This study aims to explain the Stuxnet-attack against Iran in 2009-2010 by using the IR-theory of structural realism. By doing so the theory also faces the challenge of the impact of the information revolution on security and international relations. The structural realism that is at hand is that of Kenneth Waltz and his Theory of International Politics from 1979.The study reaches the conclusion that Waltzs focus on the structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities applies well to the case of Stuxnet as a cyber attack. The creators of the sophisticated Stuxnet, USA and Israel, also indicates that when it comes to this certain aspect of the information revolution and IR, states seem to still be the main actor. Finally the character of one of the major features of the Stuxnet-attack; the internet, is shown to have an anarchic structure that fits well as an extension of the realist view of the international system.

In the wake of the cyber-attacks in 2007 against Estonia and in 2010 against Iran, academics have debated the character of cyberwar. This study applies the theories of coercive diplomacy to the cases of Estonia and Iran in order to explain cyber-attacks as instrument for coercive diplomacy. While the long term effects of the attacks have yet to be understood it is clear that cyber-attacks can, and will, become a serious threat against political decision-makers in times of conflict.

In the last three decades, states and societies have increasingly been connected to each other through Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as satellites and the Internet, thus expanding the sphere of influence of cyberspace. While offering numerous economic and security benefits, this increased global connectivity also poses various security challenges and threats at the national and international level. In particular, the threat of cyberwar has become one of the top national security issues in both the United States and China, as reflected in an increasing number of cyber disputes between the two nations recently. In the wake of this emerging threat, scholars have turned to the classical deterrence strategies of Cold War to counter these new challenges, inspiring the development of cyber deterrence theory. However, numerous pundits in the cyber deterrence literature doubt the efficacy of cyber deterrence in hindering cyberwar. What theory or approach can offer the best explanatory framework for understanding the efficacy of cyber deterrence in forestalling cyberwar, specifically between the U.S. and China, is a question that remains unanswered. This study explores the effectiveness of cyber deterrence outside the bounds of classical deterrence and technological vulnerabilities in cyber systems and networks, and, then, offers Power Transition Theory (PTT) as an alternative approach to understanding whether cyber deterrence in the context of cyberwar between the rival antagonists can be successful. It answers the question of how PTT can allow us to better understand the effectiveness of cyber deterrence in preventing cyberwar between the United States and China. A cyber application of PTT argues that cyber deterrence is largely an ineffective approach to preventing potential cyberwar between the U.S. and China, particularly if the latter achieves parity in offensive cyberwar capability with the former while concurrently remaining dissatisfied with the status quo in cyberspace.

Genom mänsklighetens historia har krigsvetenskapliga teorier funnits för att förklara framgångarna med krig och krigföring. För att anpassas till de tekniska och taktiska framstegen som t.ex. skjutvapen, flygplan och kärnvapen har inneburit har dessa teorier löpande uppdaterats. En teori som funnits under lång tid är teorin om vilseledning. Denna studie gör en fallstudie på den strategiska operationen med trojanen Stuxnet som användes för att angripa Irans kärnanrikningsprogram 2007–2010. Då den tekniska utvecklingen, där mer och mer blivit digitalt och där kriget nu även inbegriper cyber, har teoriernas applicerbarhet återigen möjligen påverkats. Studien undersöker om teorier om vilseledning kan förklara framgången med operationen. Studien använder fyra författare i tre konstellationer som beskrivit vilseledning ur perspektiven (1) vilseledningens delar och (2) vilseledningens krav. Dessa teorier har jämkats till en teori och har sedan använts som utgångspunkt i en teoriprövande fallstudie varvid dessa prövats på fallet Stuxnet. Eftersom vilseledningsteorierna ursprungligen anpassats för en tid innan kriget blivit digitalt är studiens fall ett s.k. least likely case och kan, om teorin kan förklara framgången med Stuxnet, styrka teorins applicerbarhet i den nya kontexten som cyberkrigföringen innebär. Sammantaget visar studiens resultat att framgången med Stuxnet kan förklaras med såväl vilseledningens delar som dess krav. Därtill kan de identifierade misstagen med Stuxnet, både på operativ och teknisk nivå, förklaras med brister i vilseledningens krav. Detta gör att studiens teori kan förklara framgången i en militär operation i cyberdomänen. Därmed konstaterar studien att prövade teorier om vilseledning fortsatt är giltiga. Studien föreslår även hur studiens slutsats kan användas i ett defensivt syfte.

Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake’s book, Cyber war, claims to identify a new threat and vulnerability in the United States. By examining the points they make and evaluating them in the context of the first cyber attack, STUXNET, we shall conclude that the technical argument is correct; however the overall argument is incomplete. What they fail to emphasize is the amount of human intelligence involved in committing a successful cyber attack, and the extent to which having intelligence operations greatly enhances a state's cyber capabilities. / text

John A. Warden III is renowned as one of the theorists closest to devising a new paradigm in air power. His praised theory about the enemy as a system has showed applicable on terrorist organizations amongst other areas. The most recent developed domain for warfare is the so-called “cyberspace”. There is an on-going debate concerning the importance and definition of this domain and furthermore what potential and challenges it withholds as a future arena for warfare. Some claims that a cyberattack can’t be seen as an act of war due to its lack of physical violence. Previous research show however a lack in application of theories within this domain. This thesis therefore aims to examine to which extent Warden’s theory of the enemy as a system could be applied to the cyberattack known as Stuxnet. Results show that Warden’s theory have some applicatory power on the cyberattack Stuxnet, although primarily in an indirect aspect. This study therefore shows an ability concerning the theory’s applicatory power on other areas than air power. The findings of the research regarding previous arguments about cyberwar also states that a cyberattack now could be seen as physical violent. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning </strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>

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