A portfolio can be defined as “a purposeful combination of items” (Chien and Sainfort 1998). As the topic relates to research and development (R&D) the items in question are technologies, projects or products under consideration for inclusion in a given portfolio. As described by surveys from Cooper et al (1998), companies have widely varying practices for portfolio selection. This thesis examines existing literature to determine the key characteristics of good portfolio and portfolio method. The approach needs to handle multiple objectives, account for project interactions, and address the social aspect of decision making. The resulting portfolio should be aligned with business strategy, balanced, and of maximum value. It introduces general concepts that have been used to select single projects and reviews five specific applications and assesses them against the key characteristics from the literature. After identifying gaps in the current approaches, a comprehensive approach is proposed. This approach would (1) apply multi-attribute decision analysis at the portfolio level, (2) apply constraints for common inputs to cost such as resources, and (3) apply probabilistic methods to account for project interaction. This approach incorporates successful elements from existing approaches and addresses the two areas that are not adequately addressed with current approaches.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-01

Governments in both advanced and emerging markets invest heavily into joint R&D projects to facilitate inter-firm collaboration and scientific productivity. As a science-based cluster, nanotechnology is a highly R&D-intensive field with very complex interdisciplinary features that enables multiple interactions between scientists from diverse cultural backgrounds working for multi-faceted organizations across public and private sectors and through internationally regulated borders. In this thesis, I examine the main determinants of the dimensions of inter-firm collaboration in high-tech industries particularly among nanotechnology R&D organisations across Europe. Also, I investigate the key factors that influence the innovation, financial and exit performance of nanotech companies during the commercialisation period and across 15 developed and developing countries, taking into consideration the involvement of venture capital (VC) firms. In order to methodically integrate the qualitative and quantitative features of my research study, I employed mixed method to analyse primary and secondary data collected via survey instruments and comprehensive databases; to gain valuable insights into the complexities around nanotech R&D organisations. The regression results show that a predictable legal system; a high level of tolerance for uncertainty; the proximity to key partners; a high level of export demand for high-tech products; and expansionary economic policies, leads to highly valuable and long-term relationships which produces optimal partnership size with an effective organizational structure. I find that a high financial status of nanotech firms equips R&D project managers with sufficient tangible and intangible resources to engage into complex collaborative partnerships which yield innovative performing outcomes. Also, I find that nanotech R&D firms that exit venture capital investments via IPO are more likely to have their head offices in a big city; and access foreign capital to expand manufacturing operations. I conclude that the successful commercialisation of nanotechnology industries across the globe has been due to the substantial R&D public expenditures and private investments into the application and proliferation of nanotechnologies in key converging scientific fields which require robust inter-firm collaborative partnerships to rapidly develop and promote several portfolios of high-tech products that continually satisfy consumer needs in disruptive ways and secure long-term profitability for nanotech R&D organisations.

This thesis centres around the issue of R&D, investment and growth: it is mainly concerned with the rationale which shapes the optimal investment pattern defined by a firm over time in a growing economy. We start considering the economy as a whole in order to evaluate how its actual functioning (interaction between research labs, risk of failure in innovating, patent laws and so on) shapes firms' specific investment policies. More precisely, we focus on the R&D process as it really develops in the market, and examine what is the optimal investment policy for firms involved in research and whether the selected investment policy in turn sustains the growth path of the economy. After analysing how the economic environment may affect firms' investment plans, we propose to identify the decision mechanism, as it develops inside the firm, through which an investment policy is defined over time. Thus, we move to an in-depth analysis of the process through which a profit-maximizing entity selects a specific investment policy when it is required to expand its production plant in order to satisfy a growing economy. / Cette thèse porte sur les questions de recherche et développements, d'investissement et de croissance : elle concerne principalement les raisons qui définissent au cours du temps l'investissement optimal dans une économie en croissance. Dans un premier temps, on considère l'économie dans sa globalité pour évaluer dans quelle mesure son fonctionnement actuel (interaction entre les laboratoires de recherches, risques d'échecs de innovations, licences, etc…) détermine les politiques d'investissement spécifiques des firmes. Plus précisément, l'analyse porte sur le processus de R&D qui se développe sur le marché et sur la politique d'investissement optimal pour des firmes impliquées dans la recherche. A son tour est analysée si la politique d'investissement sélectionnée soutient la croissance de l'économie. Dans un second temps, suite à l'analyse des effets de l'environnement économique sur les plans d investissement des firmes, nous proposons d'identifier le mécanisme décisionnel qui se développe a l'intérieur de la firme à partir duquel une politique d'investissement est définie dans le temps. Ainsi, nous présentons une analyse détaillée du processus à partir duquel une entité poursuivant la maximisation de son profit sélectionne une politique d'investissement particulière lorsqu'elle doit accroître sa production dans le but de satisfaire à l'économie en croissance.

Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions. These two approaches are usually labeled as "make" and "buy" strategies. In this paper, I examine the relation between a firm's choice of "make" or "buy" and the performance measures used in the firm's CEO compensation contract. I focus on the two major differences between "make" and "buy" strategies: the risk levels and accounting treatments. I then examine the differential implications of accounting-based and stock-based performance measures on managers' incentive in choosing between the two strategies. Using data from US high tech industries, I find that, firms relying on "buy" approach to obtain technology tend to depend more on the accounting-based performance measures, while those firms who innovate through R&D activities skew toward stock-based pay especially stock options

Abstract The purpose of this study is to use Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to find out success factors of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) R&D alliances and relative importance of these factors, and then to get the key successful factors (KSFs) to discuss why these KSFs have important influence on SMEs R&D alliances. AHP and case study are used in this research. Through literature review, the researcher develops 4 criteria and 16 successful factors which are arranged in hierarchical structure chart. Next, case study is used to make this chart reflect better the conditions of Taiwanese SMEs R&D alliances. Finally, to find out the KSFs, AHP is used to design the questionnaire and do questionnaire survey. The results of this study are: 1. The relative importance of the 4 criteria is: business strategy (0.386), the mechanism of R&D alliance management (0.283), partners¡¦ relationship (0.207), and government policy (0.124). 2. The 6 KSFs are: identifying market demand (0.137), clearly defining roles and responsibilities (0.101), establishing mechanism of communication and mutual trust (0.091), using complementary resources and technology (0.079), routinely assessing and adjusting (0.074), and emphasizing the degree of commitment (0.074).

Prior relative studies document that the initial underpricing and long-term underperformance of IPOs are due to information asymmetry and investors¡¦ misevaluations. However, these studies rarely identify the source of information asymmetry. The purpose of this study is to identify the contribution of R&D to information asymmetry. We then discuss the influence of R&D on initial underpricing of IPOs, and examine whether the long-term underperformance exists in R&D-intensive companies or not. Based on a sample of 702 Taiwen IPOs issued during 1991-2003, this study identify the source of information asymmetry ¡X the R&D activities of issuers. Our findings indicate that these activities significantly affect both the initial underpricing of IPOs and their long-term performance. The results can be summarized as follows. (1) R&D is positively correlated with underpricing. (2) R&D is positively related to long-term performance.

Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R&D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R&D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R&D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R&D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition, but is irrelevant under R&D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R&D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R&D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D relative to environmental R&D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R&D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R&D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R&D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R&D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R&D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R&D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R&D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R&D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).

Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R&D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R&D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R&D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R&D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition, but is irrelevant under R&D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R&D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R&D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D relative to environmental R&D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R&D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R&D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R&D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R&D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R&D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R&D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R&D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R&D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).

In this paper, my purpose is to test whether the government education policy and R&D expenditure policy can lead to development of patents or not. I use an idea-based growth model as the framework while treating patents as outputs to analyze patent development. I use the data of R&D intensity, patent and human capital of 30 countries in OECD from 1997 to 2006 based on panel data model to analyze their relationships. Research shows that R&D intensity and human capital produce some effects on patent development. Finally, I give some advice for government policy about improving patents.