To be able to do business, companies have to be equipped with capital by their shareholders. Usually, this capital is granted to them as equity. Nevertheless, it is also reasonable for shareholders to provide debt to the company. In any case, companies have to onsider the differences in taxation regarding equity and debt financing. That is why for internationally operating roups of companies the differing legal frameworks between countries are crucial factors for making decisions in corporate financing (Obser 2005: 1ff), especially because interest expenditure due to debt financing is usually tax-deductible in almost every country and thus considerably reduces a company's tax base (Jacobs 2007, 909). Hence, internationally operating companies should consider the various differing corporate tax rates between countries in their financing strategies in order to minimize their total tax base. (author's abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

Dieses Papier nimmt eine theoriegeleitete empirische Analyse des OECD Projekts gegen schädliche Steuerpraktiken vor. Auf der Grundlage der Literatur zur Handlungsfähigkeit von Nationalstaaten angesichts wirtschaftlicher Globalisierung wird ein theoretisches Modell des Steuerwettbewerbs als asymmetrisches Gefangenendilemma entwickelt. Aus dieser Spielstruktur werden verschiedene Hypothesen über die Wahrscheinlichkeit und Form der internationalen Kooperation generiert. Es kann zum Beispiel erwartet werden, dass Kooperation, sofern sie überhaupt zustande kommt, nur multilateral erfolgen wird. Des weiteren sieht das Modell die kleinen Staaten in der strukturell stärkeren Verhandlungsposition. Die Zusammenhänge, die diesen und weiteren Hypothesen unterliegen, werden mit sogenannten Schelling Diagrammen veranschaulicht. Anschließend werden die Hypothesen mit dem empirischen Material konfrontiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass das Modell in wesentlichen Zügen zutreffende Vorhersagen generiert. Allerdings zeigt sich, dass die kleinen Staaten ihren ökonomisch definierten strukturellen Vorteil nicht in Verhandlungsmacht verwandeln können. Abschließend wird diskutiert, inwieweit sich die Erklärungslücken des interessenbasierten Modells durch die Berücksichtigung der Faktoren Macht und Ideen schließen lassen. (Autorenref.) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

(kein Abstract vorhanden) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

(kein Abstract vorhanden) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

The Central- and East European Countries have lowered their corporate tax rates substantially in order to induce shifts of production capacity to their countries. This paper analyses empirically how inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows channeled to these countries reacts to these tax policies. We estimate a panel of 35 bilateral country-relationships over a period of 1995-2002. Results suggest a semielasticity of -2.93 which is in line with results derived in studies mainly on OECD countries. This indicates that from an individual country perspective, tax-lowering strategies have been successful in the past, yet they may not be a successful policy option for the future when privatization-related FDI will decrease. / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

Company-taxation policies in the Central and East European New Member States (CEE-NMS) have been frequently characterised as tax-cutting strategies in order to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). On the basis of a survey of six empirical studies a median value of the tax-rate elasticities of FDI of -0.22 in CEE-NMS and mediterranean periphery countries is derived. Yet, these tax-rate elasticities probably suffer from a sort of measurement error bias since these studies entirely rely on the host country Statutory tax rate as measure of tax burden. Building on a thorough criticism of FDI as a measure reflecting multinational activity and the Statutory tax rate as a reliable measure of the effective tax burden, 315 effective average bilateral tax rates (BEATR) are calculated for seven home countries and five CEE-NMS for the period 1996-2004, following the approach of Devereux and Griffith (1998). Since our empirical results show substantial differences in the variability of the host country Statutory tax rates and the BEATRs, it is contended that the latter should be used as explanatory variables in empirical studies. / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

Politicians and tax practitioners often claim that tax uncertainty negatively affects investment. In many countries, firms can request fee-based Advance Tax Rulings (ATRs) to mitigate tax uncertainty. We analyze theoretically the circumstances under which investors request ATRs, how tax authorities should price them and how they can affect investment. We assume that tax authorities integrate investors' reasoning into their decisions. We find that it is often optimal for tax authorities to charge prohibitively high fees to discourage firms from requesting an ATR. However, we find that revenue-maximizing tax authorities offer ATRs if the ruling enables them either to significantly reduce their tax audit costs or to increase the probability of detecting ambiguous tax issues. Under certain circumstances, ATRs may effectively foster investment and potentially benefit both the tax authorities and taxpayers. Our results provide new explanations for why taxpayers that face high levels of tax uncertainty often do not request ATRs, even when the fee is rather low. Our results also hold when the tax authority maximizes social wealth instead of its revenues. Regulatory changes in ATR requirements might serve as a natural quasi-experiment for an empirical study of our predictions regarding investment decisions. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

The growing dissatisfaction with perceived distributional inequality and budgetary constraints gave rise to a discussion on the (re-)introduction of wealth taxes. Wealth taxes are typically levied on private wealth, in some countries also on corporate wealth. To avoid misleading statements concerning possible distributional consequences of wealth taxes, preceding analyses of the economic and particularly investment effects are necessary. As investments drive job creation, tax-induced changes in investment timing may significantly affect the income and wealth distribution. We analyze the impact of wealth taxes on investment timing under uncertainty and irreversibility and the propensity to carry out risky projects. Using a Dixit/Pindyck type real options model we find that wealth taxes have real effects. This means that higher wealth tax rates can either stimulate or depress the propensity to invest in risky projects. We find that apparently paradoxical wealth tax effects (accelerated investment due to higher wealth tax rates) are more likely for low interest rates and for high-risk investments. Using either historical cost or fair value accounting may affect investment timing ambiguously. Thus, the design of wealth taxes is crucial for the resulting delay or acceleration of investment. Although our model takes an individual perspective, our findings are also relevant for the current tax policy discussion on the introduction of wealth taxes. Our results indicate that wealth taxes are particularly harmful for specific classes of investments, for example low-risk investments. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus vier Kapiteln zum Thema Steuerfehlwahrnehmung. Kapitel 1 gibt einen Überblick über die bisherige Literatur und systematisiert sie durch die Entwicklung des Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model. Das Ausmaß der Steuerfehlwahrnehmung wird u.a. durch die Verfügbarkeit von Informationen und persönliche Merkmale beeinflusst. Auch wenn Steuerinformationen verfügbar sind, schätzen die Steuerpflichtigen die Steuerlast falsch ein, weil sie sich in einem begrenzten Maße rational verhalten. Die umfangreiche Literatur zeigt auch, dass es nur wenig Literatur in Bezug auf Unternehmen gibt. Wir schließen diese Forschungslücke in Kapitel 2, indem wir die Fehlwahrnehmung durch Unternehmen in Deutschland analysieren. Um Datenbeschränkungen zu überwinden, verwenden wir einen innovativen Ansatz, der robuste Schätzungen liefert. Im Allgemeinen nehmen die Unternehmen ihre durchschnittlichen Steuersätze und Grenzsteuersätze deutlich verzerrt wahr und haben Probleme mit dem Konzept des Grenzsteuersatzes. Fehlwahrnehmungen werden tendenziell von der Komplexität, dem Steuerwissen und der Unzufriedenheit mit dem Steuersystem beeinflusst. Im Zusammenhang mit der Vermögensbesteuerung zeigen wir in Kapitel 3 anhand eines Umfrageexperiments, dass die Fehlwahrnehmung der jährlichen Vermögensteuer aufgrund ihrer mathematischen Komplexität zu einer verzerrten Präferenz führt. Die Information über die tatsächliche Steuerbelastung führt zu deutlich niedrigeren präferierten Steuersätzen. In dem abschließenden Kapitel 4 überprüfen wir die Ergebnisse einer Studie zur Steuervermeidung, die von den Grünen/EFA im Europäischen Parlament in Auftrag gegeben wurde. Diese Studie erregte große Aufmerksamkeit, weil sie behauptete, dass Unternehmen in Deutschland weit weniger Steuern zahlen, als der gesetzliche Steuersatz vermuten ließe. Wir zeigen, dass die Ergebnisse falsch sind und tragen damit zur Steuertransparenz in Deutschland bei. / This dissertation consists of four chapters on tax misperception. Chapter 1 reviews the previous literature on tax misperceptions and systematizes it through the development of the Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model. The extent of tax misperception is determined by information availability and personal characteristics. Under the assumption that tax information is available, taxpayers may even misperceive the tax burden because they behave in a rational bounded manner. The extensive literature also shows that there is little literature on corporations. We address this research gap in Chapter 2, which analyzes the misperception of tax rates by firms in Germany. To overcome data limitations, we use an innovative approach to measure tax misperception that provides robust estimates. In general, firms significantly misperceive their average (ATR) and marginal tax rates (MTR) and have problems with the concept MTR. Misperceptions tend to be influenced by the complexity of the tax system, tax knowledge, and satisfaction with the current tax system. In the context of wealth taxation, we use a survey experiment in Chapter 3 to show that misperception of a yearly wealth tax, due to its mathematical complexity, leads to a biased preference for wealth taxation. Informing respondents about the actual tax burden leads to significantly lower preferred tax parameters. In the final Chapter 4, we question the findings of a study on tax avoidance commissioned by the Greens/EFA in the European Parliament. This study attracted media attention because it claimed that companies in Germany pay far less tax than the statutory tax rate would suggest. We demonstrate that their findings are wrong and help to increase tax transparency in Germany.