This paper provides specific estimates on the scale of profit shifting among hydrocarbon MNEs. We estimate a lower-bound semi-elasticity of reported profits to sector specific income taxation of -1.88. To assess the importance of domestic profit-shifting channels, we take advantage of domestic tax differentials among hydrocarbon producers facing additional rent taxes and find that domestic profit shifting accounts for about one third of total income concealed. Overall, we estimate revenue losses in the sector due to profit-shifting amount to 12% - 35% of the income tax base, depending on the characteristics of a country's tax regime. We also observe a higher vulnerability of non-OECD economies to profit shifting in our sample, which consists of 294 domestic and multinational parents and subsidiaries during the period from 2004-2012. Finally, our analysis confirms the mitigation effect of documentation requirements for internal transactions. However, we also find that increased enforcement prompts MNEs in the Oil and Gas sector to rely more heavily on the reallocation of profits at the domestic level. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Abundant anecdotal evidence is in accord with rigorous research results confirming the existence of various forms of international tax planning by multinational firms. Increasing availability of administrative data for research purposes has enabled researchers to study not only behavioural responses of US-based firms to taxation, but also of European and other multinationals. The present paper summarizes what we can learn from recent studies on tax avoidance strategies by multinational firms in general and by German multinationals in particular. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

We examine which tax allocation system leads to more severe distortions with respect to locational investment decisions. We consider separate accounting (SA) and formula apportionment (FA). The effects of both systems have been hotly debated in Europe in the past years. The reason is that the EU Member States are striving to implement a common European tax system that would lead to a switch from SA to FA. While existing studies focus primarily on the impact of taxes on locational decisions under either SA or FA, the main innovation of this paper is that it compares both systems with regard to the level of distortions they induce. We compare the optimal pre-tax investment decision with the optimal after-tax investment decision and infer from the difference in the allocation of investment funds which tax allocation system causes more severe distortions. We assume that the multinational group (MNG) has comprehensive book income shifting opportunities under SA. We find that the investment incentives under SA are opposed to those under FA for a profitable investment project. Whereas under SA as much as possible should be invested in a high-tax country, under FA as much as possible should be invested in a low-tax country. The distortions of locational investment decisions tend to be more severe under SA than under FA if a greater share of investment funds is to be invested in a low-tax country from a pre-tax perspective and the investment is profitable. Vice versa, locational decisions may be more distorted under FA if the optimal pre-tax investment decision requires investing a major share of funds in the high-tax country. In contrast to the often stated insensitivity of FA towards income shifting, we find the introduction of a tax allocation system based on FA in Europe could lead to a severe shift of economic substance to low-tax countries. The results of this paper are of particular interest for European policy makers and MNGs as our findings may induce European MNGs to reassess their recent locational investment decisions in the face of a potential future change in the applied tax allocation system. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

In July 2013 the OECD, to tackle multinational tax avoidance, published its Action Plan against base erosion and profit shifting. The Action Plan suggests a variety of legislative and administrative measures to eliminate frictions from interactions between domestic tax laws and international tax treaties, including potential double non-taxation of businesses operating in several countries. By virtue of the OECD's structure, the proposed measures have been designed and developed predominantly by representatives from the tax administrations of OECD member countries. Our research investigates the views and opinions of other stakeholders in this process, namely tax experts from practice. We conduct a conjoint analysis, surveying experts in international taxation regarding their perceptions and beliefs on the effectiveness of the proposed actions. We find that experts rank actions that are aimed at enhancing international coordination and cooperation, as well as actions that reduce legal uncertainty, higher than other actions. Of lesser importance are antitreaty-abuse measures, further transparency at the taxpayer level and amendments to the definition of permanent establishment. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

It is well-known that taxes affect risky investment decisions. Analytical studies indicate that tax rate increases (decreases) can foster (hinder) investment if there is flexibility, in particular when an exit option is available. We design an experiment based on an analytical model with binomial random walk and entry and exit flexibility. Contrasting the underlying model, we find accelerated investment, which is often considered as an increased willingness to invest, on tax rate increases to be independent of the existence of an exit option. However, we observe this investor reaction only for a tax increase, not for a tax decrease. This behavior is driven possibly by tax salience and the mechanisms known from the theory of irreversible choice under uncertainty. Our empirical evidence suggests that the at-first-sight unexpected tax reform effects are more common than is predicted by the theoretical literature. Policy makers should therefore carefully consider the behavioral aspects when anticipating taxpayer reactions. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

The growing dissatisfaction with perceived distributional inequality and budgetary constraints gave rise to a discussion on the (re-)introduction of wealth taxes. Wealth taxes are typically levied on private wealth, in some countries also on corporate wealth. To avoid misleading statements concerning possible distributional consequences of wealth taxes, preceding analyses of the economic and particularly investment effects are necessary. As investments drive job creation, tax-induced changes in investment timing may significantly affect the income and wealth distribution. We analyze the impact of wealth taxes on investment timing under uncertainty and irreversibility and the propensity to carry out risky projects. Using a Dixit/Pindyck type real options model we find that wealth taxes have real effects. This means that higher wealth tax rates can either stimulate or depress the propensity to invest in risky projects. We find that apparently paradoxical wealth tax effects (accelerated investment due to higher wealth tax rates) are more likely for low interest rates and for high-risk investments. Using either historical cost or fair value accounting may affect investment timing ambiguously. Thus, the design of wealth taxes is crucial for the resulting delay or acceleration of investment. Although our model takes an individual perspective, our findings are also relevant for the current tax policy discussion on the introduction of wealth taxes. Our results indicate that wealth taxes are particularly harmful for specific classes of investments, for example low-risk investments. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

The exchange of tax information has received ample attention recently, due to a number of recent headlines on aggressive tax planning and tax evasion. Whilst both participating tax authorities will gain when foreign investments (FDI) are bilateral, we demonstrate that FDI receiving nations will lose in asymmetric situations. We solve a bargaining model that proves that tax information exchange will only happen voluntarily with compensation for this loss. We then present empirical evidence in a global panel and find that a tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) or a double tax treaty with information exchange (DTT) is more likely when the capital importer is compensated through official development assistence (ODA). We finally demonstrate how the foreign account tax compliance act (FATCA) and similar international initiatives bias the bargaining outcome in favour of capital exporting countries. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Diese Dissertation untersucht, wie sich die Ausgestaltung eines Steuersystems – bzw. dessen Änderungen – auf die Dynamik von makroökonomischen Variablen auswirken kann. Die Analyse wird mit Hilfe von allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodellen durchgeführt, die Keynesianische Eigenschaften haben und durch die Berücksichtigung von stochastischen Elementen dynamisch sind. Die Arbeit umfasst drei Essays, deren Hauptfokus auf der Eurozone liegt und die politikrelevanten Fragestellungen gewidmet sind. Die Arbeit deckt klassische Themen wie fiskalische Multiplikatoren und „Liability-Side Equivalence“ ab, aber sie beschäftigt sich auch mit dem aktuellen Thema der fiskalischen Abwertung. Das erste Essay untersucht die Auswirkungen von Änderungen in der Mehrwertsteuer auf die gesamt– wirtschaftliche Leistung einer Volkswirtschaft. Die Neuerung gegenüber bisherigen modellbasierten Publikationen über diese Fragestellung besteht in einer realistischen Modellierung des „tax pass-through“, also der Weitergabe von Steueränderung an Konsumenten durch Preisanpassungen. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass eine empirisch plausible pass-through-Dynamik die kurzfristigen Mehrwertsteuer Multiplikatoren drastisch reduziert gegenüber denen in herkömmlichen Modellen. Die gewonnene Einsicht, dass Standard-Modelle der institutionellen und akademischen Forschung die kurzfristigen Multiplikatoren dramatisch überschätzen, kann potentiell zu einer Verbesserung von modellbasierten Politikempfehlungen beitragen. Das zweite Essay befasst sich mit fiskalischen Abwertungen. Diese Politik zielt auf eine Abwertung des realen Wechselkurses – und damit auf eine Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit – ab, ohne dabei die Anpassung eines nominalen Wechselkurses zu erfordern. Sie sieht eine Senkung der Sozialabgaben vor, die durch eine Erhöhung der Mehrwertsteuer finanziert wird. Ein höherer Mehrwertsteuersatz macht importierte Güter teuer, während geminderte Sozialabgaben (und damit geminderte marginale Produktionskosten und Preise) inländische Güter im Ausland billiger machen. In dem Papier betrachten wir eine gemeinsame fiskalische Abwertung aller Peripherieländer der Eurozone. Die Neuerung gegenüber anderen Studien besteht darin, dass Lohnrigiditäten berücksichtigt werden – welche sich für die Effektivität der Reform als zentral erweisen –, und dass wir zwischen zwei Sorten von Abwertungen unterscheiden: Eine, in der Sozialabgaben der Arbeitgeber gesenkt werden, und eine, in der Sozialabgaben der Arbeitnehmer verringert werden. In unserem Modell ist die erstgenannte Form der Abwertung deutlich effektiver. Das dritte Essay untersucht „Liability-Side Equivalence“ im Zusammenhang von Sozialabgaben. Dieses Prinzip besagt, dass die gesetzlich festgelegte Aufteilung der Abgaben zwischen Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern langfristig keinerlei Konsequenzen für die reale Allokation hat. Ich zeige hingegen, dass die Aufteilung der Abgaben Auswirkungen auf makroökonomische Fluktuationen, auf die Effizienz der Allokation, und damit auf die langfristige Produktivität hat. Die einzige nicht in der Literatur übliche Annahme, die für dieses Ergebnis benötigt wird, ist, dass das Sozialsystem ein ausgeglichenes Budget hat. / This thesis analyzes how the configuration of a country’s tax system – or a change to that system – can affect dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates in New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models. It contains three essays, each having a primary focus on the Euro Area and each addressing a policy-relevant question. The thesis covers classic topics like fiscal multipliers and Liability-Side Equivalence as well as the more recent subject of Fiscal Devaluations. The first essay analyzes the impact of changes in the value-added tax (VAT) on output. The innovation relative to previous theoretical contributions on this subject is that my model accounts for empirically observed tax pass-through dynamics. I find that the introduction of empirically plausible VAT pass-through dramatically lowers short-run multipliers relative to those obtained if tax pass-through is not rigorously modeled. By showing that workhorse models used in academic and institutional research overestimate the short-run impact of VAT changes, the work might help to improve model-based guidance on the design of discretionary fiscal policy packages. The second essay addresses Fiscal Devaluations, a policy that is aimed at deteriorating the real exchange rate – and thereby improving a country’s competitiveness – absent an adjustable nominal exchange rate. It prescribes a reduction in social security contributions financed by an increase in the VAT. The higher VAT increases the price for imported goods, while the reduction in social security contributions (which lowers marginal production costs and with it producer prices) makes domestic goods cheaper in the importing countries. In the co-authored paper, we analyze the impact of a Fiscal Devaluation jointly undertaken by Europe’s periphery countries. The novelty is that our model features nominal wage rigidity – which is shown to be crucial for the policy’s effectiveness – and that we compare two types of Fiscal Devaluations, one that reduces firms' social security contributions and one that lowers workers' contributions. We find that the former type is considerably more effective than the latter type. The third essay investigates Liability-Side Equivalence in the context of social security contributions. This principle implies that the statutory split of contributions between firms and workers does not matter for the real allocation in the long run. I contradict this notion by showing that it matters for macroeconomic fluctuations, for the efficiency of the allocation, and thereby for long-run productivity in my model. The only non-standard assumption required to generate this result is that the social security system runs a balanced budget.

This paper estimates the effect of globalization on the implicit tax rates (ITR) on capital income, labor income and consumption, and the share of social protection expenditures in total public expenditures in Western and Eastern Europe. It tests the coexistence of efficiency and compensation effects of globalization on the expenditure as well as the revenue sides of government budgets. In Western Europe, globalization leads to an increase in social expenditures; however these expenditures are to an increasing extent financed by taxes on labor income. There is no effect of the ITR on capital income, whereas the ITR on consumption decreases. There are important differences between the welfare states. In the conservative regimes, social expenditures increase due to globalization, but they are financed to an increasing extent by taxes on labor. In the social democratic regimes, not only social expenditures, but also the ITRs on capital income and consumption decrease as a result of globalization, whereas the ITR on labor income increases. In the liberal regimes, the ITR on labor income is rising, while social expenditures and the ITR on consumption is declining. In the southern regimes, the ITRs on both capital income and consumption are decreasing. In the CEE NMS, on average, there seems to be no statistically significant effect of globalization on social expenditures nor on the ITR on capital and labor income. Globalization affects only the ITR on consumption, leading to a decline. However, different welfare regimes react differently: there is a negative effect of globalization on social spending in the Baltic countries, and a negative effect on the ITR on capital income in the post-communist European regimes. (author's abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

The draft for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Directive in the European Union includes the suggestion for an apportionment formula which allocates taxable group profits to group member corporations. These allocated profits shall then be taxed in the respective Member States. The draft directive delegates the right to define one factor of the apportionment formula, the term "Employee" to the Member States, who are therefore free to choose a narrow or a broad definition, the latter including also atypical employment schemes. Using a game-theoretic approach the paper shows that the individually rational strategy of any Member State to define "Employee" broadly so as to maximize the volume of the apportionment factor and thus maximize the allocated share of taxable income is only the best solution when tax rate differences and differences in the volume of atypical employment schemes are disregarded. If such differentials and the corporate groups' reactions to different Member States' definitions are included in modelling the game's pay-offs a narrow definition of "Employee" yields the highest individual pay-offs to the Member States involved. This change of dominant strategies is triggered by the corporate group's shifting of the employment factor from high-tax to low-tax Member States. Our paper differs from previous research on the economic effects of the CCCTB apportionment formula as it is the first paper identifying and analysing the employment factor and its distorting effects. The paper discusses possible tax minimizing strategies for corporate groups by shifting workforce and develops a model to quantify these potential relocations. Furthermore the paper presents advice to policy makers in their "Employee" definition decision and shows how Member States could use this definition to both minimize outward factor shifting and maximize inward factor shifting.(authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series