This thesis defends the potential of the ‘realist’ form of narrative for contesting, as well as reproducing, ideology. The common form of ‘realism’ consists of a loose ensemble of conventions. The key components are omniscient, evaluative narration; an empiricist objectivism; the construction of individuals as agents of action and bearers of natural attributes; cause and effect sequencing; conflict leading to resolution; mystery leading to disclosure; and the effacement of these techniques in the interests of illusion. In one critique of realism – ‘post-Althusserian anti-realism’ - these practices constitute ideology both in a general sense - as manipulation - and a specific sense - as transmitters of capitalist presuppositions. A 'social realism' or ‘critical realism’, which attempts to invalidate ideology by the presentation of countervailing data, is said to be undercut by its encoding within this alleged inherently ideological form. This critique of realism is based on an unsustainable, ‘formalist’, reduction of ‘content’ to ‘form’. The role of observation in knowledge production and the significance of inductively generated propositions are replaced by a sophisticated, but ultimately reductive, ‘discursive determinism’. From its conventionalist epistemological premises, post-Althusserian anti-realism ignores the capacity of empiricism to break with preconceptions. By dismissing the convention of accountability to evidence, the critique is forced back onto criteria of internal consistency - a position even more vulnerable to prejudice than empiricism. The thesis then argues that the concomitant view of the subject of narrative realism as a construct of liberal-individualism ignores how realist texts have questioned ideas of autonomy and a fixed human nature. Anti-realist methods have usefully exposed some of the means by which constructions of freedom and self-determination mask the subordination of labour in ‘free’ -market economies. However, this frequently entails undervaluing gains made under a rubric of human rights. The replacement of human subjectivity with discursive or economic determinism tends to expel dialogue, volition and human needs as factors in the ideational and practical repudiation of ideology. A narrow approach to realism is therefore inadequate for determining the relation of realism to ideology. The alternative position defended here is that realism’s relation to capitalism - like that of liberalism and empiricism - is tangential, not homologous. The variability of ‘content’ in realism makes realist techniques - as abstract form - politically neutral (but claimed by anti-realists to be intrinsically authoritarian). Realist conventions which construct a point of view are open options for making judgements that will vary in empirical rigour and opposition to different ideologies. The thesis sets the authoritarian aspects of realism’s attempted manipulation of the reader against the potential in realism for a dialogic plurality of perspectives, the possible defensibility of a point of view, the need for coherence and judgement in political dialogue and action, and the frequency of ‘content’-based reader resistance. The realist form is not an absolute of representation, but nor is it a mere reflex of capitalism. By the same token, the anti-realist concept of the anti-ideological function of ‘anti-realist’ texts imposes a reverse, homogeneous, inherently oppositional role onto politically heterogenous cultural forms. The thesis argues, furthermore, that by rejecting empiricist modes of substantiation and adopting a mechanistic view of ideology, the post-Althusserian critique of realism fails to engage adequately with the theoretical defence of capitalism. The harmony thesis of free enterprise can only be given a pejorative label ‘ideology’ on the basis of comparative and historical considerations of the performance of capitalism. In practice, the natural tendency of the market to cyclical instability with attendant unemployment, impoverishment and the compounding of class-based inequalities has only been mitigated by extensive government intervention. The thesis concludes then with a case study of Dickens’s Hard Times as an example of the above, more effective, approach to capitalist legitimation. Hard Times employs empiricist, semi-‘fictional’, ‘realist’ techniques to demonstrate the ideological nature of theories of free enterprise. The critical edge of this novel is blunted by a liberal-romanticism that is ambivalent about legal-institutional solutions to social problems. Despite this fault, Hard Times shows some of the possibilities offered by the realist form for viable social critique.

The main purpose of the present study is to show that scientific realism is still worth advocating despite its vulnerability in the face of anti-realist objections. For, it does not seem possible to &lsquo / do science&rsquo / without realist commitments. The second purpose of this study is to investigate the plausibility of the novel versions of realism in the sense that whether they can satisfactorily respond to the anti-realist objections. Regarding the main purpose, I try to show that theoretical terms are neither reducible to observables nor they can be dispensed with. Hence in scientific theories there always remains a metaphysical part. Regarding the second purpose I discuss ontic structural realism which holds the individualistic attributions responsible for the metaphysical parts in theories and suggests that non-individualistic interpretation of theoretical terms is possible. The legitimacy of Ontic structural realism&rsquo / s suggestion, as its advocates claim, lies within quantum facts.

This paper considers the philosophy of science that is central to Critical Realism (CR). Following a discussion of the foundational transcendental arguments of the movement, it reviews stratification, emergence, and the possibility of a unity between the natural and the social sciences. CR is broadly contrasted with other versions of scientific realism, empiricism, and idealism. the philosophy of psychology is considered as a test case in which critical realism can be demonstrated to be a workable theory of science. Specifically, a theory is propsed of social psychology that would be scientific in virtue of meeting the standards of a critical realist view of science. / i, 95 leaves ; 28 cm.

The central premise of this research is the paradox between idealism and realism in the visual arts in the context of the themes of maturation, old age and mortality. Throughout the history of art there have been artworks that feature the realistic representation of this theme in contrast to traditional idealistic trends. Selected artworks are highlighted from different art-historical periods in western art history dating from antiquity to contemporary times. These dates include artworks from the Hellenistic art of ancient Greece, Roman art and some examples from the middle ages. This theme flourished in the early modern period and in the 17th century, resulting in some artworks only being mentioned. The 19th and 20l centuries show less interest in this subject, therefore the examples are rare. Finally I examine my own art and my interest in the theme of old age in relation to a few examples of contemporary South African art. Old age is a social and cultural phenomenon, therefore the socio-political, anthropological, philosophical and cultural influences in each period are briefly investigated. The manifestation of this theme is initially concurrent with the development of realism in art history and the changes in art theory and criticism, but other factors are revealed in the course of this research which indicate that this subject has a bearing on moral and spiritual enquiry. In conclusion, it is anticipated that this discourse will enlighten the reader to the mysterious workings of the human creative nature and psyche that are stimulated by such topics as old age and mortality. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2007.

The thesis develops solutions to two main problems for mental realism. Mental realism is the theory that mental properties, events, and objects exist, with their own set of characters and causal powers. The first problem comes from the philosophy of science, where Psillos proposes a notion of scientific realism that contradicts mental realism, and consequently, if one is to be a scientific realist in the way Psillos recommends, one must reject mental realism. I propose adaptations to the conception of scientific realism to make it compatible with mental realism. In the process, the thesis defends computational cognitive science from a compelling argument Searle can be seen to endorse but has not put forth in an organized logical manner. A new conception of scientific realism emerges out of this inquiry, integrating the mental into the rest of nature. The second problem for mental realism arises out of non-reductive physicalism- the view that higher-level properties, and in particular mental properties, are irreducible, physically realized, and that physical properties are sufficient non-overdetermining causes of any effect. Kim’s Problem of Causal Exclusion aims to show that the mental, if unreduced, does no causal work. Consequently, given that we should not believe in the existence of properties that do not participate in causation, we would be forced to drop mental realism. A solution is needed. The thesis examines various positions relevant to the debate. Several doctrines of physicalism are explored, rejected, and one is proposed; the thesis shows the way in which Kim’s reductionist position has been constantly inconsistent throughout the years of debate; the thesis argues that trope theory does not compete with a universalist conception of properties to provide a solution; and shows weakness in the Macdonald’s non-reductive monist position and Pereboom’s constitutional coincidence account of mental causation. The thesis suggests that either the premises of Kim’s argument are consistent, and consequently his reductio is logically invalid, or at least one of the premises is false, and therefore the argument is not sound. Consequently, the Problem of Causal Exclusion that Kim claims emerges out of non-reductive physicalism does not force us to reject mental realism. Mental realism lives on.

Thesis (Ph.D) - University of Queensland, 2007. / Includes bibliography.

When the world is full of so much fear and worry, pain and tragedy, we need new ways to work through our own personal loss; we need new ways to heal. It is my opinion that stories are meant to heal, to make us feel and take us to a better place. Stories offer understanding, a good laugh, a way to move forward, they thrill us, make us cry, show us love, or scare us into momentary elation. My creative thesis will be a collection of short fiction that employs elements of literary realism and magical realism to explore the topic of loss and grief, as well as modes of alternative healing, demonstrating a progression of human awareness.

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<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>The actions of Sweden during the second world war has been richly discussed over the years. Sweden declared itself neutral in the war between the great powers but did not manage to maintain its neutrality. The nature of neutrality has often been discussed; whether it is of a idealistic or more pragmatic nature. Realism, a theory of international relations, would argue that it is of a more pragmatic nature, hence these two are in opposition. Realism also takes credit in claiming to explain how and why a state chooses to act in a situation.</p><p> </p><p>The aim of this essay was to, by examining specific decisions made by the swedish government during the Second World War, come to a conclusion whether or not Sweden’s proclaimed neutrality was of idealistic or pragmatic nature, and thereby possibly coming to a conclusion about neutrality in large.</p><p>It was also to examine the worth of realism as an explanatory theory by applying it to this specific case; to examine its validity.</p><p>The study was conducted using a qualitative method; presenting empiric facts and then by using a decision model interpreting the actions and results from a realist perspective.</p><p> </p><p>The study concludes that realism has explanatory power, although not a complete one. The evidence, concerning the neutrality matter, points to that neutrality should be considered as being of a more pragmatic nature.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Keywords: </strong>Second world war, international relations, realism, neutrality</p>

No description available.