Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-62).

Thesis (M.A.T.)--Wheaton College Graduate School, Wheaton, IL, 2002. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-61).

Thesis (D.D.(Dogmat.)--Universiteit van Pretoria, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 233-250).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-71).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2005. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-231). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNR11645

Should the state undertake the task of promoting the good life? Perfectionism is the idea that the state should promote the good life. Many philosophers have answered in the negative to the above question, so they reject perfectionism. This thesis aims to develop a moderate version of perfectionism, and seeks to defend it against several influential anti-perfectionist arguments, in particular the argument from public reason liberalism. I begin by examining public reason liberalism. John Rawls, Gerald Gaus, Martha Nussbaum, and many other political philosophers endorse public reason liberalism. They believe that state coercion should be publicly justified, and that perfectionism cannot meet the requirements of public reason. I argue that public reason is the object of reasonable rejection, so it cannot be realised in actual politics through state intervention in a publicly justified way. In addition, I argue that respect for persons is not a reliable basis for public reason. Thus we have good reason to reject public reason liberalism. Then I develop a moderate version of perfectionism. I contend that the state should promote the good life through supporting a wide variety of perfectionist goods, and that it should do so by using moderate measures and by appealing to perfectionist judgements of a moderate kind. Some anti-perfectionists consider that perfectionism would be unnecessary when a fair distribution of resources is realised. Yet a fair distribution of resources is not foreseeable. I propose several kinds of moderate perfectionist policies that are of great importance for any neo-liberal society where the distribution of resources is far from fair, and these policies are ultimately important for the good life, not only for remedying unfairness. Contrary to the positions of many liberal philosophers including Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron, I argue that moderate perfectionism should not be rejected on grounds of paternalism and unfairness to different conceptions of the good.

Orientador: Eliseu Savério Sposito / Banca: Silvio Donizetti de Oliveira Gallo / Banca: Antonio Carlos Vitte / Banca: Divino José da Silva / Banca: Clovis Nicanor Kassick / Resumo: Este trabalho visa analisar a possibilidade de ensinar geografia por meio do paradigma educacional anarquista. O trabalho foi dividido em duas partes contendo a primeira o construto teórico geral da tese nos seguintes eixos interrelacionados: pesquisa educacional em geografia, conceituação de ideologia, Teoria Crítica da Escola de Frankfurt, Geografia Crítica e apreciação histórica e teórica das experiências das pedagogias socialistas da Liberdade, Radical e Libertária Anarquista. Dentro do texto está situada a filiação ideológica entre o anarquismo social e a Crítica da Razão Cínica. A aproximação da educação libertária com a geografia é feita através dos postulados educacionais dos geógrafos anarquistas Elisée Reclus e Piotr Kropotkin. Na segunda parte do trabalho são incluídos os aspectos teóricos e práticos atuais que delimitam a pedagogia anarquista e o que deve considerar um projeto de escola libertária. Com a reunião dessas informações se avalia como a geografia pode ser incluída na educação libertária se não existe uma epistemologia anarquista de geografia contemporânea Diante disso, apresentam-se alguns teóricos que oferecem elementos para constituir uma proposta de anarcogeografia ou geografia anarquista, que embora seja viável deixou de ser um problema essencial. O estudo empírico se restringe à visita e entrevista com a escola democrática Summerhill (Inglaterra), da vivência na escola anarquista Paideia (Espanha) e do relato de cinco professores de geografia no Brasil. O conjunto referencial teórico, prático e empírico reunido permite dizer que a geografia realizada em escola convencional é incapaz de produzir os efeitos éticos, racionais e políticos comprometidos com a sociedade porque essa instituição é antagônica a esses propósitos. O princípio basilar da educação antiautoritária é que ninguém tem o direito... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The proposal of this study is to evaluate anarchist education paradigm using in geography teaching. The first part have are historical and theoretical explanations and in the second part have practical aspects of anarchist education and a design project to anarchist education community and geography place in it. The education research teaching geography and ideology concept and Critical Theory (Frankfurt school) and Radical Geography are the basis to discuss socialist pedagogies like radical, democratic and anarchist education experiences. The research project includes to study Piotr Kropotkin and Elisée Reclus statement about learning geography and to analyse why anarchism have not advanced in geography thought nowadays. The information collected is using to evaluate how anarchist education can be learning if there are not anarchist geography to base in it. The reports from five teachers, Summerhill Schools (UK) and Escuela Paideia (Spain) point out empirical references about free education and its possibilities to be applied in state education. The perspective arising from this account is used to offer a trenchant critique of some ways to teaching geography in the anti-authoritarian education with self-government based in democratic meetings. And have no-sense to teaching to imposing fragments of science by curriculum of school. The result is that is impossible to use anarchist paradigm in conventional education but teacher can be able to resist against fascism at school and improving freedom quotas committed with own individuality and collective and mutual practices. / Doutor

Orientador: Lúcio Lourenço Prado / Banca: Evandro Oliveira de Brito / Banca: Pedro Geraldo Aparecido Noveli / Resumo: O presente trabalho possui dois objetivos. O primeiro é esclarecer qual é o problema da aplicação da razão prática em Kant e o porquê uma "dedução transcendental" é necessária para dar conta do problema. O segundo objetivo é defender que a "dedução" realizada na Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes não é necessária, apesar de uma "dedução", no âmbito da razão prática, em geral, seja necessária. Em vista disso, espera-se ter uma clareza maior sobre as razões pelas quais é ainda preciso fundamentar a aplicação da razão prática em Kant, porém, sob novas perspectivas, isto é, mediante uma nova "dedução transcendental" que não siga os caminhos abertos pela original. / Abstract: This work has two objectives. The first one is to clarify what is the problem of the application of practical reason and why a "transcendental deduction" is necessary to deal with the problem. The second objective is to defend that the "deduction" held in the Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals is not necessary, even though a "deduction", in the scope of practical reason", in general", is necessary. According to this view, one can expect to have greater clarity about the reasons why it is still necessary to support the application of practical reason, however, upon new perspectives, that is, by means of a new "transcendental deduction" which does not follow the paths open by the original one. / Mestre

I investigate the issue of whether or not one's holding a moral belief is sufficient to motivate one to act as that belief prescribes. I argue that rational persons who hold a moral belief that is also a 'self-referential belief' will form a desire to act as that belief prescribes and thereby be motivated to act on the moral belief. I argue for this claim by, firstly, showing that the demand that moral judgements must be intrinsically motivating, Internalism, should only apply to rational persons, that is, the link between moral judgement and motivation can be broken in cases of irrationality. Secondly, I argue against the Humean claim that one cannot rationally form a desire simply because one believes that one ought to have that desire. This claim requires an investigation into a variety of views of Practical Reason and an argument concluding that Practical Reason is broader in scope than the Instrumentalist or Humean allows. I undertake this task in chapter 2. Thirdly, I argue that believing that I ought to perform a certain action will give me an internal commitment to perform that action, insofar as I am rational. I argue that an internal commitment is a form of desire. Once I recognise that I have a moral belief and an internal commitment, I will be motivated to act as that belief and commitment prescribe. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

No plano da filosofia já há mais de dois mil anos se discute qual a melhor forma de conduta humana: aquela dirigida pela razão ou pela emoção; prevalência de uma ou de outra, ou equilíbrio entre ambas. Para o que interessa à filosofia do direito, mais especificamente à interpretação e aplicação legais, Martha Nussbaum tem oferecido interessantes reflexões sobre as emoções, de modo a conceituá-las não como forças irracionais, mas sim respostas inteligentes à percepção de valor e importância de objetos, fatos ou pessoas. Neste sentido, caso demonstrada a plausibilidade de algumas destas reflexões, a própria controvérsia filosófica entre o uso da razão e/ou da emoção perderia um tanto de sentido. Indo além dos métodos comumente usados pela filosofia – introspecção consciente, análise lógica e argumentos especulativos – o objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a sustentabilidade do ponto de vista científico das reflexões de Nussbaum sobre o papel das emoções. Isto será feito através da compilação e análise comparativa entre aquelas e os resultados de recentes pesquisas neurocientíficas sobre a atuação das emoções no processo de tomada de decisões, no campo da memória e do comportamento. Ao final, observaremos quais reflexões são atualmente sustentáveis do ponto de vista científico, quais são pertinentes para um modelo de aplicação e interpretação legal que faça uso das nossas capacidades cognitivas plenas, assim como quais as reflexões que carecem de novos testes científicos para se consolidarem. / In the field of philosophy, fore more than two thousand years there have been controversy about which is the better role model for human behavior: one driven by reason, other driven by emotion, supremacy of one over the other, or an equal balance between both. For the matter of Law’s philosophy, especially legal interpretation and application, Martha Nussbaum has been offering interesting insights about emotions, defining them not as irrational forces, but intelligent answers for perception of value and importance of objects, facts, and people. In that sense, in the case of discovering evidence about the plausibility of some of Nussbaum’s insights, the philosophy debate about the use of reason or emotion, will become a non-sense. Going further the traditional methods commonly used by philosophy – conscious introspection, logical analysis, speculative reasoning – the target of this work is to investigate the scientific plausibility of Nussbaum’s insights about emotions. That will be done through the compilation and comparative analysis between her those insights and recent work in neuroscience investigations about “decision-making” processes, memory, and behavior. By the end, we will observe which insights nowadays have empirical support, which ones concern to a legal model of interpretation and application which uses our full cognitive capacities, and beside which insights demand more scientific investigation to became consolidated.