As a classical liberal, or libertarian, I am concerned to advance liberty and minimize coercion. Indeed on this view liberty just is the absence of coercion or costs imposed on others. In order to better understand the notion of coercion I discuss Robert Nozick's classic essay on the subject as well as more recent contributions. I then address the question of whether law is coercive, and respond to Edmundson and others who think that it isn't. Assuming that the law is in fact coercive, there is still a question,as with all coercive acts, as to whether that coercion is justified. Edmundson thinks that this places a special burden on the state of justifying its existence, whereas it simply places the same burden on the state as anyone else. What I reject is the longstanding doctrine of Staatsrason, namely that the state is not subject to the same moral rules as its subjects. With respect to the relation of morality to law, Edmundson thought that another of the fallacies of which philosophical anarchists were guilty was that of assuming that there was a sphere of morality where law had no business. On the contrary, our concern is with spheres of law which appear to have little to do with morality, which is to say laws against wrongs of the malum prohibitum variety, as opposed to wrongs which are malum in se. I then turn to a matter with which Edmundson begins his study, namely how it is that states acquire the authority to do what they do, namely coerce their subjects. While the fact that the philosopher's stone of political obligation has proved rather elusive may mean that a legitimate state lacks the authority to demand obedience pure and simple, Edmundson contends that it can at the very least demand that we do not interfere in the administration of justice. I argue that this attempt to sidestep the justification of the authority of the state fails and that we seem in the end to be having to take the state's word for it that we must do X on pain of penalty P. Nor, as I go on to argue, is it any help to appeal to democracy to remedy a failed justification of the authority of the state. There either is a moral justification of state coercion in order to prevent harm to innocent subjects, or there isn't, and this holds,if it does, not only at the level of individuals, but also at the level of the state, regardless of its constitutional form. After concluding that the attempts of Edmundson and others to refute the anarchic turn in recent political philosophy have failed, it would seem that the withering away of the state foreseen in Marx's eschatology is not as improbable as maybe it once appeared.

As a classical liberal, or libertarian, I am concerned to advance liberty and minimize coercion. Indeed on this view liberty just is the absence of coercion or costs imposed on others. In order to better understand the notion of coercion I discuss Robert Nozick's classic essay on the subject as well as more recent contributions. I then address the question of whether law is coercive, and respond to Edmundson and others who think that it isn't. Assuming that the law is in fact coercive, there is still a question,as with all coercive acts, as to whether that coercion is justified. Edmundson thinks that this places a special burden on the state of justifying its existence, whereas it simply places the same burden on the state as anyone else. What I reject is the longstanding doctrine of Staatsrason, namely that the state is not subject to the same moral rules as its subjects. With respect to the relation of morality to law, Edmundson thought that another of the fallacies of which philosophical anarchists were guilty was that of assuming that there was a sphere of morality where law had no business. On the contrary, our concern is with spheres of law which appear to have little to do with morality, which is to say laws against wrongs of the malum prohibitum variety, as opposed to wrongs which are malum in se. I then turn to a matter with which Edmundson begins his study, namely how it is that states acquire the authority to do what they do, namely coerce their subjects. While the fact that the philosopher's stone of political obligation has proved rather elusive may mean that a legitimate state lacks the authority to demand obedience pure and simple, Edmundson contends that it can at the very least demand that we do not interfere in the administration of justice. I argue that this attempt to sidestep the justification of the authority of the state fails and that we seem in the end to be having to take the state's word for it that we must do X on pain of penalty P. Nor, as I go on to argue, is it any help to appeal to democracy to remedy a failed justification of the authority of the state. There either is a moral justification of state coercion in order to prevent harm to innocent subjects, or there isn't, and this holds,if it does, not only at the level of individuals, but also at the level of the state, regardless of its constitutional form. After concluding that the attempts of Edmundson and others to refute the anarchic turn in recent political philosophy have failed, it would seem that the withering away of the state foreseen in Marx's eschatology is not as improbable as maybe it once appeared.

The thesis challenges the established "myth of easy legitimacy" and argues for more cautious attitude toward involuntary social arrangements by shifting the burden of proof in favour of the rigorous individual rights. Any State action shall be held for impermissible unless it is shown to be unavoidable - beyond reasonable doubts. With the assumption of existence of individual rights as a starting point, the thesis inquires into the attempts to derive State's legitimacy from individual rights. Finding this task virtually impossible, it comes to the conclusion that the only way how to legitimize the State is to compromise the individual rights somehow. Yet, to maintain some meaning of the rights, this compromise need to be restricted in scope, so the thesis analyses further the meaningfulness of "necessary and proper" provisos and the notion of "ideology" as a factor driving collective action and as the ultimate check of the State's power.

In this paper we characterize the "price of anarchy", i.e., the inefficiency between user and system optimal solutions, when costs are non-separable, asymmetric and nonlinear, generalizing earlier work that has addressed "price of anarchy" under separable costs. The generalization models traffice equilibria, competitive multi-period pricing and competitive supply chains. The bounds established in the paper are tight and explicitly account for the degeee of asymmetry and nonlinearity of the cost function. We introduce and alternate proof method for providing bounds that uses ideas from semidenfinite optimization. Finally, in the context of nulti-period pricing our analysis establishes that user and system optimal soulutions coincide.

Realist international relations theory is the most influential theoretical approach in the discipline of international relations. Within the realist paradigm there are several realist approaches. Various approaches, including classical realism, neorealism, offensive realism, neo-classical realism, and game theory, are part of the realist paradigm but some make different theoretically relevant assumptions, notably about international politics, international actors and actors' motivations. The first part of this thesis seeks to demonstrate how, despite their other differences, a fundamental assumption that anarchy determines the nature of international politics is characteristic of realist theorists as notable and different as classical realists Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Edward Hallett Carr and Hans Morgenthau, structural realist Kenneth Waltz, offensive realist John Mearsheimer, realist game theory analysis of international relations, and neoclassical realists Victor Cha, Thomas Christenson and Gideon Rose. This demonstration establishes the basis for proceeding to a critique of realists' fundamental anarchy assumption. The second part of this thesis presents an argument that realists' fundamental assumption that anarchy determines the nature of international politics has been responsible for theoretical shortcomings of realist analyses, and argues that a complexity basis for international relations theory would offer theoretical and analytical advantages. The cost of the assumption of anarchy for realist analyses is demonstrated in a critique of realist accounts of the outbreak of World War I, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and regional political integration in Europe. These major international developments should be readily addressed by the realist or any other paradigm of international relations theory. In all three cases, the factors involved leave realists struggling to re-visit their assumptions about international politics in order to explain what occurred. While such re-assessments have included a variety of efforts to broaden or redefine the factors considered, the role and implications of anarchy as a foundational assumption of realist theorising has rarely been questioned, and it remains a central realist premise. Complexity theory is being embraced in a variety of fields of social inquiry, including politics and international relations. This thesis proposes that the complexity of international politics is something that needs to be embraced and not sidelined. This is the case whether the international politics in question was in ancient times or the twenty-first century. The complexity of international politics, not anarchy, needs to be operationalised as the foundational assumption of international relations theory, in order to build international relations theorising on a more appropriate basis that can be applied more fruitfully in the descriptions and explanations of empirical international relations analyses. / Thesis (PhD)--University of South Australia, 2009

Women's fight for the franchise in both America and England in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was accompanied by scrutiny of women's relationship to the State by those with varying perspectives on the suffrage battle. In the industrial, post-agricultural age, motherhood defined a woman's place in western society, as well as her rights under and service to the State; if the normative role of the male citizen was the soldier, the normative role for women was the mother. Yet for all of the ways an embrace of maternalism limited women's access to the public realm, it also laid the groundwork for the women's movement, and motherhood was often seen as a route to citizenship by those on both sides of the suffrage battle. As women began to re-imagine themselves as enfranchised citizens, many social theorists, politicians, and novelists continued to debate the rights and roles of women across the body of the mother; thinkers as varied as Theodore Roosevelt, H. G. Wells, and Emma Goldman all wrote tracts about motherhood and the future of the nation. Rather than entering the old debates on the value or liability of maternalism for feminism, my dissertation will argue that the modernist period introduced a new and still-overlooked figure: the anarchic mother. In their essays and novels, Goldman, Rebecca West, John Galsworthy, and Virginia Woolf turned away from the emblem of the Republican Mother and toward a radical new figure. Rather than sacrificing her individual needs to the Republic, the anarchic mother's individual pursuit of liberty challenged the authority of the State and its cultural institutions. An important group of modernist novels and essays employs the figure of the mother to represent not tradition and unity but rebellion, separatism, abstention, or statelessness. This undertheorized figure in modernist and feminist thought clarifies Virginia Woolf's call, in Three Guineas, for allegiance to no country. If Woolf and many other artists were ambivalent as they linked motherhood and anarchy, contemporary feminists inherited both the possibilities and contradictions of the anarchic mother as they reexamine women's relationship to citizenship in the 21st century.

The concept of brand equity emerged inthe eightiesto justify the long term value of marketing investments. Brand equity signify the value that a brand adds to a product and is the result of the marketing of a brand. One of the most widely used strategies to enhance brand equity is to do a brand extension, which means that a firm uses an established brand to introduce a new product to the market. At worst, a failed brand extension can damage the brand equity, which Vinjamuri (2008) claims that the brand Axe is currently in danger of doing. This January Axe launched an extention including products for both men and women for the first time and Vinjamuri claims that this can disappoint Axe´s former target group (men between 14 and 27 years old) (Newman, 2012).  In this thesis Axe´s brand equity among the extensions target group (men and women, age 14 to 27) in Sweden is studied to find out if the brand extension is likely to affect the brand equity in the target group. The research, that is mainly based on theory by Keller et al. (2008), is made through a comperative study of two groups, where one group is given information about the brand extension. The results of the research indicate that Axe's brand equity is neutral or negative among the target group and that the brand extension has no noticable impact on Axe´s brand equity. / Under 80-talet uppkom konceptet varumärkesvärde för att motivera det långsiktiga värdet av marknadsföringsinvesteringar. Varumärkesvärdet betecknar det mervärde varumärket tillför en produkt och är ett resultat av marknadsföring av varumärket. En av de mest använda strategierna för att stärka varumärkesvärdet är att genomföra varumärkesutvidgningar, vilket innebär att ett befintligt varumärke används för ett nytt marknadserbjudande. Om en varumärkesutvidgning misslyckas kan den i värsta fall skada varumärkesvärdet, något som Vinjamuri (2008) menar att varumärket Axe riskerar att göra i dagsläget. I januari i år lanserade Axe för första gången en varumärkesutvidgning som innehåller produkter för både kvinnor och män, vilket enligt Vinjamuri kan göra Axe:s tidigare målgrupp (män i åldern 14-27) besvikna (Newman, 2012). I denna uppsats undersöks Axe:s varumärkesvärde hos målgruppen (kvinnor och män i åldern 14-27 år) för utvidgningen i Sverige för att ta reda på om varumärkesutvidgningen kan tänkas påverka varumärkesvärdet hos målgruppen. Undersökningen som huvudsakligen utformats enligt teori ur Keller et al. (2008) görs genom en jämförande studie av två grupper varav den ena gruppen får information om varumärkesutvidningen. Undersökningens resultat tyder på att Axe:s varumärkevärde är neutralt eller negativt hos målgruppen och att Axe Anarchy inte har någon märkbar påverkan på varumärkesvärdet. / Linn Gustafsson, Emma Engqvist

The aim of this research is to establish the bond between Friedrich Nietzsche and the anarchists, through the apparatus of elective affinity , and to challenge the boundaries of several anarchist trends especially 'classical' and 'post' anarchism and 'ideologies' like anarchism and libertarian Marxism. Moreover, it highlights the importance of reading Nietzsche politically, in a radical way, to understand his utility for the contemporary anarchist movement. The review of the literature concerning the Nietzsche-anarchy relationship shows the hitherto limited bibliography and stresses the possibility of exploring this connection, with the methodological help of Michael Löwy s concept of elective affinity . The research opens with a discussion of anarchism, following the dominant model for categorizing anarchist traditions, presenting its basic features and currents and drawing on its historical development. This leads to the introduction of two points (the questioning of the anarchist canon and the exposure of the diversity that basic anarchist concepts bear among different anarchist currents) which contest the rigid ideological perception of anarchism in favour of a fluid and dynamic anarchy. There emerges the elective affinity with Nietzsche, serving a double goal: the unification of the distinct anarchist tendencies and the definition of the anarchist parameters in relation to other ideologies. The following section of the thesis examines Nietzsche, by presenting the evolution of his philosophical thought and the fundamental theses of his perception of politics. It, then, continues with a detailed analysis of the main concepts of his philosophy based on the interpretation made by Gilles Deleuze, Alexander Nehamas and Keith Ansell-Pearson, thus structuring its interpretative context for establishing the Nietzsche-anarchy connection. This establishment is realized in a dual way. Firstly, by exploring the elective affinity through the presence of Nietzsche in the thought and politics of anarchist/libertarian thinkers (Goldman, Landauer, Benjamin) and currents (post-anarchism), and secondly by recognizing the anarchist worldview in the Nietzschean philosophy. The first path (Nietzsche in anarchism) shows how Nietzsche has interacted with or has been absorbed by the anarchist way of thinking, whereas the second path (anarchism in Nietzsche) reveals the affinal worldview of the two parts by extensively using the interpretation context mentioned above. The final section of the thesis applies the whole analysis above on a Nietzschean reading of the December 08 revolt in Athens based on the Of the Three Metamorphoses discourse from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. What has been found is the existence of a clear bond, between Nietzsche and the anarchists, which even reaches the upper levels of Löwy s elective affinity , that is Nietzschean Anarchism as a result of the two parts interactive fusion. The significance of this finding is that the relevant affinity may contribute to an alternative, to the dominant, perception of anarchism as an ideology. It may also designate its special features together with its weaknesses, meaning the objections of Nietzsche to certain aspects of the anarchist practices and worldview (violence, resentment, bad conscience), thus opening a whole new road of self-criticism for the anarchists of the twenty first century. In addition, the location and analysis of the elective affinity serves the debunking of the Nietzschean concepts used by conservative and right-wing readings in order to appropriate Nietzsche, and of the accusations that the German philosopher had unleashed against anarchists, which reveals his misunderstanding of anarchist politics.

Denna studie ämnar att bidra till förståelse kring gestaltningen av maskulinitet, detta genom en analys av samtida medierepresentationer av män. Syftet med studien är att se hur maskulinitet gestaltas i tv-serien Sons of Anarchy. För att uppnå detta har de teoretiska begreppen hegemonisk maskulinitet och manlig homosocialitet operationaliserats i en tematisk analys av tre utvalda avsnitt av serien. Valet av den tematiska analysen har delvis motiverats i att denna typ av metod kan användas i koppling till olika teoretiska ramverk. Ansatsen som drivits i analysen har varit semideduktiv då de två huvudteman som lyfts ur materialet är grundade på de teoretiska frågeställningar/begrepp som studien följer . Här syns en deduktiv ansats i koppling till den hegemoniska maskuliniteten medan det inom framförallt homosocialiteten därefter gått mot en mer induktiv ansats för att lyfta underteman. I serien Sons of Anarchy går det att urskilja olika gestaltningar av män och relationer som finns mellan olika manliga grupper. Strukturer och beteenden som kan ses som normbildande underbygger den hegemoniska maskuliniteten som i sin tur utgör ramen inom vilken den manliga homosocialiteten tar sig uttryck. Motorcykelklubben SAMCRO ses i materialet som den normerande grupp vilken representerar den hegemoniska maskuliniteten. Genom att använda de två teoretiska huvudbegreppen som studien grundats på blir det tydligt att det i materialet går att finna exempel som inom maskulinitetsstudier inte fått särskilt stort utrymme. Detta då fokus tidigare främst legat vid exempelvis patriarkala strukturer och homofobi och inte intimitet och de känslouttryck som faktiskt uttrycks mellan de manliga karaktärerna i Sons of Anarchy. Resultatet visar även att kvinnor, samt män av annan etnicitet än vit, inte uttrycks som underordnade i materialet. En av de främsta slutsatserna av studien kretsar kring behovet av en tydligare definition av begreppet hegemonisk maskulinitet.

L’action directe apparut dès 1870, sous la plume de Bakounine. Celui-ci la comparait aux« prodiges de 1793 ». En 1870-1871, l’action directe fut clairement associée à la terreur et directement mise en application durant la Commune de Paris. Les anarchistes de la Fédération Jurassienne, fortement inspirés par Bakounine, donnèrent naissance à la propagande par le fait en 1877. Même si la définition que donnait Brousse était assez large, puisque qu’allant de l’insurrection armée, à la manifestation violente. Ce n’est qu’a partir des années 1890, que la propagande par le fait fut associée presque exclusivement aux attentats terroristes. Cependant, il est possible de considérer que la propagande par le fait ne s’arrêtât pas en 1894, avec la fin des attentats, mais au contraire se prolongeât sous une autre forme. Par la suite, l’action directe se poursuivit dans des moyens comme la désobéissance civile, la résistance passive ou encore la non-violence. / The direct action appeared from 1870, under the feather of Bakounine. Bakounine compared it with the “miracles of 1793”. In 1870-1871, the direct action was clearly associated with the terror and directly applied during the Commune of Paris. The anarchists of the Jurassian Federation, strongly inspired by Bakounine, gived birth to the propaganda by the fact in 1877. The anarchists of the Jurassian Federation had been strongly inspired by Bakounine. Even if the definition which gived Brousse was rather wide, because it goes of the armed uprising, in the violent demonstration. It is because has to leave 1890’s, that the propaganda by the fact was almost exclusively associated with terrorist attacks. However, the propaganda by the fact would not stop in 1894, with the end of attacks, but on the contrary would gon on under another shape. Besides the direct action continues in way as civil disobedience, passive resistance or still non-violence.