O principal objetivo desta pesquisa é analisar alguns das principais idéias envolvidas no labirinto da liberdade, um dos assuntos de grande destaque dentro da filosofia leibniziana. Por um lado, Leibniz sempre defendeu a máxima racionalidade de todos os fatos, o que acaba por indicar que todos estes estão absolutamente predeterminados. Por outro, ele procurou mostrar que todos os seres racionais são moralmente responsáveis pelos seus atos conforme suas vontades. Por meio de um grande esforço conceitual, Leibniz procurou conciliar a idéia de um destino, racionalmente delineável, junto à idéia de liberdade das ações dos seres racionais; ele não quis defender nem a pura necessidade e nem o puro acaso. O principal aliado nessa tarefa foi o Princípio de Razão Suficiente. Este princípio ganhou foi fortalecido a partir do desenvolvimento do conceito das infinitas substâncias completas (entelechia, substância individuais, mônadas), que foi elaborado gradualmente ao longo da sua vida filosófica. Uma reconstrução básica de algumas das principais teses da metafísica leibniziana permite observar como as criaturas (especialmente as racionais) passaram a ser consideras as legítimas responsáveis por suas ações, sem que o mundo representasse uma espécie de caos. / The main goal of this dissertation is to investigate some aspects of the Labyrinth of Freedom, a key subject in the Philosophy of Leibniz. On one hand, Leibniz supported the maximum rationality of all events, meaning that they are all absolutely predetermined. On the other, he tried to show that rational beings are morally responsible for their actions, and that requires free will. Through an act of great intellectual effort Leibniz tried to conciliate an idea of all embracing destiny (rationally understood) and the concept of freedom. He resisted admitting a vision of the world driven either by absolute necessity or lost to pure chance. His main ally in this task was the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This principle gained strength from the development of the concept of infinite substances (entelechia, individual substance, monades) that was gradually forged throughout the philosopher\'s life. A brief reconstruction of some of the main features of Leibniz´s metaphysics allows us to perceive how all creatures (especially rational ones) could be seen to be truly responsible for what they do and the choices they make in a rationally structured world.

No plano da filosofia já há mais de dois mil anos se discute qual a melhor forma de conduta humana: aquela dirigida pela razão ou pela emoção; prevalência de uma ou de outra, ou equilíbrio entre ambas. Para o que interessa à filosofia do direito, mais especificamente à interpretação e aplicação legais, Martha Nussbaum tem oferecido interessantes reflexões sobre as emoções, de modo a conceituá-las não como forças irracionais, mas sim respostas inteligentes à percepção de valor e importância de objetos, fatos ou pessoas. Neste sentido, caso demonstrada a plausibilidade de algumas destas reflexões, a própria controvérsia filosófica entre o uso da razão e/ou da emoção perderia um tanto de sentido. Indo além dos métodos comumente usados pela filosofia – introspecção consciente, análise lógica e argumentos especulativos – o objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a sustentabilidade do ponto de vista científico das reflexões de Nussbaum sobre o papel das emoções. Isto será feito através da compilação e análise comparativa entre aquelas e os resultados de recentes pesquisas neurocientíficas sobre a atuação das emoções no processo de tomada de decisões, no campo da memória e do comportamento. Ao final, observaremos quais reflexões são atualmente sustentáveis do ponto de vista científico, quais são pertinentes para um modelo de aplicação e interpretação legal que faça uso das nossas capacidades cognitivas plenas, assim como quais as reflexões que carecem de novos testes científicos para se consolidarem. / In the field of philosophy, fore more than two thousand years there have been controversy about which is the better role model for human behavior: one driven by reason, other driven by emotion, supremacy of one over the other, or an equal balance between both. For the matter of Law’s philosophy, especially legal interpretation and application, Martha Nussbaum has been offering interesting insights about emotions, defining them not as irrational forces, but intelligent answers for perception of value and importance of objects, facts, and people. In that sense, in the case of discovering evidence about the plausibility of some of Nussbaum’s insights, the philosophy debate about the use of reason or emotion, will become a non-sense. Going further the traditional methods commonly used by philosophy – conscious introspection, logical analysis, speculative reasoning – the target of this work is to investigate the scientific plausibility of Nussbaum’s insights about emotions. That will be done through the compilation and comparative analysis between her those insights and recent work in neuroscience investigations about “decision-making” processes, memory, and behavior. By the end, we will observe which insights nowadays have empirical support, which ones concern to a legal model of interpretation and application which uses our full cognitive capacities, and beside which insights demand more scientific investigation to became consolidated.

Orientador: Yara Adario Frateschi / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T08:48:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Segala_VaniaDantas_M.pdf: 518928 bytes, checksum: 63931e2937ece8594b282cdf259bfb66 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: O presente trabalho pretende analisar os conceitos de razão e reta razão em Hobbes com o objetivo de compreender melhor o estatuto das leis de natureza nessa Teoria. Pois ainda que Hobbes afirme que a razão é frágil perante as paixões, que é capaz de erro e engano, que não é uma faculdade infalível, ele também nos diz que o uso diligente e rigoroso da razão possibilita a ciência bem como a dedução das regras de comportamento que conduzem à paz e à preservação de si. Como as leis de natureza são deduzidas a partir da razão, consideramos que uma investigação dessa faculdade, aliada à consideração da natureza humana, nos permite compreender melhor a questão da obrigação em Hobbes. Para tanto, pretendemos resgatar o uso que Hobbes faz dos termos razão e reta razão e comparar com os conceitos de razão e reta razão na tradição. Também nos propomos a tratar brevemente da questão da obrigação em Hobbes e como ela foi é compreendida pelos comentadores. / Abstract: The present work intends to analyze the reason and right reason in Thomas Hobbes. In this manner we aim to understand the operation of natural laws on this theory. Hobbes recognizes the fragility of reason confronted to passions, he tells us reason is prone to mistakes and deceive and it is not an infallible faculty. But in the other hand he supports that the very use of reason allows the existence of science, and through reason we can obtain that conduct rules necessary to lead us to self-preservation and peace. Since natural laws are deduced from reason, inquiring into this faculty allow us a better comprehension of the obligation in Hobbes. To achieve this, we intend to analyze the Hobbes's use of terms reason and right reason and proceed with a confrontation on traditional conceiving of reason and right reason. We also propose to deal briefly about obligation in Hobbes and how this subject is understood by Taylor e Warrender. / Mestrado / Filosofia / Filosofia

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-10T17:12:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_Chelaineda_M.pdf: 433406 bytes, checksum: 462cd8f90de1cdc4d840ed4cb9a3da8d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: O objetivo desta dissertação é estudar as diferentes interpretações da doutrina do ¿fato da razão¿. Primeiramente iremos apresentar o ¿fato da razão¿ na obra Crítica da Razão Prática de Kant, pois é importante especificar o que levou Kant a lançar mão de tal conceito e quais as lacunas que possibilitaram as divergências entre as interpretações. Em seguida iremos expor as três interpretações e críticas feitas ao conceito do ¿fato da razão¿ na literatura internacional, a saber: Larry Herrera, Henry Alisson, Lewis Beck. Estas que forneceram fundamento à discussão principal do terceiro capítulo. Por fim iremos abordar o objetivo principal da dissertação, a discussão entre as interpretações de: Zeljko Loparic com a interpretação semântica, nomeada por Almeida de ¿Decisionista¿ e Guido de Almeida com a interpretação ¿Cognitivista¿ / Abstract: The objective of this dissertation is to study the different interpretations of the doctrine of the "fact of the reason". First we will go to present the "fact of the reason" in the work ¿Critical of the Practical Reason¿ of Kant, therefore it is important to specify what it took Kant to give hand of such concept and which the gaps that make possible the divergences between the interpretations. After that we will go to expose the three made critical interpretations and to the concept of the "fact of the reason" in international literature, to know: Larry Herrera, Henry Alisson, Lewis Beck. These that had supplied fundament to the main argument of the third chapter. Finally we will go to broach the objective main of the dissertation, the argument between the interpretations of: Zeljko Loparic with the interpretation semantics, nominated for Almeida of "Decisionista" and Guido de Almeida with the interpretation "Cognitivista" / Mestrado / Historia da Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T11:49:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sipert_Claudio_M.pdf: 596097 bytes, checksum: d59b0a555c6bc5b0711fce0e637ffc1e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho é abordar o problema da realidade objetiva da idéia do sumo bem na filosofia prática kantiana. Na Crítica da Razão Prática, a idéia do sumo bem representa o objeto necessário de uma vontade moralmente determinada e, por conseguinte, a razão nos leva a procurar pelas condições de possibilidade do seu objeto. Diante da impossibilidade de um objeto correspondente ao sumo bem na experiência, a realidade objetiva desse conceito parece ser possível somente se assumirmos um ponto de vista transcendente, onde o postulado da existência de Deus é pensado como condição de possibilidade do sumo bem, seja para pensá-lo como possível numa vida após a morte ou num mundo criado em conformidade com uma ordem teleológica moral. Entretanto, com o postulado da existência de Deus ultrapassamos o campo da experiência possível que, de acordo com Kant, é o domínio onde a realidade objetiva de um conceito puro tem de ser provada. Assim sendo, a idéia do sumo bem permanece um conceito transcendente e sem realidade objetiva. Buscaremos uma solução para o problema levantado, pelo viés da semântica transcendental, proposta por Loparic, que consiste em perguntar pelo sentido e pela referência dos conceitos e juízos num domínio de dados sensíveis / Abstract: The objective of this work is to approach the problem of the objective validity of the idea of the highest good in the kantiana practical philosophy. In Critical of the Practical Reason, the idea of the highest good is represented as necessary object of a will morally determined and, therefore, the reason take us to look for the conditions of possibility of its object. Ahead of the impossibility of a corresponding object to the highest good in the experience, the objective reality of this concept only seems to be possible to assume a point of view transcendent, where the postulate of the existence of God is thought as condition of possibility of the highest good, either to think the highest good possible about a life after the death or a world created in compliance with a moral teleologic order. However, with the postulate of the existence of God we exceed the field of the possible experience that, in accordance with Kant, is the domain where the objective reality of a pure concept has of being proven. Thus being, the idea of the highest good remains a concept transcendent and without objective reality. We will search a solution for the problem raised, for the bias of the transcendental semantics, proposal for Loparic, that consists of asking for the direction and the reference of the concepts and judgments in a domain of sensible data / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

O estoicismo de Sêneca apresenta traços que refletem sua condição pessoal de homem novo, de ator na história do Império Romano e de um pensador bastante livre. As linhas de seu pensamento, que se pode chamar de estóico-senequiano, estão presentes em toda sua obra: de maneira explícita, nas epístolas e nos diálogos; e implícita, na tragédia Hércules no Eta. Para essa tragédia, Sêneca buscou, como modelo principal, As Traquínias de Sófocles, cujas personagens recebem um tratamento tal, que se pode ler, em suas palavras e em suas ações, a expressão das virtudes e dos vícios nos três níveis: cósmico, imperial e individual. A relação entre essas três instâncias é garantida, principalmente, pela tensão sujeito-objeto e pela analogia como processo de conhecimento. Em seu pensamento bipolar, pode-se ler a presença dos princípios que perpassam toda a Natureza: o ativo (do lado do sujeito) e o passivo (na vertente do objeto). A expressão máxima do princípio ativo é, no universo, o Logos; no Império, a razão do príncipe, que constitui sua alma; no homem, a razão diretriz. O vício é o desequilíbrio em qualquer uma das instâncias, e consiste numa inversão que deixa a Razão fora do lugar que lhe cabe segundo a perfeição da Natureza. O reequilíbrio, no âmbito do Universo, se faz pela \"conflagração universal\"; no Império, pelo comando de um príncipe virtuoso; no indivíduo, pela prática da virtude, sob o comando da razão. Como no indivíduo, a virtude, que é igual à sabedoria, à felicidade, à liberdade, é conquistada paulatinamente, o homem, em relação a ela, pode ser um stultus, um uacillans, um proficiens ou um sapiens. No Hércules de Hércules no Eta, convivem as três instâncias: a cósmica na conflagração universal, a do Império Romano, nas alusões político-históricas, e a do indivíduo, na trajetória exemplar do herói rumo à sabedoria e à apoteose. Sua trajetória, dividida entre um velho e um novo Hércules, promove, ainda, a passagem do tempo mítico para o tempo legal, do herói marcado pela hybris para o marcado pela uirtus. / Seneca\'s stoicism presents features that reflect his personal condition as new man, as an actor in the Roman Empire History and as a free thinker. His lines of thought, which can be named as estoico-senequiano, are in all of his works: explicitly, in his epistles and dialogues; and implicitly, in his tragedy Hercules on Oeta. As main source of inspiration to this tragedy, Seneca used Sophocles\' The Trachiniae, in which can be read, through its characters\' words and attitudes, the expression of vice and virtue in three levels: cosmic, imperial and individual. The relationship between these three levels is granted, mainly, by the tension subject-object and by analogy as a process of knowledge. In Seneca\'s bipolar thought, one can notice the presence of principles that go beyond all nature: the active (subject\'s side) and the passive (that concerns the object). The major expression of the active principle is, in the universe, Logos; in the Empire, the prince\'s reason, which constitutes his soul; in men, the guideline reason. Vice is the disequilibrium in any of these instances, and is defined as an inversion that takes reason out of its proper place in accordance with nature\'s perfection. The equilibrium is recovered again, in the universe\'s scope, through universal conflagration; in the Empire\'s scope, through a virtuous prince\'s command; in the individual scope, through practicing virtue under the control of reason. Since in human beings, the virtue, which is considered the same as knowledge, happiness, and freedom, is gained gradually, the men in relation to it can be a stultus, a uacillans, a proficiens, or a sapiens. In Hercules from Hercules on Oeta, the three instances are together: the cosmic through the universal conflagration, the one from Roman Empire through the historical and political allusions, and the individual one, through the hero\'s brilliant way to knowledge and apotheosis. His way, divided into an old and a new Hercules, promotes the passage from a mythical time to a legal time, from the hero marked by hybris to the one marked by uirtus.

Orientador: João Carlos Kfouri Quartim de Moraes / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-12T08:47:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jacaranda_RodolfodeFreitas_M.pdf: 2914724 bytes, checksum: 334c58462f48cd5e087d89dcd906adb5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: A idéia de razão de Estado foi, durante um século e meio, entre o século XVI e o XVII, um tema que exerceu grande influência no pensamento político moderno. Difícil de resumir em apenas um conceito, a razão de Estado foi utilizada para definir a capacidade de o poder soberano subtrair-se às obrigações e limites impostos pelas regras do direito ordinário para defender a ordem pública em casos de grave ameaça. A presente tese é uma pesquisa exploratória que visa a reconstruir os parâmetros das discussões que colocaram a razão de Estado no cerne do surgimento do próprio Estado. Proposta nos termos modernos que conhecemos por pensadores italianos do quinhentos, a razão de Estado tornou-se, por associações muito originais, sinônimo do pensamento de Maquiavel. Extrapolando a obra de Maquiavel, contudo, os principais teóricos da razão de Estado foram co-responsáveis por engendrar o vocabulário político da fundação do Estado na modernidade, e os elementos e técnicas que surgiram nos intensos debates decorrentes dos conflitos da época contribuíram para aprimorar as estruturas governamentais então em construção. A literatura franca e aberta da razão de Estado começou a declinar na segunda metade do século XVII, e os institutos que marcaram sua existência foram apropriados pela filosofia política normativa e pelos juristas pré-iluministas. Técnicas como a simulação e a dissimulação, o segredo, a necessidade, a crueldade e a mentira foram proscritas ou reconfiguradas segundo novos códigos de justificação do poder. Não é incomum encontrar referências ao fato de que as práticas da razão de Estado fazem parte de um passado do qual já nos livramos. Baseada na obra de pensadores contemporâneos como Michael Stolleis, Gianfranco Borrelli, Michel de Senellart, Yves Charles Zarka, Michel Foucault e Giorgio Agamben a presente tese demonstra como o desafio de pensar a sobrevivência das práticas da razão de Estado nos modelos políticos atuais corresponde ao próprio desafio, moderno por excelência, de entender a natureza do Estado e o modo como pensamos e agimos em nossa relação com o poder soberano. / Abstract: The idea of 'reason of State' was during one and a half century, between the XVI and the XVII, a theme of profound influence over modern political thought. Difficult to summarize in only one concept, the reason of State was used to define the ability of the sovereign power to break out from the obligations and limits imposed by the ordinary rules so as to defend the public order in situations of serious threat. The present work is an exploratory research that aims to rebuild the parameters of the discussions that set the reason of State in the core of the birth of the State itself. Put in the modern terms that we know from 1500s' Italian thinkers, the reason of State became, through very original associations, a synonym of Machiavelli's thought. Not restricted to Machiavelli's work, however, reason of State's main thinkers were co-responsible for creating the political vocabulary of the State's foundation in the modern age, and the elements and techniques that had appeared amidst the intense debates of the conflicts of their time contributed to improve the governmental structures then in construction. Open and direct literature about the reason of State began to decline in the second half of the 17th century, and the institutions that marked its existence were appropriated by prescriptive political philosophy and by Enlightenment jurists. Techniques like simulation and dissimulation, secret, necessity, cruelty and lie were proscribed or re-shaped according to new ways to justify power. Nowadays it is not unlikely to find references to the fact that the practices of the reason of State are part of a past already left behind. Based on the work of contemporary thinkers like Michael Stolleis, Gianfranco Borrelli, Michel de Senellart, Yves Charles Zarka, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, the present work shows how the challenge of finding evidence of the surviving practices of the reason of State in current political models corresponds to the very challenge, modern on its own, of understanding the State's nature and the way people think and act in their relationship with the sovereign power. / Mestrado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

This project is primarily exegetical in nature and aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the concept of moral responsibility in the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically in his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GR), and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR). It consists of three chapters – the first chapter interprets the concept of freedom that follows from the resolution to the Third Antinomy in the CPR. It argues that Kant is best understood here to be providing an unusual but cogent, compatibilist account of freedom that the author terms meta-compatibilism. The second chapter examines the GR and CPrR to interpret the theory of practical reason and moral agency that Kant develops in these works. This chapter concludes by evaluating what has been established about Kant’s ideas of freedom and moral agency at that point in the project, identifying some problems and objections in addition to providing some suggestions for how Kantian ethics might be adapted within a consequentialist framework. The third chapter argues that, for Kant, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (in addition to a compatibilist definition of freedom) that must obtain for an individual to qualify as responsible for her actions.

Official statistics provide us with some of our most important insights into crime and the criminal justice system. Sociologists, however, have generally not examined the institutions which produce these statistics. "Making Crime Count" addresses this lacuna through a study of the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS), which is Canada's sole source for national criminal justice statistics. To do so it employs a methodological combination of focused interviews, participant observation and documentary analysis. The availability of criminal justice statistics has fostered a distinctive approach to the governance of crime and criminal justice. A form of 'actuarial justice' has emerged whereby crime is increasingly understood as a statistical probability rather than a moral failing. At the same time, criminal justice statistics render criminal justice organizations amenable to governmental strategies that aim to manage the system. To examine the means by which the Centre has been able to produce its statistics, I draw from contemporary work in the sociology of science which emphasizes the role of complex knowledge networks in the production of scientific facts. Within the Centre's 'knowledge network' assorted elements and institutions must be aligned. We document the ways in which the CCJS is in continual negotiation with the police in order to secure data for the 'uniform crime report' survey. The Centre's controversial 1990 proposal to collect race/crime data is also explored as an example of the power and politics of official classifications. Although the Centre must maintain the appearance of being apolitical, they are occasionally engaged in micro- political negotiations in order to produce their statistics. We document the role that different jurisdictions play in shaping the Centre's knowledge production regime. Once their statistics are collected, there can be negotiations over how they should be publicized. The style of presentation employed by the CCJS is ultimately influenced by organizational constraints, audience considerations and epistemic concerns. The overall results of this research underline the importance for authors writing on 'governmentality' to consider the means through which governmental knowledge is produced. / Arts, Faculty of / Anthropology, Department of / Graduate

Thesis advisor: David Rasmussen / When is political power legitimate? Public reasons liberals argue that political power is legitimate only when it is supported by reasons drawn from principles of justice that each citizen could endorse. The most well known model for identifying whether a principle satisfies this requirement is John Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus. Typical interpretations of the idea of overlapping consensus hold that it expresses a necessary conceptual condition of any reasonable conception of justice. Against this ahistorical view, my analysis shows that Rawls’ mature account of overlapping consensus rests on a particular historicist thesis that liberal institutions are necessary for social cooperation given the presumption of moral and religious pluralism. The authority of public reasoning ultimately rests on a widespread consensus about the necessity of liberal institutions, rather than on a consensus on any particular conception of justice. The limits of public reason, on my analysis, are fixed first and foremost by liberal institutions. Given the prominent historical role of classical liberalism in specifying and defending liberal institutions, one might suppose that classical liberal conceptions of justice would have a central place in any consensus that defines the boundaries of public reasoning. I argue that this appearance is misleading. The work of scholars in disability studies show that conceptions of justice must be sufficiently sensitive to the unique needs and interests of citizens with disabilities. I argue that applying these insights to the idea of public reason shows that classical liberalism can satisfy the requirements of public reason only by unjustly ignoring the perspective of disabled citizens I show that Rawls’ model of public reason rests on a nuanced and historically grounded view of the consensus circumscribing public reason. Further, it shows that a historically conditioned concept of public reason and political legitimacy need not imply a drastic retreat from central egalitarian commitments, despite initial appearances to the contrary. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.