Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-104).

Thesis (M. Hous. M.)--University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1989. / Also available in print.

Thesis (M.Hous.M.)--University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-87). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.Hous.M.)--University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print.

Thesis (M.Bus)--Unitec New Zealand, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-79).

The purpose of this paper was to assess the impact of a modification and or repeal of section 1031 in the U.S. Tax code. Specifically, this paper focused on a "revenue-neutral" repeal effect in which the additional proceeds from the repeal of section 1031 would go towards decreasing the corporate income tax rate. Overall, the treasury would remain neutral. The implications of this potential repeal were wide. The macroeconomic effect on the economy appeared to be negative, all other things being equal. GDP is predicted to fall by .11% each year. Additionally, Investment will be negatively affected with the decreased liquidity of "exchangeable" assets due to longer holding periods of these assets. Investors should expect to hold these assets longer to decrease their effective tax rate over the life of the investment. Investment is predicted to decline by $7 billion. Real Estate will be the industry that will ultimately be affected the most by a repeal situation as the real estate sector uses like-kind exchanges more frequently than in any other industry. Overall, we can expect to see small declines in macroeconomic factors due to the repeal of this provision that has been benefiting investors for decades.

[pt] Em 2013, a Resolução CMN 4.275 alterou a redação da Resolução CMN 3.792 que determina as diretrizes dos investimentos dos fundos de pensão brasileiros. No âmbito dos investimentos imobiliários, um dos efeitos da nova Resolução foi a vedação imposta às entidades fechadas de previdência complementar (EFPCs) em adquirir participação superior a 25 por cento de imóvel que se encontre em fase de construção. Tal limitação desencoraja os fundos de pensão a adquirirem imóveis que não estejam totalmente construídos, uma vez que a compra de apenas 25 por cento do imóvel colocaria a entidade na condição de sócio minoritário, comprometendo sua ingerência no ativo e prejudicando aspectos de governança no imóvel. Havendo interesse na compra do ativo, vislumbra-se a possibilidade de o investidor institucional, dentro da nova regulação, adquirir uma opção de compra de percentual do ativo que lhe confira a posição de sócio majoritário, ou seja, a aquisição entre 51 por cento e 100 por cento do imóvel, com vencimento na data em que o ativo estiver construído. Dentro desse cenário, o presente estudo pretende apresentar a opção de compra como alternativa para viabilizar a aquisição desse tipo de ativo, calculando o valor justo do prêmio a ser pago por essa opção. O resultado obtido mostrou que o prêmio para aquisição de opção nos percentuais de participação majoritária varia de cerca de 1,15 por cento (para 51 por cento do imóvel) a 2,29 por cento (para 100 por cento do imóvel) do valor total do ativo o que, a nosso ver, inviabiliza a possibilidade de negócio nesse formato, pois os valores de prêmios encontrados não se mostram atrativos para o incorporador que precisa arcar com os custos da construção. Sendo assim, havendo interesse dos fundos de pensão em investir em imóveis em construção em percentual acima de 25 por cento, como limita a atual legislação em vigor, sugere-se encaminhar ao órgão regulador pedido de revisão da instrução solicitando que tal limite seja aplicado ao total de recursos do plano de benefícios em vez de considerar o valor total de um mesmo empreendimento, sob a alegação de ajustar os investimentos ao porte de cada plano de benefícios. / [en] In 2013, Resolution CMN 4,275 amended the wording of Resolution CMN 3,792, which determines the guidelines for investments of Brazilian pension funds. In the context of real estate investments, one of the effects of the new Resolution was the prohibition imposed on closed-end private pension entities (EFPCs) in acquiring more than 25 percent of the property that is under construction. Such a limitation discourages pension funds from acquiring real estate that is not fully constructed, since the purchase of only 25 percent of the property would place the entity as a minority partner, disturbing its involvement in the asset and impairing governance aspects of the property. If there is an interest in the purchase of the asset, it is possible for the institutional investor, within the new regulation, to acquire a call option in a percentage of the asset that gives it the majority shareholding position, that is, the acquisition between 51 percent and 100 percent of the property, with maturity on the date the asset is built. Within the scenario, this study, presents the call option as an alternative to enable the acquisition of type of asset, calculating the fair value of the premium to be paid by option. The result obtained showed that the premium for the acquisition of the option in the percentage of majority ownership varies from about 1.15 percent (to 51 percent of the property) to 2.29 percent (for 100 percent of the property) of the total value of the asset, in our view, makes the possibility of a business in this format unfeasible, since the values of premiums found are not attractive to the developer who has to bear the construction costs. Therefore, since pension funds have an interest in investing in real estate under construction in a percentage above 25 percent, as it limits current legislation, it is suggested that the regulatory body request a revision of the instruction requesting that such limit be applied to the total of benefit plan resources instead of considering the total value of the same enterprise, under the assumption of adjusting the investments to the size of each benefit plan.