In the wake of the cyber-attacks in 2007 against Estonia and in 2010 against Iran, academics have debated the character of cyberwar. This study applies the theories of coercive diplomacy to the cases of Estonia and Iran in order to explain cyber-attacks as instrument for coercive diplomacy. While the long term effects of the attacks have yet to be understood it is clear that cyber-attacks can, and will, become a serious threat against political decision-makers in times of conflict.

In the last three decades, states and societies have increasingly been connected to each other through Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as satellites and the Internet, thus expanding the sphere of influence of cyberspace. While offering numerous economic and security benefits, this increased global connectivity also poses various security challenges and threats at the national and international level. In particular, the threat of cyberwar has become one of the top national security issues in both the United States and China, as reflected in an increasing number of cyber disputes between the two nations recently. In the wake of this emerging threat, scholars have turned to the classical deterrence strategies of Cold War to counter these new challenges, inspiring the development of cyber deterrence theory. However, numerous pundits in the cyber deterrence literature doubt the efficacy of cyber deterrence in hindering cyberwar. What theory or approach can offer the best explanatory framework for understanding the efficacy of cyber deterrence in forestalling cyberwar, specifically between the U.S. and China, is a question that remains unanswered. This study explores the effectiveness of cyber deterrence outside the bounds of classical deterrence and technological vulnerabilities in cyber systems and networks, and, then, offers Power Transition Theory (PTT) as an alternative approach to understanding whether cyber deterrence in the context of cyberwar between the rival antagonists can be successful. It answers the question of how PTT can allow us to better understand the effectiveness of cyber deterrence in preventing cyberwar between the United States and China. A cyber application of PTT argues that cyber deterrence is largely an ineffective approach to preventing potential cyberwar between the U.S. and China, particularly if the latter achieves parity in offensive cyberwar capability with the former while concurrently remaining dissatisfied with the status quo in cyberspace.

This master thesis entitled Cybersecurity deals with cybersecuriy issue. The theoretical part defines basic concepts related to cybersecurity and cyber threats classification. The practical part deals with a case study regarding disputes between China and the US in cyberspace. The goal will be to test a hypothesis that China and the United States are at cyberwar with each other.

Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake’s book, Cyber war, claims to identify a new threat and vulnerability in the United States. By examining the points they make and evaluating them in the context of the first cyber attack, STUXNET, we shall conclude that the technical argument is correct; however the overall argument is incomplete. What they fail to emphasize is the amount of human intelligence involved in committing a successful cyber attack, and the extent to which having intelligence operations greatly enhances a state's cyber capabilities. / text

New methods of conflict and coercion can prompt tectonic shifts in the international system, reconfiguring power, institutions, and norms of state behavior. Cyberattacks, coercive acts that disrupt or destroy the digital infrastructure on which states increasingly rely, have the potential to be such a tool — but only if put into practice. This study examines which forces in the international system might restrain state use of cyberattacks, even when they are militarily advantageous. To do so I place this novel technology in the context of existing international regimes, employing an analogical approach that identifies the salient aspects of cyberattacks, and compares them to prior weapons and tactics that share those attributes. Specifically, this study considers three possible restraints on state behavior: rationalist deterrence, the jus ad bellum regime governing the resort to force, and incompatibility with the jus in bello canon of law defining just conduct in war. First, I demonstrate that cyberattacks frustrate conventional deterrence models, and invite, instead, a novel form of proto-competition I call ‘structural deterrence.’ Recognizing that states have not yet grounded their sweeping claims about the acceptability of cyberattacks in any formal analysis, I consider evidence from other prohibited uses of force or types of weaponry to defining whether cyberattacks are ‘legal’ in peacetime or ‘usable’ in wartime. Whereas previous studies of cyberattacks have focused primarily on policy guidance for a single state or limited analysis of the letter of international law, this study explicitly relates international law to state decision-making and precedent. It draws together previously disparate literature across strategic studies, international law, and diplomatic history to offer conclusions applicable beyond any single technology, and of increasing importance as states’ dependence on technology grows.

Il semble aujourd'hui possible de considérer que le numérique et le cyberespace ont complètement changé les rapports de force dans notre société moderne. En se numérisant, la société permet à ses membres un accès quasi illimité et instantané à des millions de ressources et données. Par ailleurs, il facilite largement les relations personnelles et professionnelles entre les individus. Si le numérique peut être présenté comme une véritable révolution, celui-ci expose son utilisateur à de nouvelles vulnérabilités, à de nouveaux risques. Le droit pénal, en ce qu'il régit la société et choisit les valeurs sociales à protéger, s'est donc intéressé au développement du numérique et à ses conséquences. La présente étude constate un arsenal législatif étendu pour lutter le plus efficacement possible contre la délinquance numérique. Néanmoins, l'analyse observe qu'il existe de nombreux obstacles à l'application du droit pénal au cyberespace en raison des particularités liées aux réseaux. La délinquance numérique n'est, en outre, pas la seule menace générée par le numérique, puisque désormais, il est possible de parler du cyberespace comme d'un nouvel espace de confrontation. Ainsi, à la délinquance numérique s'ajoute la menace militaire puisque les États investissent les réseaux par la mise en place d'armes numériques. Il s'agit alors de s'interroger sur la pertinence de ces choix étatiques et sur les solutions permettant d'accentuer la lutte contre la délinquance numérique. / Today, it seems possible to consider that digital technology and cyberspace have completely changed the balance of power in our modern society. By digitizing, the society gives its members almost unlimited access to millions of resources and data. Digital technology also facilitates personal and professional relationships between individuals. If digital technology can be presented as a real revolution, it exposes its user to new vulnerabilities and risks. The criminal law, insofar as it governs society and chooses the social values to be protected, has therefore been concerned with the development of digital technology. The present study notes the extensive legislative arsenal for fighting in the most effective manner against digital delinquency. Nevertheless, the analysis observes that many obstacles are against the application of criminal law into the cyberspace because of networks particularities. Moreover, digital crime is not the only threat generated by digital technology, since it is now possible to consider the cyberspace as a new space for confrontation. Thus, military threat is added to digital delinquency as the States set up electronics weapons into networks. Then, the arised question is about the relevance of these state choices and the solutions to intensify the fight against digital delinquency.

No description available.

網路恐怖主義（Cyberterrorism）為「網際網路」（Internet）與「恐怖主義」（terrorism）相互結合之產物，指恐怖份子為求引發嚴重破壞，並造成平民死傷，透過網際網路入侵國家關鍵基礎設施（critical infrastructures），並以之要脅政府或人民完成其政治性、宗教性或社會性目標。至2012年7月為止，對於網路恐怖主義相關議題之討論雖已持續約30年之久，然而各界對於網路恐怖主義之「定義」及「威脅性」兩項基本問題，仍然眾說紛紜，無法取得一致共識，而全球各地缺乏網路恐怖攻擊之實際案例之情況，亦使爭辯益加激烈。 　　在美國政府方面，經過2001年911事件的重大衝擊，其對於恐怖主義相關議題之敏感程度已大幅提高，並陸續制定多項反恐政策。美國是當前國際反恐行動的領導者，既為軍事與科技大國，同時也是諸多國際恐怖組織策劃攻擊之主要目標，有鑑於此，美國政府致力於防治網路恐怖主義，保護國內關鍵基礎設施不受侵襲，以維持社會安定及國家安全，其因應方式足以成為世界各國制定類似政策之重要參考對象。 　　本論文經由探討網路恐怖主義之基本意涵，比較「網路恐怖主義」、「網路犯罪」及「網路戰爭」三個概念之間的差異，嘗試針對網路恐怖主義形成明確之界定；接著綜整各界針對網路恐怖主義威脅性之爭論，以了解網路恐怖主義之真實威脅程度；最後觀察美國自柯林頓（Clinton）政府至今，有關防治網路恐怖主義政策之一系列發展、美國政府如何評估網路恐怖主義之威脅，以及在當前的政策架構之下，為保護國內關鍵基礎設施，其相對應之具體措施為何，試圖對於其整體政策建立客觀評價。 / Cyberterrorism, the convergence of “Internet” and “terrorism,” refers to the specific terrorist activities that were intended to cause massive destruction and casualties, proceeded by intruding the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems of national critical infrastructures via the Internet. Even though the discussion of the related issues of Cyberterrorism has continued for nearly 30 years now, neither the definition nor the evaluation of potential threat concerning Cyberterrorism has been settled. No consensus has been achieved. Furthermore, the lack of actual cases of Cyberterrorism attack around the world makes the debates even more intense. After the significant impact of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has substantially raised the degree of sensitivity of the issues related to terrorism and developed a number of counter-terrorism policies. As the leader of the Global War on Terror and the greatest Power in the world, the U.S. is also the main target of many terrorist groups. With its military and scientific capabilities, the practices of the U.S. government on preventing Cyberterrorism, protecting its domestic critical infrastructures from intrusion, and maintaining social stability and national security would be excellent examples to other nations for the development of their own policies. To clarify the explicit definition of Cyberterrorism, this research refined the basic meaning of Cyberterrorism and distinguished differences among three related concepts: Cyberterrorism, Cybercrime, and Cyberwar. Moreover, this research sought to induct major arguments brought up by scholars in many intense debates on the extent of Cyberterrorism threat. Last but not least, by observing development of the U.S. related policy frameworks, how the U.S. government evaluates the extent of Cyberterrorism threat, and the corresponding measures for protecting the U.S. domestic critical infrastructures, this research presented an objective assessment on the U.S. overall counter-Cyberterrorism policies.