Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Finance, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on June 19, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 143-147). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Alabama, 2007. / Advisers: Anup Agrawal, Harris Schlesinger. Includes bibliographical references.

Univ., Diss.--Saarbrücken, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. XXXIII - LXIX.

Thesis (MS)--Montana State University--Bozeman, 2009. / Typescript. Chairperson, Graduate Committee: James R. Brown. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-59).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 101-110).

No description available.

Most initial public offerings (IPOs) feature share lockup agreements, which prohibit insiders from selling their shares for a specified period of time following the IPO. However, some IPO firms agree to have a much longer lockup period than other IPO firms, and some are willing to lockup a much larger proportion of shares. Thus, the primary research question for this study is: "What are the reasons for the divergence of the lockup agreements?" The two main hypotheses that this dissertation investigates are the signaling hypothesis based on information asymmetry, and the commitment hypothesis based on agency theory. This study uses methods that have not been applied by previous studies in the literature relating to IPO lockups. First, I directly use IPO firms operating performance as a proxy for firm quality. The results show neither a negative nor a strong positive relationship between lockup length and firm operating performance. Thus, based on operating performance, the evidence does not support the agency hypothesis while showing weak support for the signaling hypothesis. I then examine the long-run returns for IPO firms with different lockup lengths. I find that firms with short lockup lengths have much better long-run returns than firms with long lockup lengths. Therefore, the results reject the signaling hypothesis while supporting the agency hypothesis. This dissertation further contributes to the IPO long-run underperformance literature by showing that firms with a high agency problem have much worse long-run returns than those with a low agency problem. Finally, I investigate the short-term stock returns around lockup expiry. Generally, I find that firms with short lockup periods experience better stock returns around lockup expiry than firms with long lockup periods, though the returns are not significantly different from one another. Overall, I conclude that the results reject the signaling hypothesis while partially supporting the agency hypothesis. In addition, I show that firms with high agency problems have much worse stock returns than those with low agency problems around lockup expiry, even though the agency variable is not significant in the regression analysis.

Zhu Yuande. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-87). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- Review of Theories and Literature --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 --- Theoretical Explanations for IPO Underpricing: --- p.4 / Chapter 2.2 --- Empirical Studies Review on China's IPOs --- p.9 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- Introduction of China's IPO Market --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1 --- Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) --- p.13 / Chapter 3.2 --- How to Price and Distribute IPOs --- p.15 / Chapter 3.3 --- Valuing IPOs and Setting Base Price --- p.24 / Chapter 3.4 --- Conclusion of This Chapter --- p.26 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- Empirical Results and Analysis of Chinese IPO Pricing --- p.27 / Chapter 4.1 --- The Data and Research Methodology --- p.27 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Regression Results and Discussion --- p.29 / Chapter 4.3 --- Conclusion of This Chapter --- p.34 / Chapter CHAPTER 5 --- Theoretical Explanations of Underpricing Based on Chinese IPO Behaviors --- p.35 / Chapter 5.1 --- The Optimal Underpricing in China's Stock Market --- p.35 / Chapter 5.2 --- Empirical Tests on Some Theories --- p.38 / Chapter 5.21 --- Signaling Model --- p.38 / Chapter 5.22 --- The Impact of Underwriters --- p.45 / Chapter 5.23 --- Winner's Curse Test --- p.46 / Chapter 5.24 --- Extensive Presale Theory --- p.48 / Chapter CHAPTER 6 --- Empirical Results and Analysis of Underpricing in China's Market --- p.54 / Chapter 6.1 --- Underpricing in A-Share Market --- p.54 / Chapter 6.11 --- Survey of Underpricing --- p.54 / Chapter 6.12 --- Empirical Results on A-Share IPO Underpricing --- p.56 / Chapter 6.13 --- Conclusion of This Part --- p.66 / Chapter 6.2 --- Underpricing in B-share Market --- p.66 / Chapter 6.21 --- Survey of Underpricing --- p.66 / Chapter 6.22 --- Empirical Results on the B-share Market --- p.70 / Chapter 6.23 --- Conclusion of This Part --- p.77 / Chapter CHAPTER 7 --- Further Development of Chinese Stock Market --- p.78 / Chapter 7.1 --- Defects in Chinese Stock Market --- p.78 / Chapter 7.2 --- Further Development for Reducing Underpricing --- p.79 / Chapter CHAPTER 8 --- Conclusion --- p.81 / REFERENCE --- p.83

by Chan Tsz Kit, Lee Wing Chun, Vincent. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-52). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF TABLES AND FIGUARES --- p.v / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background and Features of GEM --- p.2 / Features of Small Cap Companies --- p.4 / Market Statistics --- p.5 / Number of IPO in the Market --- p.5 / IPO Fund Raised in the Market --- p.6 / IPO Fund Raised by Type --- p.7 / Business Nature of Listed Firms --- p.8 / Performance of GEM Market in Terms of GEI --- p.9 / GEM Corporate Governance --- p.10 / Two GEM Listing Rules Non-compliance Cases to Date --- p.10 / Other Controversy Issues of GEM --- p.11 / Selective wavier by tom.com --- p.11 / General relaxation of listing rules --- p.12 / Property acquisition by Timeless Software --- p.13 / Errors made by GEM companies --- p.13 / Excessive valuation --- p.14 / Quality of listed company --- p.15 / Undisclosed holdings of Panda-Recruit --- p.15 / Chapter II. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.16 / Chapter III. --- DATA AND METHODOLOGY --- p.26 / Data Description --- p.27 / Chapter IV. --- EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE --- p.31 / Intraday and Weekly Stock Returns --- p.31 / Intraday Trading Volume --- p.36 / Discussing Conclusion for Quantitative Studies --- p.40 / Chapter V. --- QUALITATIVE STUDY OF GEM MARKET --- p.41 / Factors Contributed to the Prevailing Weak Sentiment on GEM --- p.41 / Blue-chip Backing --- p.41 / Mega-dollar Tech Deals Sent Tech Stocks to Higher Levels --- p.42 / Understanding on Issuer's Business is Key --- p.43 / Major Issues GEM Faces --- p.44 / Lack of Condemnation on the Listed Firms' Non-compliance --- p.44 / Attractiveness for Large Cap Issuers --- p.45 / Retail Investors Participation --- p.46 / PRC Second Board --- p.47 / Activities of Institutional Investors --- p.47 / GEI - A Good Proxy of GEM's Performance? --- p.48 / Discussing Conclusion for Qualitative Studies --- p.49 / BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.50

Wong Yu-kwan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-77). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.8 / Chapter 3 --- Data and Methodology --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1 --- Data description --- p.25 / Chapter 3.2 --- Data sources --- p.27 / Chapter 3.3 --- Methodology --- p.28 / Chapter 4 --- Results --- p.40 / Chapter 4.1 --- Results of correlations --- p.40 / Chapter 4.2 --- Results of holding rates of returns- MAAMRORsubIPos --- p.44 / Chapter 4.3 --- The post-listing price performance of the IPO firms --- p.51 / Chapter 4.4 --- Regression results --- p.59 / Chapter 5 --- Discussion --- p.65 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.70 / References --- p.74 / Tables --- p.78 / Appendix --- p.99