The phrase ‘in virtue of’ is a mainstay of metaphysical discourse. In recent years, many philosophers have argued that we should understand this phrase, as metaphysicians use it, in terms of a concept of metaphysical dependence called ‘grounding’.This dissertation explores a range of central issues in the theory of grounding. Chapter 1 introduces the intuitive concept of grounding and discusses some compulsory questions in the theory of grounding. Chapter 2 focusses on scepticism on grounding, according to which the recent philosophical interest in the topic is misguided. In chapter 3 I discuss grounding’s explanatory roles. Chapter 4 focusses on the claim that if an entity is grounded then it is an ontological free lunch. Chapter 5 discusses and rejects the claim that groundingis a relation between facts. This conclusion raises a problem: if grounding is not a relation between facts it becomes difficult to specify the connections between grounding and explanation and grounding and necessity. But not only is it desirable to specify these relations, it is essential for establishing that grounding is able to play the explanatory roles that are discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 6 responds to this problem by outlining an approach to grounding based on David Lewis’s (2003) theory of truthmaking. Against this backdrop I discuss, in chapter 7, some issues in the logic of grounding.

Metaphysical grounding has received a great deal of attention in the metaphysics literature within the last decade, offering what many see as an attractive theoretical alternative to other attempts to analyze the nature of fundamentality, e.g., dependence, supervenience, identity, conceptual analysis, etc. Still, a number of commentators note a bevy of issues facing the notion of grounding, leading some to believe it cannot perform the relevant work it has been tasked to do. One such issue is the purity dilemma, posed by Ted Sider, which follows from a plausible constraint placed on our theorizing about fundamentality, viz., that the fundamental bedrock of the world contains nothing but purely fundamental phenomena. It is argued that purity creates a problem for metaphysical grounding in that it makes it increasingly difficult to see what might ground the facts about what grounds what. In this paper, I explicate the purity dilemma, and an attempt made by Shamik Dasgupta to sidestep the challenge, and provide a secure grounding foundation for such facts. I then proceed to defend Dasgupta's view from objections made by Sider, and conclude that, at the very least, the crucial notion (autonomy) on which the former's view rests is intelligible, if it is not tenable. / Master of Arts / In this paper I discuss an ongoing debate over the nature of metaphysical grounding. Metaphysical grounding (or, “grounding”) is of interest to metaphysicians due to the satisfying way in which it handles a number of long-standing problems in the field. As Johnathan Schaffer (2009) notes, metaphysics has often concerned itself with what the most basic nature of reality is like, and grounding promises to furnish many of our metaphysical theories with the tools to answer such questions. Still, there remains a number of problems with characterizing grounding. The relevant problem I tackle in this paper has to do with whether or not grounding can be understood in its own terms. Ted Sider, for example, has suspicions that it cannot. I argue, on the behalf of Shamik Dasgupta, that there is an intelligible way to understand grounding in its own terms, and work to provide constructive answers to some of Sider’s objections.

Ontic structural realism is the view that structure is fundamental. This view is at odds with a long-standing tradition in metaphysics which takes the fundamental structure of reality to consist of individuals. Steven French argues in favour of an eliminativist ontic structural realism which is supposed to eliminate individuals, as well as other objects, from the category of fundamentalia. There have also been more moderate attempts where 'non-individuals' are encompassed in the framework. In this paper, I make two interconnected claims. Firstly, that any moderate version of ontic structural realism is too weak to be included in the ontic structural realism familiy since the view fails to satisfy the motivations for employing any kind of ontic structural realism in the first place. Secondly, that if we want to formulate an ontic structural realist view that delivers on the claim that there are no fundamentalia apart from structure we will not find a satisfying view in French's oeuvre.

Depuis le traité de Maastricht, le principe de subsidiarité fait l'objet d'une littérature remarquable tant du point de vue quantitatif que du point de vue qualitatif. La doctrine s'y intéresse au point de bâtir une « Europe de la subsidiarité » dont la finalité est la présentation des différentes formes et des diverses applications de la subsidiarité dans l'articulation des ordres juridiques internes et des ordres juridiques européens. Le résultat d'une telle construction intellectuelle brille cependant par l'absence remarquable, dans l'Europe unionaire, d'une variante de la subsidiarité qui bien que ne portant pas le nom a pourtant déjà dépassé le cap de « la vie cachée » pour celui de « la vie publique ». De ce fait, elle mérite d'être aussi intégrée dans cette « Europe de la subsidiarité » au rang de principe de la structure constitutionnelle du processus d'intégration. Cette autre forme de subsidiarité qu'est la subsidiarité inversée, est manifestement présente dans l'Union européenne où elle peut se définir soit comme la possibilité que se réservent certains États membres de l'Union d'intervenir en cas de défaillance de l'institution supranationale dans un domaine précis en l'occurrence les droits fondamentaux, soit comme une action nationale destinée à contrôler, toujours à titre subsidiaire, la qualité du droit « venu d'ailleurs » et ce, afin de garantir le respect de la « constitution fondamentale européenne ». Pourtant, elle n'a jamais fait l'objet d'une conceptualisation en tant que principe au sens de « proposition purement descriptive par laquelle le juriste rend compte d'une idée ou d'une tendance du droit ».Toutefois, la doctrine européaniste n'ignore pas / Since Maastricht Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity is the subject of many striking written works in quantity as well as in quality. It's so interesting for the doctrine that an “Europe of subsidiarity” has been built a in order to describe the different forms and applications of the subsidiarity in the connection between the national and European juridical orders. The result of this intellectual construction shines by the notable lack, in the “Europe unionaire”, of a variation on the subsidiarity. This one came through a “secret life” to a “public life” and has to be integrated in this “Europe of the subsidiarity” like a real principle of the constitutional structure of the process of integration. This other form of subsidiarity is the reversed subsidiarity and is plainly found in the European Union. It can either be defined as the possibility for some member States to interfere in case of failure in supranational institution in a limited area (here the fundamental rights), or as a national activity in order to control, always in a subsidiary way, the quality of the right “coming from somewhere else” in order to guaranty the respect of the “fundamental European constitution”. Yet there never was any conceptualization of it as an “only descriptive proposition through which the jurist is able to give a move of the law”. However the Europeanist doctrine can't deny it because the reversed subsidiarity is recognized (as a simple phenomenon this time) by many authors seeing only a way of breaking, a way to make the juridical construction more fragile or complicated. But a detailed analysis of its functions makes it possible to defend the contrary and to assert that the rev

De fameux arrêts rendus le 10 juillet 2002, par la Chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation, on retient surtout le revirement de jurisprudence concernant les clauses de non-concurrence insérées dans un contrat de travail : pour être valides, ces stipulations doivent désormais remplir différentes conditions cumulatives, dont le versement, au salarié, d’une contrepartie financière. Mais le visa - inédit - du « principe fondamental de libre exercice d’une activité professionnelle » a moins retenu l’attention. Certains ont vu dans cette norme un simple substitut de principes plus classiques (tels les principes de la liberté du travail, de la liberté du commerce et de l’industrie ou de la liberté d’entreprendre), tandis que d’autres ont cru trouver le véritable fondement de ces arrêts novateurs dans l’article 1131 du Code civil requérant que toute obligation ait une cause. La consécration et la sollicitation de ce principe de libre exercice d’une activité professionnelle constituent pourtant un apport majeur de ces décisions et d’une série significative d’arrêts postérieurs. Par référence à cette norme – et sans précision de son assise textuelle – la Cour de cassation a construit le régime des clauses de non-concurrence en droit du travail et conduit une véritable politique jurisprudentielle en la matière. Cette norme a en outre fondé la mise en question de la validité d’autres clauses et d’autres pratiques. Sa promotion en fait un élément singulier du droit positif, capable d’enrichir divers débats et de régir nombre de situations juridiques, au-delà des rapports de travail salarié. Son avènement et ses conquêtes participent aussi de phénomènes plus amples affectant l’ordre juridique français, notamment sa constitutionnalisation. Son actualité comme ses potentialités commandaient de consacrer enfin une étude à cet authentique « principe », de l’identifier précisément et de prendre la mesure de sa portée. / From the well-known court rulings pronounced by the Social Chamber of the Court of cassation on July 10th 2002, the most notorious is the reversal of jurisprudence about non-competition clauses inserted into an employment contract: to be valid, these stipulations now have to satisfy several cumulative conditions, among others the payment, to the employee, of a financial compensation. But the visa – never seen before – of the “fundamental principle of free exercise of a professional activity” didn’t get as much attention. For some people, this norm was just a substitute of more classical principles (as the principles of freedom of work, of freedom of trade and industry, or of freedom of enterprise), while others found the real foundation of these rulings in article 1131 of the Civil Code, that requires that any obligation has a cause. However, this principle of free exercise of a professional activity recognized in these decisions and used in a series of subsequent court rulings is a major contribution.Through this norm – without detailing its textual foundation – the Court of cassation built the non-competition clauses’ rules in labour law and drove a real case law policy. Furthermore, thanks to this norm, the validity of other clauses and other practices was questioned. The promotion of this norm makes it a singular element of positive law, able to improve many discussions and to govern many legal cases, beyond salaried work relationships. Also, its advent and conquests pertain to largest phenomena which affect the French legal order, for example its constitutionalization. Its topicality as well as its potentialities required to devote a study to this authentic “principle”, in order to identify it accurately and to evaluate its impact.

O presente estudo tem por objeto a qualidade ambiental como requisito para uma vida pautada em um dos fundamentos da Constituição, qual seja: a dignidade da pessoa humana. Necessário se faz, pois, adentrar algumas especificidades do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, sobretudo no que concerne ao seu tratamento pela Carta Republicana de 1988, bem como defender a proteção ambiental como direito humano fundamental. No contexto de uma sociedade globalizada em que a crescente preocupação com o desenvolvimento econômico se dá em detrimento da conservação do patrimônio ambiental, é imperioso que sejam adotadas políticas públicas garantidoras do tão apregoado direito fundamental ao meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado. O trabalho tem por escopo expor sucintamente os aspectos da fundamentalidade do direito ao ambiente sob o viés jurídico-constitucional, no intuito de que sejam instigados alguns questionamentos de ordem axiológica que gravitam em torno do tema, à luz do que preceitua a Constituição de 1988. / Submitted by Marcelo Teixeira (mvteixeira@ucs.br) on 2014-06-03T16:14:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Sergio Carvalho Trindade.pdf: 511995 bytes, checksum: 92948e049782a28753843aad55e8c8b8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-03T16:14:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Sergio Carvalho Trindade.pdf: 511995 bytes, checksum: 92948e049782a28753843aad55e8c8b8 (MD5) / The present study has as purpose the environmental quality within itself as a requirement for a life grounded in one of the foundations of the Constitution, that is: the dignity of the human person. Therefore it is necessary to enter into some specificities of the dignity of the human person principle specially concerning its treatment by the Republican Letter of 1988 as well as defending the environmental protection as a fundamental human right. In the context of a globalized society in which the increasing concern with economic development occurs at the expense of conserving the environmental heritage, it is imperative that public policies are adopted in order to guarantee the so proclaimed fundamental right to an ecologically balanced environment. The work has as scope to briefly expose the fundamentality aspects of the right to the environment under the legal constitutional bias with the intent of instigating some axiological order questionings which gravitate towards the theme, in the light of what the Constitution of 1988.

O presente estudo tem por objeto a qualidade ambiental como requisito para uma vida pautada em um dos fundamentos da Constituição, qual seja: a dignidade da pessoa humana. Necessário se faz, pois, adentrar algumas especificidades do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, sobretudo no que concerne ao seu tratamento pela Carta Republicana de 1988, bem como defender a proteção ambiental como direito humano fundamental. No contexto de uma sociedade globalizada em que a crescente preocupação com o desenvolvimento econômico se dá em detrimento da conservação do patrimônio ambiental, é imperioso que sejam adotadas políticas públicas garantidoras do tão apregoado direito fundamental ao meio ambiente ecologicamente equilibrado. O trabalho tem por escopo expor sucintamente os aspectos da fundamentalidade do direito ao ambiente sob o viés jurídico-constitucional, no intuito de que sejam instigados alguns questionamentos de ordem axiológica que gravitam em torno do tema, à luz do que preceitua a Constituição de 1988. / The present study has as purpose the environmental quality within itself as a requirement for a life grounded in one of the foundations of the Constitution, that is: the dignity of the human person. Therefore it is necessary to enter into some specificities of the dignity of the human person principle specially concerning its treatment by the Republican Letter of 1988 as well as defending the environmental protection as a fundamental human right. In the context of a globalized society in which the increasing concern with economic development occurs at the expense of conserving the environmental heritage, it is imperative that public policies are adopted in order to guarantee the so proclaimed fundamental right to an ecologically balanced environment. The work has as scope to briefly expose the fundamentality aspects of the right to the environment under the legal constitutional bias with the intent of instigating some axiological order questionings which gravitate towards the theme, in the light of what the Constitution of 1988.