determine if IPO firms adopt governance structures that are more in line with the best practice recommendations after listing and if the changes are related to IPO firms’ long-run performance. Overall, we find that IPO firms that arguably have the strongest incentive to adopt the “optimal” board structures diverge substantially from ASX’s recommendations both at the time of IPO and five years later. IPO firms’ board structures are found to be unrelated with the level of IPO underpricing and board size, after controlling for the size of the firm, is significant in explaining both long-run aftermarket performance and the probability of a SEO. IPO firms with larger boards and those that increase the board size after listing are found to perform better in the long-run. However, contrary to expectation, smaller boards are associated with a higher likelihood of equity reissuance. Overall, the results lead us to question the role played by the board of directors in signalling firm quality. Our findings also suggest that ASX’s best practice recommendations are likely to distort the market-driven practices already in place.