Background: Management control systems (MCS) are used to control organizations and make employees behave and act in the desirable way. Performance measurement (PM) systems one type of MCS and are used to communicate company strategies throughout the organization, motivate the employees to work towards company goals, and measure the outcome. PM systems can be a powerful tool, but if used in the wrong way they can have adverse effects. Aim: This thesis focused on the use of PM systems for management control purposes in research and development (R&D) organisations with the question: How can performance measurement systems be utilized in R&D organizations? Method: The thesis is based on a literature study, complemented by a case study (metric analysis, survey and deep interviews) at a R&D department. The department was investigated at two time points, in between which the PM system was re-designed. In the metric analysis, the performance targets of the PM system were categorized into quantitative-objective, quantitative-subjective and qualitative-subjective targets. Results: The results from the case study were in line with findings from the literature. At study point 2, when the PM system had been re-designed, the employees felt more involved in shaping and influencing the goals. Also the follow-up of the goals was experienced as more implemented at study point two. The types of measured targets had shifted from quantitative to qualitative, including soft values such as team spirit, at study point 2. However, the members did not feel that the goals motivated them at any time point. . Conclusion: In the literature review it was evident from the number of publications that there is a great interest in measuring R&D performance, and that PM systems are an important tool to R&D managers. Just as the company in this case study, each organization needs to analyze its own needs and adopt the PM system thereafter. Moreover, no system should be seen as static, instead it should be continuously evaluated and adjusted to make sure it measures what it is intended to measure and that it does not cause adverse effects on the organization.

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A mandate is “a business, or element of a business, in which the subsidiary participates and for which it has responsibilities beyond its national market” (Birkinshaw, 1996, p. 467). In the past MNCs set up subsidiaries as miniature replicas of the parent firm but with a changing global market the role of the subsidiary has developed into holding specific mandates. Much has been written about how subsidiaries gain mandates, but in this paper we focus on what causes a subsidiary to lose its mandate. By using AstraZeneca’s R&D unit in Södertälje as a case we examine the loss of mandates and to what extent technological capabilities are connected to the loss of mandates. The paper shows that explaining the loss of mandates is complex and requires consideration of several perspectives. We here provide a starting point for other researchers to continue upon.

Innovation and technological improvements are essential components in generating growth. While this topic is well studied, limited research exists on the effectiveness of innovation and how it drives firm value. The 2008 Financial Crisis serves as a major historical event that significantly changed the economic environment in the US. Centering my analysis around this event, my study empirically examines the efficiency of innovation investments and industry-level stock returns. By taking patents issued as a percentage of R&D outlays, I measure Efficient Innovation—how effective a firm’s R&D is in generating significant innovative change.

This study examines the effects of research and development (R&D) reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation decisions. The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor compensation (control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of restricted stock compensation). Using salient short-term incentives to motivate real earnings management, this study demonstrates that capitalization may result in managers foregoing economically efficient R&D investment opportunities. The results indicate that managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation structure has little influence on managers’ R&D project continuation choices. However, when managers capitalizing R&D expenditures had knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted (short-term) stock compensation their perceived personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. Participants who capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor received restricted (long-term) stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to please their supervisor significantly higher than all other participants. Additionally, participants with knowledge that their supervisors restricted stock compensation were significantly more concerned about the likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. These findings contribute to the management accounting literature by providing new insights on the influence of knowledge of supervisor compensation on managerial decision making as well as additional insights into the factors that contribute to and limit real earnings management. This study also extends the literature on R&D by providing evidence of the potential for real earnings management when R&D expenditures are capitalized in the absence of personal responsibility.

The thesis summarizes current state of art for the most recent research capabilities of innovation activities analysis. Its main goal is to assess the factors influencing pace and volume of technological innovativeness throughout the European industry and services sectors considering time span 2002-2008 using country-level Community Innovation Surveys and R&D data. It also attempts to evaluate trends in innovation policy instruments targeted to close the gap between Europe and world innovation leaders such as USA. Complex literature overview, basic empirical and extended instruments' analyses lead to recommendations of optimal governments' policy approaches towards different groups of countries divided by level of innovative performance.

Valuation of R&D projects is quite complex due to the substantial uncertainties in a project's life-cycle phases. The sequential nature of R&D projects continuously provides decision-makers with choices regarding whether and when to undertake future potential investment opportunities. This means that when valuing R&D projects decision-makers should take these factors into account. But R&D project usually takes long time to complete processes for commercialization. If the time to complete is longer, it is easier to trigger the crisis for capital shortage. So it seems very important modeling the capital shortage risk to induce the probability of failure in the pricing model. In this thesis we try to apply the analogy of financial securities subject to credit risk of Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) and attempt to value patents with capital shortage risk in an arbitrage free environment using the martingale measure technique. Furthermore, derive closed form formula for patents valuation which makes application easier than that of the theoretic option model. The major findings are: (1) when considering the effect of the failure frequency (capital shortage risk), the patent value will grow rapidly and then converge in the short run, no matter how other parameters incorporated into the robust analysis; (2) when increasing in the volatility of market revenues with synchronized higher volatility of investment cost, the volatility curve will be distorted to be U-shaped. Meanwhile, lower failure frequency could aggravate the decreasing in the option value. Another issue is when the manager exercises the project with multiple underlying assets, where the assets returns are of non-linear correlation particularly in the non-Normal environment. Non-parametric dependence measures may better employed when explaining co-movement. We focus on the value of a (such as resources development) project in general depends on the price of the multiple products; these are usually correlated to some extent. So the project was treated as having a rainbow option, whose underlying asset prices correlate with each other, and also as having uncertainties that decrease according to the project stage. Based on Cherubini and Luciano’s framework (2002), the risk-neutral copula models are derived to figure decision flexibilities out easily. The main framework studies the valuation of a project (call on Max) by determining the joint risk-neutral distribution of the underlying assets (products) using copulas. Monte-Carlo simulations show that the higher default risk and association among the assets and the expected cost to completion contributes the higher risk premium in our model with dependence structure of Archimedean copula family than traditional Black-Scholes environment. / Valuation of R&D projects is quite complex due to the substantial uncertainties in a project's life-cycle phases. The sequential nature of R&D projects continuously provides decision-makers with choices regarding whether and when to undertake future potential investment opportunities. This means that when valuing R&D projects decision-makers should take these factors into account. But R&D project usually takes long time to complete processes for commercialization. If the time to complete is longer, it is easier to trigger the crisis for capital shortage. So it seems very important modeling the capital shortage risk to induce the probability of failure in the pricing model. In this thesis we try to apply the analogy of financial securities subject to credit risk of Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) and attempt to value patents with capital shortage risk in an arbitrage free environment using the martingale measure technique. Furthermore, derive closed form formula for patents valuation which makes application easier than that of the theoretic option model. The major findings are: (1) when considering the effect of the failure frequency (capital shortage risk), the patent value will grow rapidly and then converge in the short run, no matter how other parameters incorporated into the robust analysis; (2) when increasing in the volatility of market revenues with synchronized higher volatility of investment cost, the volatility curve will be distorted to be U-shaped. Meanwhile, lower failure frequency could aggravate the decreasing in the option value. Another issue is when the manager exercises the project with multiple underlying assets, where the assets returns are of non-linear correlation particularly in the non-Normal environment. Non-parametric dependence measures may better employed when explaining co-movement. We focus on the value of a (such as resources development) project in general depends on the price of the multiple products; these are usually correlated to some extent. So the project was treated as having a rainbow option, whose underlying asset prices correlate with each other, and also as having uncertainties that decrease according to the project stage. Based on Cherubini and Luciano’s framework (2002), the risk-neutral copula models are derived to figure decision flexibilities out easily. The main framework studies the valuation of a project (call on Max) by determining the joint risk-neutral distribution of the underlying assets (products) using copulas. Monte-Carlo simulations show that the higher default risk and association among the assets and the expected cost to completion contributes the higher risk premium in our model with dependence structure of Archimedean copula family than traditional Black-Scholes environment.

This thesis contributes to the analysis of optimal industrial and strategic trade policy in the presence of oligopoly and other forms of imperfect competition, so as to make contact with important empirical regularities and policy concerns, such as international R&D collaboration, unionization and free trade. First, in the context of international competition in which R&D plays an important role, we study the consequences of allowing governments to subsidize R&D and coalition deviation on the R&D collaboration networks. Then we investigate the formation of FTAs as a network formation game. While the analysis of welfare effects takes the central stage, we also analyze the nature of trading regimes that are consistent with the incentives of individual countries. We address the issue of conflict of interests among firms, consumers and governments as well. Finally, we integrate the analysis of international R&D collaboration and strategic trade policies, and demonstrate how an asymmetric equilibrium arises from an international trade model with symmetric countries and symmetric firms, and study whether it is sometimes possible to improve national welfare by jointly implementing trade and industrial policies.

This dissertation investigates three sets of research questions. First, how can partner selection be used as a mechanism to minimize R&D alliance participants’ concerns about knowledge leakage? And what is the nature of the relationship among partner selection and two previously-studied protection mechanisms – governance structure and alliance scope? Extending this research question to the international context, the second set of research questions asks how international R&D alliances differ from their domestic counterparts in partner selection to protect their participants’ valuable knowledge, and how different types of international R&D alliances vary in this regard. Distinguishing bilateral from multilateral R&D alliances, this dissertation examines a third set of questions about how multilateral R&D alliances differ from bilateral ones in partner selection for the purpose of protecting participants’ technological assets. Hypotheses are proposed and tested with a sample of 2,185 R&D alliances involving companies in high technology industries. Results indicate that the more radical the innovation an R&D alliance intends to develop, the more likely the alliance will be formed between Friends than Strangers. However, under the same situation, firms are less likely to select Acquaintances than Strangers. A substitution effect was detected among partner selection, governance structure, and alliance scope used by firms to protect their valuable technological assets from being appropriated in R&D alliances. In addition, no empirical support was found for different partner selection preferences for firms forming domestic R&D alliances versus international R&D alliances. However, results show that firms, when forming trinational R&D alliances and/or traditional international R&D alliances, are more likely to select their prior partners than when forming cross-nation domestic R&D alliances. Moreover, this study shows that when an R&D alliance is formed by multiple companies, partner firms are more likely to be prior partners. I argue that concerns about knowledge leakage explain this result.

It aims at find out the shortage of Value chain activities should be improved of Chinese little recycle companies, through a comparative analysis of value chain activities of a laggard and advanced recycle company. And set the steps to identify opportunities for little recycle companies to gain competitive from low cost and add-value. Finally try to find out the most proper way though the value chain and competitive advantage to develop recycling companies ‘competitiveness. And it also gives some useful suggestions.