Objective: Chest pain is a common reason for an encounter in general practice. The present investigation was set out to characterize the consultation rate of chest pain, accompanying symptoms, frequency of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, and results of the encounter. Materials and Methods: Cross‑sectional data were collected from randomly selected patients in the German Sächsische Epidemiologische Studie in der Allgemeinmedizin 2 (SESAM 2) and analyzed from the Dutch Transition Project. Results: Overall, 270 patients from the SESAM 2 study consulted a general practitioner due to chest pain (3% of all consultations). Chest pain was more frequent in people aged over 45 years. The most common diagnostic interventions were physical examination, electrocardiogram at rest and analysis of blood parameters. For the majority of cases, the physicians arranged a follow‑up consultation or prescribed drugs. The transition project documented 8117 patients reporting chest pain with a frequency of 44.5/1000 patient years (1.7% of all consultations). Physical examination was also the most common diagnostic intervention, and physician’s advice the most relevant therapeutic one. Conclusion: The most common causes for chest pain were musculoskeletal problems followed by cardiovascular diseases. Ischemic heart disease, psychogenic problems, and respiratory diseases each account for about 10% of the cases. However, acutely dangerous causes are rare in general practice.

The minority rights paradox is articulated at the level of political theory, is deployed by liberal democratic institutions, and can be observed in the political discourse of mass communications. Minority groups, it is argued, are paradoxically claiming purported rights that are unsupported by the values upon which the claimants base their claim. On the one hand, minority claims are made on the basis of rights secured by a liberal democracy; on the other hand, the claims undermine the legitimacy of liberal reasoning—the same reasoning that legitimizes the rights on which the claims are made. The self-referential implications of this paradox are as follows: Either the minority claim negates its own justification or the underlying justification renders the claim moot. In either case, the charge of paradox effectively puts an end to the conversation by dismissing minority rights claims before they are properly understood. My aim is to first, come to terms with political dialogues in which the charge of paradox occurs and second, to overcome the stultifying effects of the minority rights paradox through a deliberative approach to negotiating the concept and content of minority rights claims. Evaluating the claims of minorities, I will argue, requires a dialogue that can adapt to the participants in the dialogue—an inclusive deliberative process that gives formal, procedural and substantive recognition to the worldviews of minority cultures in political decision-making.

This thesis investigates Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) reception of the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). I focus on four specific topics. In chapter one I examine Kierkegaard’s early reception of Hamann which I argue provides the basis for Kierkegaard’s conception of his own authorial task. In particular, I examine concepts of humour and systematicity and the centrality of the figure of Socrates. Central to my argument is a contrast between Kierkegaard’s reception of Hamann and that of Hegel’s review. In chapter two I show that Kierkegaard develops an argument against speculative philosophy and its claims to have achieved the absolute beginning. I argue that Kierkegaard appeals to Hamann’s critique of Kant which centres around the possibility of a priori cognition and the dependency of reason on language. I contend that Kierkegaard takes up Hamann’s critique in order to show that the absolute beginning which speculative philosophy claims to have achieved in the form of pure thinking is unachievable because of the dependency of thought on language. Chapter three examines the conception of selfhood in Hamann and Kierkegaard. I address their views of the self as unified and their critique of alternative conceptions of selfhood which undermine this unity. I show that Kierkegaard’s arguments in relation to despair and forgetfulness share important similarities with Hamann. Chapter four explores Kierkegaard’s critique and repair of post-Kantian reflection theory. I demonstrate that Kierkegaard proceeds to provide a minimal view of the self achieved through reflection which finally encounters its own limits in its own self-knowledge. I propose that Kierkegaard presents this as Socratic ignorance and that his model for outlining the limits of self-knowledge stems from Hamann. I develop my argument by arguing that for Hamann and Kierkegaard self-knowledge is only available through divine revelation.

Political philosophers widely assume that public reason liberalism is hostile to religious contributions to liberal politics. My dissertation argues that this assumption is a mistake. Properly understood, public reason liberalism does not privilege religious or secular reasoning; a compelling conception of public reason liberalism can balance the claims of secular citizens and citizens of faith. I develop a framework that can resolve the tensions between liberalism and faith not only at a theoretical level but in the practical matters of dialogue, public policy, institutional design and constitutional law.

Max Horkheimer’s mature works on theology and Schopenhauerian metaphysics have been portrayed by subsequent critical theorists as an illicit regression from his earlier social theory in a two-fold sense. First, his concern to reflect on empirical experience is replaced with speculation regarding intelligible concepts, i.e. concepts that do not arise from observation on the basis of sense-intuition but are rather products of “pure” reason (God) or the imagination (Schopenhauer’s will). Second, his advocacy of the Enlightenment as an emancipatory political project is replaced by its skeptical critique. I argue that this consensus radically misunderstands the concerns animating the late Horkheimer insofar as his reflections on intelligible concepts are both intimately related to a continuing concern with empirical inquiry, as well as an outworking of his commitment to the realization of the Enlightenment. The argument is presented in three related movements. In the first, I interpret Horkheimer’s oeuvre in terms of his pervasive interest in developing a materialist logic. I begin by outlining his early understanding of thought as a form of inquiry for embodied social subjects (chapter 1), before noting how, in his mature theorizing, this account serves as a basis for a presentation of the relationship between various kinds of inquiry and the practice of social critique (chapter 2). In the second, I contend that Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason is best understood as congruent with this materialist logic, not as a speculative departure from an earlier concern with empirical inquiry. I begin by examining Horkheimer’s empirical analysis of how historical changes in the basic institutions defining political economy in modern life affect the reasoning habits of subjects (chapter 3). I then turn to his diagnosis of the way such changes affect the selfunderstanding of modern subjects, leading to a pervasive form of alienation (chapter 4). In the final movement, I present Horkheimer’s turn to theological concepts of the intelligible as a therapeutic response to this alienation. First, I examine his understanding of the content of theological concepts as well as how such concepts may be preserved in a form appropriate to modern life (chapter 5), and conclude by illustrating his own attempt at such a retrieval in his late reflections on the Jewish liturgy (chapter 6). In the conclusion, I note that this interpretation offers a constructive challenge to philosophers concerned with the tradition of critical theory. On the one hand, Horkheimer articulates what would be required for the fulfillment of the Enlightenment project in terms critical theorists will recognize as their own, by offering an account of the social practices that are necessary for the self-determination of the subject. Yet his presentation contests a fundamental axiom of such theorists regarding the role intelligible concepts ought to play in seeking this goal. Horkheimer defends an account of the significance of the liturgy for practices of reasoning that is quiet foreign to such theorists. Instead of setting liturgical reasoning over against a militantly “secular” Enlightenment, he demonstrates that such reasoning is integral to its fulfillment.

Zusammenfassung Das Thema dieser Diplomarbeit ist die Beendigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses - Vergleich der Rechtsregelung der Tschechischen Republik und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Die Arbeit gliedert sich in fünf Teile, die verschiedene Möglichkeiten der Beendigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses durch den tschechischen und deutschen Gesetzgebung behandelt, und befasst sich detailliert um einzelnen Kündigungsgründe in beiden Rechtsregelungen. Zwischen arbeitsrechtliche Rechtsregelungen beiden Nachbarländern, der Tschechischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gibt es auf einer Seite erhebliche Unterschiede, die sich aus wesentlichen Teil aus der unterschiedlichen rechtlichen und historischen Entwicklung ergeben. Auf der anderen Seite kommt es in der Einigung Europas zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der einzelnen Staaten, die sich im Bereich des Arbeitsrechts zum Ausdruck kommt. Obwohl sich das Arbeitsrecht ständig weiterentwickelt, behalt sich in jedem Staat seine Individualität, angesichts der Situation des Landes. Derzeit ist die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ein wichtiger Wirtschaftspartner der Tschechischen Republik. Angesichts der Existenz von internationalen Wirtschaftsunternehmen, Arbeitsmigration und grenzüberschreitende Beschäftigung, es ist praktisch, einen Überblick über die...

The thesis of this work is a treatise on liberalism in general firstly, what contains the etymology of the word liberalism. There are explained the beginnings of this orientation, dating back to ancient times and Middle Ages. The description of the beginnings of liberalism in England follows. The historical events of the time, which played an important role in the birth of liberalism, are accented. Liberalism is based on certain principles as well as any other social or political theory and in this work this principles are enriched especially by ideas of John Locke. Liberalism reached its height in England in the nineteenth century when it defended its leading position. Liberalism is not only social and political orientation but it plays an important role in economy also. It supports free trade without state's interventions and it promotes private enterprise. Although liberalism was often criticized by church representatives and particularly by Conservatives, liberal ideas are still current. Liberal Democrats are the third-largest party in the House of Commons in Great Britain. They have made a coalition government together with the Conservatives since 2010. Key words: Liberalism, individuality, freedom, reason, justice, tolerance

Dans notre étude, nous retraçons le chemin d’une reconstruction de la raison pratique à partir du concept de responsabilité. La théorie de la communication est en mesure de nous fournir les moyens théoriques pour saisir l’étroite relation entre responsabilité et normativité pratique, tant au niveau de la reconstruction de la raison pratique, qu’à celui de son application. Néanmoins, il ne s’agit pas d’une reconstruction du mouvement d’ensemble de la pensée de Habermas. Bien au contraire, nous procédons, tel est notre choix méthodologique, par une mise en relief de l’ouverture dialogique de la théorie de la communication à ses interlocuteurs. La théorie de la communication veut restaurer toute la richesse pratique du concept de responsabilité dans ses droits en s’appuyant sur une critique de la subjectivité moderne. Néanmoins, une critique de la théorie de la communication peut montrer que le moment de la constitution de l’intersubjectivité va de pair avec celui du sujet de la communication. / In our study, we are tracing the way of the reconstruction of the practical reason starting from the concept of responsibility. The theory of communication can provide us with the theoretical tools in order to understand the close relation between responsibility and the normative core of practice at the level of the reconstruction of the practical reason as also of its application. Nevertheless, our study does not have for his object the reconstruction of Habermas’ thought as a whole. On the contrary, our methodological choice is to proceed based on the emphasis on the opening of the dialogue of the theory of communication towards its interlocutors. The theory of communication attempts to restore the whole practical richness of the concept of responsibility underpinning a critique of the modern subjectivity. Nevertheless, a critique of the theory of communication can show that the moment of the constitution of the intersubjectivity is consistent with that of the subject of communication.

Le XVIIIème siècle consacra en France la disjonction idéologique, intellectuelle et spirituelle entre la raison critique et empirique du philosophe et l’anthropologie chrétienne des défenseurs de l’orthodoxie. Toutefois, l’intuition et l’intention d’un syncrétisme humaniste aspirant à voir collaborer l’intelligence scientifique et l’intelligence de la foi survécut à la Renaissance et au Grand siècle pour soutenir la réflexion de littérateurs catholiques reconnus, les abbés Morellet, Coyer, Yvon, Bergier et Raynal. Ces théoriciens de la médiation incarnaient une frange modérée de l’apologétique catholique, une apologétique de la conciliation qui soulève maintes interrogations quant à sa nature et sa portée : parvint-elle à arrimer les valeurs chrétiennes aux idées forces des Lumières rationnelles, proposa-t-elle une voie médiane entre les partis antagonistes des « philosophes » et des « dévots » ? L’exploration analytique et la mise en perspective comparative des termes de l’alliance de la raison et de la foi révèlent une conciliation plurielle ; véritable nébuleuse idéologique élevée sur l’humanisme théologique du molinisme jésuite, elle se confronte à des difficultés externes d’ordre conjoncturel, partisanes notamment, se heurte aux antagonismes de la certitude du christianisme et du doute méthodique, se soumet aux exigences de la dualité de la « raison » - philosophique et scientifique -, mais subit également les retombées de ses propres ambiguïtés et carences conceptuelles. In fine, l’enjeu de ces ambitions syncrétiques ne repose plus tant sur le diptyque foi-raison que que sur les interactions entre le sentiment de foi, la nature et la science. / The XVIIIth century, in France, sanctioned the ideological, intellectual and spiritual separation between the critical and empirical reason of the philosopher and the christian anthropology of the orthodoxy partisans. However, intuition and intent of a humanist syncretism aiming at the collaboration of both scientific and faith intelligence lived through Renaissance and XVIIIth century, to maintain the thought of famous Catholic litterateurs, abbots Morellet, Coyer, Yvon, Bergier and Raynal. Those mediation theoreticians personified a moderated minority of catholic apologetics, an apologetic of conciliation calling to mind about its nature and its significance: did it manage to tie up the christian values to the strong ideas related to the rational Enlightenment; did it offer a medial path between the antagonistic parties of the “philosophers” and the “devout persons”? A pluralist conciliation can be revealed by analytical exploration and by putting into perspective comparatively the terms of the union between reason and faith. Deemed as a true ideological nebula rose on the theological humanism of Jesuit molinism, this conciliation was constrained by cyclical external difficulties, was torn apart between Christianity certainty and methodical doubt, was faced to the requirements of the duality of the philosophical and scientific “reason”, but was also submitted to the consequences of its own ambiguities and conceptual lacks. In fine, the stake of these syncretic ambitions lied less on the faith-reason diptych than on the harmonization of the feeling of faith, nature and science.

Esta dissertação visa oferecer uma interpretação da verdade prática em Aristóteles que explique o papel causal da razão prática com relação à ação humana. Nossa hipótese é de que a verdade prática depende fundamentalmente da efetividade causal da razão prática na ação, visto que a razão prática, por sua relação com o desejo, consistiria em algo que é simultaneamente da verdade e da ação, de sorte que a verdade prática não seria uma verdade que apenas pode levar à ação, mas uma verdade que efetivamente leva à ação, ou melhor, ela seria verdade justamente por levar à ação. Para tanto, analisaremos o sentido em que a razão prática é causa de ação mostrando que a realização de seu a verdade está inequivocamente ligada ao desempenho dessa função causal, não podendo se reduzir ao fato de a razão prática descobrir ou se valer de proposições verdadeiras. / This dissertation aims at an interpretation of Aristotles account of practical truth which explains the causal role of practical reason with regards to human action. Our hypothesis is that practical truth depends fundamentally upon practical reasons causal efficacy in action, since practical reason, due to its relation with desire, would be something which is at the same time of truth and action, so that practical truth would not be a kind of truth which can only lead to action, but a kind of truth which elicts action, in other words, it would be truth precisely because it elicts action. In order to do that, we shall analyse the sense in which practical reason is a cause o action showing that the achievement of its the truth is unequivocally connected to the performance of this causal role, implying that practical truth is not reducible to the fact that practical reason discovers or makes use of true propositions.