There is a big debate among economists, why are the resource-rich economies growing slower than resource-poor economies? Which is making this puzzle more difficult, there are two groups of resources-rich abundance countries one group grow more than other ones. For instance, the Arabic Gulf, Nigeria, and Venezuela are growing slower than Botswanan, Norway, and Australia, but both groups are resources-rich countries. Is it the resources curse scenario? Or is it weak institutions? To study this puzzle, I have observed two groups of studies. The first group of old studies claim that the problem of low growth in resources-rich economics comes from the scenario of Dutch disease, but the second group or more recent studies strongly refuse the claim by the first group. They have debated that the problem comes from poor institutional quality. We totally agree with both groups, yet we have another scenario. The resources-rich countries suffer from Dutch diseases problem and from poor quality of institutions. We strongly criticize the most significant a series of studies by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997a,1997b, 2001). They have debated that the Dutch Disease scenario is a possible mechanism of the resource curse, which is the labor factor and capital factor move from the manufacturing and service sectors to the natural resources sector. Thus, the negative effect of natural resources on economic growth is direct effect. We argue that there is a positive relationship between most types of natural resources (oil) and economic growth. We claim also this a positive relationship holds true even after controlling for significant variables found to be for economic growth. We are not only debating that the main symptoms of the resources curse come from the weakness of institutional quality, but also come from Dutch disease scenario. We see that the indirect effect of natural resources on economic growth. To prove this association, we have used multiple institutions and resources. However, we set up three chapters: The first chapter discusses how natural resources (oil rents) impact institutional quality (control of corruption) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We discuss that is there any possibility of interaction terms between oil rents and rule of law from one side, and between oil rents and democracy from another side to avoid high corruption in MENA countries? Our findings confirm: First, the oil rents can highly feed corruption. Second, our estimates confirm that the relationship between oil rents and corruption depends on the quality of institutions (rule of law), which oil rents avoid to feed corruption unless the mean of quality of law role is (0.33). Furthermore, our findings suggest that the autocracy is better policy in the region. In the second chapter, to approach to our goal, the main symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon in MENA. The findings confirm that the economic growth in MENA is greatly and positively influence by oil rents, but we have blamed poor institutions leading to the phenomenon of resources curse. When the weakness of institutions reaches to certain limits, oil rents will start to create a negative impact on growth. This result seems to confirm the theory of the natural resource curse and to confirm that resources-rich countries are associated with poor institutions. Moreover, the interaction terms between diversification and oil rent can promote economic growth. In the third chapter, we discuss how the interaction terms between various types of natural resources, petroleum, natural coal, and coal, and political stability influence economic growth? The findings have diagnosed there are dissimilar effects by petroleum, natural gas, and coal on economic growth.

Cette thèse s'intéresse au rôle de la qualité des institutions sur le développement économique des pays. Elle se situe dans la perspective des travaux de la nouvelle économie politique. La méthodologie utilisée est principalement l'analyse économétrique de données originales, notamment d'évènements historiques profonds comme par exemple l'identité du colonisateur, les conflits lors de l'Indépendance, la guerre froide et les soutiens des États puissants du monde. Elle traite dans un premier chapitre de l'effet des institutions sur la croissance économique via les variables qui affectent la productivité totale des facteurs. Le résultat indique que la qualité des institutions explique les différentiels de croissance de la productivité totale des facteurs. La manière dont les institutions et les politiques économiques agissent sur celle-ci dépend également du niveau du développement humain de chaque pays. A partir de ce résultat acquis, la thèse se propose ensuite de savoir pourquoi dans certains pays, en particulier les pays africains, les institutions sont de moins bonne qualité que dans d'autres. La principale cause de l'existence d'un système institutionnel néfaste au développement économique serait l'existence de fortes incitations des élites ou des groupes sociaux qui exercent le pouvoir politique à maintenir des politiques et institutions inefficaces afin de rendre l'expropriation des rentes du secteur des ressources naturelles immobiles plus facile. Il est montré, en effet, que ces élites peuvent se maintenir au pouvoir voire s'enrichir sans mettre en œuvre des institutions et des politiques économiques développementalistes c'est-à-dire favorables au développement économique. Le deuxième chapitre présente un modèle théorique permettant d'analyser la politique gouvernementale endogène et les divergences dans les performances économiques liées aux incitations politiques générées par les rentes des ressources dans les pays d'Afrique. Le troisième chapitre analyse empiriquement l'impact de la qualité des institutions et de la dépendance aux ressources naturelles sur le taux de croissance du PIB. L'analyse montre qu'il n'y a malédiction des ressources naturelles que dans les pays où les institutions extractives ont été mises en place pendant la colonisation. De plus, le phénomène de la malédiction diminue en Afrique au fur et à mesure que l'on s'éloigne de la fin de la Guerre froide. Le quatrième chapitre explique à partir des modèles de durée les grandes divergences de longévité au pouvoir des présidents africains. Le test trouve que c'est plus le mécénat des Etats puissants que la présence de ressources naturelles qui explique la longévité au pouvoir et que l'aide soviétique est plus efficace que l'aide américaine lorsqu'il s'agit de maintenir les dictateurs au pouvoir. L'utilisation des mécénats pour leur défense militaire permet aux dictateurs d'éviter de développer des institutions efficaces et la taxation. Le cinquième et dernier chapitre analyse l'effet de l'institutionnalisation des partis politiques (mesurée par la différence, dans un pays, entre le nombre d'années du parti politique du dirigeant, et le nombre d'années d'exercice du pouvoir de ce dernier) sur la qualité institutionnelle d'un pays. Il montre que lorsque le parti s'organise autour d'un homme, les débats à l'intérieur du parti portent uniquement sur le leadership, alors que quand il se fonde autour d'un programme le débat porte sur la définition de l'intérêt général. L'analyse montre également que l'absence d'institutionnalisation des partis a un effet sur la sélection des élites et sur le mode de gouvernance d’un pays, c'est-à-dire la Qualité des institutions. / This thesis focuses on the impact of institutional quality on the economic development of countries. It is in the perspective of the work of the new political economy. The methodology used is mainly econometric analysis of original data, including deep historical events such as the identity of the colonizer, conflicts at Independence, the Cold War and the support of powerful states in the world. It deals in the first chapter of the effect of institutions on economic growth via the variables that affect the total factor productivity. The variable 'quality of institutions' explains differential growth of total factor productivity. However, the analysis conducted shows that the way institutions and economic policies affect it depends on the level of human development in each country. There is therefore no universal model of good institutions. Instead, institutions should be adapted to contexts according t the degree of development. From the result obtained, the thesis then explains why in some countries, especially African countries, institutions are of lower quality than in others. The main cause of the existence of an adverse institutional system to economic development is the existence of strong incentives for elites or social groups who wield political power to maintain inefficient policies and institutions to make the rents expropriation easier in sector with immobile natural resources. It is shown, in fact, that these elites can maintain power to enrich themselves even without implementing institutions and 'developmentalist' economic policies that is to say in favor of economic development. The second chapter presents a theoretical model allowing to analyze the endogenous government policy and differences in economic performance related to political incentives generated by resource rents in African countries. The third chapter empirically analyzes the impact of institutional quality and dependence on natural resources on the growth rate of GDP. The analysis shows that there is a curse of natural resources in countries where extractive institutions were established during the colonial period. ln addition, the phenomenon of the curse decreases, gradually in Africa as, one moves away from the end of the Cold War. The fourth chapter explains from the duration models, large differences in longevity in the power of African presidents. The test found that it is sponsorship by powerful States more than the presence of natural resources which explains the longevity in power and Soviet aid is more effective than American aid when it comes to keeping dictators in power. The use of sponsorships for their military defense allows dictators to avoid developing effective institutions and taxation. The fifth and final chapter analyzes the effect of institutionalization of political parties (measured by the difference in a country, the number of years the leader of the political party, and the number of years of exercise of power the latter) on the institutional quality of a country. It shows that when the party is organized around a man, debates within the party are only on leadership, whereas when it is based around a program debating the definition of general interest. The analysis also shows that the lack of institutionalization of the parties has an effect on the selection of elites and the governance of a country, in other words, the quality of its institutions.

Cette thèse étudie les causes de l’essoufflement de la croissance des pays Sud méditerranéens en les comparants aux pays asiatiques. Cette comparaison a été faite à travers l’analyse des politiques industrielles et éducatives menées, ainsi qu’à travers la dimension institutionnelle. On a également essayé d’analyser les facteurs économiques et sociaux qui ont probablement contribué à déclencher les révoltes dans ces pays. Nos résultats empiriques ont montré que la qualité des institutions est un déterminant pertinent des différences de croissance. Ils ont également montré que c’est la Tunisie qui a réuni les facteurs nécessaires pour que cette révolution soit réalisée. Le degré de développement de la société civile- mesuré par les taux de participation de la femme à la vie active et d’utilisation d’Internet- semble jouer un rôle important dans le déclenchement de ces révoltes, et ceci dans un contexte de taux de chômage élevé, d’inégalités de revenus et de faible niveau de démocratie. / The thesis investigates the causes of growth weakening in southern Mediterranean countries in comparison with Asian countries through industrial and educational policies analysis, as well as through the institutional dimension. It also attempts to analyze the economic and social factors that may have contributed to triggering the revolts experienced by these countries. The main results of this research are: First, the quality of institutions is a relevant determinant of growth differences between countries. Second, Tunisia is the country that gathered together the most necessary elements for this revolution to be achieved. Third, it is found out that the degree of development of civil society as measured by the participation rate of women in the workforce as well as the rate of Internet use played an important role in triggering these revolts. This result is achieved in an environment featured by high levels of unemployment, income inequality, and low levels of democracy.