In my thesis I focus mainly on omnipresence of the internet and technology. Additionally on colapse of physical environment in online culture and infinite reproduction ability and transformability of digital matter. However, I’m also concerned about their feedback application into exhibition areas. The thesis deals with change of authorship – after an art piece gets documented, it becomes a circulating material. Authorship of an artwork is almost impossible to track down, same as the initial context. Artistic outcome switches from auratic object into a file which is a subject to the network architecture. In the last two decades the relationship between image, text, language, meaning, body, space, subject and object changed radically. The task is no longer to create unique and original art but to observe existing supplies of images and spaces as de-subjectivized.

The purpose of this thesis is to study the novels of Maria Edgeworth in an attempt to discover whether or not her novels have merit beyond their representation of the manners and morals of her historical period. This involves first an examination of her novels in the light of such criticism as has given rise to the question of their importance.

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That a theory is merely effective has historically counted against it, especially in pro-realism discourse. For example, many realists take the interpretation of a theory to amount to specifying what the world would be like was the theory true (or characterizing the possible worlds picked out by the theory). But effective theories are not true simpliciter. They describe a limited subset of nature and only approximately so, giving the traditional realist little to work with. The effective realist gives up on the traditional realist project, noting that contemporary physical theories tell us nothing, or very little, about what's fundamental. The traditional realist gives us unreliable results for our ontology at fundamental length scales. Effective realism responds by taking effective theories seriously. I have two primary goals in this paper. First, I consider a few responses to arguments provided by Ruetshce (2017). Ruetsche worries that the theory space over which the effective realist quantifies might fail to be comprehensive. I hope to defend the effective realist through the use of first-order scientific evidence and with a response motivated by Fraser (forthcoming). Second, I develop an objection to effective realism similar in kind to one posed by Ruetshce. Rather than a skepticism in the space on which the renormalization group acts, I entertain a more general skepticism with respect to the construction of effective field theories. I then tease out a response grounded in theory space constraints to justify the effective realist's use of effective field theories to guide ontological commitment. / Master of Arts / Realism, or the view that we can believe in the approximate truth of scientific theories or parts of those theories, has long struggled to overcome its skeptics. Many past theories have been discarded. Many new theories have replaced their predecessors. Many problems plague our interpretations of the results of the theories we have access to. To bolster the case for realism, I defend a modest view in the context of high energy physics by taking advantage of a tool called renormalization. The tool allows us to partly characterize domains that we have not yet empirically probed, and I argue that this provides fertile grounds for realism.

In this essay I examine the relation between religious non-realism and religious pluralism. Religious pluralism is celebrated by it's adherents, to be benevolent and tolerant towards other religions truth claims and practices. Religious non-realism is also, by its adherents, praised for its including way to look upon truth claims and differing opinions about reality. When it comes to questions like what there is and what is not, does God exist or does he not etc. the religious non-realist is prone to less dogmatism and definite answers than metaphysical realists. Or at least so does the non-realists themselves like to think. What I examine in this essay is whether religious non-realism pragmatically implies religious pluralism, or if a non-realist judiciously can dismiss religious pluralism and instead adopt a form of confessional view of a specifik religion. Religious exclusivism, like the one Alvin Plantinga defends, rejects the possibility of x being both true and false. If a religious claim is taken to be true then incompatible claims have to be considered false according to this view. This fits poorly whith religious non-realism since the latter does not embrace a correspondance theory of truth. Religious pluralism is strongly criticized, among others for leaving “God” or other religious entities empty and whithout characteristics or content. This, because if God is litterally indescribable and unreachable, we would have no reason to believe that God has the chatacteristics we think he has. If religious pluralism cannot answer to the criticism, and if non-realism can not help pluralism evade the problems, then we are in need of a religious inclusivism that does not depend on metaphysical realism. I propose, what I have called, a pragmatic non-realistic inclusivism as an answer to the problem. This is a non-realistic theory that evades metaphysical realism and reductionism of religion, but nevertheless can prefere one religion before others. Not because one religion is concidered to have metaphysical and objective truth while others do not, but because one could prefere a specific religious language and consider that religion to be the most adequate response to human life

The primary concern of this piece of work is to reconsider scientific realism debate in the philosophy of science. Accordingly, the overall aim is to come up with the clues of a viable scientific realist attitude in the face of anti-realist interpretations of scientific theories. To accomplish this aim, I make use of two modified versions of scientific realism, that is, &lsquo / epistemic structural realism&rsquo / and &lsquo / entity realism&rsquo / . Epistemic structural realism is a realist position of which proponents claim that the only knowable part of the reality is the structure of it which is expressed by the mathematical equations of our best scientific theories. On the other hand, according to entity realism, the only assured knowledge obtained from scientific theories is the existence of theoretical entities posited by these theories. I argue that a combination of the properly construed versions of these two positions might fulfill the afore-mentioned aim of this thesis.

Visionen med tunnelbygget i Hallandsåsen var att det skulle generera vinster på olika plan, men det kom mer att handla om snabba problemlösningar som inte alls blev tidseffektiva. Tunnelkommissionen analyserade problemen och släppte en slutrapport där lösningar föreslagits. Syftet med denna uppsats är att sammanfatta kritisk realism som en vetenskapsteori vars ontologiska och epistemologiska grunder skiljer sig från andra och som därmed behandlar teoretiska och praktiska aspekter annorlunda inom forskning. Därefter ska kritisk-realistiska angreppssätt analyseras i relation till Tunnelkommissionens slutrapport för att sedan kunna se om någon av dem reflekterar svagheter eller styrkor i olika anseenden. Resultatet av undersökningen visade att Tunnelkommissionen har svagheter i deras ställningstagande mot förståelser av grundläggande faktorer och endast finner lösningar som ur ett kritisk-realistiskt perspektiv skulle anses vara temporära. Kritisk realism däremot har svagheter i den bemärkelsen att det är svårt att komma fram med specifika tillvägagångssätt som reflekterar deras ontologiska och epistemologiska grunder i praktiken. Däremot visar denna undersökning att kritisk realism också förmedlar nya insikter inom forskning genom att förmedla nya grundläggande ställningstaganden.

This study will examine the European Union and its politics towards terrorism between the years of 2015-2017. To help with this, this study uses the theory realism to investigate to what extent the European Union and its politics match with realism. This study shows that the politics from the EU towards terrorism has some realistic elements and, in some areas, it is very clear that the politics from the EU towards terrorism is realistic. However, in some areas the politics do not match with realism and one example of this is the European unions will to prevent and cooperate rather than using military means. To get result this study looked at the politics that was made by the European Union between the years of 2015-2017 and was then able to compare this to the theory of realism. The time period was chosen because of the number of terrorist attacks and because the bigger threats. It is then interesting to examine how the EU:s politics towards terrorism changed because of the threats and attacks.

This thesis critically assesses ‘relaxed realism’ – a group of views that have entered the metaethical debate recently (Dworkin, 1996; Kramer, 2009; Parfit, 2011; Scanlon, 2014). Relaxed realism promises a novel perspective on our normative practice. In particular, it aims for a view that is genuinely distinct from traditional non-naturalism on the one hand, and sophisticated forms of expressivism on the other. This thesis calls into question whether such an aspiration can be met. The approach is twofold. First, the thesis argues that relaxed realism can meet various of its objectives better by relying on theoretical resources that expressivism offers. To argue for this claim, it discusses three challenges that relaxed realism should be able to meet according to its own objectives. With regards to each challenge, it then shows that as it stands relaxed realist views fail to adequately respond to it. Finally, the thesis suggests that relaxed realism can better respond to the respective challenges – and hence, better meet their own objectives – by endorsing certain expressivist resources. Second, the thesis argues that relaxed realism is an inherently unstable view. It does so by raising a dilemma. Either relaxed realism fails to establish the desired difference to expressivism or it succeeds, but at the expense of erasing the difference to traditional non-naturalism. The conclusion of the thesis is critical: the relaxed realist aspiration for a novel take on our normative practice – distinct from both traditional non-naturalism and expressivism – remains unmet.