This paper argues that credit ratings have contributed to the current financial crisis. In United States, the previous “reputational model” as well as the current proposals aimed at reducing reliance on rating agencies, enhancing competition and increasing transparency is not sufficient to improve the integrity of rating agencies. This paper suggests that imposing stricter liability on rating agencies is necessary. The proposal to eliminate the exemption of NRSROs under Section 11 of the Securities Act is necessary but not sufficient for holding rating agencies accountable. The first amendment defense always shields rating agencies from legal liability, while the absence of a common standard make it hard to impose liability for negligent ratings. Finally, this paper suggests that the courts should not award the rating agencies First Amendment protection and consider the distinguished characteristics of rating agencies, when examining the professional liability of the agencies.

This paper argues that credit ratings have contributed to the current financial crisis. In United States, the previous “reputational model” as well as the current proposals aimed at reducing reliance on rating agencies, enhancing competition and increasing transparency is not sufficient to improve the integrity of rating agencies. This paper suggests that imposing stricter liability on rating agencies is necessary. The proposal to eliminate the exemption of NRSROs under Section 11 of the Securities Act is necessary but not sufficient for holding rating agencies accountable. The first amendment defense always shields rating agencies from legal liability, while the absence of a common standard make it hard to impose liability for negligent ratings. Finally, this paper suggests that the courts should not award the rating agencies First Amendment protection and consider the distinguished characteristics of rating agencies, when examining the professional liability of the agencies.

The aim of the thesisis an analysis of EU credit rating agencies legal regulation in comparison with regulation in the USA. This analysis outlines the crucial and less important aspects of regulation in EU and USA. One of Chapters of this study is also describing the reflection of EU credit rating agencies regulation to Czech law. The thesis is composed of five chapters. First of them explains basic context and position of credit rating agencies. Chapter two is focused on EU legislation. Chapter Three briefly describes the position of credit rating agencies in the Czech Republic. Chapter Four illustrates the credit rating agencies legal regulation in USA. The text is mainly focused on Two of the EU regulations and, regarding the US legislation, on the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, part of the Dodd - Frank Act and some of the more important rules conducted by Security Exchange Commission. The comparison of both legal systems is placed in Chapter Five and completed with commentary.

Credit rating agencies are controversial yet influential financial gatekeepers. Many have attributed the recent failures of credit rating agencies to conflicts of interest, such as the agencies’ issuer-pays business model and the agencies’ provision of ancillary services. This report identifies these conflicts; examines recently-finalized Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations proscribing these conflicts; and suggests other possible regulatory measures. The strategies available to regulators are diverse and differ widely in their political and administrative feasibility. These strategies include outright prohibition of conflicts; removing regulatory references to credit ratings; enhancing agency liability; organizational firewalls; performance disclosures; demonstrating due diligence and its results; increasing competition; staleness reforms; internal governance; administrative registration; and requiring alternative business models. While the report primarily focuses on how the most recent financial crisis—and the related market for asset-backed securities—highlighted conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies, this report also examines how credit ratings—and their limitations—affect sovereign debt markets. / text

This paper contributes to the literature by presenting a detailed summary of existing problems with credit rating agencies and proposing a model of a European Rating Agency that acts as a competitor and benchmark to the established credit rating agencies. European Rating Agency (ERA) as a new entrant will make a difference by increasing rating transparency and reputation cost for rating agencies at the same time. A vital point when developing the idea of an independent rating agency was the minimization of regulation changes. This will help shareholder to better orientate and understand the functionalities of the European Rating Agency which will make its establishment process easier. Reputation cost (capital) are assumed to be the building blocks that support the unique position of current rating agencies. ERA is modelled specifically to target this information and use the fragile concept of trust and reputation to the benefit of all stakeholder.

<p>This paper explores the effect of credit rating agency’s (CRA) reputation on the discretionary disclosures of corporate bond issuers. Academics, practitioners, and regulators disagree on the informational role played by major CRAs and the usefulness of credit ratings in influencing investors’ perception of the credit risk of bond issuers. Using management earnings forecasts as a measure of discretionary disclosure, I find that investors demand more (less) disclosure from bond issuers when the ratings become less (more) credible. In addition, using content analytics, I find that bond issuers disclose more qualitative information during periods of low CRA reputation to aid investors better assess credit risk. That the corporate managers alter their voluntary disclosure in response to CRA reputation shocks is consistent with credit ratings providing incremental information to investors and reducing adverse selection in lending markets. Overall, my findings suggest that managers rely on voluntary disclosure as a credible mechanism to reduce information asymmetry in bond markets.</p> / Dissertation

This dissertation consists of three essays linking the business models of rating agencies to the rating decisions these agencies make as market intermediaries between buyers and sellers. The first study examines the link between a rating agency‟s primary revenue source and its rating decisions. Theoretically, rating payments could influence rating agency decisions or be counterbalanced by reputational rewards for rating accuracy. I explore this relationship in U.S. corporate credit ratings, where some agencies are primarily paid by bond issuers (sellers) and others by investors (buyers). Analysis of a balanced panel of 338 companies rated between 2005 and 2009 reveals that agencies produce differing ratings consistent with the preferences of their paying customers. Changes in buyer-paid ratings are more frequent and generally precede corresponding seller-paid rating changes. Seller-paid ratings are slower to incorporate negative information, particularly for rated firms in the financial services sector and firms with ratings above a critical grading cutoff. The second study complements the first by estimating the gap between the rating information disclosed by sellers and the information sought by buyers, again using evidence from U.S. corporate credit ratings. While seller willingness to pay for an additional rating is highly concentrated among a subset of relatively high-quality firms, buyers demonstrate more uniform interest in additional ratings for firms at all quality levels. This finding highlights an information gap among high-risk firms that is not a major focus of existing regulation. The third study focuses on rating decisions by government rating agencies, an alternative rating model to those examined in the first two studies. The empirical setting is Canadian film classification where the existence of multiple regional regulators has been justified by claims of variation in community standards. I find significant and increasing consistency in the regulatory decisions of these agencies, suggesting institutional isomorphism that brings into question the persistence of the parallel regional structure. Overall, these studies provide new empirical insight into the relevance of rating agency heterogeneity to firm strategy and policy. The findings may also be relevant to a variety of other settings involving information disclosure such as environmental impact and corporate social responsibility.

This dissertation consists of three essays linking the business models of rating agencies to the rating decisions these agencies make as market intermediaries between buyers and sellers. The first study examines the link between a rating agency‟s primary revenue source and its rating decisions. Theoretically, rating payments could influence rating agency decisions or be counterbalanced by reputational rewards for rating accuracy. I explore this relationship in U.S. corporate credit ratings, where some agencies are primarily paid by bond issuers (sellers) and others by investors (buyers). Analysis of a balanced panel of 338 companies rated between 2005 and 2009 reveals that agencies produce differing ratings consistent with the preferences of their paying customers. Changes in buyer-paid ratings are more frequent and generally precede corresponding seller-paid rating changes. Seller-paid ratings are slower to incorporate negative information, particularly for rated firms in the financial services sector and firms with ratings above a critical grading cutoff. The second study complements the first by estimating the gap between the rating information disclosed by sellers and the information sought by buyers, again using evidence from U.S. corporate credit ratings. While seller willingness to pay for an additional rating is highly concentrated among a subset of relatively high-quality firms, buyers demonstrate more uniform interest in additional ratings for firms at all quality levels. This finding highlights an information gap among high-risk firms that is not a major focus of existing regulation. The third study focuses on rating decisions by government rating agencies, an alternative rating model to those examined in the first two studies. The empirical setting is Canadian film classification where the existence of multiple regional regulators has been justified by claims of variation in community standards. I find significant and increasing consistency in the regulatory decisions of these agencies, suggesting institutional isomorphism that brings into question the persistence of the parallel regional structure. Overall, these studies provide new empirical insight into the relevance of rating agency heterogeneity to firm strategy and policy. The findings may also be relevant to a variety of other settings involving information disclosure such as environmental impact and corporate social responsibility.

Background: The credit rating agencies have been heavily contested and criticized. In addition to this, other informational sources may potentially deliver the information that the CRA is intended to provide. This may have changed their role in reducing information asymmetry in the financial market. Purpose: This thesis will investigate (i) whether changes (upgrade/downgrade) in credit ratings lead to abnormal returns in share value, and thereby provide useful information to potential and current investors. The thesis will also (ii) examine whether there are significant differences between the periods before and after the GFC in 2008. Method: Regression based event study using a dummy-variable approach. Conclusions: No strong evidence that credit ratings have a significant effect on stock prices in the European stock market. Small indications that the market is responding more strongly to a rating change announcement during the period 2000-2008 compared to 2009-2019.

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