What stance should we take toward our best scientific theories? Traditionally, there have been two answers: realism and antirealism. Structural realism is an attempt to find middle-ground between these two views. Rather than accept everything our best theories seem to say about the world, the structural realist endorses only what those theories tell us about the structure of the world. I argue that switching the focus to structure allows the realist to better deal with problems of theory-change, and to better make sense of contemporary physics. I go on to offer a specific version of structural realism based on an understanding of structures as networks of relations between objects that are nothing more than places in structures. My view allows that there are objects and relations, but reverses the usual order of dependence: objects depend on relations rather than the other way around.

The main purpose of the present study is to show that scientific realism is still worth advocating despite its vulnerability in the face of anti-realist objections. For, it does not seem possible to &lsquo / do science&rsquo / without realist commitments. The second purpose of this study is to investigate the plausibility of the novel versions of realism in the sense that whether they can satisfactorily respond to the anti-realist objections. Regarding the main purpose, I try to show that theoretical terms are neither reducible to observables nor they can be dispensed with. Hence in scientific theories there always remains a metaphysical part. Regarding the second purpose I discuss ontic structural realism which holds the individualistic attributions responsible for the metaphysical parts in theories and suggests that non-individualistic interpretation of theoretical terms is possible. The legitimacy of Ontic structural realism&rsquo / s suggestion, as its advocates claim, lies within quantum facts.

This study aims to explain the Stuxnet-attack against Iran in 2009-2010 by using the IR-theory of structural realism. By doing so the theory also faces the challenge of the impact of the information revolution on security and international relations. The structural realism that is at hand is that of Kenneth Waltz and his Theory of International Politics from 1979.The study reaches the conclusion that Waltzs focus on the structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities applies well to the case of Stuxnet as a cyber attack. The creators of the sophisticated Stuxnet, USA and Israel, also indicates that when it comes to this certain aspect of the information revolution and IR, states seem to still be the main actor. Finally the character of one of the major features of the Stuxnet-attack; the internet, is shown to have an anarchic structure that fits well as an extension of the realist view of the international system.

Ontic structural realism is the view that structure is fundamental. This view is at odds with a long-standing tradition in metaphysics which takes the fundamental structure of reality to consist of individuals. Steven French argues in favour of an eliminativist ontic structural realism which is supposed to eliminate individuals, as well as other objects, from the category of fundamentalia. There have also been more moderate attempts where 'non-individuals' are encompassed in the framework. In this paper, I make two interconnected claims. Firstly, that any moderate version of ontic structural realism is too weak to be included in the ontic structural realism familiy since the view fails to satisfy the motivations for employing any kind of ontic structural realism in the first place. Secondly, that if we want to formulate an ontic structural realist view that delivers on the claim that there are no fundamentalia apart from structure we will not find a satisfying view in French's oeuvre.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This thesis develops a general theory of patterns on the basis of the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. The main questions with which this thesis is concerned are: what is the ontological status of patterns? In what does their reality consist in? Why does exhibiting patternhood seem to be a necessary condition for the very possibility of cognition? The development of the theory is motivated by a discussion of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a theory that has recently been gaining attention in analytic philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of physics. The central claim of OSR is that only patterns (structures) are real; individual objects are not real, or have only a “thin” being in some sense. In this thesis I deal mainly with the version of OSR developed by James Ladyman and Don Ross in their book Every Thing Must Go. I address two criticisms that are commonly levelled against OSR, (1) that it cannot give an adequate account of the difference between physical structure and mathematical structure, and (2) that it cannot give an adequate account of the relationship between the world and our representations of the world. I then show how Peirce’s philosophical framework, as encapsulated in his pragmatism, theory of the categories, Scholastic realism, and theory of the continuum, could provide an answer to these difficulties. OSR will also be used to illuminate an aspect of Peirce’s philosophy which I believe has not been sufficiently emphasized in the literature, namely its structuralist aspect. Specifically, it will be shown that Peirce’s philosophy leads to a worldview very similar to that of OSR, via a path of reasoning that is completely different from those standardly used to argue for OSR. This thesis as a whole is an attempt to throw light on the nature of patternhood through an elucidation and justification of this path of reasoning, which I call the alternative path to OSR.

As a component of the overall policy to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against the U.S., the Bush and Obama administrations have turned to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones. From 2004 to 2014, Pakistan has seen the largest volume of U.S. drone strikes targeting radical groups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban, a trend that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. On the surface, using drones to eliminate terrorists while avoiding an official armed conflict aligns with the theory of neo- or structural realism developed by Kenneth Waltz. And yet although 9/11 served as the impetus for the U.S. to refocus attention on ameliorating the threat of terrorism and to initiate far-reaching measures to protect homeland security, there remains intense debate over whether or not the U.S. is actually more secure than it was prior to 9/11. While structural realism is still relevant to the current international system, the effects of drone strikes in Pakistan may set the U.S. on a path toward increasingly destabilizing situations that could lead to heightened insecurity and ultimately a change in power in the international system. The existing literature suggests that drone strikes in Pakistan are (1) leading to revenge-driven counter attacks, (2) intensifying radical anti-Americanism and creating more potential terrorists, (3) damaging the U.S. relationship with nuclear-armed Pakistan, (4) destabilizing the regions where drone attacks are launched, and (5) undermining American 'soft power.' The culmination of these five trends has the potential to disrupt the current balance of power in a way that is not in America's national interest. The unique security dilemma presented by the asymmetrical threat of terrorism and the asymmetrical response of drone strikes necessitates the continued evolution of neorealism as an IR theory. / Master of Arts

The primary concern of this piece of work is to reconsider scientific realism debate in the philosophy of science. Accordingly, the overall aim is to come up with the clues of a viable scientific realist attitude in the face of anti-realist interpretations of scientific theories. To accomplish this aim, I make use of two modified versions of scientific realism, that is, &lsquo / epistemic structural realism&rsquo / and &lsquo / entity realism&rsquo / . Epistemic structural realism is a realist position of which proponents claim that the only knowable part of the reality is the structure of it which is expressed by the mathematical equations of our best scientific theories. On the other hand, according to entity realism, the only assured knowledge obtained from scientific theories is the existence of theoretical entities posited by these theories. I argue that a combination of the properly construed versions of these two positions might fulfill the afore-mentioned aim of this thesis.

A presente dissertação de mestrado busca contribuir para o debate em desenvolvimento sobre a emergência de países do Sul Global, a partir do estudo das relações de poder hierarquizadas em que estes esses países estão inseridos. Nesse sentido, questiona-se como estruturas de assimetria material atuam sobre o comportamento de distintos atores do sistema internacional. As oportunidades e constrangimentos de tais estruturas materiais se manifestam especificamente para distintos atores? Como essa variação se articula com as possibilidades de emergência de países do Sul Global? A partir da resposta a essas perguntas, busca-se propor um caminho para identificar episódios históricos de constituição, por parte de países do Sul Global, de capacidade transformativa de sua posição nas relações internacionais em que se inserem. Para tanto, mobiliza-se um diálogo entre a literatura sobre diferenciação estrutural e sobre a hierarquia nas relações internacionais, como modo de articular analiticamente o processo de socialização entre estruturas políticas e econômicas. Desse diálogo estrutural, pretende-se compreender os mecanismos de exclusão que perpetuam assimetrias materiais no sistema internacional e os meios instrumentalizáveis para sua ruptura. / This master's thesis aims to contribute to the debate on the rise of countries from the Global South, proposing the study of hierarchical power relations that they entail. In this sense, it questions how structures of material asymmetries act conditioning the behavior of actors throughout the international system. Are the opportunities and constraints deriving such structures specifically varying for different actors? How is this variation related to the possibilities of rise in the Global South? From the answers to these questions, it is hoped to propose an alternative to identify historical episodes of constitution, by countries the Global South, of transformative capacity of their position in the international relations that they operate. Therefore, the work mobilizes a dialogue between the literature on structural differentiation and hierarchy in international relations, as a way of analytically articulate the process of socialization of political and economic structures. This structural dialogue focuses on identifying mechanisms of exclusion that perpetuate materials asymmetries in the international system and the means to their rupture.

This thesis defends Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR) against both Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) and Traditional Scientific Realism (TSR). It is argued that TSR cannot properly explain what actually happens throughout radical theory changes in science / in the sense that a plausible version of Scientific Realism should, somehow, satisfy Scientific Anti-Realists&rsquo / concerns about the link between &ldquo / truth&rdquo / and &ldquo / success&rdquo / of our scientific theories. On the other hand, it is claimed that OSR is not a form of Scientific Realism but rather basically a modified form of Pragmatism. To that effect, it is further argued that Modern Physics does not provide convincing reasons to accept the conclusions that advocates of OSR derive from it. It is finally asserted that a Structural Realist understanding of Scientific Explanation is not possible. In that regard, it is argued that a defense of Structural Realism by No Miracle Argument (NMA) against Pessimistic Meta Induction Argument (PMIA) will be effective if and only if the NMA is formulated by the predictive success of scientific theories, rather than constructing it on the explanatory power of them.

Russell’s claim that only structural knowledge of the world is possible was influentially criticized by Newman as rendering scientific discoveries trivial. I show that a version of this criticism also applies to the “structural realism” more recently advocated by Worrall, which requires continuity of formal structure between predecessor and successor scientific theories. The problem is that structure, in its common set-theoretical construal, is radically underdetermined by the entities and relations over which it is defined, rendering intertheoretic continuity intolerably cheap. I show that this problem may be overcome by supplementing the purely formal relation of intertheoretic isomorphism with the semiformal “Ontological Reductive Links” developed by Moulines and others of the German “structuralist” approach to the philosophy of science.